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Title:

Luminant Generation Company

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant

Units 3 and 4

DOCKETED USNRC

Docket Number:

52-034/035-COL

June 15, 2009 (10:30am)

ASLBP Number:

09-886-09-COL-BD01

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF

Location:

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| 1 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
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| 2 | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| 3 | ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL |
| 4 | ORAL ARGUMENTS |
| 5 | · |
| 6 | IN THE MATTER OF Docket Nos. |
| 7 | LUMINANT GENERATION 52-034-COL |
| 8 | COMPANY, LLC 52-035-COL |
| 9 | (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power ASLBP No. |
| 10 | Plant, Units 3 and 4) 09-886-09-COL-BD01 |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Wednesday, June 10, 2009 |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Jury Selection Room |
| 15 | Hood Country Justice Center |
| 16 | 1200 West Pearl Street |
| 17 | Granbury, Texas |
| 18 | |
| 19 | The above-entitled matter came on for oral |
| 20 | argument at 9:00 a.m. |
| 21 | |
| 22 | BEFORE THE LICENSING BOARD: |
| 23 | ANN MARSHALL YOUNG, Chair |
| 24 | DR. GARY S. ARNOLD, Administrative Judge |
| 25 | DR. ALICE C. MIGNEREY, Administrative Judge |
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| 1 | APPEARANCES: |
|----|--|
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| 11 | TIMOTHY P. MATTHEWS, ESQ. |
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| 18 | On behalf of the Petitioners: |
| 19 | ROBERT V. EYE, ESQ. |
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JUDGE YOUNG: Let's go on the record.

Good morning. My name is Ann Marshall Young.

I'm the chair of this licensing board. I am the lawyer member of the Board, and I'm going to ask

Judge Arnold and Judge Mignerey to introduce themselves and provide their areas of expertise.

JUDGE ARNOLD: My name is Judge Arnold. I am technical judge on this Board. My degrees are in math and nuclear engineering, and I have spent all of my career essentially in the nuclear reactors program, designing for the Navy.

JUDGE YOUNG: Judge Mignerey?

JUDGE MIGNEREY: Yes. I'm Judge Mignerey. I am a part-time technical judge. I am a professor of chemistry at the University of Maryland, and my specialty is nuclear chemistry.

JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. And then let's just start over here at the left with the Applicant's counsel.

MR. FRANTZ: My name is Steve Frantz. I'm counsel for Luminant Generation Company. I'm with the law firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Washington, D.C. On my left is Jon Rund, and on my right is Tim Matthews, also Morgan, Lewis.

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| 1 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Do you want to |
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| 2 | introduce any other people that may be taking any |
| 3 | part or that you may be speaking with, or |
| 4 | MR. FRANTZ: Right now we don't anticipate |
| 5. | having any other speakers. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Very good. |
| 7 | All right. NRC Staff? |
| 8 | MR. BIGGINS: Thank you, Judge. Yes. Good |
| 9 | morning. My name is James Biggins with the NRC |
| 10 | Staff. With me today is Marcia Simon and Susan |
| 11 | Vrahoretis. Also present today are the |
| 12 | environmental project manager, and sitting in, a |
| 13 | replacement for the safety project manager. |
| 14 | JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to provide their |
| 15 | names? |
| 16 | MR. BIGGINS: Certainly. Mike Willingham and |
| 17 | Phil Ward. Also present we have Barry Zalcman. |
| 18 | Thank you. |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: And for the Petitioners? I'm |
| 20 | going to move this phone just a little bit so I can |
| 21 | see you better. |
| 22 | MR. EYE: Good morning, Your Honor. My name |
| 23 | is Robert Eye. I'm the attorney for the |
| 24 | Petitioners. I'm with the firm of Kauffman & Eye, |
| 25 | Topeka, Kansas, and on my left is Eliza Brown, and |

1 Karen Hadden is on camera, and they're both staff 2 members with the SEED Coalition, one of the 3 Petitioners. 4 JUDGE YOUNG: And do you have any other of the 5 Petitioners that you'd like to introduce? 6 MR. EYE: We have Don Young in the audience, 7 representing the firm, and his -- there he is -- is here as well. 8 9 (Pause to reconnect conference call.) 10 JUDGE YOUNG: While she's doing this, this is 11 Sara Cueler, who's helping us from our office, and 12 this is Matthew Rotman, who's our law clerk, and 13 since I'm a little bit technologically challenged, 14 I'm going to keep them here till we make sure this 15 is working. 16 (Pause.) 17 JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Eye, were you finished 18 making your introductions? 19 MR. EYE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right. Also by way 21 of introduction and also to allay any possible 22 confusion, I want to just explain a little bit about 23 who we are and what we do. 24 This Board is part of a panel of legal and 25 technical judges in various areas of expertise. We

are an entity that is independent of the NRC Staff, who's here today as a party. Our job is to act as neutral adjudicators, bound only by the law, including statutes, rules, and controlling case law precedent, which includes courts' decisions and those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself. It is by following the law and deciding cases without fear or favor toward any party, including the NRC Staff or any other party, that we fulfill our duties as Administrative Judges. We are here to hear the arguments of all parties. We have read the pleadings on the issues before us, which today include mainly the admissibility of certain contentions filed by the Petitioners under the requirements of 10 CFR, or Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.309,

subsection (f)(1)(I) through (vi).

We may interrupt the arguments from time to time to ask questions or focus the inquiry on particular points, and we have issued a memorandum to the parties with some specific questions that we will expect the parties to address in their arguments.

Therefore, as a general rule, we don't expect that counsel would merely repeat everything that's

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been written in the written pleadings that have been 1 2 filed with us, other than to provide very brief 3 summaries as appropriate for clarification. 4 We welcome you all to this proceeding. Unless 5 the parties have any other matters that require our 6 immediate attention, we will begin the argument this 7 morning with argument on the Applicant's motion to strike portions of the Petitioners' replies, and 8 9 then move on to argument on the contentions in 10 numerical order. 11 So, Mr. Frantz, do you want to start or 12 identify who's going to make that argument? 13 Thank you, Judge Young. MR. FRANTZ: Yes. 14 JUDGE YOUNG: Yes. Did you have anything 15 else? 16 I'm sorry, Your Honor. Sorry, Mr. MR. EYE: 17 Frantz. I did have a preliminary matter. 18 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. 19 MR. EYE: Your Honor, last week we made an 20 inquiry about access to the Internet, and we were 21 assured that that would be -- that we would have it. 22 Is there something that we need to do, because we've 23 been unsuccessful up to this point about getting it, 24 so perhaps rescue has just appeared, so all I had to 25 do was ask, I guess. So thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE YOUNG: Do we need to take a minute to 1 2 let -- does everyone else that needs that have it? 3 (Pause.) There was a time, Your Honor, when 4 MR. EYE: 5 these kinds of proceedings weren't dependent on these machines, so -- but it's a new age, so we're 6 7 going to take advantage of it. (Pause.) 8 9 MR. EYE: Your Honor, I think we can proceed on the motion if that's all right with that panel. 10 JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Mr. Frantz? 11 12 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you, Judge Young. 13 Initially I'd like to point out that our motion to strike is narrowly focused and conforms 14 15 with NRC precedent. We are not attempting to strike the entire set of the Petitioners' reply. Instead 16 17 we're only looking to strike portions of that reply, 18 namely those portions that seek to expand the scope 19 of the contentions or to add new supporting information for the contentions. 20 As discussed in more detail in our motion to 21 strike in Section 3 of that motion, there are 22 numerous NRC precedents, both at the Commission 23 level and Licensing Board level, that hold that a 24 reply may not be used to expand the scope of a 25

contention or to add new technical support for a contention.

The Petitioners' reply runs afoul of this
longstanding precedent. In particular, Contentions
2 and 8 in the initial petition to intervene pertain
to the content of the environmental report.

However, in the reply, Petitioners for the first
time raise issues related to compliance with 10 CFR
52.79(a)(3) which pertains to the content of the
final safety analysis report, not the environmental
report.

Similarly, Contention 3 in the initial petition pertains to the content of the environmental report, but the reply instead refers to compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh), which is a safety contention or safety regulation and not an environmental regulation. So it's very clear that with respect to these three contentions, they're attempting to expand it from an environmental contention to also include safety issues, which we believe is impermissible under the NRC precedents.

Additionally, with respect to Contentions 2, 8 and 9 in the Petitioners' reply, they raise new references, technical references, to outside web pages. They have new reports attached to their

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reply that were not part of the initial petition, and we believe that these are all impermissible and should be struck under the NRC precedents.

Contrary to the Petitioners' arguments, these additional references to regulations and these additional technical reports are not mere legitimate amplifications. Legitimate amplification would be an additional explanation of their initial contention or perhaps a response to arguments that we raised in our answer or the Staff raised in its answers. Instead, what they're doing is trying to expand the scope to now include safety issues and to provide new technical references to cure the defects in their initial petition.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just interrupt you there, because the real question here is what constitutes legitimate amplification.

MR. FRANTZ: Yes.

JUDGE YOUNG: And so it would be helpful if you could be specific with regard to any case law that you're aware of that provides any definition of that term. Otherwise it sort of tends to fall into one of those categories of legitimate amplification may to some extent be what's in the eye of the beholder.

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MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I realize that the term is 1 2 somewhat flexible, and there's not a precise 3 definition, but the precedents do very clearly indicate that, one, you cannot supply new technical 4 reports, either new affidavits, new reports from 5 technical experts or new technical citations. 6 7 all go well beyond legitimate amplification. JUDGE YOUNG: Have you provided the case law 8 9 that supports your argument in your original motion 10 or --MR. FRANTZ: Yes. In Section 3 of that 11 1.2

motion. Also, I might call the Board's attention to a very recent case involving the Bellefonte COL proceeding. In that case, the Petitioners did something very similar to what Petitioners are doing here. In Bellefonte, Petitioners in their reply had new affidavits. They had new technical reports from other reported experts. They had new references to web pages.

And the Applicants moved to strike, and the Board granted that motion to strike. That's just one example among many where either the licensing boards or the Commission itself has struck new technical supporting documents for a contention.

Additionally, as I mentioned, when the

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Petitioners attempt to expand the scope of the 1 2 contention, to go from an environmental to safety, that is clearly more than a legitimate 3 amplification. That's an expansion of the scope. 4 JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Eye? 5 Thank you, Your Honor. As you noted 6 MR. EYE: 7 a moment ago, it is rather subjective in terms of 8 9 of legitimate amplification.

determining precisely what falls into the category

Your Honor, it's our contention that citation to additional provisions that bear on the Commission's decision to license or not license these plants are always germane. They always come into the discussion about the application, and to the extent that those particular provisions were not explicitly called out in the original petition, I think that the Applicant is on notice that all provisions that bear on licensing within the NRC regulations are something that they need to be prepared to address and deal with.

To the extent that the Applicant has not had an opportunity to fully expand on the issues that we raised in our reply, particularly related to 52.79(a)(3) and 50.54(hh), there are provisions in the regulations that would allow this Panel to

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permit the Applicant to, I guess, do a surreply and address those issues at more length as they would see fit, although I think that they pretty well covered them in the papers that they've already filed, but nevertheless, there is that regulatory provision where they could expand on those arguments if they wanted to.

The legitimate amplification argument, we think, applies here primarily not only because safety considerations are always pertinent, but also because if we look at the specific things that we did add, they didn't change the contentions. They didn't alter the primary focus of the contentions. What they did was attempt to clarify or bring additional information that would have some bearing on helping the panel and those others in the Commission that are responsible for making these decisions.

It was our intention all along -- and we tried to do our best at this -- to give the decisionmakers here the maximum amount of information that we could, and to the extent that that may have crossed some line, vague though it may be, that was not necessarily legitimate amplification, we would urge this panel to err on the side of considering

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more information rather than less, and if in the 1 process of considering more information rather than 2 3 less, it is prejudicial to the Applicant, then I think the Applicant should be given an opportunity 4 5 to respond in some meaningful way. We're not here to do anything that's unfair, 6 7 but what we are here to do, we hope, is to bring pertinent information to the attention of this Panel 8 9 and the Commission generally to assist as best we 10 can in making an informed decision about the application that's before you. 11 12 JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. Does the NRC wish to speak? 13 14 MR. BIGGINS: Yes, Judge, thank you. 15 The Staff, as stated in the motion, agreed 16 with the motion that the portions of the reply that 17 the Applicant seeks to strike are not legitimate 18 amplification of the originally filed contentions. 19 The Staff would point out that the Louisiana 20 Energy Services case, and as recently followed in 21 Crow Butte, provide precedent that could help guide this Board to determine whether or not this is 2.2 23 legitimate amplification or not. 24 The Staff position is that any citations to 25 the Code or requirements should have been provided

in the original petition, and providing them in the 1 2 reply is not legitimate amplification. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: Let me interrupt you there. Why would that not be legal argument that would be of 4 5 the kind that would be allowed on any issue before a legal forum? 6 7 MR. BIGGINS: Well, Judge, particularly in citing new provisions that may have additional or 8 9 supplementary requirements would be a requirement that the Petitioners should have raised in their 10 11 original petition. If it's additional argument --JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me interrupt you 12 13 again. In the initial petition there's no 14 requirement that any statutory or regulatory 15 citations be provided in the original petition. Ιf there is, tell me where that comes from. 16 17 MR. BIGGINS: Well, I agree with you on that 18 point, Judge. The point I would make is that the 19 contention itself has to be defined in the petition, 2.0 and to the extent that a citation to an additional Code section would raise a new or additional facet 21 22 to an issue -- that new argument is really what it 23 is -- should have been raised in the petition, not 24 in a reply.

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JUDGE YOUNG: If the legal argument that's

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made, at least in part by virtue of reference to a section of the regulations, for example, that may not have been cited previously, and the legal argument that's being made is on the same issue raised in the original contention, wouldn't you agree that that would be acceptable? If it does not expand the MR. BIGGINS: contention, yes, I would agree that that would be acceptable. JUDGE YOUNG: So we get back to the thing that we all learned in law school about defining what the issues are. MR. BIGGINS: Certainly, Judge, and as with these contentions, the contention itself has to be properly set forth in the petition, meeting the requirements of 2.309(f)(1).

If citing an additional Code section in the Commission's rules doesn't expand the argument and is already supported by a contention, the Staff would agree that that would be proper. However, if the contention is one of omission where the Petitioners are claiming that the Applicant didn't meet certain rule requirements and then in the reply they're citing a new rule requirement that could not be reasonably included in the interpretation of that

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contention, that's a new argument and should have been properly made in the petition itself.

JUDGE YOUNG: What might be helpful -- and I'll just tell you at this point that we're going to take the motion under advisement, and in making our rulings on the contentions we will not consider anything that we don't find would constitute legitimate amplification -- it might be helpful, as we go through the arguments today, if the parties have specific arguments on the information that you're challenging and whether that would fall within the issue originally set forth in the contention, you can make those more specifically with regard to the contentions in question, and then we'll take those arguments under advisement as well, because I think that it comes down to an issue-byissue determination and what's an issue and what's a sub-issue and what's a side issue and so forth. that might be helpful for us in hearing the arguments today.

Go ahead.

MR. BIGGINS: One last point, Judge, is the argument that a surrebuttal could cure any prejudice. The Commission, in its rulings, hasn't said that it's not permissible to go outside of

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legitimate amplification except when a cure can be had to the prejudice. The first and primary consideration that the Board must face is whether or not under the Commission precedent this is a legitimate amplification or not. So the question that the Board has to answer is not whether or not a prejudice could be cured with a surrebuttal. Thank you.

JUDGE YOUNG: Any further argument?

MR. FRANTZ: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Then let's move forward to argument on Contention 1, and on the argument on the contentions, in light of our earlier advice and the advice this morning about not just repeating what's in the pleadings, we were thinking that the best way to proceed would be to start with the party who would be the next one to reply to the last pleading that was filed.

In other words, the Petitioners have filed replies, so on all those to which the Petitioners have filed specific replies, we would start with the Applicant; on all those where the Petitioners did not file specific replies -- and we may have questions about those when we get to them -- have the Petitioners start first and then have the NRC

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Staff go last on each argument. 1 2 Does that make sense to everyone? Does anyone 3 have any objection to that? 4 MR. BIGGINS: That's agreeable to the Staff, 5 Judge. MR. EYE: No objection from Petitioners, Your б 7 Honor. MR. FRANTZ: That's fine. 8 9 JUDGE YOUNG: And I guess even though you did provide a reply on 1, in one sense, this make not 10 11 make sense as much for Contention 1, so maybe we'll make an exception at the start, and that's because 12 13 the question that we had previously asked in our memorandum of May 27 was given that we need to make 14 our determinations on all the contentions under 1.5 16 Section 2.309(f)(1), how could the Licensing Board 17 find Contention 1 to be admissible under the 18 criteria of Section 2.309(f)(1) in light of the 19 Commission's April 27 order denying your motion to 20 stay the proceeding, and in light of a more recent 21 Commission decision -- not a more recent -- yes, 22 more recent -- in the Sharon Harris case to the same 23 effect. Would you care to address that, because that's 24

really what we need to look at here and I'll be

frank with you, we have a hard time seeing how we would not be bound by that precedent.

MR. EYE: Your Honor, so do we, but we're here to make a good record; that's part of our function here, and please recall that procedurally we filed our motion to stay contemporaneously with the petition, and they, at least at the beginning, tracked along together.

and we felt compelled to try to preserve the contention -- again, primarily to make a good record -- and so we made the reply that we did. But we certainly understand, and I've read the Sharon Harris decision and the cases that preceded it as well, and it appears to us that if Commission precedent is going to be followed here and we're going to be bound by it -- at least in this particular proceeding -- it appears that that contention would have been dealt with in the form of the motion.

But I want to make sure that the record is clear: We consider it still to be a good contention, and I won't belabor the argument, but we do believe that to disconnect the reactor certification from the balance of the issues doesn't

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do justice to why they ought to be considered together, that is the significant differences between the reactor that is being proposed and its predecessors. And to the extent that the cart is before the horse, we think that that's contrary to really what the Atomic Energy Act would anticipate to be certain that licenses are only issued consistent with the public's interest.

This may be, as much as anything, an argument about sequencing, but it also, we believe, extends beyond that inasmuch as we now have something of an artificial demarcation between the reactor certification process and everything else, and we think that they are organically considered together, that they should be considered organic and together, and that's the argument that we've made.

And consistent with the Panel's directions, I will do my best not to be too repetitious from what we've already said in our papers, but we do recognize the underlying legal issues here in terms of this being bound by Commission precedent and so forth.

JUDGE YOUNG: Are you arguing to any extent that there are specific omissions in the application comparable to those, for example, in the Sharon

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| 1 | Harris case? Are you making that argument at all? |
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| 2 | Or it sounds as though you're agreeing that we could |
| 3 | not not agreeing, I'm not saying what our ruling |
| 4 | would be, but that you're more ore less conceding |
| 5 | that we would not have the authority under the |
| 6 | precedent to find this particular contention |
| 7 | admissible. |
| 8 | MR. EYE: That is correct, Your Honor. We |
| 9 | think that to the extent that you are going to |
| 10 | recognize and be bound by Commission precedent, you |
| 11 | really don't have much flexibility on this |
| 12 | particular contention, and partly because of the way |
| 13 | the motion was handled originally. |
| 14 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. In light of that, do the |
| 15 | Applicant or the NRC Staff have any arguments on |
| 16 | Contention 1? |
| 17 | MR. FRANTZ: We have no further arguments. |
| 18 | Mr. Eye appears to have conceded that this |
| 19 | contention should be dismissed. |
| 20 | MR. BIGGINS: The Staff would agree with that. |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. |
| 22 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, I want to make sure that |
| 23 | the record is clear. I'm not conceding that the |
| 24 | contention should be dismissed, what I'm saying is |
| 25 | that because of the precedent here |

| 1 | JUDGE YOUNG: We don't have the authority. |
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| 2 | MR. EYE: you don't have the authority. |
| 3 | I'm not suggesting that as a matter of law because |
| 4 | of the legal reasoning that we've cited in our |
| 5 | arguments. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: We understood that. Does any |
| 7 | other party have anything to argue in response to |
| 8 | that? It may not be appropriate at this point; that |
| - 9 | may come up later. |
| 10 | MR. FRANTZ: I would just simply add that he |
| 11 | appears to be contesting Commission policy and |
| 12 | Commission regulations, and obviously the Board is |
| 13 | bound by that as well as the parties. |
| 14 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Now, on Contention 2 |
| 15 | having to do with the relation to the Waste |
| 16 | Confidence Rule, we have a similar question there, |
| 17 | where even though the Petitioners have provided a |
| 18 | reply, the question is more or less directed more at |
| 19 | the Petitioners, so does anyone have any objection |
| 20 | to letting the Petitioners argue first on that one? |
| 21 | MR. RUND: No. |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Eye. |
| 23 | MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 24 | Your Honor, in large measure, the progression |
| 25 | of arguments related to Yucca Mountain we believe |

2 endeavor to do so.

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have to take account of the events on the ground that are happening in rather rapid-fire order these days, but it also ought to take account in terms of the longer history related to the availability of Yucca Mountain, and we believe that it is time for the Commission, both as a legal matter and as a policy matter, to step back and ask some serious questions about whether or not there's still a basis to have confidence in the Waste Confidence Rule.

Now, the argument -- I'm sorry.

JUDGE YOUNG: And you said it's time for the Commission, and so you might want to be specific about what you're asking this Board to do and what you're wanting to make a record on in terms of asking the Commission to do.

MR. EYE: I am, Your Honor, and I will

Primarily, Your Honor, our contention was triggered by statements made in the environmental report by the Applicant that seemed, a reasonable reading of those, to assume that its waste could be dispositioned at Yucca Mountain, and we take issue with that.

And to the extent that the environmental report makes the assumption that their waste would

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1 be dispositioned at Yucca Mountain, it allows the 2 Applicant then to either defer or escape altogether 3 for regulatory purposes the necessity of dealing 4 with having waste on its site for indefinite 5 duration of time. In other words, the out that 6 Yucca Mountain represents allows them to defer, for 7 example, seeking an on-site spent fuel storage 8 capacity license. And some of our contentions that deal with 9 10 high-level waste and reflecting back on it really 11 probably ought to be read sort of in pari materia, 12 If you will, inasmuch as they are generally focused 13 on the idea that reliance on the Waste Confidence 14 Rule for this particular Applicant and this 15 particular application allows them to avoid 16 questions about indefinite duration of time storage 17 of spent fuel and other high-level waste on site. 18 JUDGE YOUNG: When you say indefinite, you're 19 talking about post-closure? MR. EYE: I don't know that I would 20 21 necessarily define it that way, but it would include 22 post-closure, for sure. 23 JUDGE YOUNG: To the extent that you're talking about post-closure, wouldn't the 2.4 25 decommissioning process address that? To the extent

that it would not, if you could focus your argument 1 on that and also on, again, what you think we have 2 3 any authority to do. I think that you --4 MR. EYE: 5 JUDGE YOUNG: And again, in our next question we mention vis-a-vis Secretary Chu's statement, the 6

statement of our former Chairman Klein's May 12 statement.

MR. EYE: Yes, Your Honor. Clearly, the juxtaposing of Secretary Chu and Commissioner Klein's views about this helped sharpen our thinking about what this panel can and could or shouldn't do. Again, we believe that decommissioning, yes, will include at some point -- under the rules, at any rate -- that they will have to remove spent fuel and high-level waste from the site in order to be able to say that they've decommissioned Comanche Peak Units 3 and 4, which raises other questions, because with all due respect to Commissioner Klein, we believe it's speculative in terms of trying to predict whether a spent-fuel repository will be available, and we believe it's even more speculative to say when it will.

MR. EYE: On the other hand, to the extent that Secretary Chu, who is in a position to make

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certain policy decisions at least for this

Administration over the next whatever course of time
they would be in office, that's not speculative.

That's the here and now. Those are the events on
the ground.

And we think that it's important that this

Panel and, frankly, all interested parties take

account of those events on the ground and factor

them into whatever decisions need to be made. In

this instance specifically, it would be that, given

that there is no prospect for waste coming out of

Units 3 and 4, that it would ever be dispositioned

to a repository at Yucca Mountain, and it's partly

because it may not be available at all, but it would

certainly not be available for these wastes, because

it would have already reached its capacity.

Alternatives need to be considered, alternatives in terms of management of that waste stream, instead of going down the path of seeking a license, getting a license, operating the plant, and then realizing that they don't have an off-site repository to which to take their waste. So we back up.

Can they then invoke the Waste Confidence Rule about how long they can manage waste on site?

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Commissioner Klein's comments that you cite to in the speech that he gave, I believe, last month -- I believe it was May -- effectively expanded the length of time that applicants ought to be able to confidently manage waste on site. What was missing in that speech -- and I'm sure that it's in the background documentation and so forth that Commissioner Klein relied on, although it was not cited in his speech -- is what assumptions went into that. What assumptions went into the idea that it could be maintained on site in an environmentally safe and secure way for the

durations of time that are suggested?

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me interrupt you there again. There's another factor that we probably ought to acknowledge here, because in our office, there are people involved in a hearing on Yucca Mountain, and I think there've been statements to the effect that whatever happens will depend on the science, whether the science supports it and so forth. So could you sort of include that in your balancing there?

MR. EYE: I certainly will, Your Honor. if I may share an anecdote that I think captures or perhaps responds to your question, back in the late

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1980s, when Yucca Mountain was one of the three finalists to be the repository, the other two finalists were Deaf Smith County, Texas, and Richland, Washington. And an inquiry was made to me at the time, because I was involved in some nuclear regulatory work, about which site would be ultimately selected, and it didn't take me any time at all to respond. It was Yucca Mountain.

And the person said, Why; is it because the science is so superior there? I said, No. It's because at the time the Speaker of the House of Representatives was Jim Wright from Texas, and the majority leader was Tom Foley from Washington. So there is a scientific dimension to it, but it's more than science. It's acceptability by the society in general and whether it will be politically workable.

Those are dimensions that certainly don't exclude the science, but the science can't be looked at in a vacuum either. It has to be looked at in the broader sphere of both social and political considerations. And so we fast-forward to our situation now, and Yucca Mountain is on deck, and yet there seems to be -- there are scientific objections to it. I mean, even Secretary Chu suggested that we can do better than Yucca Mountain,

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but there are also --

JUDGE YOUNG: Did you say can or cannot?

MR. EYE: We can do better than Yucca

Mountain. I believe it was the response to the question Senator McCain posed to him in that hearing, where he said that Yucca Mountain was no longer going to be pursued as a repository by this Administration, and the follow-up question was, Then what do we do, and I believe Secretary Chu said, in sort of an abbreviated way, We can do better.

Now, precisely what that means, I'm not sure, but I'm going to take it at face value that in his judgment -- and I think that we have to ascribe a fair amount of expertise to that -- that he believes that Yucca Mountain, on either scientific, social, or political grounds, is something that we can do better.

And so in terms of the scientific dimension,

yes, I think that those debates will go on for a

long time in terms of whether the geologic

repository plan to Yucca Mountain is acceptable from
a scientific perspective.

But I think that if the discussion is attenuated and ends with that, then we will not be addressing two of the more critical aspects of the

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problem, and that is whether it is either socially and/or politically acceptable for that waste stream to end up in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, or whatever destination it may have.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me see if I can just get us focused back off the politics a little bit on to what we can do and on to the Waste Confidence Rule.

I want to ask the Staff when we get to them -- or actually if you want to tell us quickly now -- what -- if you want to give us an update on the progress of the update to the Waste Confidence Rule.

And, I guess, in the context of that, the general principle in our proceedings that -- and there's precedent on this -- that if there is a current rulemaking, it's not something that we would address in an adjudication, because it's obviously much more of a generic issue than it is specific to one plant.

Do you have a quick response on that?

MS. SIMON: Yes, Your Honor. This is Marcia
Simon for the Staff. Our understanding is that the
rule, the proposed rule responding to comments, has
gone up to the Commission. We don't have any update
as far as an expected date when it would be
finalized, however. But I guess at this point I

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would remind the Board that there is an existing rule in place, and that rule will be in effect until any new rule is enacted. JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead. MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor. Which gives rise to: What can this Panel do? And I think that -- in terms of a very functional approach, that ought to be the question on virtually every contention, as far as that's concerned. This Panel, it seems to me, could take the approach that under the -- recognizing that the Waste Confidence Rule is in flux, could essentially take a step back and wait to see what the new Waste Confidence Rule is going to look like. Perhaps it will be a duplicate of the current rule. We don't know how the Commission is ultimately going to address this.

But to proceed with the idea that all the work that's gone in to amend the current Waste Confidence Rule will not have substantive effect on it seems to me to be not taking account of the realities that pertain to the Waste Confidence Rule proceedings.

