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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Requirements for Fingerprint-Based

Criminal History Record Checks

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	REQUIREMENTS FOR FINGERPRINT-BASED
5	CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD CHECKS
6	+ + + +
7	WORKSHOP
8	+ + + +
9	THURSDAY,
10	JUNE 4, 2009
11	+ + + +
12	ROCKVILLE, MD
13	+ + + +
14	The Workshop convened in Salon I of the
15	Rose Hill Ballroom, Legacy Hotel, 1775 Rockville Pike,
16	Rockville, Maryland, at 8:30 a.m., Harry Tovmassian,
17	Facilitator, presiding.
18	PRESENT:
19	HARRY TOVMASSIAN, Facilitator
20	TOM BLOUNT, NRC
21	RALPH BUTLER, University of Missouri
22	GEOFF WURTZ, NRC
23	LINH TRAN, NRC
24	JERUD HANSON, Nuclear Energy Institute
25	GARY PURDY, NRC
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1	PRESE	NT (Continued):
2	STEVE	MILLER, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
3		Institute
4		STEVE REESE, Oregon State University
5		JERE JENKINS, Purdue University
6		KATHRYN BROCK, NRC
7		BETH REED, NRC
8		DUANE HARDESTY, NRC
9	SEAN	O'KELLY, University of Texas (present via
10		telephone)
11	MARK	TRUMP, Penn State University (present via
12		telephone)
13		ALAN ADAMS, NRC
14	ANDREV	W KAUFFMAN, Ohio State University (present via
15		telephone)
16	KENAN	UNLU, Penn State University (present via
17		telephone)
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25		NEAL D. CDOCC

PROCEEDINGS

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(8:33 a.m.)

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MR. TOVMASSIAN: Well, good morning, everyone. This morning we're conducting NRC's public workshop and its advanced notice of fingerprint-based criminal history rulemaking on checks for individuals granted record unescorted access to the research and test reactors.

This is a Category 3 meeting. In addition to industry representatives, licensees, and vendor organizations, non-government organizations, private citizens and other interested parties are encouraged to participate.

This public workshop is being transcribed, and the minutes of this meeting will become part of the public record. So, of course, you should not use proprietary information sensitive any or any information of any kind during this meeting.

Now, for the purpose of the transcription, I'd like everybody at the table to identify themselves. The folks who are not at the table, we'll your names off of the addressee list, but you're going to make any comments, please do it at the podium and address yourselves for purpose of transcription here.

My name is Harry Tovmassian. I'm from the
Regulatory Analysis, Policy and Rulemaking Branch of
NRR, and I'm the project manager rulemaking lead for
this particular project.
I wonder if the rest of you can identify
yourselves for the sake of the transcription, please.
MR. MYERS: Tom Myers, National Institute
of Standards and Technology.
MR. BLOUNT: Tom Blount, Deputy Director
for the Division of Policy and Rulemaking in NRR.
MR. BUTLER: Ralph Butler, Chair of TRTR,
Director of the University of Missouri Research
Reactor.
MR. WURTZ: Geoff Wurtz, project manager,
NRC.
MS. TRAN: Linh Tran, project manager,
NRC.
MR. HANSON: Jerud Hanson, Senior Project
Manager, Nuclear Energy Institute.
MR. PURDY: Gary Purdy, NRC Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
MR. STEVE MILLER: Steve Miller, Armed
Forces Radiobiology Research Institute and TRTR.
MR. REESE: Steve Reese, Director, Oregon
State Radiation Center and member of TRTR.

1	MR. JENKINS: Jere Jenkins, Purdue
2	University and TRTR.
3	MS. BROCK: Kathryn Brock. I'm a Branch
4	Chief in NRR with responsibilities for Research in
5	Test Reactors.
6	MS. REED: Hi. I'm Beth Reed. I'm with
7	NRC Research Test Reactor Branch.
8	MR. HARDESTY: And I'm Duane Hardesty,
9	project manager, Research in Test Reactors.
10	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Okay. I would like all
11	of you to make sure that you sign the attendance sheet
12	at the back so that we can get a full accounting for
13	everybody that was