JUDGE YOUNG: But what about the fact that there is obviously a rulemaking going on? It's now with the Commission, so -- and there is precedent

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set that says that when there's a rulemaking in progress, then that's something that we would not address in an adjudication proceeding.

MR. EYE: Your Honor, given the fact that the timing is as it is and we're -- as we've just been informed by Staff counsel, that the proposed rule has been handed up to the Commission for deliberation, it doesn't seem to me to be a stretch to have this Panel take account of that administrative decision, and instead of perhaps having to require a repetition of the petition process under a new Waste Confidence Rule that might be issued down the line, why don't we wait to see what the new Waste Confidence Rule actually reads like, and proceed under it, if in fact it's substantially different.

But right now, I agree with you, that there is a -- that the current rule is in place, but the reality is it's being challenged, both internally at the Commission -- I mean, there's -- and externally, and the Commission has seen fit to elevate this to a proceeding that has taken, I would presume, an enormous amount of Commission resources to deal with, and proceeding in this particular adjudication, not taking that into account seems to

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me to run the risk of sort of an inefficient process, if you will, inasmuch as we might be back here at some point, making arguments under the new Waste Confidence Rule and how the application does

or doesn't conform to it.

So I don't know that there would necessarily be in a practical and legal sense -- if this Panel, for example, were to rule that it would not deal with the contentions related to the Waste Confidence Rule that we have posed until or unless there is a new Waste Confidence Rule and at that time, take up the application in light of the new rule, doesn't seem to me to be either a radical departure from sort of an orderly process, nor does it disregard the fact that there is a Waste Confidence proceeding that is tracking along with what we're doing here. It --

JUDGE YOUNG: So in other words, hold off.

MR. EYE: To the extent that you can, essentially stop the clock and find out what the new Waste Confidence Rule says. And that would -- I mean, I'm certainly not going to try to argue the case for the Applicant, but they're in kind of a different position as well. The rules are changing not only for the Petitioner; they're changing for

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everybody else.

And to that extent, a more efficient way to approach this might be to stop, suspend that particular aspect of the adjudication until a new Waste Confidence Rule is issued, because if the Waste Confidence Rule essentially accepts the fact that there is no capacity for the new reactors' waste and that a second repository must be established, or if the Waste Confidence proceeding that is now under consideration concedes that Yucca Mountain will not be available, now we're talking about establishing not one new repository, but two or perhaps more, depending upon just what kind of capacity each one of these new facilities that are yet unsited, unplanned, unspoken of in many respects, would have.

These are very speculative matters at this point, and yet they bear on a very important aspect of the combined license application, and that is what to do with this waste stream.

JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.

Did you have any questions?

JUDGE ARNOLD: Yes. I do have a question. In your -- and this I will address to the Staff. In the original petition, you stated, "The Waste

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Confidence decision is inapplicable, because it only applies to reactors that are currently operating and not new reactors such as the proposed Comanche Peak Units 3 and 4."

I have read Licensing Board decisions that

have stated that the Waste Confidence decision is

applicable to new reactors, but I have not read

anything convincing in either the regulations or

other writings from the Commission that clearly says

that this Waste Confidence Rule applies to new, notyet-built reactors as well as currently licensed

reactors. Do you know of any reference that would

support the view that it does apply?

MS. SIMON: Your Honor, the Staff believes that the cases -- the recent Licensing Board cases involving COL licensing applications do support the proposition, and we would point to our answer at page 13 and also in the Applicant's answer at page 22, I believe they set out in a little bit more detail the logic behind that, and they do cite to the -- I think the 1999 Waste Confidence update, for example, which was a Commission statement of consideration.

JUDGE ARNOLD: The closest thing I've seen -- and this was in the Applicant's response, is 72

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1 Federal Register, 49352, where it says the NRC is 2 revising 51.23(b) and (c) to indicate that the 3 provisions of these paragraphs also apply to 4 combined licenses, which comes real close, except that the Waste Confidence is 51.23(a), not (b) or 5 6 (c). So it's almost as though they specifically 7 avoided saying that the Waste Confidence Rule was 8 applicable to new reactors. 9 And I'm not yet at a point where I know which 10 way to go on this, so I would ask if the Staff has 11 anything else to say on that. 12

MS. SIMON: Your Honor, I would just refer you to the Licensing Board decision in the Lee case, William States Lee, which is LBP-08-17 --

JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. Could you repeat that a little bit louder?

MS. SIMON: Sure. It's the William States Lee COL proceeding, which is LBP-08-17, and referring to page 29 of the slip opinion, they concluded that in light of the plain language of the rule and its regulatory history, the Waste Confidence Rule applies, and I believe that they, either in the text or in the text and footnotes, explain that -- in more detail their reasoning, and that would be the reasoning that we would point you to.

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1 MR. EYE: Excuse me. Could we get that 2 citation one more time? JUDGE YOUNG: 3 I think it's on page 13 of 4 your -- the same one you cite there. MS. SIMON: Yes, Your Honor. 5 6 MR. EYE: All right. Okay. Thank you. 7 MR. RUND: Judge Arnold, you asked about, I 8 think, why the Commission didn't update paragraph 9 (a) of the Waste Confidence Rule. 10 The regulation reads that it applies to any 11 reactor, so while paragraph (b) didn't mention COL 12 applications, there was no need to update paragraph 13 (a), because it was broad enough to encompass COL 14applications and reactors under Part 52. 15 JUDGE ARNOLD: Let me just explain my 16 conundrum with that. If they're saying "any 17 reactors" meaning "current reactors," that's a 18 bounded set. There's some way that they could in 19 their minds justify that we can store the waste for 20 a bounded set of reactors. 21 But if you're talking about current and any 22 possible future reactor, that's an unbounded set of 23 reactors. You don't know how many, and I would find 24 it very difficult to be able to say, I have

confidence that we can store fuel for an unspecified

number of reactors. So that's my logic that did not make that convincing to me. MR. RUND: There are earlier statements of considerations on the Waste Confidence Rule which -and the Commission has expressed an intent for the Waste Confidence Rule to apply to future reactors. Now, I think I understand your concern. This is a rule that isn't going to be looked at and isn't going to be changed for the next 50 to 100 years, and reactors can continue to be built.

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I see where you're coming from, but the Commission undertakes a review of this regulation on a regular basis and hasn't sought the need to really change that aspect of the regulation.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. So your argument would be when they say "any reactor," they know they're going to be looking at that in five years, so it's any reactor that's conceivable within the next five years.

MR. RUND: Well it's not only that. Commission -- and I'll quote a little bit from our brief where the Commission has in, I think it was, the 1990 rulemaking stated that it believes Congress will provide the needed institutional support to essentially add any new repositories that are

needed, if the additional new reactors would produce waste that would exceed their expected capacity.

Now, you know, of course, that's an issue that the Commission is looking at now as part of a rulemaking, and the Board recognized there's Commission precedent that holds that when contentions raise issues that are being dealt with in ongoing rulemaking, the Board should reject those contentions.

And I refer the Board to the Oconee case at CLI 99-11, and this contention, Contention 2, as well as Contention 3 and Contention 6, essentially are a challenge to both the current regulation that's in place and also the ongoing rulemaking.

JUDGE YOUNG: Over to you, Mr. Eye.

MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, this is a little bit of a semantics analysis, I suppose to a certain extent, inasmuch as the term "any reactor," as you suggest, is not exactly the model of clarity. Does it mean any reactor extant? We think that's what it means because if it means anything else, now you're in the realm of speculation.

The new reactors haven't been built in this country for going on 30 years, and so when this

verbiage was used, "any reactor," we think a more reasonable interpretation of it is that it was the set that is extant today, not those which might be added five years from now or ten years from now or whatever time that capacity might be added. It's a numbers game to a certain extent.

We know what the DOE's policy is as far as the capacity for spent fuel from the commercial waste stream is going to be at Yucca Mountain if Yucca Mountain is ever available, and we know that the capacity or that the amount of spent fuel that would be available under DOE policy will probably be reached in terms of the total metric tonnage around the country sometime in the next year or two or so.

How does that then allow any room, any capacity for waste coming out of Comanche Peak Units 3 and 4? There will be no room, so for the Applicant, and the Staff, for that matter, to take the position that "any reactor" just has an openended capacity assumption we think is not supported by either evidence, reason or logic.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let's go to the Applicant now and let me ask you to start by addressing, in light of the question that Judge Arnold asked and in light of the realities that have been brought out by the

Petitioners about what's going on with the current Administration, how do you respond to the Petitioners' suggestion that we hold off on making our ruling on the contentions relating -- you said Contention 2, but let's just say the contentions that would relate to this issue until we see what the Commission has done.

And more specifically, the Commission may take care of all these issues, but were the Commission to issue a rule that left open the question of new reactors, conceivably that might make a difference in what our ruling would be if we held off on making our ruling. What's your response to the suggestion that we do hold off and any ramifications of that?

MR. RUND: We think it's inappropriate and inconsistent with Commission regulations and Commission precedent. There's a current Waste Confidence Rule that's in place, paragraph (a) covers "any reactor."

JUDGE YOUNG: But let's assume that we were to interpret "any reactor" to mean current reactors; then conceivably we could make a ruling that the contention is not a challenge to the current rule because the rule does not apply to new reactors.

We realize another licensing board has ruled

that it does apply to new reactors, but we're not bound by other licensing board rulings, so why would it not be appropriate to hold off on making our ruling?

And when you mentioned that there was precedent, is there precedent on holding off on making a ruling delaying a ruling until the conclusion of the rulemaking? I guess I'm not aware of any off the top of my head.

MR. RUND: The precedent is the Oconee case at CLI 99-11. It dealt with an issue that was being dealt with in a rulemaking, and the Commission indicated that it's appropriate to reject those contentions and not hold those contentions in abeyance.

In fact, there's really one exception to this rule, and it deals with design certifications, and it arises out of the New Reactor Policy Statement, and there's a draft policy statement that suggested that contentions dealing with design certification rulemakings be held in abeyance, and if members of the public had commented and said that's consistent with Commission policy, when you've got those types of contentions, the commenters noted, Commission precedent holds that you should reject those

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contentions, and the Commission agreed.

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JUDGE YOUNG: Have you cited these in your answer?

MR. RUND: I have that citation here; I'm not sure that we've cited it for that specific point or answer, but it was Volume 73 of the Federal Register at page 59558 is the Commission's response to that comment, and the Commission recognized that normally that is the case but it was going to make an exception with regard to design certification rulemakings given the unique circumstances, and that with those types of contentions if they were otherwise admissible, they should be held in abeyance, but for all other types of contentions, it seems as if the appropriate thing for a licensing board to do is to reject those contentions that deal with subjects that are being dealt with in an ongoing rulemaking.

JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. Continue if you have any other argument.

MR. RUND: Yes, I'd just like to point out a couple of more points. The application doesn't rely on Yucca Mountain; it relies on the Waste Confidence Rule. The environmental report does contain, in passing, a discussion of Yucca Mountain, but nowhere

does it say that we're relying on Yucca Mountain to be available; it said we're relying on the current regulation which is in effect, and challenges to that regulation are barred under 10 CFR 2.335.

Also, I'd like to note that with regard to the statements that the Board has noted from Secretary Chu and then-Chairman Klein, those comments really should have no impact on the Board's decision, because under the current Waste Confidence Rule, whether you view it as a challenge to the current Waste Confidence Rule or a challenge to the ongoing Waste Confidence Rule, these contentions — and really this issue applies to Contentions 2, 3 and Contention 6 — these contentions are challenges to those provisions.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me ask you a question.

Let's say that there were no statement by then

Chairman Klein and let's say that there were a rule

that said X and there was a massive amount of

evidence and statements and so forth that said not

only is X not true but Y is true. At some point

doesn't it become almost absurd to say we're going

to reject a contention because it's challenging a

rule that says X when you've got -- and I'm talking

about an extreme case here, but wouldn't you agree

that there would be some extreme case where it would just -- I mean, there are statutes on the books that in various states and maybe federal statutes as well that they're just not enforced, they're not longer applicable, but they're still there -- isn't there some situation where that argument would not hold true in light of just overwhelming evidence to the

MR. RUND: As far as contention admissibility goes, I don't think that's the case. There are instances where under 10 CFR 2.335(b) that a petitioner could seek a waiver of a regulation -here the Petitioners haven't done so, and really it would be inappropriate because this is a generic issue and waiver is limited to circumstances that are unique to a specific application.

JUDGE YOUNG: If a waiver is not appropriate and you had one of these situations where it was just outside the realm of reality -- and I'm talking an extreme situation -- but somehow recognizing the reality of the situation which is sort of one of the arguments that Petitioners' are making.

MR. RUND: Where you're dealing with a rule that's in place that, under your hypothetical, is absurd, there is an opportunity for members of the

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public to petition for rulemaking and that really is the appropriate remedy in that situation, not to submit a contention that challenges the regulation

And to move away from your hypothetical back to the contentions we have here, there is an ongoing rulemaking and Petitioners, in fact, cited comments and if it was concluded impermissibly in the reply, as Mr. Frantz indicated, you don't need to consider that.

But you may want to take note that to the extent that they have a problem with the proposed rule, they've already used the remedy and used the process that's appropriate to deal with their concerns by submitting comments, and presumably the NRC will review their comments and determine whether or not to follow their suggestions.

JUDGE YOUNG: I think in light of the fact that there's a current rulemaking going on, this may be an academic inquiry, but there could be consequences. I mean, obviously the reason that they're raising the issue is because of the concerns associated with keeping waste on site. Do you want to address that?

MR. RUND: Yes, I would. I'd just note that paragraph (b) of the current Waste Confidence Rule

1 just says that the environmental report doesn't need 2 to contain information to evaluate spent fuel 3 storage after operations, and that's the regulation 4 that we have, and they haven't suggested waiving it, 5 and it's really the only other option if they want 6 to bring a contention. 7 And in fact, I note that in the proposed 8 update to the Waste Confidence Rule, the Commission 9 recognized as much, and I think there is a footnote 10 where the Commission recognized that. The only way 11 you could bring these types of contentions in 12 proceedings is if the waiver requirements are satisfied, and here they aren't. 13 14 JUDGE YOUNG: What's the citation for that 15 footnote? 16 MR. RUND: It really was two places, but I'll 17 give you the more detailed discussion. It's Volume 18 73 of the Federal Register, and it's page 59558, 19 Footnote 10. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. D you want to give the 21 other one? 22 MR. RUND: I think that one suffices. 23 other one is a little briefer, and that's really where the substance of the Commission's discussion 24 25 about the waiver requirements in terms of the Waste

| 1 | Confidence Rule issues were addressed. |
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| 2 | JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further? |
| 3 | Judge Mignerey, did you have any questions? |
| 4 | (No response.) |
| 5 | JUDGE YOUNG: Oh, dear, I think we've lost |
| 6 | her. |
| 7 | (Pause.) |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Did you say you were just about |
| 9 | finished? |
| 10 | MR. RUND: That's all we had on Contention 2. |
| 11 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Let's take five minutes |
| 12 | to see if we can check this out, and then come back |
| 13 | to the Staff and then if you have any further |
| 14 | argument. |
| 15 | (A brief recess was taken.) |
| 16 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We'll resume as soon as |
| 17 | we get Judge Mignerey back on the line. |
| 18 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: Hello. |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. We're back together. |
| 20 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: We're going to try again. |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right, and feel free to |
| 22 | call, Judge Mignerey. |
| 23 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: Okay, I will. The thing is |
| 24 | when it just goes dead, I don't know whether it's |
| 25 | gone dead or somebody is talking so quietly I have |
| | |

2 JUDGE YOUNG: So everyone might want to speak 3 up. All right, so we're back on the record. NRC 4 5 Staff, your arguments on the issue of the Waste Confidence Rule and Contention 2. And let me just 6 7 ask are you going to have any additional or separate 8 argument to make on Contention 3, or have you 9 already made all your argument that would also apply to it? 10 MR. EYE: Your Honor, I think that the 11 arguments we've been making currently really apply 12 13 to both 2 and 3, and I appreciate that you're willing to kind of lump those together for these 14 15 purposes because I think it logically follows. 16 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Judge Mignerey, also 17 speak up if you cannot hear anything, and we'll be 18 glad to ask people to raise their voices in here. 19 JUDGE MIGNEREY: Understood. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Go ahead. 21 MS. SIMON: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 I'd first like to address the issue of the 23 definition of "any reactor," and I'd like to point out to the Board that if you look at the proposed 24 2008 rule, the language of 5123(a) does not change, 25

no idea that they're talking.

it still says "any reactor" and certainly if "any 1 2 reactor" did not include new reactors but now it was 3 going to include new reactors, there would be a need 4 to clarify that in the language of the rule. 5 let me just refer you to 73 Federal Register, page 6 59551 -- that's the language of the proposed rule 7 Also, I'd like to point out that the Waste 8 Confidence Decision by the Commission and the 9 accompanying Waste Confidence Rule is a prediction. 10 If you look at the 1990 rule, which is at 55 Federal 11 Register 38475, and if you look at the --12 JUDGE YOUNG: Fifty-five? 13 MS. SIMON: I'm sorry; 55-38475, and if you also look at the 1999 update, 64 Federal Register 14 15 68006, the Commission has committed to reviewing the 16 rule if any significant circumstances warrant it or 17 every ten years, whichever comes first, and it is a 18 prediction, so they are looking to the future and I 19 think that "any" therefore should be any foreseeable 20 reactors. 21 JUDGE MIGNEREY: This is Judge Mignerey. If 22 someone has been talking, it has been absolutely 23 mute on my end. 24 JUDGE YOUNG: I know you have a soft voice, so

get maybe a little closer to the microphone.

1 MS. SIMON: Judge Mignerey, can you hear me 2 now? 3 JUDGE MIGNEREY: Yes, I can. Thank you. 4 MS. SIMON: Okay. So again, our argument 5 would be that the word "any" means any: 6 many existing; it doesn't mean current. 7 Commission had wanted to say that, they would have 8 used that language. 9 The Staff's position in general on Contentions 10 2 and 3 is that first and foremost they're 11 challenges to the Waste Confidence Rule and 12 therefore are not admissible on that basis. 13 In addition, they're not admissible because 14 they are part of an ongoing rulemaking, and we would 15 agree with what the Applicant stated earlier 16 regarding whether or not a contention should be held 17 in abeyance with respect to the Waste Confidence 18 Rule. We believe that only the design certification 19 contentions were intended by the Commission to be 20 held in abeyance under their policy statement. 21 Also, spent fuel storage and spent fuel 22 disposition are clearly generic issues and Supreme 23 Court precedent as well as Federal Appellate Court precedent clearly gives the Commission the right to 24 25 deal with those through rulemaking rather than

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through adjudication.

The Petitioners have had an opportunity to participate in that rulemaking, and indeed two of the documents that they've submitted in this proceeding are essentially comments that were sent in as part of that rulemaking, and so they have had an opportunity to pose their concerns to the Commission.

With respect to the statements of Secretary
Chu and former Chairman Klein, we would note that
neither of those statements are rules; they're
certainly made by high-ranking officials, but
they're not rules, and therefore they have no
binding legal status with the Board.

Both Secretary Chu's statement and former
Chairman Klein's statement are essentially
considered already in the statement of consideration
in the proposed rule. In fact, Chairman Klein's
statement echoes -- if you look at 73 Federal
Register 59549 to 59550, you'll see all the
information in former Chairman Klein's statement
essentially stated in the proposed rule, and one of
the elements of that is doubts or the possibility
that Yucca Mountain might not be available, and so
therefore we feel that Secretary Chu's statement is

1 embodied in that as well. But they don't have 2 binding status on the Board. 3 I'd also like to point out that the proposed 4 rule, as we pointed out in our pleading, the 5 proposed rule does not contradict the existing rule 6 in any way. I think that's all that we have, Your Honor. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Do you have any rebuttal? 8 9 MR. EYE: Very briefly, Your Honor. 10 appreciate that this perhaps could be characterized 11 as a kind of academic question in a way, but on the 12 other hand, from a legal perspective, we believe 13 that this Panel and the Commission generally has a duty to consider the relevant factors that bear on 14 15 any particular licensing decision. 16 Relevancy is bounded not necessarily by what 17 is encompassed in a Federal Register notice or by the CFRs; relevancy is a legal term, as this Panel 18 19 knows, that takes into account things that go 20 perhaps beyond what has been considered in previous 21 proceedings. 22 It's relevant that there is no capacity available onsite, it's relevant that there is a 23 24 stall on getting offsite capacity.

consequently -- and we've cited cases under the

Administrative Procedure Act, specifically the Kempthorne case -- it's 473 F.3d 94 -- that essentially stands for the proposition that notwithstanding whatever constraints that the Staff and Applicant would have you operate under in terms of considering whether offsite capacity is a relevant consideration, we believe that it's relevant to whether the application is adequate in terms of it anticipating what needs they will have on site for spent fuel storage, and for that reason, we think that it would be an error of judgment not to take those relevant factors into account and make them a part of this licensing decision.

And I think that when this Panel took the perhaps rather extraordinary step of actually making a citation to not only Secretary Chu's comments that we put in our petition, but then juxtaposing those to then-Chairman Klein's comments, it's a recognition, at least implicitly, that things are going on outside the constraints of the rulemaking that will have ultimately a bearing on the very real and very pragmatic decisions that need to be made about how to handle this waste stream. And for that reason, we would urge that the contentions at issue be admitted to this adjudication.

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JUDGE YOUNG: Just one question, from me, anyway. The requirements for contention admissibility include not just that issues be material but also that the issue is within the scope of the proceeding, and I think probably some of the case law that talks about licensing boards not considering contentions on issues that are the subject of rulemaking goes to whether an issue is within the scope of a proceeding.

It may be relevant to the ultimate issues at issue in the application but it may not be within the scope of the adjudication because it's being dealt with in another context. Do you want to address that?

MR. EYE: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

Again, to the extent that there is a disconnect between a rulemaking proceeding and a COLA adjudication, we think that it ought to be a consideration to err on the side of making sure that the COLA adjudication gets the attention, both in terms of these contentions and any others that are required, in order to ensure compliance with the Atomic Energy Act that licenses only be issued that are consistent with the public's interest.

JUDGE YOUNG: But if there is case law that

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says we are not to consider in an adjudication issues that are being dealt with in rulemaking and the rule that sets the criteria for contention admissibility includes one that says that a contention must demonstrate that the issue is within the scope of the proceeding, that's not something that would be sort of fuzzy so that we would err on the side of one thing or another. That's pretty clear, isn't it?

MR. EYE: It depends. It's clear if we want to operate under this idea that this particular application that is before you now need not take into consideration the reality that Yucca Mountain will not be available for its waste stream.

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but I guess the issues
that are facing us -- and I want you to address
those -- one, the Commission does have various ways
of addressing what they call generic issues in
various contexts, and the Commission has also stated
its concern about the efficient use of resources.

So if the Yucca Mountain issue is being dealt with in another context, among those being the current rulemaking on the Waste Confidence Rule, then I'm not sure that no matter how good or relevant your arguments on the merits of addressing

the issues may be, if the issues are going to be addressed in other contexts and there's law, there's precedent that says we should not address those if we find that you have not demonstrated that issue you raise is within the scope of the proceeding, then we really don't have any authority to -- I mean, as I explained at the beginning, our function, our neutrality, our duty to the rule of law depends on our following the law which includes rules and precedents as well as statutes, and you would not want us to bend that in favor of the Staff, for example.

And so in the same way, I don't think we can

And so in the same way, I don't think we can bend that in favor of however impassioned or sympathetic argument you may have on an issue in general. If the law is not there to support our admitting the contention, then we have as responsibility to the rule of law and to following whatever law is applicable in this situation.

So that's a mouthful, but do you want to respond to that.

MR. EYE: Yes, I do. I certainly am not advocating and the Petitioners don't advocate that you depart from the rule of law.

JUDGE YOUNG: I didn't think you were.

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And if I've suggested otherwise, it 1 MR. EYE: was a misstatement on my part. I'm simply saying 2 3 that interpretation of the rule of law here, as we see it, is a good deal more expansive than perhaps 4 the Staff and Applicant see it and perhaps the Panel 5 6 views it. 7 JUDGE YOUNG: Or perhaps the President views 8 it. Or perhaps. And that, again, is-9 MR. EYE: 10 probably subject to some challenge down the line perhaps. But if we go back to -- and I think that 11 12 it's a very pertinent consideration that you raise, because it certainly has a bearing on Petitioners 13 how efficiently these processes roll out. 14 15 We don't have the resources that other parties 16 do, and so we think that it is important that not 17 only for Commission purposes but for all parties' 18 purposes that we proceed in this thing as 19 efficiently as possible. 20 And in that regard, I guess we go back to the 21 suggestion that we made earlier: what is really 22 wrong with giving this some time to mature and take 23 into consideration what is not on the back burner 24 but what is moved up to the front burner in terms of 25 modifications to the Waste Confidence Rule or

proposed modifications of the rule, and deal with the reality of whatever that may be at the time rather than using a somewhat artificial constraint of what we think might be the rules in the future. Efficiency does make a difference. JUDGE YOUNG: Now, you do realize that if the new rule were to raise something new --Judge Mignerey, are you still with us? JUDGE MIGNEREY: Yes, I am. I guess I just have one comment to make, and that is the Petitioner's reply to plead for something that he called, I guess, sort of reality, and I don't think we have any good idea what the reality will be when a reactor actually comes on line.

JUDGE YOUNG: And the issue that I was going to raise, which sort of relates to that, is that if the new rule were to raise an issue that were not there before, such that you could legitimately get in a new contention under the rules on late-filed contentions, then that would be open to you. I think one of the other parties mentioned that earlier.

MR. EYE: True, assuming that the license proceeding had not progressed to a point where issuance of the license was effectively a fait

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accompli. Then it would be too late for us to raise a contention on a license that's already out the door and in the Applicant's hands. So that is a concern for us, and while we recognize that these proceedings on COLA adjudications tend to move, in relative terms, rather slowly, that doesn't necessarily have to be the case, and having worked in agencies before, I know that agencies get the reputation of moving very slowly, but when agencies decide they need to move fast, they can, and we don't want to be in a situation where we're operating under the Waste

Confidence Rule as it is now and a license is issued and then the real beneficiaries of a modified Waste Confidence Rule, or supposedly that we may be the beneficiaries of that, we are foreclosed from raising those arguments because the license

proceeding has matured to the point where it's

JUDGE YOUNG: By the way, I apologize for that; there's no way I can turn off other rings if we're leaving it open for Judge Mignerey to call.

> MR. EYE: Understood.

really no longer germane.

Anything further surrounding JUDGE YOUNG: issues or concern? There was the issue that you

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raised on terrorism, and if we did have a question on that, in light of the various case law that we cited in our question 3(c) in our May 27 memorandum, do you want to address that? And I think you had another contention -- Contention 19 also dealt with that, and we're sort of in a similar situation here. Go ahead.

MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, one thing I think is noteworthy is that most of the cases that were cited in the memorandum that the Panel sent around in anticipation of this hearing really predate the reality now of, using the Commission's language, of a changed-threat environment, inasmuch as the new regulations that deal with fires and explosions that I'm sure we'll probably address at some point in this proceeding.

This is another one of those reality checks, if you will, and we recognize that in the original petition, we didn't take up the question of whether there ought to be a 50.54(hh) consideration of spent-fuel -- dry-cask storage of spent fuel and so forth on site, but nevertheless, the concept of guarding against inadvertent radiological accidents or accidents -- releases, rather, caused by

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malicious acts, we think, is always germane to these proceedings. I mean, that's really the point is to control releases, to prevent releases.

And to the extent that we see that off-site disposition of high-level waste streams will not be available, it leaves only one place for that waste to go, and that is on site, so that triggers then other considerations about the safety and security of those particular facilities.

JUDGE YOUNG: I'm not following, I guess. The changed-threat environment, what did you mean by that, and why would not the Commission's decisions on terrorism-related issues -- and the case -- I think there is a pending case on this, I think maybe in the First Circuit. Is that right? Or that it soon will be before the First Circuit. But before us, the Commission has ruled that we don't address those issues in these types of proceedings. So I wasn't following what you meant.

MR. EYE: Right. Well, we take issue with that inasmuch as now that there's been a formalized regulatory decision in the context of 50.54(hh), that essentially embraces the idea that now more must be done --

JUDGE YOUNG: You're talking about fire

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protection.

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MR. EYE: I am, and -- fire and explosion protection and mitigation related to that. We think it's a logical extension of that to take into account those same considerations as it bears on dry-cask storage on site. Are we asking this Panel and the Commission to expand the scope of its considerations? Yes, we are. I'm not going to sit here and say otherwise, because we are. And why? Because we think it's consistent with the public's interest and those considerations that are germane under the Atomic Energy Act.

JUDGE YOUNG: If we address the fire protection considerations in the contention on that, how is there something left to address in this context?

MR. EYE: Because 50.54(hh) addresses the capacity of the licensee to maintain reactor -- or containment integrity, core cooling, and spent-fuel pool cooling. It doesn't extend to dry-cask storage, and we think that that's a consideration that's relevant and that would be, I think, a factor that ought to be considered in the context of these contentions related to onsite dry-cask storage.

It's just one of several contentions or

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considerations we think have a bearing on the whole onsite storage question.

MR. RUND: I'd just like to point out that the cases that the Board cited are recent, 2007, and the Third Circuit decision was 2009. That was just issued a few months ago, and those cases, we believe, are controlling. I'd also like to point out the NEPA principle that's expressed in those Commission decisions and in Third Circuit decision aren't based on an assessment of the current-threat environment. They're based on traditional NEPA principles that are somewhat analogous to tort principles in that NRC licensing decisions aren't the proximate cause of the environmental impacts caused by terrorist activities.

The Commission and Third Circuit have held that the terrorist activities aren't the cause -
I'm sorry -- the impacts resulting from those activities are too far removed and too attenuated from the NRC actions to warrant consideration under NEPA. And, you know, Petitioners -- now they're referencing in their reply impermissibly and here at oral argument a safety regulation, which is 50.54(hh).

And while Mr. Frantz has already addressed the

motion to strike, I just want to note that original Contention 3 referenced the environmental report, I counted, at least five or six times, and now they're, in their reply, attempting to essentially submit a new contention which, I recognize, overlaps a bit another contention, which we'll address later.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me back up just a second.

In the Commission's decisions that we cited in our question 3(c), those, I believe, all relate to license renewals, and there are Licensing Board decisions in COL cases, but there's no Commission decision in a COL case. Could there be -- could the types of cases be viewed differently since a COL is talking about the -- from the start essentially, and license renewal cases have traditionally been fairly limited in scope in comparison, for example, to a COL case?

MR. RUND: In fact, actually, one of the cases the Board did cite -- and we cited it on brief -- was in the Grand Gulf early site permit proceeding which, while not a COL, is a Part 52 proceeding that involved a new reactor, and while it's an early site permit, we think it's applicable here. It's also a Part 52 case.

JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead.

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MR. RUND: I just would want to add that we believe that the Grand Gulf decision, because it is a Part 52 case, and the Oyster Creek decision, while a license renewal case, that the logic applies, and those decisions are binding on the Board for ________ Contention 3, as well as Contention 19.

JUDGE YOUNG: Staff?

MS. SIMON: Thank you, Your Honor. We agree with the Applicant that the cases you cited are controlling. We would also note that the holding in these cases is that the NRC is not required under NEPA to consider environmental impacts of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant, and we believe that the NEPA issue is similar, both in license renewal and in the COL proceeding, even though in a license renewal proceeding, the safety side is limited to aging. So we would say that those cases are applicable, and therefore, that the terrorism aspect of Contention 3 and Contention 19, which essentially is a challenge to those cases, are both precluded by those cases which, since it's Commission precedent, must be followed by the Board.

May I just make one more note? If the

Petitioners are concerned that the new rule in

50.54(hh) should change something, then they do have

1 the avenue of a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2 2.802 to bring those concerns to the Commission. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: The concerns about bringing the casks as part of the -- bringing that within the 4 5 ambit of the rule? MS. SIMON: Right. If they felt that the new 6 7 fire safety rule should include that, then they could bring that to the Commission's attention 8 9 through a petition for rulemaking. 10 JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have any questions? 11 Judge Mignerey, do you have any questions? 12 JUDGE MIGNEREY: No, I do not. 13 JUDGE YOUNG: Did you have anything, just to 14 wrap up? 15 MR. EYE: Very briefly, Your Honor. The opinions, the judicial opinions about the scope of 16 17 NEPA as it applies to this question are not uniform, 18 as we know. There is a controlling Ninth Circuit 19 opinion that says otherwise, that says NEPA does 20 require a terrorist-related analysis. Now, the 21 Commission has taken the position that it will observe the Ninth Circuit's decision within the 22 23 Judge of the Ninth Circuit, but outside of it, they 24 reject it. 25 We're on sort of a constitutional collision

course here, if you will, and in order to avoid that, which I think our system really demands that we try to avoid, we're simply urging that the Ninth Circuit's decision about this matter be embraced and that it become Commission precedent, and --

JUDGE YOUNG: But, again, that's with the Commission, and, you know, these issues may be resolved at a level higher than this one, but what we have to decide may not be what you're wishing we would decide, but be limited to what we have authority to decide.

MR. EYE: And we understand that, Your Honor, and, again, part of our function here is to make sure that we make an adequate record, so that in terms of potential subsequent reviews, either administratively or judicial, that there's something there for those forums to consider.

JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right. If there's nothing more on Contentions 2 and 3, the next two contentions, 4 and 5, you did not file any reply on, and I guess -- I think you made a proviso that that should not be taken to mean that you agree that the contentions should be dismissed, but how should we take your failure to reply to the Applicant's and Staff's arguments?

1 MR. EYE: That we stand on the papers that we 2 filed originally, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have anything further to 4 add with regard to those? We have them before us. 5 Right. And, Your Honor, and MR. EYE: actually we've -- I think some of our discussion 6 7 has, by inference, dealt with some of the issues 8 that are raised in those various contentions. 9 In terms of the question that you raised, 10 then -- and I don't want to anticipate, but you do 11 address a question specifically to Contention 5, which is one of the contentions that there was not a 12 13 specific reply on. To the extent that those 14 questions that you've raised, that you want us to 15 address, if you want us to do that now, we can. 16 Otherwise, it's just however you want to proceed. 17 JUDGE YOUNG: Did any other party have any 18 arguments on Contention 4? 19 MR. MATTHEWS: This is Tim Matthews. I'11 be 2.0 addressing Contention 4 for the Applicant. 21 We, I guess, would point out that this 2.2 contention is one that has already been addressed 25 23 years ago in a similar adjudicatory proceeding and 24 been addressed all the way through the United States 25 Supreme Court and we think is resolved, and leave it

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| 2 | MS. SIMON: Your Honor, the Staff doesn't have |
| 3 | anything to add to the arguments already made. |
| 4 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Then on the question |
| 5 | on Contention 5 and that just had to do with the |
| 6 | particular part of the rule that I'm not sure. |
| 7 | It might make most sense to have Applicant or |
| 8 | the Staff begin on this one, that I think the |
| 9 | argument was that the table sets forth the |
| 10 | requirements, and there is language that talks about |
| 11 | that the table may be supplemented. |
| 12 | And I guess our question there was: If it may |
| 13 | be supplemented, how are the things that are in the |
| 14 | table, how would they be viewed as limiting if the |
| 15 | rule itself says that the table may be supplemented? |
| 16 | MS. SIMON: Did you want the Staff to go |
| 17 | first, Your Honor? |
| 18 | JUDGE YOUNG: I guess I was looking at the |
| 19 | Staff, because we were talking about a rule, but |
| 20 | whichever one of you want to go first. |
| 21 | MR. MATTHEWS: I'm happy to address it, Judge. |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. |
| 23 | MR. MATTHEWS: The 1984 rule recognized some |
| 24 | confusion in earlier decisions and added to Table S3 |
| 25 | language in 51.51 that the Board cited in its |

question, recognizing that the table, which only identifies the quantity of the effluents, not the health effects, that the language that the Board cites notes that that table, the data regarding emissions, can be supplemented by the Applicant in its environmental report to address those health effects. And a different section of the regulations, 41.45(b)(1), talks about the level of detail required to be addressed for a particular environmental impacts. In the environmental report, the Applicant does address the environmental impacts. That's in Section 5 -- I'm sorry -- the health effects, 5.7.1.7, where it addresses Table S3's effluents.

The Petitioner here does not challenge, either by omission that the health effects aren't -- or alleges health effects aren't addressed, I guess, but doesn't challenge the Applicant's discussion of the health effects. Rather, the Petitioners' challenge is to the quantity of the effluents and therefore impermissible.

JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead.

MS. SIMON: Your Honor, the Staff would just like to note that any additional analysis that is

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| 1 | provided by the Applicant could be the subject of an |
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| 2 | admissible contention, provided that the contention |
| 3 | admissibility rules are met, and as just stated by |
| 4 | the Applicant |
| 5 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: If anything's being said, I |
| 6 | can't hear anything. |
| 7 | MS. SIMON: I'm sorry. |
| 8 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: This is Judge Mignerey. |
| 9 | MS. SIMON: The staff |
| 10 | JUDGE YOUNG: Move the microphone a little bit |
| 11 | closer. |
| 12 | MS. SIMON: I'll be eating it. |
| 13 | JUDGE YOUNG: If possible. |
| 14 | MS. SIMON: Basically what the Applicant just |
| 15 | stated regarding the fact that the petition does not |
| 16 | address any supplemental discussion in his |
| 17 | contention but it's really attacking what the |
| 18 | content of Table S3 itself, and therefore, it's an |
| 19 | attack on Table S3 and not on any supplemental |
| 20 | discussion. |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: Does that conclude your |
| 22 | argument? |
| 23 | MS. SIMON: Yes, Your Honor. |
| 24 | JUDGE YOUNG: And I guess the question for you |
| 25 | really is: You say the off-site releases could |

| 1 | originate from various things, but you don't provide |
|----|--|
| 2 | much specific support, and you're nodding your head. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | MR. EYE: Well, correct, Your Honor. I mean, |
| 5 | the contention says what it says. But to a certain |
| 6 | extent, it's based upon an assumption that's made in |
| 7 | the environmental report by the Applicant, and the |
| 8 | assumption is likewise not very well supported in |
| 9 | the environmental report. Why? Because they're |
| 10 | dealing with some imponderables to a certain extent. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | They are too dealing with predictions about |
| 13 | what will happen or not happen in the future. Their |
| 14 | assumption and prediction is that everything will go |
| 15 | as planned and that there will never be any |
| 16 | significant releases to the environment of radiation |
| 17 | from these waste management activities. That's an |
| 18 | assumption that we frankly think is something that |
| 19 | should be challenged. |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: But the assumption is based on |
| 21 | the requirements of the rule essentially. Would you |
| 22 | agree? |
| 23 | MR. EYE: At least in part it is. Yes. It's |
| 24 | based on that, and again, it's based on the |
| 25 | necessity for the Applicant, in order to get its |

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 license, to perpetuate this assumption that there
will be no significant off-site releases of
radiation related to their waste management

activities. And that is a prediction.

That's an assumption that bears on the public's health and the environment. And to the extent that it's inconsistent with the public's interest, it's inconsistent with what is required under the Atomic Energy Act, and that's the point of our contention.

Let me summarize. It's difficult to square the Atomic Energy Act's mandate that licenses only be issued consistent with the public's interest when what we have related to Contention 5 is an assumption that is untested, a prediction that is based upon assumptions about what will happen in the future. It's difficult for us to square that with being in the public's interest when there is so — from a public health and environmental perspective, there's so much at stake potentially.

And so what we want this Board to do is essentially require the Applicant to back up and ask themselves some hard questions about onsite processing accidents, transportation accidents, offsite processing and so forth, in order to sharpen

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their assumptions and predictions about what consequences there could be related to releases of radiation when they engage in these kinds of management activities for waste. JUDGE YOUNG: You're being sort of general here, and I guess I'm having a little bit of trouble understanding where you depart from what the rules require the Applicant to do and the extent to which the contention would be a challenge to those, and the extent to which it would be anything other than that, particularly in view of the fact that the support you give for the contention is very sparse and somewhat speculative. MR. EYE: It's a commonsense kind of approach, Your Honor. It's a commonsense approach that challenges the Applicant to take account of things that they are now essentially protected from assuming under the rule. JUDGE YOUNG: Let me --MR. EYE: The rule the way it's structured allows the Applicant to avoid addressing what we can consider to be pertinent questions, and --

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, then, why is not your challenge, then, a challenge again to the rule, which is something that is outside the scope of an

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adjudication, which is something that if you have a 2 concern about what the rule permits, then your 3 remedy would be to ask the Commission to change the 4 rule. 5 That would be one remedy. MR. EYE: Another remedy would be a citation to the Atomic Energy Act 6 7 with the pertinent question being: Is issuance of a 8 license without taking into consideration the kinds 9 of issues that-we've raised in Contention 5 10 consistent with the public's interest? And 11 that's --12 JUDGE YOUNG: And you might bring that --13 MR. EYE: -- our overarching --14 JUDGE YOUNG: You might bring that at a level 15 higher than we are, but we're here today on -- first 16 of all, on what contentions are admissible under the 17 contention admissibility rules. 18 And I don't know that we need to go into all 19 the history of why the contention admissibility 20 rules are there and why the various provisions of 21 them are there, but the basic idea is to make sure 22 that in an adjudication, the issues that are 23 admitted for adjudication are limited to those that 24 are appropriate for adjudication and can -- and I'm 25 paraphrasing here -- but can reasonably be resolved

1 in an adjudication. 2 And the types of issues you're raising here 3 and possibly elsewhere tend -- sound in some sense more like policy issues, challenges, you say, to the 4 5 adequacy of a rule, which are not the kind of issues 6 that are normally and that can maybe reasonably be 7 addressed in an adjudication, which is geared more towards specific factual issues that are subject to 8 9 what takes place in litigation. 10 MR. EYE: Right. And we recognize those 11 constraints that this Board operates under, Your 12 I'm not disputing that. But, again, we're 13 here partly also to make sure that we make a good 14 record --15 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. 16 MR. EYE: -- and preserve these issues as is 17 needed. 18 JUDGE YOUNG: And you've done that. 19 you. 20 MR. EYE: Thank you. JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further? 21 22 JUDGE ARNOLD: Yes. JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead. 23 24 JUDGE ARNOLD: Absolutely. First, in this 25 contention, Petitioners state, "The environmental

1 report assumes that there will be no significant 2 radioactive releases to the environment related to off-site disposal." Applicant, would you agree that that's a 4 5 proper -- a correct characterization? Did you make that assumption, or was that the result of some sort 6 7 of evaluation? 8 MR. MATTHEWS: The Applicants, pursuant to 10 9 CFR 51.51 incorporated Table S3 as required. 10 S3 considers releases, both from high-level waste 11 and low-level wastes. In fact, it very 12 conservatively estimates those releases, 13 conservatively meaning higher. 14 The Table S3 makes some very conservative 15 assumptions, as the Supreme Court recognized, about, 16 for example, early release of fission-product gases 17 and higher fuel consumption than a -- in the nominal 18 reactor than Comanche Peak would actually use. 19 So the question is, we think, not whether 20 Table S3 is correct. It's whether Table S3 21 considered release of radionuclides. 22 JUDGE ARNOLD: And in your understanding of 23 the derivation of that table, was it just back-of-24 the-envelope estimation or was there some explicit

evaluation, looking at specific radionuclides, their

decay, their transport and whatever. 1 2 MR. MATTHEWS: Judge Arnold, I'd say the 3 record is very clear --JUDGE MIGNEREY: This is Judge Mignerey. 4 Ι 5 believe the problem is we have voice-activated 6 microphones, and if you do not get close enough to 7 activate them, I hear absolutely nothing. 8 MR. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Judge Mignerey. 9 I'll lean in. 10 The record is very clear with respect to the 11 references cited in footnote 1 to Table S3. extensively evaluate radiological release at all 12 13 phases of the uranium fuel cycle, and in fact, the uranium fuel cycle analysis is specifically for 14 that -- for consideration of these environmental 15 effects in the context of reactor licensing. They 16 17 are not, for example, to consider the environmental 18 effects in licensing Yucca Mountain or any other 19 waste storage or disposal facility. 20 JUDGE ARNOLD: In 10 CFR 51 on environmental reports, it basically says that the report should 21 22 discuss environmental impacts to an extent proportional to their significance. Would you 23

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consider what you did concerning Table S3 to be

consistent with the environmental importance of

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disposal?

MR. MATTHEWS: Absolutely, Judge Arnold. As the Commission has held, the impacts of the uranium fuel cycle itself are very low. We are talking here about one aspect of the uranium fuel cycle, and I would point the Board to a recent Commission decision denying a petition to amend Table S3. It's in March of 2008.

The Commission held that, "The NRC has made a generic determination that the radiological impacts of the uranium fuel cycle will remain at or below the Commission's regulatory limits, and as such, are of small significance." That's just over a year ago, so to the extent that things have changed, it has only moved in the more conservative direction.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay.

JUDGE YOUNG: But do you have a more specific citation for that?

MR. MATTHEWS: I'm sorry. It's 73 Federal Register 14946 at 14947.

JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.

JUDGE ARNOLD: The petition goes on to say that, "The COLA should fully consider the public health and environmental consequences of major releases to the environment of radioactive materials

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as a result of off-site disposal activities. Offsite releases could originate from onsite
processing, transportation accidents, off-site
processing, and long-term releases from the disposal

Now, I would basically think that long-term releases from the disposal site and off-site processing would really fall under the licensing activity doing the processing or the storage and be more appropriate there. But I do see on-site processing and transportation accidents. Does your environmental report address those?

MR. MATTHEWS: Judge Arnold, the Commission considered not only each phase of the uranium fuel cycle, but considered what aspects in each of those phases would be of environmental significance. It considered those and specifically addressed them.

So to the extent that the Commission has held -- has decided what's important, yes. It specifically includes management of low-level wastes in Table S3, including transportation.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Is that S3 or S4, because it says if you don't meet all the criteria for S4, you have to do a separate evaluation.

MR. MATTHEWS: Table S4 goes to transportation

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of radioactive wastes, and Table S4 is incorporated 2 in the application as well. It is addressed in 3 Section 5.7, consideration of the uranium fuel cycle. There is a discussion in the environmental 5 report. Petitioners do not cite any authority -- they 7 don't quarrel with any aspect of what is in the 8 environmental report. They don't raise an issue 9 under 1(e)(6) or f(1)(6) -- point to some issue, 10 much less cite authority challenging what is in the 11 report or the Commission's regulation. 12 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Thank you. And over to Petitioner, you've characterize it 13 as an assumption, whereas Applicant says that there 14 15 is a significant evaluation behind it. So when I 16 look at your contention and it says that that 17 assumption should not be used, I would expect to see something here that clearly showed some evidence 18 19 that that statement was wrong. What do you have 20 to -- what can you provide in that arena? 21 MR. EYE: That the assumption about no 22 releases is wrong? 23 JUDGE ARNOLD: Correct. 24 It would be partly based on the lack MR. EYE:

of actual experience that we have with anything that

even resembles dealing with high-level wastes at a repository or with the frequency of transportation necessity to get those materials there. These are -- the assumptions are based upon a lack of actual operating experience.

So it's a little bit like trying to prove a negative, I suppose, and, again, we go back to taking a commonsense approach to these kinds of questions.

Now, again, I want to make sure that I don't get crossways with the Board. We cited 5.7.1.6 in our contention and essentially noted that the Applicant had adopted the assumptions that were built into the NRC's policy about no releases being pertinent -- or being made or being realized over -- through these activities.

We think that's an assumption that's not justifiable, and to the extent that we are here to preserve that issue and to make some record on it, that's partly our function, and to the extent that it is to call attention to what we think is a deficiency in the license application that has its origins in what we consider to be a deficient NRC policy, then we are making a record on that as well, to the extent that these are assumptions.

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1 I mean, it jumped out at me when I read the 2 environmental report that such absolute terms were 3 used, absolute terms like, There will be no 4 significant radioactive release. There are very few 5 absolutes in this world, as I've experienced it, and to say that there will be no significant radioactive 6 7 release over the duration of time that we're dealing 8 with seems to me to be an absolutism that we should 9 be very cautious about adopting and embracing. 10 And that's why we're here is to make a record 11 on those kinds of assumptions. 12 JUDGE YOUNG: But isn't the operative word 13 there, though, "significant"? 14 MR. EYE: Yes. Well, there's two operative 15 words: "no" and "significant." Yes. 16 significant really doesn't have -- I mean, it's not 17 necessarily self-defining in this context. What is 18 significant to one person may be insignificant to 19 another. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have any support for the argument that the determinations that were made in 21 22 adopting the tables don't address the issue of 23 significance effectively? 24 MR. EYE: To the extent that there is an

understatement --

JUDGE YOUNG: I mean, not that we would allow 2 a challenge to the rule, but --3 Right. MR. EYE: JUDGE YOUNG: -- I think the significance 4 5 issue -- I think the argument that we would hear from the Applicant would be that the significance 6 7 issue is addressed in the rule. MR. EYE: Well, to the extent that we believe 8 9 that the significance is tied to assumptions about exposures to radiation and the health effects 10 11 related thereto, we think that those assumptions are 1.2 not robust enough, if you will. They don't account for the full range of 13 14 potential health effects that might be realized from 15 a, quote, insignificant release of radiation even, 16 because it's the Commission's policy that exposure 17 to any ionizing radiation carries with it the risk 18 of radiation-related disease and/or genetic defects. 19 So significance really here begs some definition, I 20 suppose, because even under the NRC's policy, any 21 exposure carries risk, and to the extent that there 22 is risk, that has significance. 23 And so if we -- again, I don't want to play a 24 semantics game, but you pointed out, isn't the

operative word "significant." Any release is

significant to the extent that it has a health 1 2 effect or the potential for a health effect. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But you are -- we still 4 sort of circle back around to it being a challenge 5 to the rule, it sounds like. 6 MR. EYE: It -- well, implicitly it is, but 7 this Applicant is the beneficiary of that, and to the extent that we are trying to keep the Applicant 8 9 from becoming the beneficiary of this rule, that's 10 our purpose or one of our purposes here. 11 JUDGE ARNOLD: You look like you want to say 12 something. 13 MS. SIMON: I just wanted to reiterate that the statement that the Petitioners are challenging 14 15 is a statement regarding NRC's assumptions that are 16 built into Table S3 regarding the releases from 17 wastes, and as you pointed out, it is a challenge to 18 the rule, a challenge to Table S3. There is no 19 dispute in the petition regarding the Applicant's 20 analysis of transportation impacts, for example, 21 which are in -- not only in Section 5.7, but, I believe, also in Sections 3.8 and 7.4 of the 22 23 environmental report. JUDGE YOUNG: Let's take five minutes. 24 25 (A brief recess was taken.)

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Back on the record.

I was just saying we'll move on to Contention 6 now, and then we don't know how long or involved or what the nature of the argument on Contention 7 will be in light of the recent filings from the Applicant related to Contention 7. If they're relatively short, we can try to deal with those before lunch, otherwise, maybe we can just summarize what needs to be addressed and then be prepared to come back after lunch and address that.

On Contention 6, that's another on which you did not file a reply, and I guess some of the issues in Contention 6 are similar to some of the other issues we've been discussing with regard to raising general sort of overarching concerns that may not be that related to the types of things that are normally addressed in litigation settings.

What would you like to add with regard to those concerns? And I assume you're standing on your original contention there. Do you have anything just briefly to address the other concern that I just mentioned?

ME. EYE: To the extent that it is, again, going back and dealing with assumptions made to the benefit of the Applicant based on Commission rules

and so forth, my response would be the same as 1 2 before, Your Honor. I don't want to belabor the 3 record, but that would be how we would deal with 4 that. 5 JUDGE YOUNG: Applicant? ME. RUN: We have nothing further to add other 6 7 than the fact that Contention 6 is also a challenge to the Waste Confidence Rule as it stands now, and 8 it also relates to the ongoing rulemaking, and 9

JUDGE YOUNG: Staff?

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MS. SIMON: Thank you, Your Honor. I would like to address the question that the Board asked to the Petitioners, because I'd like to make a clarification.

therefore, is outside the scope of the proceeding.

It is technically possible under the regulations for a licensee to store spent fuel afer the termination of a part 52 license. The way that would happen would be if the licensee applied for and obtained a part 72 license before the Part 52 license was terminated, and if the licensee did so, they would be subject to the decommissioning requirements of Part 72 when they wanted to end that license and the spent fuel would then have to be transported offsite. So I just wanted to make a

technical correction to that.

The point that the Staff was trying to make was that as long as spent fuel is on site, the site will be subject to an NRC license and NRC regulatory authority, therefore, the specific issue that was raised in this contention, which is that the COLA should consider public health and environmental consequences of requiring government units to become custodian of spent fuel after the license lapses is really not a possible scenario under the regulations.

JUDGE YOUNG: I guess one thing, having done a license termination proceeding in the past, that I might share with you is that at the point at which a license termination plan is being undertaken, there is a right to a hearing at that point. Do you have anything to add in light of what the Staff has said?

ME. EYE: Your Honor, I don't other than to say the import of our contention was really, again, we're dealing with such long periods of time and so many imponderables in terms of -- and I'm not casting aspersions on the Applicant at all here, but we know that some of our major business institutions that have been longstanding in our country and our economy have failed, have gone away, and it cuts

across industrial lines, whether it's the airlines,
utilities, whatever.

And it's, to us, incumbent to try take into

And it's, to us, incumbent to try take into account the scenarios, the contingencies that might pertain to dealing with a default, because there is no means by which to prevent a default. A default, by its very nature, is outside the scope of what a legal requirement would allow, but defaults happen on contracts and in other matters, and it just seems to us that when we're talking about virtually generations of time that a contingency that deals with what happens to a facility where there has been a default of a license is a pertinent consideration, and that was primarily the emphasis of that contention.

JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just ask a question of the Staff with regard to the last issue touched on.

There are financial requirements of applicants. Do you want to just give a short explanation of what provisions there are that would address the concerns about defaults?

ME. BIGGINS: Jim Biggins for the Staff, Your Honor. I'll answer this specific question.

50.75 provides for decommissioning funding assurance for the disposal of waste, and so the

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Commission does take into consideration through its rules -- as a later contention you can address -- is the ability of the licensee to dispose of waste on site and off site. So that is not necessarily directly addressed in anticipation of question 6, but the Commission does have rules and procedures for dealing with the disposal of waste, so that's what we would follow.

JUDGE YOUNG: Did the Applicant want to make any response to the last concern raised?

ME. RUN: I'd just like to add that this contention is focused on the environmental impacts of onsite storage, and that's squarely addressed in the current Waste Confidence Rule, paragraph (b), which does apply clearly to combined license applications.

MS. SIMON: Your Honor, may I just make one more point? I don't have the Atomic Energy Act in front of me, but I believe it's Sections 186 and 188 there's discussion of revocation of licenses, and I believe that there is a provision that allows the Commission to take control of a site in circumstances where, for instance, a license has been revoked, so I would imagine that those sections would apply also in the case of a default.

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The Commission does, as Mr. Biggins said, have regulations specifically to decommissioning funding requirements that have to be reviewed that try to minimize any possibility of that, of a default, but in that event, I believe the Commission does have some power to take control of the site.

JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further?

ME. EYE: Only, Your Honor, to the extent that, I mean; we're sort of going into a separate contention on the funding assurance, but we're proceeding somewhat along those lines in this argument anyway; I don't see anything wrong with doing that.

You know, the funding assurance really is a stream of revenue that accumulates over time, and the accumulation -- the large accumulation of funding over time is really what counts. If there's a default that predates that and the funding has not reached a point where it's a meaningful enough amount of money to deal with the consequences of spent fuel and so forth, now you've got a situation where the default has happened, the stream of revenue has stopped, yet there's still problems with spent fuel that need to be dealt with. Well, who's going to embrace that problem?

And as we suggest in our contention, really the only institutions in our society that are set up to do that in any kind of meaningful way would be units of government, and to the extent that that is a scenario that can't be ruled out, there are health and environmental effects that we believe ought to be accounted for and dealt with accordingly.

JUDGE YOUNG: Just one last question from me on this. Do you have any authority for the idea that this adjudication should consider, for example, what governmental entity will have responsibility for these problems that you assert cannot be ruled out?

ME. EYE: The Atomic Energy Act, 42 USC 2133(d), which says these license ought to be issued in the public interest or consistent with the public interest -- I'm paraphrasing, but that's essentially the legal authority that we believe ultimately would have to be satisfied.

MS. SIMON: Your Honor, may I just respond briefly and say that even if a government entity did take over, they would have to have an NRC license to possess spent fuel on the site, so again, there's no situation where spent fuel onsite would not be covered by an NRC license.

1 ME. EYE: Well, Your Honor, that again assumes 2 that a governmental entity will do two things: 3 apply for the license, and get it. And those are assumptions, those are predictions, and to the 4 5 extent that they are questions that even Staff now implicitly raises, we think that they're germane to 6 7 the COLA adjudication. 8 JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further on Contention 9 6? 10 (No response.) JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Contention 7 11 presents a couple of unusual situations. This is 12 one in which the Staff agreed that it was 13 14 admissible; however, the Applicant has filed 15 subsequent information recently which it asserts in 16 effect renders Contention 7 moot, because you do 17 address the things that are challenged in Contention 18 7. 19 Mr. Eye, what's your position in response to 20 the information that's been filed by the Applicant, and where do you see us going from here? 21 22 ME. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor. The information at issue has been classified 23 24 as SUNSI, S-U-N-S-I, and we've made an application 25 to get access to it under that provision.

haven't gotten a response to that application for 1 access as of yet. So we don't know, frankly, 3 whether what's been submitted is consistent with what's required under the regulatory provisions or 4 not, or whether it's arguable even. 5 JUDGE YOUNG: But you have made an That's really what I was trying to get application. 8 at. We have. It's last week that we made it. JUDGE YOUNG: Once that's resolved, then if we often use is once you become aware of new

you wish to challenge that information, then you can file a new contention. Basically the rule of thumb information that could lead to a new contention, if you file that new contention within 30 days of receiving that new information. And I think, unless anyone points out a reason --

ME. BIGGINS: Judge, Jim Biggins for the Staff again. We are currently reviewing that SUNSI access request. I would point out that that is not a matter for decision by this Board according to the order that as attached to the Federal Register notice of hearing. Once the Staff makes its determination, according to that order, there is a

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1 specific period of time -- I believe it's 25 days --2 for filing a contention based on the information, 3 and so the Staff's position is that both the Staff, 4 the Applicant and the Petitioners are all bound by 5 the terms of that order. JUDGE YOUNG: That's fine, thank you for 6 pointing that out. So that would be 25 days then. 7. ME. EYE: That's what we assumed it would be. 8 9 And again, we're operating under the assumption that 10 we're going to get access. 11 JUDGE YOUNG: What is the provision in the order, if any, about the circumstances of any appeal 12 of the Staff's order if it were to be a denial? 13 ME. BIGGINS: If the Staff denies the request, 14 15 the Petitioner, or as the order calls them, the Requester, has the opportunity to appeal the Staff's 16 17 decision, and that appeal would likely be referred 18 to this Board for consideration. 19 JUDGE YOUNG: That's what I've done in 20 previous cases, so I sort of assumed that probably 21 would be what would happen here. 22 ME. BIGGINS: I would ask that this Board be 23 very careful in discussing this matter at this time because of the separation of function consideration 24 25 that if there is an appeal from any decision,

1 whether it be by the Petitioners or by the 2 Applicant, this Board would have to consider it, and 3 we wouldn't want any bias to occur from today's 4 proceeding. 5 JUDGE YOUNG: We will assure you that we will refrain from all possible bias, at least any that 6 7 we're aware of. 8 ME. BIGGINS: Thank you, Judge. 9 JUDGE YOUNG: And if you want to try to make 10 us aware of any that we're not aware of, you're free 11 to do that too. 12 So it sounds as though you're all -- everybody 13 is on the same page here; we all know what's going 14 to happen at this point, and so there's not really 15 anything more to discuss with regard to Contention 7 16 today, or is there? 17 ME. FRANTZ: I'm afraid I'm not quite on the 18 same page. JUDGE YOUNG: Or, okay. Excuse me for 19 20 stepping ahead too far. 2.1 ME. BIGGINS: The Staff would like to respond 22 to the question itself as well. I don't believe 23 we've had that opportunity yet. 24 JUDGE YOUNG: Now, the question, you mean? 25 ME. BIGGINS: The question specifically asking

what the significance of the filing is, and the 1 2 Staff's position originally on Contention 7 was that 3 it was admissible in part; however, the Staff 4 position now is that with the filing the contention 5 is now moot, the portion that was admissible is б moot. 7 JUDGE YOUNG: But that's based on the information that we don't have now. Right? 8 ME. BIGGINS: Well, the Staff has that 9 information and believes that the information meets 10 11 at least filing requirements for the rule itself. Similar to a docketing decision, the Staff would 12 13 reserve the right to ask RAIs of the Applicant as 14 necessary, but we believe the information moots the 15 contention, which was one purely of omission. 16 The contention was essentially that there was 17 a new rule, the information as not provided as 18 required by the rule, the Staff's position is that 19 the information has now been provided, and 20 therefore, that contention itself is moot. If, as new information, a new contention could 21 be crafted by the Petitioners, obviously that would 22 fall under the criteria for a late-filed contention. 23 JUDGE YOUNG: And since you're talking about 24 25 information that none of us, other than the

2 Judge? JUDGE ARNOLD: I believe so. 3 4 JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead. 5 JUDGE ARNOLD: The original petition makes 6 reference in several places to design control 7 documents and that's outside of the scope of the COLA, so I'm thinking that there is -- and I make 8 the assumption that what the Applicant submitted did 9 10 not address any changes to any of the design control documentation. Is that correct? 11 ME. FRANTZ: First of all, if I may state our 12 13 position, we also agree that the contention is now moot. 14 15 Judge Arnold, turning to your question, I 16 can't get into the details, obviously, of the report, but it is SUNSI. I will note that the 17 applicant for the design and certification for the 18 19 U.S. APWR did submit a report that addresses the 20 substance of the rule, even though the rule was not 21 in effect at that point in time, and we then developed our report under 52.80(d) of the rule in 22 23 light of the information supplied by the design and certification applicant. 24

Applicant and the Staff has, is there anything left?

JUDGE ARNOLD: So I guess I'm getting the

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2 potential issues still there, but we're not in the position to address them now. 3 MR. BIGGINS: Judge, if I may, to directly 4 5 respond to your questions well, Staff believes that the portion of the contention that attacked the 6 7 design certification was the inadmissible portion of the contention, and so now the contention is 8 9 either -- is wholly inadmissible, either because it 10 was an attack on the design certification document, or is not moot based on filing by the Applicant. 11 JUDGE ARNOLD: My intention was to see if we 12 13 could address at this time that portion of the 14 contention that you originally considered 15 inadmissible, and I'm starting to think that we 16 can't, simply because of the Applicant's statement 17 that there has been some change to the design 18 control documents. 19 MR. FRANTZ: I'm sorry. I may not have been 20 precise. I did not say that there was a change. 21 JUDGE ARNOLD: Oh. 22 MR. FRANTZ: I said that we developed our report in light of the report submitted by 23 24 Mitsubishi for the U.S. APWR design certification. 25 And, again, I hate to go into much more detail,

impression now that there are issues -- there are

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because this is all classified or SUNSI information, both from Mitsubishi's standpoint and from our aspect, for our COL application.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Does anyone see any reason then why we can't address that portion of the contention that the Staff considered inadmissible right from the start, that being safety analysis, PRA, and

other documents of that sort?

MR. FRANTZ: Well, I agree certainly there.

To the extent that they're challenging the PRA, that would obviously be outside the scope of this proceeding and outside the scope, frankly, of 50.54(hh). 50.54(hh) pertains to a deterministic event, namely you postulate a large fire or explosion. It has nothing to do with the PRA per se.

Similarly, to the extent that they challenged the environmental report, again, there's something that is relevant in 50.54(hh) to the environmental report. That's a safety evaluation, not an environmental evaluation. And then based upon the reply from the Petitioners, I understand that there are criticisms of the DCD for the U.S. APWR were based upon the fact that they don't believe the DCD addresses fully the new rule 50.54(hh).

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And so I don't -- based upon that representation by the Petitioners, I don't believe that they were intending to challenge the DCD. What they were intending to do is to challenge whether or not the Applicant for the COLA had submitted the report required by 52.80(d).

JUDGE ARNOLD: Let's go to the Petitioner and see what they intended.

MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor. Actually, counsel for the Applicant, his comments just now are, I think, pretty close to what we were attempting to do. What we recognize is that there's something of a hierarchy of documentation here that results in an environmental report and an application. That hierarchy includes the design control document, and it includes the FSAR.

Now, to the extent that we have a new regulatory provision that's been adopted by the Commission in March of this year, that implicates that hierarchy of documents, both the DCD and the FSAR and the ER, or whatever else in that compendium might be germane. It is something that ought to be considered. It's a new circumstance.

To be fair to the Applicant, when they drew up their DCD and their FSAR and their ER, 50.54(hh) was

just a glimmer in somebody's imagination, I suspect, or maybe it doesn't even reach that point. Well, now 50.54(hh) is the law of the land, and whatever documentation in that hierarchy has a bearing on it, on 50.54(hh), the compliance therewith, ought to be considered in this COLA adjudication, because the environmental report really is just -- has -- is built on the foundation of the DCD and the FSAR, at

least in large measure.

And when we went back and looked at the DCD, it was for the purpose of determining, What does it say now; how does it address now the prospect of large fires and explosions taking major portions of a plant out of service; what does it say now, because it was possible from our view that they already anticipated that.

Well, when we went back and looked at the source documents, it was pretty clear to us that they had not anticipated the magnitude of fires and explosions that are anticipated under the new regulatory requirements, and so we did criticize those. But it was for the purpose of saying, If they're offering up the status quo to you as satisfying 50.54(hh), it's not enough; it doesn't work.

And that was part of our emphasis there was anticipating that the Applicant might attempt to say, Well, we've already addressed 50.54(hh) in our current documentation, and we were anticipating that and addressed it accordingly. But -- and this may be far too -- you know, splitting hairs far too much.

Whether our contention -- the balance of our contention is considered moot and we wait around to see what the information -- assuming we get access to it and that we can evaluate it and so forth, and then we do another contention, or whether this Panel simply says, We're going to hold back in abeyance for now, until the Petitioners get an opportunity to see the information that's been filed and amend their contention accordingly.

Procedurally it probably doesn't make very much difference, so long as we get access to the information that we need to make that evaluation.

In our papers I believe what we've suggested is the latter, that you not find that this contention is moot, but rather find that the original contention, as bifurcated under the Staff's analysis and the Applicant's analysis, bifurcated, one, to say, Was the information in the original documentation -- I

think there was an agreement, implicitly, that it was not, making the contention germane -- but then the substance of the information having now been submitted renders the contention moot.

We would prefer that you just not make a ruling on that mootness argument now, until we do have an opportunity to address the new information and submit that evaluation to this Panel for its consideration, and then make a determination as to whether or not the contention should be admitted into the full adjudication. It's more of a procedural mechanism than anything else.

MR. FRANTZ: If I could respond briefly to that, first of all, Judge Arnold, I have been authorized by my client to say that our 52.80(d) report does not deviate from the design control document, so at least we can tell you that much.

With respect to comments by Petitioners that you perhaps hold this contention in abeyance pending their access to our report, again, I think the case law is very clear that the appropriate process is to dismiss the contention as moot and then enable the Petitioners, as warranted, to raise a new contention based upon the new information that we've submitted.

JUDGE YOUNG: The only problem about holding

it moot at this point is that we don't have access to the information that you've submitted at this point. We have not been provided it, and I'm not sure that -- I mean, in one sense, it seems to make more sense to just hold off until the decision has been made, and if necessary, appealed and another decision made on access before ruling on the contention as a whole. I mean, there may be some parts of it that could be separated out, but in looking at it, it almost seems as though those are not part of the contention itself. They're part of the argument in support of the contention. So I guess I'm not following how we would rule that it's moot at this point.

MR. FRANTZ: You do have the representation by counsel for the NRC Staff that they have reviewed our report and find it essentially to be equivalent to a docketing decision, where they found it be sufficient to further --

JUDGE YOUNG: I'm not sure that would lead us to automatically do that.

MR. FRANTZ: No. But I think given that representation by the Staff, that's a sufficient basis for classifying it as moot, with the

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2 contention based upon the content of that report 3 once they have access to it. 4 JUDGE YOUNG: Well, unless you gave me some 5 specific authority that we would rely on that 6 representation by the Staff, in the absence of 7 seeing the information on which a mootness 8 determination were made, I don't see how we could 9 make that --10 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I would suggest then, 11 because it is with the NRC, that I believe the Board 12 could get access to that document if they wanted to. 13 MR. BIGGINS: Yes. 14 JUDGE YOUNG: And I'm not sure the Board would 15 want to, at least I'm not sure that I would feel 16 comfortable making a determination based on information that all parties did not have access to. 17 18 Is there really any reason not to hold off on this? 19 MR. FRANTZ: Well, right now, both the 20 Applicant and the NRC Staff object to all the 2.1 contentions. If you want to --JUDGE YOUNG: Is there any reason to support 22 23 your objection? Is there any real practical reason 24 why we shouldn't hold off on making this ruling 25 until all parties have access to the information on

realization that Petitioners can always submit a new

| 1 | which the ruling would be based? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes, because we |
| 3 | MR. BIGGINS: Judge |
| 4 | MR. FRANTZ: believe that the parties |
| 5 | that the Petitioners have not satisfied the |
| 6 | requirements for admissibility as a party |
| 7 | JUDGE YOUNG: What is the practical impact of |
| 8 | holding off on making a ruling? |
| 9 | MR: BIGGINS: Judge, if I may |
| 10 | JUDGE YOUNG: Hold on. |
| 11 | MR. BIGGINS: Yes, Judge. |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: Hold on. What is the practical |
| 13 | impact of holding off on making the ruling? |
| 14 | MR. FRANTZ: The practical impact is that the |
| 15 | Petitioners then essentially have party status, and |
| 16 | you've admitted them as Intervenors. And that's the |
| 17 | practical harm to us. |
| 18 | JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm not sure that you can |
| 19 | even say that at this point, but in any event, do |
| 20 | you have any support for the argument that an |
| 21 | adjudicator would make a ruling based on information |
| 22 | that one party does not have access to and on which |
| 23 | there has been a request for access and the |
| 24 | determination on which has not yet been made? I |
| 25 | mean, I think that would go beyond any normal |

1 understanding of what adjudication consists of. 2 MR. FRANTZ: Well, there are oftentimes NRC 3 Staff determinations that are not subject to review 4 by the Board. For example --5 JUDGE YOUNG: But that one is. 6 MR. FRANTZ: And what I'm suggesting here is 7 that, for example, the Staff determination on 8 docketing can be accepted by the Board without 9 further review. I think this decision also by the 10 Staff, that the report that we've submitted is 11 sufficient for their review under the rule. That should be sufficient for rendering this condition 12 13 moot. JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further? 14 15 MR. BIGGINS: Yes, Judge. The Staff position 16 is that it is a Staff determination whether or not 17 the Petitioners receive access to the SUNSI 18 information. Yes, that is reviewable by the Board 19 should it be denied and appealed. However, the 20 Board has to consider the situation where if SUNSI 21 access is denied and the Board were to uphold that 22 determination, then this contention would have to be 23 ruled on by the Board without allowing access to the 24 Petitioners to the information. 25 JUDGE YOUNG: Let's assume that possibility

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| 1 | were to occur. |
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| 2 | MR. BIGGINS: Certainly. |
| 3 | JUDGE YOUNG: Is there really any reason to |
| 4 | make that determination now, based on the |
| 5 | possibility that we might get to that point, rather |
| 6 | than waiting to that point and having that brief, |
| 7 | because we're talking about extremely unusual |
| 8 | situation where any forum would render a decision |
| 9 | where all parties did not have access to the |
| 10 | information, and we're being asked to do that in the |
| 11 | absence of further briefing on the possibility that |
| 12 | we might get to a point where we would rule that the |
| 13 | Petitioner should not have access to this? I mean, |
| 14 | do you realize what you're arguing here? |
| 15 | MR. BIGGINS: I do. I do, Judge. And I would |
| 16 | point out that that is a possibility considered in |
| 17 | the Commission's order that was part of the notice |
| 18 | of hearing, Federal Register notice. If the |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: Where? Give us the reference to |
| 20 | that. |
| 21 | MR. BIGGINS: The Federal Register notice |
| 22 | itself? |
| 23 | JUDGE YOUNG: To the part where the Commission |
| 24 | made a specific said anything whatsoever that |

should lead us to a conclusion that we should make a

2 MR. BIGGINS: My point, Judge, referring to 3 the Federal Register notice, was that there is a 4 possibility that SUNSI access can be denied. That's the whole point of an access --6 JUDGE YOUNG: And there's something in the --7 MR. BIGGINS: -- provision. 8 JUDGE YOUNG: -- Federal Register notice to suggest that determinations should be made prior to 9 10 reaching that point? 11 MR. BIGGINS: As a --JUDGE YOUNG: What is the practical reason for 12 13 doing it now rather than after the point at which any determinations are made on access? 14 15 MR. BIGGINS: As a practical matter, this is a contention purely of omission, and the information 16 17 has been provided, which the staff has received and 18 accepted the information and says that it is now --19 has now been provided on the docket, the Board has 20 access to that information to make its 21 determination. 22 Access by the Petitioners is not necessary for the Board to review that information and determine 23 24 whether or not the contention -- that portion of the 25 contention is now moot.

ruling of this nature.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. If the parties would like to brief this issue, you're free to do that, but -- and we'll set any necessary deadlines for you to do that, but I personally would expect to get some good legal authority for the argument that we should, especially at this point, make any ruling based on information of which all parties are not aware.

I mean, the general case law out there in the rest of the world -- we're talking about very cutting-edge issues, and you're blithely arguing to us that we should make a ruling based on information that the Petitioners don't have access to. And so before we do that, I will expect to get briefs from all parties on any legal authority that we have any authority to do that, especially at this point.

So one would be the authority for us to do that and the extent to which that goes, and two would be why we should do that now, rather than wait until later.

And I haven't heard one practical reason that would persuade me at this point that there's any benefit in doing this now rather than a few months down the line, how that would make any difference to anyone such that we should do it at this point.

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The Applicant says that we should do it at this point because that might result in Petitioner 2 3 getting party status. I'm not sure I follow the logic of that. That could be included in the 4 briefs, but --5 6 MR. BIGGINS: Perhaps I --7 JUDGE YOUNG: -- I certainly, -- certainly you would need to brief this further before you got any 8 9 ruling from us of that nature, at least from me. MR. BIGGINS: Well, Judge, perhaps I 10 11 misunderstand the Board's position, but my point -the simple point I am trying to make is that the 12 Board can -- has the authority to make the decision 13 on this contention, even if the Petitioners are not 14 15 allowed access to that information, and if you look at the inverse of the situation, if the Board 16 refuses to rule on this contention until the 17 18 Petitioners are granted access, that is an 19 assumption that they would be granted access under 20 the --JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Biggins, you're not 21 listening very well, or you're --22 MR. BIGGINS: -- terms of the --23 24 JUDGE YOUNG: -- not understanding very well. 25 My question to you is: Why should we even make a

has been made? I might also point out that we're 2 3 talking not about safeguards information or classified information. We're talking about 4 unclassified, not safeguards information, and 5 whether they should have access to that so that they 6 7 can draft a contention that addresses the information to which they now do not have access. 8 And I don't think you realize how unusual the 9 arguments you're making are. I mean, these are 10 11 issues that -- any -- these are issues on which cutting-edge rulings and determinations are being 12 made now, and we're talking about national security 13 being involved, which generally would involve .1415 classified information. And you're talking about 16 nonclassified, not even safeguards information. 17 So let's just --18 MR. BIGGINS: Judge --19 JUDGE YOUNG: I mean, unless you really 20 have -- just hold on. 21 MR. BIGGINS: Yes, Judge. 22 JUDGE YOUNG: Unless you really have something that you really need to say now about this, I think 23 24 you should refrain and file a brief on this further, 25 so what do you need to say now?

determination on this until the access determination

MR. BIGGINS: I do not disagree with the Board 1 that you could wait until the SUNSI determination 2 could be made. My -- I believe the Board can wait 3 until that decision is made before ruling on this 4 contention, and the Staff would not be providing a 5 brief arguing otherwise. 6 7 However, I would note that there is a 8 situation where under the Commission policy, under 9 the Commission order, the Petitioners may not ever 10 get information to that SUNSI information. were to occur, the Board has the ability to review 11 the information and make a determination on the 12 contention. 13 I'm not saying that the Board needs to rule 14 before either, one, reviewing the information 15 16 itself -- I think that is necessary -- or, two, waiting for the SUNSI determination. I see no 17 reason why we cannot wait for the SUNSI 18 19 determination. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Then what is it that you're 21 trying to say? What I'm trying to say is if the 22 MR. BIGGINS: circumstance were to occur that the Staff denied the 23

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request, the Board upheld that request, and even if

it were appealed to the Commission, the Commission

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| 1 | upnerd that request |
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| 2 | JUDGE YOUNG: The denial, you mean. |
| 3 | MR. BIGGINS: Correct. The Board by reviewing |
| 4 | the information itself still has the ability to rule |
| 5 | on the contention, even in that situation. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: And why should we do it now |
| 7 | rather than later, again? |
| 8 | MR. BIGGINS: Again, it is not our position |
| 9 | that you should do it now rather than waiting |
| 10 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. |
| 11 | MR. BIGGINS: for the SUNSI access. |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. If you're not making |
| 13 | the argument that we should do it now, then we can |
| 14 | wait until later, and the only person who the |
| 15 | only party that disagrees with that at this point, I |
| 16 | would presume, would be the Applicant. If you want |
| 17 | to make an argument on that to finish up on that, |
| 18 | you may. |
| 19 | MR. FRANTZ: Could I ask one clarifying |
| 20 | question? |
| 21 | Let's turn the question around. If the NRC |
| 22 | Staff does grant access to SUNSI, would the Board |
| 23 | then feel free to rule that this contention is moot? |
| 24 | JUDGE YOUNG: We began our questioning asking |
| 25 | what the ramifications of what you have filed are. |

1 I think that at that point, and from my view, it 2 would make sense to get the parties' argument on 3 whether or not it's moot after they've gotten 4 access. We could hold a telephone argument; I mean, 5 these things can be handled. 6 To take the extreme measure that you're 7 advocating of making rulings before they have 8 access, I think, one, is an extreme measure, and 9 two, if they already had access at this point, we 10 could then hear their argument on the mootness 11 issue. 12 MR. FRANTZ: I understand. 13 JUDGE YOUNG: Later we can get pleadings, we 14 can do telephone arguments, there are ways to handle 15 these things. If any of the parties would like us 16 to do anything other than that, or if there are any 17 other alternative ways to address this before we 18 leave we can discuss a deadline for briefing of

Did you want to add anything?

MR. BIGGINS: Judge, may I ask a clarifying question? I guess it's my understanding then that the Board would defer ruling on the contention admissible or inadmissible rather than simply admitting it and determining that it's moot?

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that.

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other words, my understanding of what you're saying 1 2 is that the Board would not rule on the 3 admissibility of the contention until the Board has reviewed the SUNSI information and a determination has been made whether or not the Petitioners have access to the SUNSI information. JUDGE YOUNG: The Board has not had a chance to confer on this; we just got the information today, but I think it's fairly obvious that if we

defer our ruling, we would not admit the contention; we would neither admit or deny it, we would wait until the Staff has made its determination on access, if necessary, we would rule on any appeal of that, and then if ultimately the Petitioners got access to the information, we would hear the argument on whether it's moot, and the Petitioners would then also have an opportunity to file an amended contention. All these things could be decided in due course.

MR. BIGGINS: That answers my question. Thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Now, as I said, we haven't conferred on this, but to me that sounds like the logical way to approach it.

Did you have another view, Judge?

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JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, yes, I do. I look at

51.54(hh) and I see that, for instance, each
licensee shall develop and implement guidance and
strategies intended to maintain or restore core
cooling, et cetera, which says to me it's got to be
guidance.

It doesn't give any criteria on how well the
core cooling has to be established, criteria on the

core cooling has to be established, criteria on the containment or anything; it's basically you have to show that you're going to be able to do something or you're going to have a procedure in place to do something to improve the situation.

On a plain reading of this, if you say our strategy to restore core cooling is a bucket brigade, well, you've met the strict requirement of this. You have a procedure; it's just not a very good one.

So I'm wondering what is the relevant information. To me, the relevant information is that they've submitted something that they say fulfills this; it's not the contents of that.

So I say that until I hear something else, I think the Petitioners have received the information necessary to rule on whether or not guidance and strategies have been developed.

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So let me ask Petitioners, do you agree or
disagree that your initial contention saying that
this information has not been provided -- strictly
has not been provided, is that contention moot, or

has it still not been provided?

MR. EYE: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that question, because I don't know what the information says, and I'm not willing to draw the bright line between submitting information and just automatically assuming that it meets even minimum guidance requirements. I don't take leaps of faith like that, and my clients wouldn't want me to do that, I don't think.

And so I disagree with the idea as this contention is evolving -- and it is evolving because just the nature of the timeline it's on, these regs only became active March 27 or 29 of this year, so we're certainly on the front edge of it -- I don't necessarily take the position that it's a contention purely of omission.

I think that to the extent that the day that we were required to file our contentions, April 6 of this year, we were operating on the assumption -- and I think it was legitimate -- that the information had not been submitted, so at that point

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it was on the idea that it was an omission.

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But we also, perhaps precipitously, took the approach that we would likely argue with the sufficiency of what was submitted if in fact what has happened happened, and that is that there's been no amendment of the underlying DCD, and we attack the DCD in our petition because it doesn't adequately address the points that are raised in 50.54(hh) -- it, at least in our view, just does not

Now, if they adopted what's in the DCD and perhaps added or modified information somehow in their most recent submittal, that's really a question of adequacy in terms of whether it's met the minimum requirements under 50.54(hh).

And I don't think that this Board has discretion to time its decisions consistent with either access to information that we may or may not get, appeals from those access decisions, and then bundle it up with the other decisions that have to be made about the admissibility of the contentions that we've submitted for the Panel's discussion -- or consideration, rather.

MR. BIGGINS: Judge, the Staff position is that, yes, a determination could be made by the Board at this time because the information has been

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supplied; however, again, we recognize that it would be reasonable to wait until the SUNSI access determination is made. However, a bucket brigade would not be acceptable to the Staff. I cannot get into the details of the submission, of course, but the Staff position is that the information submitted meets the requirements of the rule.

Very specific or detailed staff guidance for

Very specific or detailed staff guidance for this rule has not been issued and won't be issued until approximately September. I don't think we need to wait that long to determine the sufficiency of this information to determine that, as a contention of omission, the information has now been supplied.

With that, the Staff position is still that the contention itself is moot to that extent and inadmissible to the extent that it was originally an attack on the design certification document.

JUDGE ARNOLD: I was not suggesting that Staff would consider a bucket brigade adequate, but it would mean that that specific hole in the application was filled, although very poorly.

MR. BIGGINS: We do believe that the hole in the application has been filled; however, again, that is akin to a docketing decision. Let me be

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very clear, this is not a docketing decision. 1 2 akin to that to the extent that the Staff has 3 received and accepted the information; the Staff 4 still needs to conduct its analysis and review of 5 the information which would be documented in the final safety evaluation report. 6 JUDGE ARNOLD: How long would you anticipate it will take before the access decision is made? MR. BIGGINS: We have, under the order, ten days from receipt of the request. Although there was some problem with receiving the request, I

believe we received it -- and don't hold me to this -- on the 6th, so we have a very short turnaround time to make our determination, and according to the order, again, there's a very short turnaround time for even appealing the decision. That's why the Staff believes it is reasonable to wait for a determination on access to the SUNSI question.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay, thank you very much.

MR. FRANTZ: One other piece of information for you, Judge Arnold: There is guidance that's still in draft form, and our letter to the NRC dated May 29 does refer to this guidance, and this is It's Guidance NEI 06-12, which has public now.

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| .1 | what's called B.S.b guidance for preparing the types |
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| 2 . | of reports. |
| 3 | JUDGE YOUNG: What's the word you used? |
| 4 | MR. FRANTZ: I'm sorry. |
| 5 | JUDGE YOUNG: It has B something? |
| 6 | MR. FRANTZ: B.5.b. |
| 7 | JUDGE YOUNG: B.5.b. |
| 8 | MR. FRANTZ: Phase 2 and 3 submittal |
| 9 | guideline. So again, we're not writing on a totally |
| 10 | white piece of paper here; we do have some guidance |
| 11 | that we're following. That guidance is currently |
| 12 | being reviewed, as Mr. Biggins indicated, for |
| 13 | endorsement by the NRC. |
| 14 | JUDGE ARNOLD: I'm satisfied. |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: Just one more question for the |
| 16 | Petitioners. |
| 17 | Apart from the issues that we've been |
| 18 | discussing or apart from the issues that relate to |
| 19 | the information that we don't have before us, to the |
| 20 | extent that you're challenging the design document, |
| 21 | do you want to make any argument why that would not |
| 22 | be a challenge to a rule in effect? |
| 23 | MR. EYE: Yes, Your Honor, I would be happy to |
| 24 | address that. We recognize that the general rule is |
| 25 | that a DCD has the protection, if you will, of a |

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rulemaking, and then it's then arguably invulnerable to a subsequent collateral attack.

But when a DCD is written under one regulatory regimen and that regulatory regimen then changes in some rather fundamental ways, then the information in the DCD ought to be fair game for criticism, particularly in the context of a COLA adjudication that's now operating under the new regulatory regimen.

Moreover, the environmental report and the FASR both adopt the DCD, and I don't think there's any argument that the FASR and the ER can certainly be considered as germane issues to be raised with this Panel and the adjudication in a more general sense, so that if there is a defect in the underlying DCD that ripples through the FASR and the ER and it's related to a regulatory provision that's been adopted by the Commission — in the case, 50.54(hh) — that ought to be dealt with in the context of the adjudication.

It should not preclude -- well, let me approach it this way: If it does, if in fact the DCD somehow precludes us from judging or contesting the sufficiency of the Applicant's submittal that they claim conforms with the requirements of

50.54(hh), then we're really -- we don't have any opportunity under the adversarial process to bring that issue to you even, and we're shut out from that which I don't think, under the adjudicatory process under 10 CFR 2.3 is really permissible.

JUDGE YOUNG: I think the Commission has pointed out that -- I'm not looking in the right place, but there are other means to challenge the design documents if there should be a change in those, and if any party can help me out here, I'm thinking that the Commission has addressed the ability to later on down the line address any future issues in the design as it becomes more final.

MR. EYE: Well, Your Honor, this has become final to the extent that we now know that the DCD for Comanche Peak hasn't been altered, so maybe we're arguing about something that's not really ultimately going to be pertinent.

To the extent that that hasn't been amended as a result of the 50.54(hh) requirements, then we move on to what has been amended, and if that is the FASR and the ER, as a practical matter, then that would certainly be something that could be dealt with in the context of a contention and the COLA adjudication without having to resort to the DCD.

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1 And again, we're shadowboxing here to a 2 certain extent, because we don't know what 3 information has actually been submitted. 4 JUDGE YOUNG: Is the -- oh, excuse me. 5 MR. EYE: And to that extent, I think that how you approach this to begin with still makes the best 6 7 sense, and that is let's deal with this when 8 everybody has got the same access to the same 9 information. 10 Now, if it turns out that for whatever reason 11 the Staff says that we should not get access to that 12 information, then we'll take that up in an appeal, 13 and if the appeal affirms the Staff decision, then 14 it does and we'll deal with that. But it seems to 15 me we're sort of rushing to that position needlessly 16 at this point. 17 JUDGE YOUNG: What I was trying to do is just 18 address the issue of the extent to which your 19 arguments challenge the design control document. 20 Let me just ask the Staff, do you know whether 21 there's any intent to change that? 22 MR. BIGGINS: Judge, I don't believe there's 23 any intent to change the Commission's policy that a 24 design control document cannot be attacked in an 25 adjudication.

JUDGE YOUNG: No, no. To change this 1 2 particular design control document, the PRA and the severe accident evaluation, based on the changes in 3 4 the rule. 5 MR. BIGGINS: I don't have any information 6 regarding that, Judge. 7 MR. FRANTZ: Judge, again, this is a deterministic rule; it's not a probabilistic rule. 8 9 Under the rule there's a need to postulate from whatever cause, a large fire or explosion, and so 10 11 the PRA is not at issue in this proceeding. 12 Additionally, I might add that the new rule, 13 the 50.54(hh)(2) and 52.80(d) do not apply strictly 14 to design certification applications; they're 15 directed towards applicants for licenses and holders 16 of licenses. MR. BIGGINS: And, Judge, I believe you were 17 looking for a citation to Commission policy 18 statement. I have it on page 19 as printed from the 19 20 website, I believe, regarding a person having 21 standing with respect to one of the facilities 22 proposed in the applications. 23 It's the Staff's position that the Commission has made very clear that a contention which is 24 25 otherwise admissible under 2.309, with respect to

1 the application being contested, when it relates to 2 the design certification document, could be held in 3 abeyance, and I believe you referred to that 4 earlier. 5 I think that's the situation here, that the 6 Petitioners are talking about, where if they believe 7 they're trying to hit a moving target regarding the 8 design certification itself, yes, an applicant has the ability to reference a design certification 9 10 that's been docketed but is not yet finalized. 11 And what that does is anytime there are 12 changes to the design certification document which 13 would affect the combined license application -- for instance, if some provision in the design 14 1.5 certification document as deleted by the design 16 certification applicant, that could be an issue for 17 a new contention, and the Petitioners certainly have 18 the ability to raise new contentions in that regard. 19 JUDGE YOUNG: What was the citation again? 20 MR. BIGGINS: I have it on page 19, but I 21 think the --22 JUDGE YOUNG: Of your --23 MR. BIGGINS: -- Federal Register notice of 73 FR has it on page 20972. 24 25 JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.

| 1 | MR. FRANTZ: Judge Young, if I could raise |
|----|--|
| 2 | just one more point very briefly, there may be a |
| 3 | situation that arises where the NRC denies access to |
| 4 | SUNSI, so they never do get access to our 52.80(d) |
| 5 | report. At some point, the Board's going to have to |
| 6 | rule on that contention, even though they don't have |
| 7 | access. |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I think the issue is: Is |
| 9 | there any reason to do that before we even |
| 10 | MR. FRANTZ: No. |
| 11 | JUDGE YOUNG: make the ruling on the |
| 12 | access. |
| 13 | MR. FRANTZ: I understand. I think Mr. |
| 14 | Biggins is right that, you know, given the short |
| 15 | time frame they have for making the initial |
| 16 | determination and given the Board's timelines for |
| 17 | issuing an order based upon this prehearing |
| 18 | conference and the pleadings to date, I think the |
| 19 | shorter timeline is Mr. Biggins' timeline, rather |
| 20 | than your timeline. So in that case, it makes sense |
| 21 | to just hold off. |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Anything else on |
| 23 | Contention 7 now, or is now a good time to break for |
| 24 | lunch? |
| 1 | |

(No response.)

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. We're a little late. It's 20 to 1:00 now. Let's say be back and ready to go on the record at a quarter to 2:00. (Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., this same day, Wednesday, June 10, 2009.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

JUDGE YOUNG: Before we go to Contention 8, anything further on Contention 7?

MR. BIGGINS: Nothing further from the Staff, Judge.

JUDGE YOUNG: And so I guess we're all agreed we're going to wait to hear from the Staff on the access issue, and then if it runs counter, then there'll be time for appeal, and you'll notify them about the time for appeal.

MR. BIGGINS: Would the Board like to be served with a copy of our determination?

DUDGE YOUNG: Yes. I think it would probably be good to serve everyone. If anything else comes up on that, the parties can file written pleadings. We're not -- I guess there's no need at this point for any briefing. If we see any further need in the future for briefing, we'll let you know. If any party wants to raise an issue, you can file something in writing or also request a telephone conference at any time on this or any of the other issues.

So if there's nothing more on that, we'll move to Contention 8, and we did have a reply on that, so I think we'll start with the Applicant on this one.

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| Τ. | MR. FRANTZ. Thank you, budge foung. First c |
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| 2 | all, I would like to address the question posed by |
| 3 | the Board in its memorandum of May 27. |
| 4 | The Board asked which were the most relevant |
| 5 | regulations to this contention, and with respect to |
| 6 | the need for a license for waste disposal, the most |
| 7 | relevant regulations are 10 CFR Section 61.2, and |
| 8 | 20.2001(a)(3). Both of those indicate that there's |
| 9 . | no need for a separate license for effluents per se |
| 10 | Other |
| 11 | JUDGE YOUNG: Repeat the second one for me, |
| 12 | please. |
| 13 | MR. FRANTZ: 20.2001(a)(3). That regulation |
| 14 | essentially allows an existing licensee to dispose |
| 15 | of radioactive material through its effluents, |
| 16 | provided that the effluents are within NRC limits. |
| 17 | JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. It was just brought |
| 18 | to my attention that Judge Mignerey we don't |
| 19 | think she's on yet, so |
| 20 | (Pause.) |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: We can go off the record for a |
| 22 | minute. |
| 23 | (Off the record.) |
| 24 | JUDGE YOUNG: We had just started on |
| 25 | Contention 8. We apologize for not waiting, and if |
| | |

| 1 | you want to just recap briefly. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I would like to first |
| 3 | address the Board's questions posed in its |
| 4 | memorandum of May 27. The most relevant regulations |
| 5 | that pertain to disposal are in |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: Judge Mignerey, can you hear |
| 7 | counsel? |
| 8 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: I can hear you, but I cannot |
| 9 | hear counsel. |
| 10 | MR. FRANTZ: Can you hear me now? |
| 11 | (No response.) |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: Did you hear that? |
| 13 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: No. |
| 14 | MR. FRANTZ: Can you hear this? |
| 15 | (No response.) |
| 16 | JUDGE YOUNG: Bring it closer. I think |
| 17 | MR. FRANTZ: Can you hear this? |
| 18 | (No response.) |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: Maybe it's not on. Pull it a |
| 20 | little closer, if possible. |
| 21 | MR. FRANTZ: Can you hear this? |
| 22 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: Yes, I can. |
| 23 | MR. FRANTZ: Okay. The most relevant |
| 24 | regulations that pertain to waste disposal are in 10 |
| 25 | CFR Section 61.2, which basically states that for |
| | |

1 land disposal of waste received from third parties, 2 there's a need for a license, but there's no 3 requirement in Part 61 itself that requires a 4 license for waste generated by the licensee itself. 5 The second provision is in 20.2001(a)(3) which 6 allows for disposal of radioactive material in 7 effluents, provided that the effluents are within NRC limits. 8 9 The NRC limits in question are for the most 10 part in Section 20.1301 and 1302, which establish 11 dose limits for members of the public; additionally, 12 Appendix B to Part 20 has limits on concentrations 13 of various radionuclides in effluents. JUDGE YOUNG: B? B or D, did you say? 14 15 MR. FRANTZ: B. I'm sorry. 16 JUDGE YOUNG: B. MR. FRANTZ: In that regard, one regulation 17 which we think is particularly important in this 18 proceeding -- and we'll mention it not only here on 19 this contention but also on other contentions -- is 20 21 note 3 in Table B-1 to Appendix B to Part 51, and 2.2 that regulation has a definition of the term "small" for the purposes of environmental impact statements, 23 in particular for license renewal statements, but 24 obviously that's also generically applicable 25

elsewhere, too.

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And that definition basically states that radiological impacts shall be deemed to be small if the effluents and doses are within NRC limits.

That's the definition of the term "small," and that's exactly what we have here at Comanche Peak.

We have predicted effluents which are well within NRC limits, and therefore, by definition, those environmental impacts are small.

Turning to Petitioners' reply, the reply has numerous new references to web pages, both in terms of allegations regarding dam failures and global warming. We believe that those should all be struck, as mentioned earlier today and in our motion to strike. None of those references were in the initial petition to intervene, and it's not appropriate at this point for the Petitioners to be raising new technical supporting documents.

But even if the Board were to consider these documents, we don't believe that they establish a genuine dispute on any material fact. First of all, you don't even have to get to their allegations regarding dam failure or dewatering of the reservoir, because their premise is wrong. Their premise is that there's a radiological problem with

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Squaw Creek Reservoir. That simply is not true.

As shown in our environmental report at

Section 6.2.5, the tritium levels currently in Squaw

Creek Reservoir where we discharge are well within

regulatory limits for tritium. Additionally, we do

periodic environmental monitoring of the sediment in

the reservoir, and that monitoring shows no

detectable radionuclides due to operation of

Comanche Peak 1 and 2. And, therefore, there simply

is no radiological problem with the reservoir,

contrary to the allegations by the Petitioners.

Additionally, going forward in the future, we will have monitoring programs for our effluents.

Those programs are discussed in the environmental report, Sections 3.5.1 and 6.2. Those monitoring programs will ensure that in the future, we continue to meet all NRC limits on effluents, and therefore, again, by definition, the radiological impacts are small, and the Board doesn't even need to reach the issue on dam failure or dewatering.

But even if you take Petitioners' arguments at face, let's assume that there is a dam failure.

Let's assume that there is dewatering. They have provided absolutely no basis for an allegation that that would result in any significant environmental

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impact. There's nothing in their report -- in their petition.

They have no technical reports that they reference. There's no expert opinions. There's nothing anywhere in Contention 8 that would indicate that there'd ben any significant radiological impact, either from a dam breach or from dewatering, and therefore, for numerous reasons, we believe that this contention should be dismissed for failure to, one, establish a genuine dispute on material fact, and, two, for failure to have any adequate technical support.

JUDGE YOUNG: Does that conclude your -- MR. FRANTZ: Yes, it does.

JUDGE YOUNG: Can you help me out a little

bit? In your response -- I understood you just now

to say that you're monitoring and you will be doing

monitoring to make sure that there's nothing in the

sediment and there will not be anything in the

sediment, such that -- let me see if I understood

you -- such that even if there were a dam failure

and/or drought drying up the water, that anything

that could be released would still be within the

regulatory limits. Is that what --

MR. FRANTZ: That's very close, Judge Young.

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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 Just a few clarifications.

We're not saying there's nothing in the sediment. We're saying there's nothing that's detectable in the sediments, due to Comanche Peak 1 and 2. We do -- there are core sensitivities for our monitoring instruments, and there may be something that's below the technical levels, but we have not found anything detectable due to Comanche Peak 1 and 2.

In the future, we are not going to say there's never going to be anything in the sediment. What we're saying is that the effluents will all be within NRC limits, and therefore, by definition, the impacts are small.

JUDGE ARNOLD: When you discussed some of the relevant regulations, you mentioned 10 CFR 20.2001(a)(3), saying that basically you can discharge without a permit, as long as you maintain below the limits, and looking at that, it says the limits of 20.1301 --

MR. FRANTZ: Yes.

JUDGE YOUNG: -- which are expressed in terms of their effect on the public. Well, if you're discharging to a lake, you're in a controlled environment with a lot of water shielding, so there

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| 1 | could be, in fact, quite a lot of radionuclides in |
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| 2 | there, and still not be affecting the public, but if |
| 3 | that water is released through a dam break or |
| 4 | something, you'd have it in a new configuration that |
| 5 | could possibly affect the public. Do you have any |
| 6 | comment on that? |
| 7 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. And we do, again, periodic |
| 8 | monitoring of the water in Squaw Creek Reservoir. |
| 9 | We ensure that the levels of radioactivity in the |
| 10 | water are within NRC limits. |
| 11 | JUDGE YOUNG: The other part I wanted to get |
| 12 | from you is in your where in your answer do you |
| 13 | say that? |
| 14 | MR. FRANTZ: We do |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: That even with a dam failure, |
| 16 | the monitoring that you will have in place will |
| 17 | detect anything that would, in the event of a dam |
| 18 | failure or drought drying up everything, keep any |
| 19 | radionuclides within |
| 20 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I don't believe our |
| 21 | application |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: regulatory limits. |
| 23 | MR. FRANTZ: itself discusses dam failure. |
| 24 | What we do discuss is our monitoring of Squaw Creek |
| 25 | Reservoir, and what we say is that that monitoring |

1 does go out and checks for tritium and other gamma 2 emitters, for example, and ensures that they are 3 within acceptable limits. And therefore by 4 definition, if the reservoir is within acceptable limits, if you breach the dam, you're still going to 5 be acceptable downstream, in terms of the 6 7 radionuclides at least. 8 JUDGE YOUNG: If -- what happens with the 9 monitoring? If the monitoring were to detect something, how would you address that? 10 11 MR. FRANTZ: I may have to call upon some of 12 my friends back here to help, but I believe, first of all, there's reporting obligations that we'd have 13 to make to the NRC, and also, of course, this is --14 15 we do this monitoring periodically, so this would not be something that would come upon us unknown and 16 wouldn't be surprising us, because we do have 17 periodic monitoring. 18 19 We'd be able to detect trends and shifts, and 20 we do trending of the activity in water, so we would 21 know, I think, well before we would ever reach any kind of limit that we were approaching it, and we'd 22 23 take appropriate corrective action. Let me confer quickly with my client and see 24 whether they have anything further. 25

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(Pause.)

MR. FRANTZ: Yes. My client has basically confirmed what I have said, and, again, we have to use the off-site dose calculation manual to look at the activity off-site and calculate the impacts, potential impacts, and make sure again that we're within regulatory limits, and if we're not, we're going to have to take mitigation measures. And we do trending under that program, too, to make sure that if we are trending up, we can take mitigation before we exceed limits.

JUDGE YOUNG: Judge Mignerey, did you have any questions for Mr. Frantz before we move on?

JUDGE MIGNEREY: I don't have any questions.

I think I just have some clarifications, so on page

39 of the response, basically you'd describe the

remediation parameters or scenarios should the

effluents be too low. Correct? So you do have a

back-up plan in situations of very low flow. Is

that correct?

MR. FRANTZ: It's a little bit -- that's close, but it's a little bit different. This is an issue that was raised by the petition to intervene. They are contending, based upon FSAR Section 11.2, that we're going to be releasing tritium in excess

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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 They have simply mischaracterized

2 and misread FSAR Section 11.2. 3 What that says is that when we have maximum 4 tritium production department when all four units 5 are operating, the releases, if we were to release them, could possibly exceed limits. And so what we 6 7 would do in that case to prevent us from exceeding 8 limits on our releases, we would divert the effluent 9 to a holding --10 JUDGE MIGNEREY: Right. You're using the mitigation methods that you described. 11 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. We use either evaporation 12 13 ponds and holding tanks where we would divert the 14 effluent. 15 JUDGE MIGNEREY: Right. Thank you. 16 JUDGE YOUNG: I guess we'll go to you next and 17 then the Staff last. Okay. 18 MR. EYE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE YOUNG: And if you could respond to the issue that was just discussed and to the basic issue 20 21 that the application does contain provisions for 22 monitoring and for catching anything before it would reach a point where, even were there a dam break or 23 the drought, those limits would not be exceeded. 24 25 MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor.

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of NRC limits.

environmental report of the Applicant is what triggered this contention, the plain verbiage that it used in its application.

It said that Squaw Creek Reservoir is the only thing that's being continuously impacted beyond just the plant itself from a radiological standpoint.

But we don't know -- and it's being impacted by tritium, of course, which is fairly well understood and quantified.

But what we don't understand is this radioactive particulate, which I assume is either cladding or resin or some sort of solid that is escaping whatever means by which those particles are supposed to be kept sequestered, and they end up in the Squaw Creek Reservoir, but we don't know the size. We don't know the source terms. We don't know the quantity.

And so we take it, I guess, on the assumption that even not knowing the what, when, size and source terms and so forth, that it's okay, but there's no analysis by the Applicant to tell us what those particulate are; they simply say that they have radioactive particulate matter that's released and it's deposited in the sediment layer of the reservoir. Well, that tells us just enough to ask

1 more questions.

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And when they say that there's a small radioactive or radiological impact, there's no analysis to support that, particularly when it comes to these particulate. The reservoir is large; it's got a large sediment layer.

I can't think that they're doing such a comprehensive monitoring of the sediment layer that they're finding all particulate, and as we know radioactive particulate in sediments of cooling reservoirs is not an unusual phenomenon; it's something that nuclear plants do routinely, but that doesn't necessarily mean we should excuse it and just leave them to discharge this without any description or quantification.

So in terms of the regulations that pertain -and we've already cited one, and I didn't do it in a
frivolous way -- it seemed to us that discharging
radioactive particulate that would otherwise be
dispositioned in a low-level radioactive waste dump,
putting it into the sediment layer was sort of a de
facto disposal point. So should it meet the
qualifications of a low-level radioactive waste
facility? Well, that was our argument.

I think in addition to that, to the extent

that the Applicant has an obligation to fully quantify the kinds and quantities of radioactive materials that will be generated, it ought to include what's being put into the Squaw Creek Reservoir. In that regard, the final disposition of these radioactive particulate, whether they remain in the sediment indefinitely or whether they escape and get either airborne or downstream, whether there's an environmental or public health impact will be largely impacted by what isotopes are actually being discharged, their source terms and whatever other health physics considerations that would have to pertain to that. Are these particulate, for

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JUDGE YOUNG: Are you challenging the monitoring that they're doing that would detect these things?

example -- we don't know: Are they the size of a

breadbox, or are they the size of a thumbnail or are

Well, I suppose in a way, but really MR. EYE: what we're challenging is their right to discharge unquantified, unspecified radioactive particulate into the Squaw Creek Reservoir.

JUDGE YOUNG: If what they do discharge

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they microscopic?

meets -- are within or under the regulatory requirements, what would your dispute with that be?

MR. EYE: One of the disputes is that there's a cumulative effect. The Applicant itself says that there's a cumulative impact of each passing year of operational activities related to the buildup of these radioactive particulate in the sediment, but there's no quanification of that. You, as a Panel, are left to, I guess, fill in that information for yourself.

So we are disputing their right to do this without fully describing it in terms of kinds and quantities. Otherwise, where is the limit on the size of the particulate that they can discharge? Where is the limit on the quantity of particulate that they can discharge?

And in terms of if it's cobalt or cobalt-60 particulate and it's in the sediment, unless they just happen to find it, they probably won't count it as something that's a radioactive problem, but that doesn't mean that the problem isn't there just because they've not found it or not quantified or adequately described it otherwise.

So I agree that they do monitoring, but even by their own admission they have radioactive

particulate in that sediment. Well, what is it, what's the size of it, how frequently is it discharged, what kind of radioactive material is it? And I guess the longer-term question would be is this something that we can project out over the course of the life of the plant and get a quantity analysis about how much will be in that reservoir the day that they stop operations. Could that have a radiological impact that's greater than small? We don't know, because that analysis isn't provided. So when we looked at this and saw that there was an admission about cumulative impacts, it seemed to us that if there was a recognition of an impact that it was cumulative and that they knew at least the basic contours of what was causing this impact, that there ought to be further analysis to fill in these informational gaps. JUDGE YOUNG: Before we move on, do you want to address this issue of there does seem to be an inconsistency between this cited section on page 5.11-3 and what you say?

MR. FRANTZ: I don't think there's anything inconsistent at all. What we're saying is that currently, given our current monitoring, we have no detectable levels in the sediment. We're not saying

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1 that's going to be the case forever, but we are 2 saying that we will do monitoring to ensure that the 3 levels remain acceptable. 4 By the way, also I believe that our 5 environmental monitoring report that we submit to 6 the NRC does identify what these detectable levels 7 are, so it's not a mystery what the levels are right 8 now. 9 More important, Mr. Eye's statement that the 10 COL application does not identify by radionuclide 11 the amounts being released each year is just simply incorrect, and I refer to the Board to SR Table 12 13 11.2-10R through 11.2-13R where there are annual 14 discharge limits -- not limits; I think it's what we 15 expect to be released for various conditions, and 16 it's an annual release of numerous different 17 radionuclides; there's pages of them here. 18 JUDGE YOUNG: And where are those found in the 19 application? 20 MR. FRANTZ: In the final safety analysis 21 report Table 11.2-10R through 11.2-13R. 22 JUDGE YOUNG: Are there any particular pages, or do you just find them by reference? 23 MR. FRANTZ: If you'll hold on for a second, I 24 25 can give you the pages. It begins on page 11.2-6

1 and that goes through page 11.2-13. 2 JUDGE YOUNG: In the application. I was just 3 asking our law clerk if we could pull those up. 4 MR. FRANTZ: And also to get back to your 5 question, Judge Young, again, we are saying that in 6 the environmental report that's possible that there 7 might be some accumulation of radionuclides in the 8 sediment, but our point here is that, again, it's all within limits and therefore, by definition, the 9 10 environmental impact is small. 11 JUDGE YOUNG: You say that in the event of, I 12 think it was, the tritium that you would divert part 13 of the liquid into another pond. What if you were 14 to reach a limit with particulate matter? 15 MR. FRANTZ: I don't know the answer to that question offhand, but my expectation is that 16 tritium, that probably is the most likely to have 17 reached that limit because tritium can't be filtered 18 19 unlike, say, particulate. 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Filtered? 21 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. 22 MR. EYE: Tritium is clearly a pernicious problem because it can't be filtered; it's just 23 discharged, and in the FSAR, as I recall it from 2.4 memory, there was a concern that when all four units 25

would be operating, they might reach the acceptable limits.

Now, to the extent that they can divert it and hold it and wait for the tritium to decay to a point where they can then discharge more into the reservoir has a lot of assumptions tied to it. One is just exactly how long they can wait for it to decay -- it's got, obviously, a quantifiable decay time -- and the capacity of the ponds that they would divert into to wait until it decayed enough.

Particularly when you've got a recognition by the Applicant that with all four units running you might be tripping that limit, it seems that they're really running an unnecessary risk in some respects with having concentrations of tritium in that water that will either be exceeded or could be exceeded.

Now, the other question that I think ought to be raised is whether tritium monitoring is on a continuous as a real-time basis so that they can know whether there's a tritium level that is about to exceed or whether it has to wait for the monitoring to happen and then you find it's in exceedance, and you do something about it at that point. And honestly, in deconstructing the FSAR, I couldn't tell exactly what their monitoring program

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called for in that regard.

But this is, again, triggered by their own recognition that they're going to be generating a lot of tritium and that it might be enough to cause a regulatory limit problem in the Squaw Creek Reservoir

JUDGE YOUNG: But in their answer and in what Mr. Frantz has said, they do describe the precaution to prevent the buildup of tritium and also the diversion technique to deal with the problem. the Petitioners have a specific dispute with that?

MR. EYE: No, Your Honor, other than whether there is a means by which to accurately determine the time at which that diversion ought to occur. other words, we think that the regulatory limit ought never be exceeded, and if they monitor periodically and they find that it's been exceeded, then I think per force of logic it means that it's been in exceedance for some period of time, and then they can take remedial measures and do the diversions and so forth that their plan would anticipate.

And again, that particular narrow aspect was one I just couldn't answer based on what I read in the FSAR or the environmental report, for that

matter, in terms of just when it would be that they would know that they had gone in excess of the regulatory limit.

here so I'm going to ask for help from all parties here, but I'm trying to get a handle on this. If, as they say, their application does address the manner in which they anticipate and prevent the buildup of tritium in the reservoir, and then if necessary, divert it, and if you don't any dispute with what they're doing, I guess my question would be what -- if there's no dispute, we can't admit a contention, so what would be the dispute that would be left to be litigated with regard to tritium? And then with regard to the particulate matter -- well, let's deal with it one by one.

MR. EYE: Tritium first.

JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.

MR. EYE: The tritium, our contention is based on the statement in the application that with all four units running they run the risk of exceeding tritium levels -- I believe is a pretty close verbatim quote. If that's the case, then the Petitioners contend that there ought to be some means by which to know precisely when they will trip

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the regulatory limit to prevent going in excess.

And based on what we can glean from the documentation of the Applicant, it appears that they would have to wait for the next monitoring cycle to know whether or not they had been in exceedance status.

JUDGE YOUNG: But if they're doing the trending -- and that's why I asked the question do you have a dispute with what they describe about what they're doing and with the references to the sections of FSAR -- if they're doing these things, I'm trying to get you to be a little more specific on where you have a dispute with what they're doing.

If the monitoring that's described is done in such a manner that they would not reach a point of violating the limits because they would know about it approaching that point well before and they would take precautions well before they approached that limit, where's the specific dispute?

I mean, obviously you can be concerned about the possibility of exceeding the limits, but if there's a description in the application of how they plan to do their monitoring so that they would be able to catch it before it approached the limit and then they have a procedure in place to divert if

they reached -- if they approached that limit, then what is your specific dispute with that? MR. EYE: Part of it is really due to the nature of tritium itself with a half life of about twelve years, and it's that it has the potential to accumulate over time, obviously, because that's why they monitor for it. We don't dispute that they monitor, we don't dispute that they can track and trend; that's what they're in the business to do, at least partially. We don't dispute that they have a means by which to divert and at least on a temporary basis maybe deal with what looks like a situation where they've either exceeded tritium limits or they're tracking and trending very close to doing that. But that really doesn't give the Petitioners the kind of assurance that over time their methods -- not the monitoring, but the methods by which to deal with remediation -- will be effective so that the Squaw Creek Reservoir will continue to be the kind of facility that they need to discharge water into. So in other words, if they're tracking and trending and they find that they are moving up

toward the limits where they would be in excess of

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the regulatory standard and they begin their diversion, is this a function of having to wait for a long period of time until the decay level drops to a point in the reservoir where they can again begin to discharge water into the diversion structures?

That really isn't addressed.

I mean, they don't take on the question of the tritium levels in the diversion structures, only the tritium levels in the reservoir itself, so that's on the tritium side. It's just -- it's that recognition that they are going to be generating a lot and that there may be management problems with making sure that it doesn't exceed regulatory limits.

I don't want to repeat myself on the particulate. I think we've laid that out as best we can. I will say, however, in response to the Applicant that we looked at the table that they just referenced, and there's not a specific quantification in this as to specific particulates that are being discharged.

There is a very long list, and you can see it, but it does not specify what particulates are being discharged. They may be in there, but they are not called out to relate back to the statement in their

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| 1 | environmental report about the accumulation of these |
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| 2 | particulates in the sediment of Squaw Creek |
| 3 | Reservoir. |
| 4 | Well, I don't know that that for us, that |
| 5 | doesn't seem like an adequate specification, given |
| 6 | the recognition that there is this accumulation in |
| 7 | the sediment. |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Can you clarify? |
| 9 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I want-to correct a couple |
| 10 | of misperceptions here. |
| 11 | One, we would not hold up tritium until it |
| 12 | decays. That is not the method specified in our |
| 13 | environmental report or FSAR. Instead what we would |
| 14 | do and this is clearly listed on page 11.2-3 of |
| 15 | the SR we would dilute the tritium and then |
| 16 | release it. |
| 17 | Second of all, Mr. Eye has perhaps mixed up |
| 18 | some monitoring that we do. We do two types of |
| 19 | monitoring. We do the periodic environmental |
| 20 | monitoring of the Squaw Creek Reservoir, but we do |
| 21 | continuous monitoring of effluents. That's process |
| 22 | monitoring. |
| 23 | And as described in page 6.2-1 of our |
| 24 | environmental report, "Radioactive liquids are |
| 25 | filtered, treated, sampled, prior to discharge, and |

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monitored continuously during release." And so we do have continuous monitoring of effluent releases.

Finally, with respect to his last comment about these tables and the FSAR, I don't know what he's talking about. We have listed every radionuclide that's being emitted to identify their concentrations and show that they're a very small fraction of the limits. I don't know what more he could possibly want than what we have in those tables of the FSAR.

JUDGE YOUNG: Are you looking at the same thing? Can you refer to pages so that we -- can we clarify what the different perceptions are here?

MS. BROWN: 11.2-6, FSAR.

MR. FRANTZ: And going to that page -- and I'll just start. There's a list there. It must be 20 or 30 radionuclides, isotopes, various isotopes, on that very page. There are more pages. And for each of those isotopes, it identifies there were these quantities, generation quantities, from various sources, and then the total amount of the releases, and then going on to Table 11.2-12R, which is on page -- starts on page 11.2-10, again it has the list of isotopes, and for each one, it has a discharge concentration, and microcuries per

1 milliliter. It has the concentration limit for that 2 isotope, and it has the fraction of the 3 concentration limit. 4 JUDGE YOUNG: Are you seeing what he's talking 5 about? 6 MR. EYE: Yes, Your Honor. But, again, this 7 is a table that specifies liquid discharges. doesn't specify solids that are being discharged, 8 9 and in that regard, do I take the explanation by counsel to mean, for example, that there are 10 11 particulates of cobalt that can be found? -- because 12 they list a very long line-up of isotopes. Which of 13 those are the particulate that are being discharged? -- because that specification or that 14 differentiation isn't made. 15 MR. FRANTZ: These are the total effluent 16 17 limits and expected amounts. It doesn't really matters what the form is, whether it's dissolved 18 19 matter, whether it's particulate matter. It's all listed here on this table, including cobalt-60 and 20 21 cobalt-58. 22 MR. EYE: And so do I take it to mean that when counsel says that before this liquid is 23 24 discharged, it's, I think -- I'm not sure I got the 25 full listing, but it's filtered, treated, monitored,

and there are still particulates that are 1 2 discharged. 3 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. 4 MR. EYE: That's our problem, Your Honor. 5 Even with the --6 MR. FRANTZ: That's not --7 MR. EYE: I'm sorry. MR. FRANTZ: I'm sorry, Mr. Eye. Go ahead. 8 MR. EYE: Even with their best efforts 9 minimize discharge and particulates on that 10 11 assumption, they're still being discharged, and so 12 it's our position that these are essentially waiting 13 in the sediment to go somewhere, to be dispositioned 14 either over time, before they decay, because some of these have very long decay times. 15 16 JUDGE YOUNG: But, I guess, we sort of tend to 17 keep going -- coming back around to an issue of 18 whether what's being disputed is something that is 19 permitted by the regulations and that, as I 20 understand the Applicant, they're saying that they 21 do monitoring, they keep records of what the various 22 substances are, whether they be particulates or 23 dissolved in liquid, effluents, and that anything that is discharged would be under and within the 24 25 limits that are permitted under the regulations.

1 And so if you're -- if what you're disputing 2 is those discharges that are permitted under the 3 regulations, then wouldn't that be a dispute with 4 the regulation? 5 MR. EYE: No, Your Honor. They say that there 6 is a radiological impact to that reservoir from 7 radioactive particulate. Because they meet 8 regulatory limits on an annual basis says nothing what the long-term radiological impact would be on 9 that sediment 30, 40 years down the line, after it's 10 accumulated all these radioactive particulates. 11 12 It's the Petitioners' position that before you 13 all make a decision about whether there ought to be a license that issues to this proposed facility or 14 1.5 not, you ought to know what the end result will be in that sediment as far as the build-up of 16 radioactive particulate. 17 If you take a particular snapshot over any one 18 19 year's period -- okay. Let's work on the assumption 20 that it meets regulatory limits. Does that tell us 21 anything about what that sediment will be like 30 or 40 years after it's been continuously impacted, by 22 23 their own admission? 24 JUDGE YOUNG: If they're required to take

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samples on a periodic basis and the samples would

include everything that's been built up and the 1 2 samples are required to meet the regulatory limits, 3 wouldn't that address your concern? 4 MR. EYE: In the analysis that they've done so far, there's no indication of a cumulative impact 5 analysis, other than just they've qualitatively 6 7 described it in the environmental report, but what was the radioactive limits of that sediment five 8 9 years ago? What is it now? What is it going to be 10 30 years from now? They say that there's a cumulative impact. Well, what is it? I mean, 11 12 that's our question. 13 JUDGE ARNOLD: Let me just ask Applicant a 14 question that may help on this. 15 I mentioned earlier that looking at 10 CFR 16 20.2001, it said you can discharge as long as you're 17 below the limits of 1301, and I noted that those limits were in terms of dose rate. 18 19 Now, if you're evaluating the dose rate from 20 the effluent that has gone into the lake, does that 21 not account for all radioactive materials that have 22 been deposited in that lake and are still there? 23 MR. FRANTZ: I don't know the details. 24 assume that that is the case. Yes. 25 JUDGE ARNOLD: So it is a cumulative impact.

| Τ | Cumulatively what you've discharged in here is |
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| 2 | giving a dose less than, I think it was |
| 3 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. We |
| 4 | JUDGE YOUNG:1 |
| 5 | MR. FRANTZ: certainly do monitor, and |
| 6 | monitoring by definition in the environment does |
| 7 | pick up the cumulative impacts on the environment, |
| 8 | by definition. |
| 9 | JUDGE YOUNG: Since you said you weren't |
| 10 | absolutely clear on that, can you talk with your |
| 11 | people and also tell us where in the application |
| 12 | that issue would be addressed, in terms of what type |
| 13 | of monitoring or sampling or testing that would be |
| 14 | done to address the accumulating over the years |
| 15 | sediment and what it contains? |
| 16 | MR. FRANTZ: I will check with my client and |
| 17 | get back to you at the break after the break. |
| 18 | JUDGE YOUNG: Judge Mignerey, do you have |
| 19 | anything to add or ask on this? |
| 20 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: No, I do not. |
| 21 | JUDGE ARNOLD: I do, and it's back on the |
| 22 | tritium. Once again, the question's for the |
| 23 | Applicant. The environmental report, Section 5.2.1 |
| 24 | states, "Under this maximum tritium-generation |
| 25 | condition and maintaining a 20 percent margin below |

1 the off-site dose calculation manual" -- and then it goes on. From that, it would seem to infer that 2 your own goal is to maintain tritium levels at 80 3 percent of the limit. 4 5 MR. FRANTZ: I believe that's correct. JUDGE YOUNG: Maintain or not go over? 6 7 MR. FRANTZ: Not go above the --8 JUDGE ARNOLD: Let's assume that you were at 9 80 percent of the limit, and you have four plants -10 operating at full power. Do you have any idea of the time frame it would take to exceed 100 percent 11 12 without taking any action? Is it hours? Days? 13 Weeks? MR. FRANTZ: I don't know, but, again, we do 14 continuous monitoring of our effluents. Our process 15 16 monitoring is continuous, and so we would know it 17 immediately, essentially. JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, I'm just saying, because 18 if this is something that would take months to 19 occur, I would think even periodic monitoring would 20 be enough, whereas if we're talking days, you could 21 22 miss it. And so if you could maybe get back and 23 answer with that, too. MR. FRANTZ: Yes. 24

JUDGE YOUNG: Did you have anything further,

Mr. Eye?

MR. EYE: Your Honor, I want to make sure that our record is clear on this, and I want to -- this citation to the FSAR that we were referring to is on page 11.2-2, and it says, "However, during the maximum tritium-generation condition (i.e., all four units operating full power), the tritium concentration could be exceeded."

And then there's a discussion about the 20 percent that they want to maintain, so that's -- I just want to make sure that we made clear to you what provision it was that triggered our contention and concern.

The only other thing I would want to raise is related to the argument that has come up about maintaining dam structural integrity and so forth.

And I -- this is disputed matter in the context of the motion to strike. At least part of it is, at any rate. And although the way we responded to this by citing Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which deals with expert testimony and so forth. It seemed to us to be a legal response to their objections.

And in that regard, it seems to us that there are -- it's not only that the dam -- maintaining the dam's structural integrity is important from a

radiological standpoint, not needlessly exposing downstream people to tritium exposures and particulates or whatever it might be, but without that dam, they don't operate the plant. I mean, it's a necessary facility in order to have that plant function, and, I mean, it just seems to us that if it's a, to use some slang, kind of a deal-breaker, if it's not there, that it's so important that it ought to get a lot more attention than it did in the environmental report, because it got virtually no attention in the environmental report, the dam structure itself.

I don't even remember specifically whether it was described in any kind of quantified or even qualitative way. So that's -- we think that the dam is an under-studied aspect of the plant, and so we would urge that the Commission or this Panel take that up in a way so that there can be some assurance that 30 years from now, 40 years now, that dam is still going to be serviceable, because again, without it, the plant shuts down. If there are four of them, all four of them would shut down.

MR. FRANTZ: Can I just add one more thing?
We've heard a lot from Mr. Eye, but we have
absolutely nothing in his petition to intervene or

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1 in his reply, for that matter, that provide any 2 technical support for any of his allegations 3 regarding radiological impacts. There's absolutely 4 nothing, and as a result, his contention is especially deficient under Section 2.309(f)(1)(5). 5 6 He's doing nothing but speculating at this 7 point, and there is plenty of Commission precedent 8 that speculation is not a sufficient basis for a contention. That's all we have here in Contention 9 10 8, is speculation. 11 MR. EYE: It's hardly speculation when we take 12 the facts out of the environmental report that the 13 Applicant's prepared. 14 JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just ask this couple of 15 questions, and then we'll get to the Staff. 16 again, I'm asking, from a layperson's perspective, so that I'll be clear at least. 17 18 With regard to the quotation from page 11.2-2, 19 that the tritium concentration could be exceeded, is 20 there another place where the application says that 21 if it is exceeded, that would be taken care of in 22 advance by the diversion, or what is -- how do you 23 deal with that statement? 24 MR. FRANTZ: Well, again, once we -- we do 25 have our effluent process monitoring on a continuous

basis, and if we were to exceed our limits, we'd 2 have to stop the discharges right then. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: So that statement -- and we were 4 trying to get it up, but we don't have that right 5 That statement, how would you explain that 6 statement? 7 MR. FRANTZ: It's an attempt to explain our process and our operations. What it's saying is 8 9 that if we were to get close to exceeding our 10 limits, what we'll do is just divert the effluent to 11 evaporation ponds or holdup tanks and we would only 12 then discharge it -- if you go on to the next page, 13 we would discharge it when we have enough other water to dilute the effluent to make sure it's 14 within our tritium limits. 15 16 JUDGE YOUNG: With regard to the purpose of the reservoir and the dam, is what you're arguing 17 18 that in effect it's sort of a redundancy because your procedures are sufficient to ensure that 19 20 whatever goes into it would be under the limits but 21 that this is sort of a secondary protective measure. 22 How do you address what Mr. Eye said about that it's 23 required for the operation of the plant? MR. FRANTZ: He's correct with respect to 24 25 Units 1 and 2; I don't believe he's correct with

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respect to Units 3 and 4. For Units 3 and 4 the 2 cooling water for the circulating water system is 3 drawn from Lake Granbury, not from Squaw Creek 4 Reservoir, so there's a different cooling source for Units 3 and 4 than there is for 1 and 2. 5 We do use the common discharge port for 6 7 radioactive effluents for all four units. discharges, though, from the circulating water 8 9 system do go back to Lake Granbury, so we do have two different discharge ports, if you will: one for 10 11 cooling of Units 3 and 4 and that goes back to Lake 12 Granbury, and one for other kinds of discharges 13 which goes into Squaw Creek Reservoir. JUDGE YOUNG: Does that address your --14 MR. EYE: It confirms what we said: To the 15 extent that they need a point of discharge and they 16 17 no longer have a retention structure to keep the radioactive water that's discharged impounded, that 18 19 seems to us to be a pretty serious operational 20 point. MR. FRANTZ: And we could discharge that 21 22 directly into a stream, a river or ocean or 23 anything, as long as we're within limits. 24 JUDGE YOUNG: So that gets back to my earlier To the extent that it's there to be a 25 question:

place to discharge into, are you relying on it as a 1 2 redundancy, as a secondary protective measure 3 following the first protective measure, which is to 4 make sure that there are no discharges that go into 5 it, or that there are no discharges that accumulate that would violate the regulatory requirements in 6 7 the first place? Am I understanding that right? 8 MR. FRANTZ: The primary purpose of Squaw Creek Reservoir is to act as a cooling source for 9 10 Units 1 and 2; it's not to act as a backup for 11 dilution, as far as I know. 12 We do additional monitoring, not only in Squaw 13 Creek Reservoir but elsewhere out in the environment 1.4 to, again, make sure that to the extent there is any accumulation we catch that, and to the extent that 15 16 there may be accidental releases, we catch that. 17 But again, I don't think Squaw Creek Reservoir 18 is designed or intended to be as a backup for our 19 process effluent system; that's designed to release 20 effluents within NRC concentration limits. 21 MR. EYE: I think we've exhausted this 22 particular point as far as Petitioners are 23 concerned, at least right now. 24 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, Ms. Simon. 25 MS. SIMON: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'd like to initially add just one -- well, 1 2 two citations to the regulatory requirements. One 3 is I'm not sure that anyone mentioned Part 50, 4 Appendix I, which is the as low as reasonably 5 achievable, or ALARA, guidance, and I think Section 2(a) deals with the liquid effluent limits in that 6 7 regard. 8 And I'd also like to say that another 9 regulatory requirement that's relevant to consider 10 in Contention 8, as with other contentions, is 11 2.309(f)(1), and as was pointed out a few minutes 12 ago, getting back to a big-picture perspective, there is no adequate support for this contention under 2.309(f)(1)(5). 14

> Commission case law is clear that it's the Petitioners' burden to provide the necessary support, as is shown most recently in Sharon Harris, CLI 09-8, slip opinion at page 9, where the Commission reiterates that. So the Staff's position is that Petitioners did not and still has not provided that necessary support.

JUDGE YOUNG: Can you address the issue of support by separating it out into the different parts of the argument?

MS. SIMON: Certainly, Your Honor, and I think

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we've addressed this to some extent in our pleading, but I'll review it for you.

With respect to the -- there are several, I guess, parts to this contention as originally written with respect to the environmental and public health impacts of dam failure leading to release of radioactive particulate. There were no effects in the original petition to demonstrate any risk of dam failure or any risk that radioactive particulate and sediment would be transported downstream in the event of dam failure.

JUDGE YOUNG: On the dam failure itself, how do you address the argument in the reply that for some things they're sort of self-evident and you don't really need expert opinion. Dam failure, it's being argued, is something that's more or less in the common realm of knowledge that people in the public have so that the type of support that you're arguing would be necessary is not really required.

MS. SIMON: It's true in general that dams do fail; however, the issue there is whether this particular dam will fail, and certainly there's been no provision of information to show that every dam will fail within a reasonable time frame -- I'm not talking about 10,000 years, but with adequate

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maintenance and monitoring of a dam, it's not necessarily true that it's common knowledge that a particular dam will fail.

and obviously, this is just one part of it and this is why I asked you to separate it out into parts, because without the radiological consequences, the relevance of that would be drastically lowered, but if -- well, I'm not sure -- if the application does not contain the type of specification of what the maintenance would be or analysis of the life span of the dam would be, and assuming there were some consequences of that, would you still be arguing that there would need to be more support than was provided for the argument that there's nothing in the application to address the types of things you're talking about? That's a little circular, but do you understand what I'm getting at?

MS. SIMON: I think I do, and please correct me if I misunderstand.

But first of all, we don't feel that there was any support, so it's not a question of whether there was enough support. Second, I'd like to just return to the contention admissibility requirement, and the burden is on the Petitioners.

If they contend that there's a risk that this dam is going to fail, they are the ones who have to provide some support for that.

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but let me back up. If

I'm understanding them to be saying that there's

nothing in the application showing that the dam will

remain strong, then the contention is not that the

dam will fail; the contention is that there is

nothing in the application to assure that it won't

fail.

So it somewhat becomes a matter of semantics, but I think that could be a significant difference, and if the argument is made that there's nothing in the application to support that it won't fail and you're raising the argument that, well, with proper maintenance, et cetera, the dam shouldn't fail, is there anything in fact in the application that addresses maintaining the dam so that it won't fail?

MS. SIMON: I don't believe that it's necessary to go to that, because the contention as written, as specifically written by Petitioners, was not that there's no information in the application saying that the dam won't fail; the contention as written --

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, it says, "There's no

176 discussion in the environmental report of any 1 2 contingencies for a dam failure or the environmental 3 and public health consequences when radioactive-4 laden sediment would be transported downstream as a 5 result." So actually it says the environmental report 6 7 assumes that the dam will remain intact and 8 structurally reliable. There's no discussion for - any contingencies for dam failure. 9 10 So I guess it's a matter of interpretation, 11 but I think it could be reasonably read as saying by 12 saying that the environmental report assumes that 13 the dam will remain intact, that what's being said 14 there is that the environmental report doesn't 15 specify how assurance of the -- how the Applicant will assure that the dam will remain intact, they're 16 17 just assuming it. That's what the Petitioners are 18 saying.

> Right, but the entire contention MS. SIMON: is that the dam will fail and there will be environmental and public health radiological impacts; that was the contention.

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the contention actually is inadequate, because it fails to fully analyze the radiological hazards that will blah, blah, blah --

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pardon me.

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(General laughter.)

JUDGE YOUNG: And then continuing on in the basis for it, it addresses the issue of the dam again as being -- by saying that the environmental report assumes that the dam will remain intact.

Both of them seem to be -- in both cases they seem to be challenging the lack of analysis rather than asserting affirmatively that there will be a failure, and I think it's sort of a difference maybe that has some significance in terms of looking at contention admissibility.

Now, with all that said, since the main thrust of the contention has to do with radiological hazards, this is sort of a side issue, but with regard to the dam itself, I'm not sure that you're really addressing what's being said which is that the application doesn't analyze it.

MS. SIMON: The safety of the dam is discussed in the FSAR on page 2.4-8. I don't know whether that section, off the top of my head, that discusses maintenance; I believe it discusses the design flood, for example, that it's designed for, and information like that. So there's not absolutely nothing in the application regarding the structure

| 1 | of the dam. |
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| 2 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, well, anyway, you can move |
| 3 | on to the |
| 4 | MS. SIMON: Okay. |
| 5 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Well, let me just ask, if it |
| 6 | . were a contention of omission saying that the |
| 7 | application omitted a specific discussion, to be |
| 8 | admissible, wouldn't there also have to be a showing |
| 9 | that that information should have been in the COLA? |
| 10 | MS. SIMON: Yes, that's correct, Judge Arnold. |
| 11 | There would have to be a showing that there's a |
| 12 | regulatory requirement for that information. |
| 13 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Did you see that in there |
| 14 | anywhere? |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: Where is the requirement that |
| 16 | there has to be a showing of a regulatory |
| 17 | requirement? |
| 18 | MS. SIMON: How else could you show that it |
| 19 | was an omission if you didn't have some requirement |
| 20 | for the information? |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm not sure that I agree |
| 22 | that this is a contention of omission, but let's |
| 23 | assume that it is what has been termed a contention |
| 24 | of omission. Couldn't there be a contention of |
| 25 | omission that says the application does not contain |

| 1 | X, which is necessary to assure the safety of the |
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| 2 | public in these specific circumstances without |
| 3 | making any reference, any citation to a regulatory |
| 4 | requirement? |
| 5 | MS. SIMON: I think there has to be a specific |
| 6 | citation to a requirement. |
| 7 | JUDGE YOUNG: Where does it say that in the |
| 8 | rule? This is a very strict rule, and if it doesn't |
| 9 | say that in the rule, I'm not sure that we should |
| 10 | add it to the rule |
| 11 | MS. SIMON: There is no rule specifically |
| 12 | regarding a contention of omission, and the Staff, |
| 13 | it is not our position that this is a contention of |
| 14 | omission, this is a contention of inadequacy with |
| 15 | failing to analyze among other things, failing to |
| 16 | analyze the environmental and public health impacts |
| 17 | of radiological releases if the dam should fail. So |
| 18 | I'm not sure that it's even necessary to go to the |
| 19 | contention of omission. |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then we can get back on |
| 21 | to the radiological hazards, or if you want to |
| 22 | finish up on that before you move on. |
| 23 | MS. SIMON: Thank you, Your Honor. |
| 24 | The other part of that equation is that the |
| 25 | Applicant has concluded that the environmental |

1 impacts of the particulate release into the reservoir will be small, and that has not been 2 disputed: no facts or other support by the 3 Petitioner. 4 5 Our arguments with regard to dewatering and 6 airborne transfer are essentially similar; again, no facts or expert support.

But let me also just say with regard to the dam integrity, the Petitioner is now saying that it's not just the issue of impacts from radiological effluence but also purely that the dam is needed for the function of the plant. That's a whole new contention.

The Staff doesn't see that in the original contention; there's nothing about the dam being needed for the function of the plant, so we would argue that that's essentially trying to amend the contention at this point.

JUDGE YOUNG: I didn't take what they were saying as trying to say that that was the contention; I took that as an argument in support of the contention that they made, but, in other words, to stress the necessity of the dam to prevent the release of the particulate matter or other matter that would be in the reservoir, but maybe I

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misunderstood.

MS. SIMON: In the event that the Board did take it that way, then I just wanted to state our position.

Again with regard to the tritium and the statement by the Petitioner, which was to the effect that they will be generating a lot of tritium and there may be management problems to make sure that they don't exceed regulatory requirements, the Applicant has provided information in the application, showing how it meets the various regulatory requirements, which are stated in terms of dose, or in the case of the table in Part 20 in terms of concentrations.

The Petitioners have not provided any analysis, any facts, any expert opinion to contend that the Applicant's analyses are somehow incorrect. And, again, it's a lack of support for their contention. They're making assertions without support, and so we feel that that does not meet the admissibility requirement.

And I think other than that, the other aspects of the contention -- for instance, the groundwater -- we didn't discuss, and I think that's adequately addressed in our pleading.

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| 1 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, I wanted to make sure |
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| 2 | that the Panel has the citation in the FSAR that may |
| 3 | shed some light on this. The FSAR at 2.4.4.1 and |
| 4 | you'll find that at page 2.4-24 says, |
| 5 | "Structural" |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: Back up and say that again. I'm |
| 7 | sorry. |
| 8 | MR. EYE: Sure. It's page 2.4-24, and it's |
| 9 | if you have it then, it's the second paragraph of |
| 10 | that section, Your Honor, that begins with the |
| 11 | sentence, "Structural analysis of each structure has |
| 12 | not been performed as a part of this analysis. The |
| 13 | potential backwater effects of dam failures on the |
| 14 | Brazos River are examined." And then it goes on |
| 15 | with some more discussion about 500-year flood and |
| 16 | so forth. |
| 17 | But we take that first sentence as indicating |
| 18 | that they that the Applicant has not done any |
| 19 | kind of an analysis of the dam. |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further on |
| 21 | Contention |
| 22 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I just not that we |
| 23 | haven't done any analysis. Obviously we have done |
| 24 | an analysis. We had to build the dam to begin with, |
|) 5 | and in that regard the dam's been in evictors |

| 1 | since 1977 and was built for serving Units 1 and 2. |
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| 2 | Therefore, it's not very surprising that our FSAR |
| 3 | for 3 and 4 don't discuss the structural engineering |
| 4 | criteria for that dam. It's just not relevant to |
| 5 | our application. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: You were going to get back to us |
| 7 | with two |
| 8 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. I need to get perhaps at |
| 9 | the break, if I can-discuss with my client the |
| 10 | matters, I'll get back to you immediately after the |
| 11 | break. |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Is there anything else on |
| 13 | Contention 8? |
| 14 | MS. SIMON: Your Honor |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: Yes. |
| 16 | MS. SIMON: I'd just like to add that |
| 17 | again, there was no dispute raised with Section |
| 18 | 2.4.4.1 in the FSAR in the petition. |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: Maybe it would be good to take a |
| 20 | break now so you can do that now, and we'll deal |
| 21 | with that before we move on. Okay. Ten minutes. |
| 22 | (A brief recess was taken.) |
| 23 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Mr. Frantz. |
| 24 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. Thank you. The Board had |
| 25 | two questions. The first question essentially asked |
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| 1 | whether our dose evaluations accounted for the |
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| 2 | accumulation of radionuclides in the environment, |
| 3 | and the answer is, yes, they do. Based upon our |
| 4 | weekly and monthly environmental monitoring, we use |
| 5 | the results of that monitoring then to do our |
| 6 | calculation of doses to members of the public. |
| 7 | And because by definition we're doing |
| 8 | environmental monitoring, that does account for the |
| 9 | accumulation of any radionuclides out in the |
| 10 | environment. The |
| 11 | JUDGE YOUNG: Could you explain that to me in |
| 12 | maybe a little bit more simplified terms? When you |
| 13 | do the environmental monitoring you said by |
| 14 | virtue of the fact that you do the environmental |
| 15 | monitoring. |
| 16 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. |
| 17 | JUDGE YOUNG: You're talking about off-site. |
| 18 | MR. FRANTZ: That's correct. |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: Well, what about the argument |
| 20 | that it accumulates in the reservoir? |
| 21 | MR. FRANTZ: Well, to me, the reservoir would |
| 22 | be, quote, off-site. That's part of the off-site |
| 23 | monitoring program, as distinct from in-plant, in- |
| 24 | process monitoring of the effluent. |
| 25 | JUDGE YOUNG: So when you say you do the |

monitoring of effluent, you're talking about the 1 2 effluent into the reservoir? 3 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. As I said, we do continuous 4 monitoring there, and then when it's outside our 5 plant systems, we then do the environmental monitoring on a weekly and monthly basis. 6 7 JUDGE YOUNG: And when you take -- the 8 argument, as I understood it, was that there's no 9 means to measure how much accumulates in the 10 sediment at the bottom of the reservoir. 11 MR. FRANTZ: No. There is a way, and we do in 12 fact do periodic sampling of that sediment. What we 13 have found over 15 years is that there has never been any detectable levels of radionuclides due to 14 15 plant effluents from Units 1 and Units 2. 16 Now, there are other radionuclides, naturally 17 occurring radionuclides. Cesium-137, if I recall 18 that correctly, has been detected, but that was 19 detected even before we began plant operation, so we 20 don't attribute that to plant operation. 21 JUDGE YOUNG: So the sampling that you do of 22 the sediment would be that you would actually go 23 down to the mud and go deep enough so that it would take into account everything that had accumulated 24 25 there over the years, not just the top.

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| 1 | MR. FRANTZ: Now, I don't know how deep it |
| 2 | goes, but I assume it would be deep enough to |
| 3 | account for that. Yes. I'll ask my people to |
| 4 | correct me if I'm wrong. |
| 5 | (Pause.) |
| 6 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. It does take into account |
| 7 | sediment buildup. |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Just out of curiosity, is |
| 9 | that mentioned in the application anywhere or |
| 10 | MR. FRANTZ: I don't know that the details of |
| 11 | the sampling in the sediment are discussed, but |
| 12 | again, I'll |
| 13 | (Pause.) |
| 14 | MR. FRANTZ: Yes. Again to put this on the |
| 15 | record, it does not say all the details and the |
| 16 | methodology. It basically has the locations and |
| 17 | frequencies of collection. |
| 18 | JUDGE YOUNG: Is there any kind of generally |
| 19 | accepted state-of-the-art method for sampling |
| 20 | sediments? |
| 21 | (Pause.) |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: Are you going to be able to |
| 23 | summarize that, or do you |
| 24 | MR. FRANTZ: I think it's better if he just |
| 25 | comes up to the microphone and introduces himself |

and identifies his position and informs the Board. 1 I don't need to be an intermediary on this. 2 3 MR. BIGGINS: Judge, the Staff will consider 4 this legal argument rather than testimony. MR. FLOYD: Yes. My name is Edwin Floyd, and 5 I'm environmental specialist with ENERCON Services. 6 7 I also used to work in this area of Comanche Peak, in the environmental monitoring and effluents. 8 The sampling of sediment here in like Lake --9 10 Squaw Creek, Squaw Creek Reservoir, Tres Rios, which 11 is downstream -- the sediment is so thin, there's 12 not much sediment, and so you can't do a dredge or 13 anything with mechanical devices, so we use the samples or take them with a shovel, and they have to 14 15 gather at least 2.2 kilograms of the sediment in 16 that area, and it's collected, and that's done every And then each one of those samples is 17 18 tested for gamma-isotopic radionuclides. JUDGE YOUNG: Obviously we are sort of getting 19 20 into discussing some factual issues. I asked the 21 question in response to your concern about the 22 accumulation, and I think this is more, at this 23 point, to sort of provide clarification of that issue that you raised today. But at the risk of 24 25 continuing this, I'd like to ask a little bit more

| 1 | clarification about how you do that. |
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| 2 | You say you use a shovel. What kind of are |
| 3 | you talking about what kind of a shovel are you |
| 4 | talking about, and where in the reservoir would that |
| 5 | happen? |
| 6 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, I wish to object to |
| 7 | this |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. |
| 9 | MR. EYE: on the record. I want to make |
| 10 | sure that this is outside of what is expected or |
| 11 | anticipated in this particular oral argument, and |
| 12 | if |
| 13 | JUDGE YOUNG: It is, and |
| 14 | MR. EYE: I mean, I'm not trying to constrain |
| 15 | the Panel from gathering information that it |
| 16 | believes it needs, but I want to make a record |
| 17 | objection to this. |
| 18 | JUDGE YOUNG: No. You're fine to make that |
| 19 | objection, and I'm just rereading your contention |
| 20 | and trying to find anyplace where you mention the |
| 21 | cumulative effect. Can you help me out here? |
| 22 | MR. EYE: I'll try. (Perusing document.) I |
| 23 | think it's first in the quotation from the |
| 24 | environmental report that talks about the cumulative |
| 25 | radiological impact on Squaw Creek Reservoir. |

That's the first place that jumps out as I scan 1 2 this, Your Honor. 3 Then at the top of page 27, the paragraph that states that there's no plan to remove or remediate 4 5 the particulate matter that is accumulating, and instead there'll be just -- they'll wait for it to 6 7 decay, which I think infers that there's a 8 cumulative impact. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We won't go any further 9 10 with this, because obviously I sort of invited your 11 objection, so --On the other question -- thank you, sir, 12 anyway. We appreciate it. 13 14 On the other question? MR. FRANTZ: Yes. The other question from the 15 Board was how long would it take to go from the 80 16 17 percent limit up to the 100 percent limit. And our 18 people say they estimate it's only on the order of 19 months, probably close to a year for that to occur, 20 and in contrast, we do tritium monitoring on weekly 21 and monthly basis, so we would catch that well 22 before we would reach the 100 percent limit. 23 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Any follow-up on Contention 8? 24 25 MR. EYE: I think not from the Petitioners,

Your Honor.

MR. FRANTZ: We have no more.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. I guess where we went just now sort of brings up the whole issue of not getting into the merits of the contention.

Obviously there's been some argument back and forth in the pleadings and here today about what the actual situation is, and part of that was to address the extent to which the contention challenges radiological releases that would be -- that would exceed radiological regulatory limits, and those that might be within limits.

And I think we tried to get some clarification earlier from you as to which you are -- and when I say you, I mean the Petitioners -- which you are alleging, and I think the way the cumulative discussion came up was that despite the assurances in the responses, answers, that there are measures there to address the -- to make sure that any releases don't violate the radiological limits, you felt that there was still this question of accumulation.

Looking at this contention as being narrowed to the accumulation issue, is there anything that any of the parties would wish to add on Contention

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| 1 | 8, without getting into getting testimony from |
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| 2 | non-lawyers? |
| · 3 [·] | MR. FRANTZ: Just that to date there has been |
| 4 | no detectable accumulation of particulate in the |
| 5 | sediments, which is their issue. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: And to the extent that that |
| 7 | would leave open the possibility that there could in |
| 8 | the future be detectable? |
| 9 | MR. FRANTZ: -And, again, if there is, it would |
| 10 | be in such small amounts, well within regulatory |
| 11 | limits, that by definition, the environmental impact |
| 12 | would be small. |
| 13 | JUDGE YOUNG: And the way that you're going to |
| 14 | assure that, by reference to the application |
| 15 | MR. FRANTZ: That's correct, with our |
| 16 | environmental monitoring program that we discussed, |
| 17 | and our process monitoring, and we've discussed and |
| 18 | it's discussed in detail in Section 6.2 of the |
| 19 | environmental report. |
| 20 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, if I may just be heard |
| 21 | briefly on that, the reason I'm troubled by that |
| 22 | statement is because the environmental report says, |
| 23 | without quantification, that there is a radiological |
| 24 | impact on Squaw Creek Reservoir that is accumulating |
| 25 | due to plant operations, and then |

JUDGE YOUNG: That's the part you've quoted. 1 2 MR. EYE: And it segues right into 3 particulate. Now, it's either one way or the other. 4 I mean, if there's been no empirical evidence to 5 support that there's a radiological impact, as I 6 think I just understood, then why the statement in 7 the environmental report that says that there is? 8 JUDGE YOUNG: It says there's an impact, and 9 then that takes us back to the nature of the impact, whether it's an impact that we exceed the regulatory 10 11 limits or not. 12 MR. EYE: Right. And, for example, I would 13 have liked -- I mean, in a different hearing, I would like to have cross-examined the person that 14 15 came to the table just a moment ago, to get some 16 specifications on precisely where they get their 17 samples in relation to the discharge point. right at the discharge point, or is it across the 18 19 reservoir? Is it just precisely where? 20 I mean, these are -- it's simply inconsistent 21 to suggest on the one hand, as it does in the 22 environmental report, that there are these 23 cumulative radiological impacts, and then to 24 essentially say that they've never been detected. 25 JUDGE YOUNG: All right. If there's nothing

| 1 | further on Contention 8, thank you all, and we will |
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| 2 | move on to Contention 9. And this, I believe, is |
| 3 | one on which we did get a reply, so we'll start with |
| 4 | you again, Mr. Frantz. |
| 5 | MR. FRANTZ: Judge Young, it might be helpful, |
| 6 | though, if we could get some clarification from the |
| 7 | Petitioners first. |
| 8 | The Board had a question, asking the |
| 9 | Petitioners to identify the Savannah River study |
| 10 | that apparently forms the basis for Dr. Makhijani's |
| 11 | two statements. Before I start my reply or my |
| 12 | presentation, it would be very helpful to have an |
| 13 | answer to that question first. |
| 14 | MR. EYE: May I have just a moment, Your |
| 15 | Honor? I think I can |
| 16 | (Pause.) |
| 17 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, the |
| 18 | JUDGE MIGNEREY: This is Judge Mignerey. Is |
| 19 | anybody saying anything? |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: No, we weren't. I think |
| 21 | someone's about to, though. |
| 22 | MR. EYE: Sorry, Judge. I was searching for |
| 23 | some documentation. |
| 24 | I took question 9(a), Your Honor, to mean |
| 25 | it says, "Petitioner should be prepared to clarify |

Dr. Makhijani's reference to the Savannah River 1 2 study." I took that to mean that you wanted some, 3 why did we cite to it, and why was it a basis for 4 the contention and the arguments in support thereof. And so that's pretty much what I was prepared 5 6 to talk about in terms of Dr. Makhijani's reliance 7 on the Savannah River study where the more advanced 8 lab-tap model was used, which under Dr. Makhijani's 9 analysis yielded a more accurate dose projection. 10 JUDGE YOUNG: I think we were -- it was going 11 more to the --12 JUDGE ARNOLD: We want the reference. 13 JUDGE YOUNG: The actual reference. 14 MR. EYE: Right. And we're trying to locate that, actually. Your Honor, can we try to contact 15 16 Dr. Makhijani and see if we can get specific citation to that and provide it to you when we're 17 able to -- he's traveling, but we do -- we're able 18 19 to talk to him by -- or contact him by email, and if 20 that would be permissible, then we would certainly do our best to get the specific citation to that as 21 22 soon as we're able to contact him and get that. 23 MR. FRANTZ: Judge Young, this, I think, clearly indicates the problem we had with this 24 25 contention.

They don't identify the source of their study. We don't know what they're referring to. We can't look at the report to make sure they're accurately characterizing it, and we have no basis for knowing what they're referring to. It's an unidentified report. They have some obligation to come forward to identify this report, so that we know what we have to defend against. We think we know what the report is. a report that we cite in our answer. It's 1991

report by the Westinghouse Savannah River Company, with number WSRC-RP-91-9975. We think that's the report, because it seems to correspond with some of the allegations in the contention, but we don't know for sure. And a lot of our answer and a lot of what I'm going to be saying here today is based upon that Westinghouse 1991 Savannah River report.

Going to their reply, they do have a second statement by Dr. Makhijani. That was not contained in their initial petition. They had just a simple one-page statement initially.

Again, I think the Board should strike this longer statement in the Petitioners' reply because it was not contained in their initial contention. They have an obligation to come forward with this

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| 1 | information up front and not withhold it until their |
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| 2 | reply. |
| 3 | But even if the Board were to consider it, we |
| 4 | don't believe that it creates any genuine dispute of |
| 5 | material fact. |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: Judge Arnold just suggested |
| 7 | something that might make sense here. Would it make |
| 8 | sense to put this contention off until tomorrow |
| 9 | morning? |
| 10 | MR. FRANTZ: I would be happy to do that. |
| 11 | Yes. |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And then we'll have more |
| 13 | information at that time. |
| 14 | MR. EYE: Thank you. |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then on Contention 10, I |
| 16 | don't think you provided a reply. |
| 17 | MR. EYE: That is correct, Your Honor. And |
| 18 | this was the subject of one of your specific |
| 19 | questions that, if you would like, I could try to |
| 20 | respond to. This dealt with the MOX fuel |
| 21 | contention. |
| 22 | There probably is some confusion that's been |
| 23 | created here as a result of the reference to MOX |
| 24 | fuel in the Applicant's environmental report. We |
| 25 | took the reference and discussion in the |
| | |

environmental report about MOX fuel. We inferred from that, that that was the fuel of choice for this particular -- or the proposed reactors, Units 3 and 4. Based upon the Applicant's answers and the Staff as well, I believe, but certainly Applicant, there appears to be at this time, at any rate, no intention to use MOX fuel, at least at the beginning of the operations of Units 3 and 4. I think that's what I understand the Applicant's position to be. And to the extent that that's the case, then I

don't know that this particular MOX fuel contention should go into an adjudicatory phase, but -- and I apologize if there was some needless work done with this. It was simply in response to the statement in the ER about MOX fuel, and we took that to mean that that's what they were going to utilize, so --

JUDGE YOUNG: And if there were any plan in the future to use it, as the Staff points out, there would be a requirement for a license amendment, and there'd be the right to a hearing on that. So can we take it you're withdrawing Contention 10?

MR. EYE: Yes. At this time, we will. they submit their license, then we'll probably be back to talk about that.

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1 JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. 2 MR. EYE: Thank you 3 JUDGE YOUNG: So then moving on to Contention 4 11, the impacts of global warming and climate 5 change, I should --6 MR. EYE: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion 7 about how to handle Contention 11? 8 JUDGE YOUNG: Sure. Go ahead. 9 MR. EYE: I would suggest, if there's no 10 objection, of course, that we, for purposes of 11 brevity, combine 11 and 12, because they really are 12 kind of running in tandem, and to the extent that 13 we're talking about relationship between greenhouses 14 gases, global warming, inadequate water, those two 15 contentions are, I think, pretty closely related in 16 subject matter. 17 MR. FRANTZ: Judge Young, I think we would 18 object to that. We do see these as being separate 19 and raising very distinct issues, and we'd like to 20 deal with these separately. 21 JUDGE YOUNG: Staff have a view? 22 MR. BIGGINS: Judge, regarding the questions, 23 was the Board going to follow its questions next, or are we going contention by contention now? 24 25 JUDGE YOUNG: What's your view on how we

| 1 | should go? |
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| 2 | MR. BIGGINS: Well, I think it would be |
| 3 | appropriate to finish the questions that you had, |
| 4 | that the Board specifically had. |
| 5 | JUDGE YOUNG: And |
| 6 | MR. BIGGINS: And then if you have additiona |
| 7 | questions on the other contentions, obviously we're |
| 8 | available to answer them. |
| 9 | JUDGE YOUNG: And which question were you |
| LO | referring to? |
| 11 | MR. BIGGINS: I was seeing question number 1. |
| L2 | being next. And I did not see a question specific |
| L3 | to Contention 12. |
| L4 | JUDGE YOUNG: So are you agreeing with do |
| L5 | you think we should do Contentions 11 and 12 |
| L6 | separately? Do you see any reason to do them |
| .7 | together? |
| .8 | MR. BIGGINS: I was prepared to respond to |
| .9 | your question 12, and if you want to handle |
| 20 | Contentions 11 and 12, we'll certainly respond to |
| 1 | those as well. |
| 2 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So you have no view on |
| 3 | it. Let's just do them separately. |
| 24 | So I think you did file a reply on |
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Contention --

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| 1 | MR. EYE: I don't think we did on 11, Your |
| 2 · | Honor. |
| 3 | JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just get the right thing |
| 4 | in front of me here. |
| 5 | MR. EYE: I'll look again, but |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: You reference your reply to |
| 7 | Contention 8. |
| 8 | MR. EYE: Correct, Your Honor. We did. |
| 9 | That's right. I apologize. And, Your Honor, |
| 10 | without belaboring the record, that was primarily to |
| 11 | address the dilution factor that would be assumed |
| 12 | which assumes an adequate supply of fresh water to |
| 13 | do the dilution, so as to bring tritium levels down |
| 14 | to the mark where they need to be to meet regulatory |
| 15 | standards. |
| 16 | And so we referenced the reply related to |
| 17 | number 8 for 11, because it's our contention that |
| 18 | with inadequate water resources, the dilution factor |
| 19 | would be inherently more difficult to achieve. |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. So do you want to go |
| 21 | first on Contention 11, or with that said or |
| 22 | MR. FRANTZ: I'd be happy to. |
| 23 | JUDGE YOUNG: any proposal to |
| 24 | MR. FRANTZ: Let me address the Board's |
| 25 | question first that it asked regarding the |

environmental regulations that pertain to global warming and climate change, and I guess the short answer is there are no NRC regulations that specifically deal with climate change and global warming.

There is another regulation, though, that just deals in general with the topic, and that's 10 CFR Section 51.45(b)(1), which states that in environmental reports, the impacts shall be discussed in proportion to their significance.

Similarly, if you go on to 10 CFR Part 51,

Appendix A.6, which deals with the contents of an
environmental statement, that regulation states,

"Data and analysis in a statement will be
commensurate with the importance of the impact, with
less important materials summarized, consolidated,
or simply referenced. Effort and attention will be
concentrated on important issues. Useless bulk will
be eliminated."

Turning and look at Contention 11 in light of these regulations, Petitioners have provided absolutely no basis for believing that Comanche Peak would have any impact on global warming or climate change. It has absolutely no technical support, no expert opinion, nothing that would indicate that our

plant will impact global warming. 1 2 JUDGE YOUNG: I think that the contention goes 3 more to that global warming may have an impact on --4 MR. FRANTZ: Judge, you just stole my thunder . 5 on that one. That was my very next statement. 6 JUDGE YOUNG: Oh. 7 MR. FRANTZ: And I think you're absolutely 8 right. 9 JUDGE YOUNG: Go right ahead. 10 MR. FRANTZ: The issue with this contention is 11 whether global warming will impact water 12 availability for use by the plant, not whether the 13 plant will impact global warming. And with respect to the real issue in this 14 15 contention, again the Petitioners have provided 16 absolutely nothing, no expert opinion, on technical support, no references, nothing that would impact --17 18 that would show that there's going to be an impact 19 on water availability due to global warming. Because they haven't provided any technical 20 21 support, this contention should be rejected pursuant to Section 2.309(f)(1)(5). 22 23 JUDGE YOUNG: Now, there is case law that says 24 that you don't have to have expert's report. You 25 can have a fact-based argument.

MR. FRANTZ: That's correct, but you need some 1 2 facts. You just can't have argument by counsel, so, 3 for example --4 JUDGE YOUNG: But there are facts -- there are 5 allegations that there could be protracted drought. 6 MR. FRANTZ: Those are allegations and 7 speculation by counsel. The rules contemplate more 8 than that. It doesn't have to be an affidavit from an expert. It could be, as they do in other cases, 9 10 citing to a technical report in literature. It 11 could be an NRC guidance document. It could be an 12 industry guidance document, but they need something 13 besides just pure speculation by counsel, and that's 14 what they don't have here. 15 JUDGE YOUNG: So are you arguing that global warming, which might include protracted drought, is 16 17 speculation? MR. FRANTZ: Yes, I am. There's nothing --18 19 it's speculation on his part that there's nothing in 20 his contention that supports that allegation. 21 I might also add, by the way, that we do have 22 a section in our environmental report that looks at 23 water availability, including droughts, and 24 particularly our Chapter 2 of our environmental 25 report looks at this, and we show that even given

droughts, we still have sufficient water 2 availability. 3 Petitioners have not cited that discussion. They have not contested that discussion, so 4 5 therefore their contention also fails to satisfy Section 2.309(f)(1)(6), which requires them to 6 contest the relevant portions of our environmental 7 8 report. 9 JUDGE YOUNG: Does your answer give that 10 reference? It was Chapter 2? 11 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. 12 JUDGE YOUNG: I'm trying to remember if you --You referenced sections --13 yes. 14 MR. FRANTZ: Yes. It's, I believe, 2.3 of the 15 environmental report has a fairly extensive 16 discussion --17 JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Historic droughts. 18 do. That's right. 19 MR. FRANTZ: In this regard, by the way, their 20 contention is very similar to a contention that was 21 raised recently in the William States Lee COL 22 proceeding, and the Board rejected that contention, again saying that the Petitioners' assumptions 23 24 regarding droughts were unsupported, and they had 25 failed to address the relevant portions of the

application. For the same reasons, we believe the Board should reject this contention.

There are a number of other allegations in this contention that seem to have no relevance at all to the contention itself. Again, the contention, as you've pointed out, Judge Young, is the impact of global warming on water availability, but they have a couple pages in here regarding impacts on Squaw Creek Reservoir, chemical discharges, water quality, aquatic impacts, thermal discharges. None of those have any relevance to their contention itself. They just seem to be thrown in randomly in this contention.

Therefore, the Board, I think, can just reject this contention without even addressing these ancillary statements or allegations by the Petitioners. But, again, even if the Board were to consider these other ancillary issues, there just, again, is not any expert support for them.

They don't contest the relevant portions of our environmental report. For example, Chapter 5 of our environmental report discusses in detail the environmental impacts of chemical discharges, water quality issues, aquatic impacts, and thermal discharges.

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Petitioners don't contest any of that in this 1 2 contention, so again, these other ancillary 3 allegations are also insufficient to satisfy the Section 2.309(f)(1)(5) and (6); therefore, the 4 Board, I think can just reject this contention 5 without even addressing these ancillary statements 7 or allegations by the Petitioners. But again, even if the Board were to consider these other ancillary issues, there just, again, is 10 not any expert support for them; they don't contest 11 the relevant portions of our environmental report. For example, Chapter 5 of our environmental report 12

> impacts and thermal discharges. Petitioners don't contest any of that in this contention, so again, these other ancillary allegations are also insufficient to satisfy Section

discusses in detail the environmental impacts of

chemical discharges, water quality issues, aquatic

JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Eye, can you address in the course of your argument the failure to address the sections in the environmental report that do talk about historic droughts?

MR. EYE: I don't think I can elaborate on it any more than we did in our original petition, Your

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2.309(f)(1)(5) and (6).

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Honor, or in the reply where we cited some additional references to droughts and so forth.

JUDGE YOUNG: Staff?

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MR. BIGGINS: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.

I'll start with the Staff's position that its answer does address the admissibility of the contention under 2309(f)(1). But go directly to your question on 12, which I read as a very broad question, so

I'll start with a broad answer, particularly regarding what environmental regulations relate to the matters that might be taken into account for global warming or climate change.

And the Staff position is that there are no directly applicable regulations that speak directly to global warming or climate change; however, at a high level, Section 102 of NEPA does provide that all agencies of the Federal Government shall, and then 102, Subsection (2), paragraphs (a), (c) and (f) provide some detail, including: "Include in every recommendation a report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality to human environment. A detailed statement by the responsible official on: 1) the environmental impact of the proposed action..." And there are

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more requirements within Section 102 of NEPA; I won't go through all of them at this time.

The overall view of the Staff, though, is that the Staff must review and provide in its EIS an analysis of the significant impacts of this proposed action which part of that will be an analysis of global warming or climate change to determine, first, whether they are significant, and then, second, if they are not significant, to eliminate them from detailed study as provided in the numerous sections of Part 51, but particularly 10 CFR 51.29

The scoping process description gives an idea of how the staff would approach these kinds of issues. First, the Staff, in subsection (a)(2), would identify the significant issues to analyze in depth, and then in (a)(3) identify and eliminate from detailed study issues which are peripheral and are not significant.

So in that respect, the Staff will look at global warming and climate change from the environmental perspective in order to comply with the requirements of NEPA, and that analysis will be in our EIS.

Now, on the safety side, there is also a consideration in our regulations -- and I don't

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| 1 | believe this was raised by the Petitioners |
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| 2 | generic design criteria 2, in 10 CFR Part 50, |
| 3 | Appendix A, provides that: "The design basis for |
| 4 | protection against natural phenomena would be |
| 5 | structures, systems and components important to |
| 6 | safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of |
| 7 | natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, |
| 8 | hurricanes, floods, tsunami, seiches and loss of |
| -9 | capability to perform their safety functions, and |
| 10 | the design basis for these structures, systems and |
| 11 | components shall reflect: 1) appropriate |
| 12 | consideration of the most severe of the natural |
| 13 | phenomena that have been historically reported for |
| 14 | the site and surrounding area with sufficient margin |
| 15 | for the limited accuracy, quantity and period of |
| 16 | time in which the historical data have been |
| 17 | accumulated." |
| 18 | And so to sum up the Staff's approach, we will |
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be looking at, from one perspective or another, climate change and global warming regarding both how the plant could affect global warming or climate change, and, two, how global warming or climate change could affect the safe operation of the plant.

And I believe we can essentially eliminate most of the concerns about the construction phase,

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because the Staff's view and understanding of global warming is that it's not going to happen overnight.

We're talking about a long-term process.

And so we're primarily on the safety side

focusing on the safe operation of the plant. And one citation that was not provided by the Applicant or the Petitioners was to the final safety analysis report of the COL application, where starting in Section 2.3 on page 2.3-1, the application does discuss meteorology and looks in depth from that point all the way through -- I guess it would be maybe into 2.4 even -- at the historical climatology of the region and the area, the locality, and using that predicts how that would affect the safe operation of the plant, looking at floods, looking at droughts, and other natural phenomena in order to comply with GDC 2.

JUDGE YOUNG: To comply with?

MR. BIGGINS: The generic design criteria 2, GDC 2 -- pardon me.

And so the way that the Staff looks at this is, from the safety perspective, the Petitioners haven't raised a dispute with all of this analysis that is contained in the application, and so where the portions of the contention start to talk about

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availability of water or drought or anything like that, they have failed to review the application completely and raise a material dispute.

With respect to the environmental analysis, particularly how this plant will affect or could possibly affect global warming or climate change, that analysis is embodied in another regulation that we've discussed in depth today, 51.51, the environmental data of the uranium fuel cycle, Table S3, and Table S3 considers the impacts of the operation of the plant on the environment.

And although it was part of the background information that was considered when the table was created, I don't believe the Staff position is that carbon dioxide -- which is what we're really talking about when we're talking about global warming impacts from operation of the plant were specifically incorporated -- they're at least not enumerated necessarily in Table S3.

However, the Staff believes that a CO2 emission could easily be calculated from Table S3 and the information supporting Table S3, and there will be an analysis in the EIS regarding generally global warming and climate change as the operation of the plant could affect them.

And so to that extent, I don't believe the Petitioners have raised a dispute properly, either 2 3 on the safety side or on the environmental side, in response to your question number 12. 4 And let me look back briefly. As the Staff --5 and I won't go through all of this again because 6 7 it's laid out in our answer -- approximately nine 8 claims that the staff identified in Contention 11 and for the reasons cited in our answer, we believe 9 10 each one of those claims fails to meet the admissibility criteria of 2.309(f)(1). 11 And with that, I'll take any questions that 12 13 you have. JUDGE YOUNG: Taking each one of those as 14 support for the claim made in the contention itself, 15 16 how do you address those? MR. BIGGINS: As support for the claim in the 17 18 contention? JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Rather than treating 19 20 each one separately as a separate contention, and I 21 think we've gotten into this in other cases. 22 MR. BIGGINS: Well, certainly, however, I read the contention itself as they set it out that the 23 Applicant failed to analyze the impacts of global 24 warming on rainfall, and my reading of each one of 25

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those claims, perhaps two of them relate to the contention and the rest do not. First, the impacts will include protracted drought, which may compromise water resources. one may perhaps deal with global warming on rainfall, however, again, the report that the Petitioners used to support this talks about manmade drought conditions from a decrease in end-stream flow-ups has noting to do with global warming.

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They also, again, when you're talking about compromising water resources, you're talking a safety analysis for the operation of the plant, you're not talking about how the plant would contribute to global warming or climate change, and that first claim does not raise a dispute with the information that's contained in the FSAR.

Claim 2 that relatively high levels of tritium exist at this site versus other sites. In support of this claim, they cited the Rice report, although the Rice report itself identifies that Mr./Dr. Rice -- I don't recall his status -- had insufficient time to perform a thorough review. I don't see how he can draw legitimate conclusions if he's unable to perform his review.

In addition to that, there's no other

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information specific to this site or other sites regarding tritium levels, and this is one of those claims that has nothing to do with global warming or its impacts on rainfall in the area.

Claim 3, the ER concedes that radioactive — particulate will be deposited in the sediment layer of the SCR. Again, I don't see how that supports a contention that alleges that there are impacts of global warming on rainfall in this area. And I believe that to the extent that they raise this claim in this contention, it merely is a repetition of the claim that was raised in Contention 8.

Claim 4, the Petitioners should assume that the SCR dam will fail. Again, I don't see how this is related to the impacts of global warming on rainfall, and again, it is also raised in Contention 8 and has been dealt with thoroughly today.

Claim 5, the SCR perimeter security must be provided beyond the operation of the license. Staff position is that this also is not related to impacts of global warming on rainfall and is outside of the scope of this proceeding regardless, because it relates to an issue beyond the operation of the license.

Claim 6, that the Petitioners must resolve

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post-license ownership of the SCR in the COLA.

Again, the Staff does not see how this relates to the impacts of global warming on rainfall and also believes that dealing with post-license issues is beyond the scope of this licensing proceeding.

Claim 7, the Applicant must analyze pollution impacts from chemical treatment of water. I believe this was raised in the previous contention. As the Staff noted, in the answer the environmental report does address liquid effluent impacts in the environmental report Sections 3.6 and I believe 1.2, and again has nothing to do with the impacts of global warming on rainfall.

Claim 8, the COLA should consider impacts to water waste quantity and quality, and while this may be peripherally related in perhaps a cumulative way to water quantity availability based on rainfall amounts, they don't raise that issue; rather, they simply say that the Petitioners must consider those impacts and don't provide any details or analysis or factual or expert support, for that matter.

And then claim 9 that the Staff identified, heat energy and water directly released into the atmosphere contribute to global warming. We think that this might be the one claim that truly does

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1 relate to global warming as the operation of the plant might affect global warming or climate change; 2 3 however, there is no support for this particular claim to indicate that either the amount of heat 4 5 energy or the water vapor released from the 6 operation of the plant would have any effect or any 7 significant effect on global warming or climate 8 change, and without supporting that contention -- or 9 that claim, it fails to support the contention and 10 the contention would be inadmissible. 11 JUDGE YOUNG: What about the requirement in 51.45 -- and I think the Applicant mentioned this 12 13 that section -- that the environmental report shall 14 contain a description of the actions, statement of 15 its purposes, a description of the environment 16 affected. How does that relate to the subject you 17 addressed? 18 MR. BIGGINS: A description of the environment affected? 19 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Right, which the allegation is 21 that there will be global warming, which will be 22 part of what should be taken into account. 23 MR. BIGGINS: From the heat energy and the water directly released, that last claim? I want to 24 25 make sure I understand your question.

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JUDGE YOUNG: That global warming would be part of the environment affected, insofar as it affects the amount and whether there will be an adequate supply of fresh water for purposes of plant operations.

MR. BIGGINS: To the extent that the regulation requires the Applicant to describe the environment, the environmental report does do that in Chapter 2, and the Petitioners don't raise any dispute with the description of the environment in that regard.

Now, where you've gotten back to whether or not there is adequate water for the safe operation of the plant, again, that's addressed in the final safety analysis report, which the Petitioners don't cite at all any of the lengthy analysis of the climatology or availability of water for operation of the plant

JUDGE ARNOLD: Let me just ask a hypothetical question. If there was -- if global warming did lead to a significant change in the climate, significantly reducing the availability of water, would there be some point at which plant operation would be deemed no longer viable?

MR. BIGGINS: I take it from your question

| 1 | you're assuming this climate change or global |
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| 2 | warming or drought would occur during the operating |
| 3 | life of the plant, and so within the licensed |
| 4 | operation period, if that were to occur, the FSAR |
| 5 | does describe the minimum water requirements for the |
| 6 | plant, and below which the plant cannot operate, but |
| 7 | that |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have a cite on that? |
| 9 | MR. BIGGINS: I don't. I'm simply responding |
| 10 | to the question. It's my understanding that |
| 11 | information's in the application. |
| 12 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. If you could provide that |
| 13 | later, just |
| 14 | MR. BIGGINS: Certainly, Judge. So I'll |
| 15 | provide information specific to the water |
| 16 | requirements of the plant. |
| 17 | JUDGE YOUNG: The section of the FSAR that you |
| 18 | just referenced that requires minimum water |
| 19 | requirements for plant operation, I think is how you |
| 20 | described it. |
| 21 | MR. BIGGINS: I might have a section here I |
| 22 | can refer to. |
| 23 | JUDGE YOUNG: I didn't mean to interrupt the |
| 24 | flow of your argument. I just thought you might |
| 25 | have the cite handy. |

(Pause.)

MR. BIGGINS: Low water considerations are identified in FSAR Section 2.4.11, starting on page 2.4-36. Plant requirements are specifically addressed in 2.4.11.5, starting on page 2.4-38.

JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.

MR. BIGGINS: Certainly. And so to ensure that I respond to your question, Judge Arnold, we're not talking about a situation that would happen overnight, so for safe shutdown of the plant, if water was not available, it would be something that the plant operators would be able to identify over time, and once they determined that they reached that minimum water amount, they'd be able to safely shut down the plant.

JUDGE ARNOLD: I do have another question for Petitioner. I found the idea of global climate change, the effects on operation, intriguing, but I did not see anything in the petition that showed definitively that global warming will lead to a reduced amount of water, so I took a look, and, in fact, I found there's a lot of theories by reputable researchers, some that say, yes, there'll be less rain.

There's a lot of them that say there'll be

1 increased rain because of increased evaporation, and then there's another group that says hot and dry areas will get hotter and drier, and wet areas will 3 get wetter. So I'm not seeing a general consensus on what the effect of global warming will be. Faced with that situation, how does somebody try to analyze the effect on that plant? MR. EYE: Your Honor, I think that you've identified the conundrum, frankly, that many climatologists and climate models are facing. the reality is that the way we get our arms around that is through the NEPA process, and what I just heard Staff counsel suggest that is going to be done in the anticipated environmental impact statement related to Units 3 and 4 will be an attempt, at least, to figure out what impacts might occur as a

And more specifically, I think one of the issues that will pertain to that is the provision in the FSAR about minimum water requirements in order for operations to continue.

result of global warming, as related to plant

You're right. Climatologists have not definitively determined precisely what the effects will be at a particular geographic point.

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operations.

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cite -- and, again, this is a disputed matter, but in our reply we cite to an article that was published in Science last year, I believe it was, that talked about a -- they used the term "permanent drought." Now, "permanent" sounds -- you know, I was criticizing somebody earlier today for using absolutist terms. Well, "permanent" sounds pretty absolute to me.

But in terms of the way the article couched its analysis, it was that at least for the foreseeable future, there would be a protracted drought that was more severe than had been experienced in the southwest part of our country during anybody's living memory.

The manifestations of that, it seems to us, ought to be covered or ought to be thought of as contingencies for plant operations that would be a natural thing to be covered in the environmental report and the supporting documentation.

However, having heard Staff counsel for the Commission today say that these will be issues that will be covered in the context of the EIS frankly encourages us that the precise task that you outlined earlier about just how does one go about doing this, will be -- there'll be a good-faith

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attempt to do that.

And frankly, that may be the better forum, may be the better mechanism to address that, and in the scoping comments for the EIS that we submitted, we -- there was at least one provision in there where we talked about projected climate change and impacts on plant operations and so forth.

So to the extent that we've got another process kind of running parallel to this, one that might be a more appropriate way to deal with these kinds of questions, that particular part of our contention might be better dealt with in the EIS.

JUDGE ARNOLD: Okay. Also, reading from your petition, to somewhat change the subject, "The COLA should also include an analysis of pollution impacts downstream from water contaminated by chemical treatment such as biocides, algicides, pH adjusters" -- blah, blah, blah.

Okay. Noting that the environmental report does say, "The water treatment chemicals are designed to be consumed by the system with residual concentrations remaining in the effluent as at trace to nondetectable levels," does that, in your mind -- is that not a statement of what the effect on the environment is?

I didn't mean

2 to --3 JUDGE ARNOLD: Go ahead. 4 MR. EYE: At any one snapshot of time, yes. But, again, we're talking about plant operations 5 that could continue for many decades, and, again, 6 7 we're talking about cumulative impacts, and so I 8 think that's what that was geared toward. 9 At any one point, a particular discharge might 10 have down to trace or something akin to that, but 11 we're going to have discharges over upwards of 30 12 years presumably if this thing -- if these units 13 would run at least that long and perhaps longer, based on relicensing that's going on. So I think 14 that's the import of that observation, Your Honor. 15 Thank you. 16 JUDGE ARNOLD: In view of what you just said 17 JUDGE YOUNG: 18 about the Staff's plans for EIS and also taking into 19 account the reference that Mr. Biggins provided of 20 FSAR at Section 2.4.11 and then under that 5 and 38, 21 I think, that there are requirements for minimum --22 there are minimum water requirements for safe 23 operation, for operation, what remains in the 24 contention, and are you in a position to withdraw 25 any parts of it or if not, what would remain?

It -- I'm sorry.

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MR. EYE:

MR. EYE: Your Honor, I think that the part that would be most appropriately withdrawn, based upon the comments of Staff counsel, would be the relationship between global warming and protracted drought in plant operations, to the extent that those are going to be covered in the EIS.

I want to be -- I don't want to withdraw this contention prematurely, but since we're on the record and so forth, I think that we can rely on the comments of Staff counsel that this will be included in the scope of issues that would be analyzed in the EIS.

So I think that that particular discrete issue could be and probably might better be dealt with in the context of the EIS.

JUDGE YOUNG: I guess I'm not following completely what would be left, and also in terms of the parts of the FSAR that staff cited, if there is a provision in the application that says that there are minimum water requirements and that if they aren't met, the plant won't operate, and you haven't disputed that, what happens to the contention? And when I say, the contention, I mean the bolded part on page 31 where the number 11 and then the four lines there.

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MR. EYE: Your Honor, it may be that we're 2 advancing toward the end of the day, and I'm not 3 sure I completely understood your question. 4 Is it if we reserve for the EIS the question 5 of the relationship between global warming and 6 potential impacts on plant operations, then 7 Contention 11 as set forth in the bold would be 8 covered by --9 JUDGE YOUNG: Well, that --10 MR. EYE: -- that. JUDGE YOUNG: -- and also the section in the 11 12 FSAR. If it's required in the application that you 13 have to have enough water and the contention is the application's inadequate because there's nothing to 14 15 assure an adequate supply of water, in fact that 16 section appears to assure that there -- that if 1.7 there's not an adequate supply of water, then the 18 plant won't be operating, if I understood it 19 correctly. 20 I'm sorry. MR. EYE: I see. I mean, your analysis is misunderstand. Correct. correct, Your Honor. And I think that what the import of this contention is that in light of what we know concerning the potential impacts of global

warming and so forth, the assumption that there will

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1 be adequate water to meet the FSAR operational 2 requirements is in doubt. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: But does the FSAR assume that, 4 if the FASR says -- if it sets a minimum water 5 requirement, that is there, in fact -- is there in 6 fact an assumption that there will be an adequate 7 supply, if there's a provision in the FSAR that 8 addresses what happens if there's not? 9 MR. EYE: Well, yes, but --JUDGE YOUNG: Am I talking in circles here? 10 11 MR. EYE: Well, I see -- I think I see your 1.2 question. This partly is due to some assumptions in the 13 14 environmental report that there will be adequate 15 water supplies available for plant operations, and, 16 true, I think it's -- you know, in legal vernacular, 17 it's black-letter law that you need sufficient 18 supplies of fresh water to run the nuclear plants. 19 In the environment report, there is -- the 20 point of departure in the environmental report is 21 that there will be adequate supplies of water for 22 plant operations. 23 We take the position that, given the impacts of global warming, climate change, protracted 24 drought, that assertion in the environmental report 25

may not be a valid one.

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And so I don't want to say that there's no relationship between the environmental report's assumption that there will be adequate water and the FSAR provision that says, at some specified trip point, if you decrease water past that point, plant operations cease. True, but I think that's kind of apples and oranges.

The FSAR provision is almost an emergency kind of situation, not unlike they faced at Vogtle and, I think, the Hatch plant in Georgia last summer or last fall when water levels dropped to the point where the intakes were darn near exposed or partially exposed, and I think they got very concerned about plant operations at that point.

That's kind of an emergency provision. The environmental report takes a longer view and says, We're going to have enough water to support plant operations through the term of the license, and it's that assumption that we would take issue with, given the impacts of global warming.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. The Applicant cites several sections of the environmental report that do talk about historic flow data of the Brazos River and historic droughts and so forth. How -- do you

want me to repeat?

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MR. EYE: If you would, Your Honor. I apologize. Thank you.

JUDGE YOUNG: On page 55 of the Applicant's answer, the Applicant cites the sections of the environmental report that talk about monthly flow data of the Brazos River and historic -- recent and historic droughts, which would seem to go to the issue that you're raising in the contention, and which you have not disputed, I don't believe.

MR. EYE: Well, the historic data are what they are. It's the projected availability of water that we believe comes into play in this contention. The historic data are reflective of adequate water flow, but it's our contention that now that climate change is happening, we can't necessarily rely upon the historic data for support to make a decision about future operations.

JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So you're concerned about the sort of area before we get to such a water shortage that plant operations would cease under the FSAR provision, which would be impacted somehow by global warming before they got to that point.

I guess if I understood your argument a minute ago right, if the FSAR provision is based on

regulatory requirements, is the conceptual area, I guess, that exists prior to the point at which water resources would be inadequate, how would those come into play?

MR. EYE: They matter, Your Honor, in a couple of ways, one of which may not have been very well articulated, but all of this underpins the decision by the Applicant to use water resources for purposes of nuclear power generation.

We think that there are probably better uses for those resources than using them for nuclear plant operations, particularly as those water resources become more scarce, and as Dr. Trungale notes in his report, it's not only that we've got a global-warming sort of climate change looming over us, but downstream users, to the extent that we've got -- I think it's Dr. Trungale or Mr. Trungale characterizes it -- a manmade drought. I mean, you can pull enough water out of the Brazos River, downstream it's going to look like there's a drought effect.

So under the reasoning in the contention, it really extends both to upstream availability for adequate quantities of water for plant operations, but it also extends the discussion to downstream

1 impacts, which would be aggravated, exacerbated by 2 very large withdrawals of water out of the Brazos. 3 JUDGE YOUNG: So on the question of materiality, a genuine material dispute, how would 4 5 you just concisely phrase that? MR. EYE: The issue is whether the 6 7 environmental report makes a faulty assumption about 8 the availability of fresh water for plant operations during the term of the license. 9 10 JUDGE YOUNG: And if the provision in the FSAR 11 provides that if there's not enough water, it won't 12 operate, what's the material issue left then? 13 MR. EYE: The material issue left then is the 14 impact that the plant will have already had on water 15 resources downstream as documented by the Trungale 16 report, for one thing, and the decision initially to build a nuclear plant knowing that these fresh water 17 resources are essential in order for plant 18 19 operations. 20 In other words, if a key piece of the puzzle is you must have fresh water at levels to satisfy 21 22 the plant needs and there's doubt about the 23 availability of that resource for plant purposes, then is it in the public interest for a plant to be 2.4 25 licensed?

JUDGE YOUNG: I'm just trying to put my 1 2 fingers on the Trungale report. I've got too many 3 stacks of papers up here. MR. EYE: Your Honor, I have a copy of it 4 5 here, if you'd like. 6 JUDGE ARNOLD: Everyone has it before her. 7 (General laughter.) 8 JUDGE YOUNG: I've got it now. Okay. 9 Anything further on Contention 11? 10 MR. BIGGINS: Judge, I would have just a brief comment. The Staff believes that the contention is 11 12 inadmissible as pleaded by the Petitioners, and the 13 Staff does not agree to reserve any issues for the 14 environmental impact statement. And I would point out for the record, since Mr. Eye emphasized it, 15 16 that the Staff, along with Judge Arnold's 17 observations, is not going to come up with some cohesive global warming/climate change model to 18 19 explain future conditions in this area; that's 20 beyond the copse of our environmental impacts 21 statement review and analysis. We will analyze it in accordance with what we 22 23 believe our NEPA obligations are, but we don't have 24 any crystal ball either to determine exactly what 25 those impacts are.

And to the extent that the Applicant relies on 2 historical data to determine what future likely 3 water availability, the Petitioners haven't provided 4 any facts or experts in order to support their own belief that there will not be water. 5 6 And so at this point, I think what the Staff 7 is left with to rely on, as well as the Applicant 8 and this Board, is the historical data, and I 9 believe that is also what the experts that Judge 10 Arnold cited also rely on. 11 I have nothing further. Thank you. 12 MR. FRANTZ: Your Honor, I'd also just like to 13 reiterate too that Petitioners have provided nothing 14 to indicate that global warming would have any 15 impact on the flow in the Brazos River or the levels 16 on Lake Granbury, which is the source of our cooling 17 water for Units 3 and 4. 18 JUDGE YOUNG: The source of? 19 MR. FRANTZ: Cooling water. And because they 20 have provided no support at all for their 21 allegations, this contention must be dismissed. 22 MR. EYE: Part of it depends on how you handle 23 the additional materials that we submitted in our 24 reply as well. I think that to the extent that we 25 cited some additional materials that would suggest

| | that in fact a protracted drought condition could |
|----|--|
| 2 | pertain to this area, we would submit that would be |
| 3 | another kind of support for this contention. |
| 4 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Thank you all. |
| 5 | Moving now to Contention 12. |
| 6 | MR. EYE: Your Honor, may I clarify one thing |
| 7 | too, based upon Staff counsel's comments? |
| 8 | To the extent that there was a commitment by |
| 9 | the Petitioners to withdraw that contention based |
| 10 | upon a commitment from the Staff to address it in |
| 11 | the EIS, given the somewhat qualified answer that |
| 12 | Staff counsel just gave, if there was an implication |
| 13 | from the Petitioners that we were prepared to do |
| L4 | that, I think we would have to withdraw that at this |
| 15 | time. |
| 16 | JUDGE YOUNG: So you're withdrawing your |
| L7 | withdrawal; you're not withdrawing the contention. |
| L8 | MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor. That's a |
| L9 | good way to put it. |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. So now moving to |
| 21 | Contention 12, it's all on one page. Do you think |
| 22 | we can get that done in the next half hour or so? |
| 23 | And I don't think that we had a reply on this |
| 24 | or any of the remaining ones, other than 9, which we |
| 25 | haven't addressed yet, so we'll start with you. |
| | |

MR. EYE: Thank you, Your Honor.

The reason that we think that there's now a legal obligation to consider the greenhouse gas impacts related to the UFC, arises from the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts against EPA, a decision that was rendered just two years and a couple of months ago, it was the first week of April 2007, as I recall.

And in that particular case, seminal case, to the extent that it interpreted the Clean Air Act to require that carbon dioxide now be considered an air pollutant, and there now has been, I think perhaps even subsequent to filing our petition or close in that time, an endangerment finding by the Environmental Protection Agency that says in fact CO2 is a pollutant.

So it's our contention that, given the legal requirements now under Mass. v EPA and the endangerment finding that was done by EPA recently, there is a requirement to look at the uranium fuel cycle for its greenhouse gas impacts. And that, in sum, is why we included that particular contention.

JUDGE YOUNG: And how is that something that is material to this particular adjudication?

MR. EYE: Well, the United States Supreme

Court says that CO2 is considered a pollutant, and 1 2 the uranium fuel cycle, as we note here, has various 3 places along the way where there can be anticipated CO2 discharges and subsequent greenhouse gas 4 5 impacts. So it's not unlike a coal plant that now may 6 7 be submitting documentation for its license: 8 does it have to do that it didn't have to do before 9 April 2007? -- take into account CO2. And the legal 10 landscape has changed because of Massachusetts 11 against EPA, and I think it's further changed by the 12 endangerment finding that EPA has done. So we're suggesting that not unlike other 13 14 large stationary sources that now will have to factor in a CO2 impact in terms of what they can 15 16 expect over the long term for their facilities, likewise for this particular proposed expanded 17 18 nuclear plant operation, because CO2 is a pollutant 19 under the Clean Air Act, it ought to be separately 20 or discreetly analyzed in the context of the 21 environmental report. 22 JUDGE YOUNG: Applicant? 23 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you, Judge. This contention should be rejected, because it 24 lacks any supporting basis whatsoever and fails to 25

address any material issue related to this

proceeding to the issue of issuance of a COLA.

It fails to recognize that the issues they

want addressed are addressed in the environmental report. And finally, because it's a collateral attack on Table S3 that hasn't been granted authority by the Commission to raise, with respect to Petitioners' assertion that somehow Mass. V. EPA is related to this proceeding, they couldn't be more wrong.

Mass. v. EPA dealt with Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, and all the Supreme Court decided was that the EPA had the authority to regulate tailpipe emissions from new automobiles. It has absolutely nothing to do with NEPA; it has absolutely nothing to do with licensing of Comanche Peak 3 and 4. I think we can set that aside unless there are some questions further on it.

The endangerment finding is not part of the contention; it's not part of the basis. We'd argue the same thing. It's completely unrelated. I'd point out that it's nowhere identified as part of the basis for this contention.

To the extent the Petitioners are providing a contention of omission, again, it's just simply

wrong. As it's noted in our brief and in the Staff's brief, the carbon dioxide or greenhouse gas air impacts from uranium fuel cycle are addressed.

For the uranium fuel cycle, the electrical generation, electrical use by other components of the uranium fuel cycle are addressed in Section 5.7.1.3. Chemical effluents, including carbon dioxide of the uranium fuel cycle, are in 5.7.1.4; transportation in 5.7.2.

The benefits of carbon dioxide avoidance by use of Comanche Peak 3 and 4 for generation of baseload electric power is contained in 10.3.2.2 and 10.3.3. Air impacts from construction of the plant are 4.4.1.6. Air impacts of operation are in 5.5.1.3. And the core of their contention that somehow the uranium fuel cycle impacts need to be offset from our assertion of CO2 avoidance are specifically addressed as quoted in our brief in Section 5.2.1.2.4.

So I don't know what more we could say about the uranium fuel cycle, and we shouldn't have to guess. Petitioners haven't cited any deficiency. To the extent it's not a contention of omission, that it's somehow of inadequacy, they haven't pointed to any of these sections and identified how

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they're inadequate.

There's just nothing -- and certainly there isn't any factual basis, let alone expert reports -- stating that the carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas emissions from the uranium fuel cycle would be anything different than what we've provided in the report.

There's just nothing here. There's no basis.

There's nothing provided in the contention that

would allow this Panel to admit it. There's just

nothing there.

And, finally, I'd note that carbon dioxide emissions are considered as part of Table S3, although not specifically enumerated. I would bring the Panel's attention to footnote 1, where it indicates that -- where it's clear from the underlying documents cited further in that same footnote, where it's clear that those documents have addressed it, the table should be read as a specific zero entry.

As with the section cites and page cites in our brief, we point to where WASH-1428 and NUREG-1116 -- or 0116 talk about gaseous emissions including carbon dioxide.

The issue here is not whether if Table S3 were

written today, how it would consider carbon dioxide now. The only question is whether the Commission has already described for us how carbon dioxide will be addressed, and it has in Table S3 and in 5151 that requires us to adopt Table S3. We've done that.

Petitioners haven't asserted even that there will be some different number than the default zero entry finding, and further, as we talked earlier in respect to Contention 4 with respect to Table S3, they're free to challenge the health effects of anything in Table S3. They just haven't done it. There's nothing that says our assessment of health effects is anything other than correct.

The Board in Sharon Harris said that unless you -- unless the Petitioner cites some alternative energy, some alternative for electric baseload generation from -- than nuclear, then you don't even get into consideration of the offsets from the uranium fuel cycle. Here Petitioners haven't asserted some other basis or some other viable alternative for electric baseload generation that would support that threshold question of whether we get the uranium fuel cycle.

So sorry for the long list, but that's what we

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were presenting. The two-paragraph contention does not provide any basis for admissibility. Thank you.

JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Staff?

MR. BIGGINS: Yes, Your Honor. The

Petitioners, to begin with, do not address the fuel

cycle impacts discussion in the environmental

report, and the Staff is left, after reviewing the

petition, with the question of why should greenhouse

gas discussion be added beyond what is already

there.

I believe the Petitioners are stating that the uranium fuel cycle has substantial greenhouse gas impacts. However, they haven't provided any support to identify why those are substantial, especially in comparison to alternate baseload energy sources which would have much, much larger greenhouse gas impacts.

I believe the Staff position is that the greenhouse gas impacts from the uranium fuel cycle are determined in the underlying assertions that were used to create Table S3, although they are not enumerated there, and that the Staff believes that the greenhouse gas impacts from the uranium fuel cycle would not be substantial.

In fact, they would be insignificant, and to

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that extent, I don't believe that this Board, as cited in our petition, needs to flashback and review in some greater detail the actual calculations of carbon dioxide from the uranium fuel cycle, because under NEPA, again, matters that are not significant can be dismissed.

And I would point out again, as I believe we pointed out in our answer, that recent decisions in Bellefonte and Lee were -- which had similar contentions also dismissed them. That's all I have. Thank you.

JUDGE YOUNG: Any quick rebuttal on that?

MR. EYE: Just very briefly, Your Honor. We have offered up in a separate contention discussion about alternative base load, and it's -- to the extent that there is a relationship between contentions overall in this matter, I would ask the Panel to incorporate that discussion that we made about alternative base load into the description that we attached to this particular contention.

But beyond that, I'm looking at the provisions or at the sections, rather, in the environmental report that were cited, and for example, 5.7.1.3 talks about the fossil fuel effects.

There's no separate discussion in there about

CO2, and we think that because of the designation now of CO2 specifically as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act, notwithstanding that Mass. v. EPA dealt with tailpipe standards, the majority opinion did not differentiate sources for CO2.

It said in its holding CO2 is a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. It didn't say, it's a pollutant if it's emitted from a tailpipe or a smoke stack or any other source. It said, It is a pollutant to be regulated under the Clean Air Act, or least that the EPA had to make a decision on endangerment one way or the other, which they've now done, of course.

So to the extent that there's an assertion by the Applicant and Staff that somehow the environmental report does adequately discuss impacts of CO2 subsequent to the holding in Mass. v. EPA, we would respectfully disagree.

JUDGE YOUNG: One of the requirements of 2.309(f)(1) is that you provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the Applicant on a material issue of law or fact, and that this information must include references to specific portions of the application, including the environmental report and safety

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| 1 | report, that the Petitioner disputes and the |
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| 2 | supporting reasons for each dispute. |
| 3 | You haven't cited any of those sections in |
| 4 | here. |
| 5 | MR. EYE: That's correct, Your Honor. We |
| 6 | cited the legal the legal argument that we made |
| 7 | revolved around Massachusetts against EPA, and that |
| 8 | was the import of our argument. |
| 9 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. It's ten to 5:00. |
| 10 | We have |
| 11 | MR. RUND: Judge Young, before you wrap up, |
| 12 | may we have the opportunity to respond to the |
| 13 | assertions about alternatives to baseload |
| 14 | generation? |
| 15 | JUDGE YOUNG: You can. We can do that I'm |
| 16 | assuming you're talking about Contention |
| 17 | MR. RUND: Oh, I don't want to address that |
| 18 | contention now. I just want to address the |
| 19 | JUDGE YOUNG: Oh, okay. |
| 20 | MR. RUND: invitation to incorporate that |
| 21 | by reference into this contention. |
| 22 | JUDGE YOUNG: Oh, okay. Go ahead. |
| 23 | MR. RUND: We'll address the merits of that |
| 24 | separately, and because it's unsupported, Mr. Frantz |
| 25 | will address that. |
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| 1 | JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. RUND: We don't think it's appropriate |
| 3 | the requirement is the contention provided support. |
| 4 | It should be a stand-alone |
| 5 | (Pause.) |
| 6 | JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me. Go ahead. |
| 7 | MR. RUND: We don't believe it's appropriate |
| 8 | to be incorporating other sections of the |
| 9 | Petitioners' document that they now at hearing think |
| 10 | are convenient and might support their contention. |
| 11 | The obligation is to provide that basis in the |
| 12 | statement of the contention. It's not there. It's |
| 13 | simply not there, and I'll leave it at that. |
| 14 | We'll agree to disagree about what the Supreme |
| 15 | Court said, and I think they were clear. It's not |
| 16 | ambiguous about what they said. The Panel's more |
| 17 | than capable of interpreting that. And I'd add |
| 18 | Bellefonte to the list of I'm sorry Harris to |
| 19 | the list of Panels that have rejected similar |
| 20 | contentions. Thank you. |
| 21 | JUDGE YOUNG: All right. So we have left |
| 22 | Contentions 9, and then 13 through |
| 23 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Through 18. |
| 24 | JUDGE YOUNG: 19 aren't there 19? |
| 25 | JUDGE ARNOLD: Oops. I didn't flip far |

| 1 | enough. 19. |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUDGE YOUNG: Is there anything else that |
| 3 | anybody thinks that we can properly do today or any |
| 4 | objection to leaving the rest of those until |
| 5 | tomorrow? |
| 6 | MR. EYE: No objection by Petitioners, Your |
| 7 | Honor. |
| 8 | JUDGE YOUNG: Any thoughts on that? |
| 9 | MR. BIGGINS: None. |
| 10 | JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right. Then we'll |
| 11 | reconvene at nine o'clock tomorrow morning and go, I |
| 12 | guess, straight to contention 9, and whatever it was |
| 13 | that we were going to follow up on. There was some |
| 14 | reason we were doing that, and it's escaping me |
| 15 | right this moment, but |
| 16 | MR. EYE: About Contention 9? |
| 17 | JUDGE YOUNG: Right. |
| 18 | MR. EYE: It was we're waiting for some |
| 19 | communication |
| 20 | JUDGE YOUNG: The reference to the Savannah |
| 21 | River study. Right. Okay. So you'll have that for |
| 22 | us. |
| 23 | MR. EYE: We have emailed Dr. Makhijani |
| 24 | already and asked him to make sure that we've got |
| 25 | the right reference, so |

and the contract of the contra

JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right. Then we can go off the record, and we'll look forward to seeing you tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, June 11, 2009.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Luminant Generating Co., LLC

Name of Proceeding: Oral Arguments

Docket Number:

52-034-COL & 52-035-COL

ASLBP No. 09-886-09-COL-BD01

Location:

Granbury, Texas

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Barbara Wall

Official Reporter

Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.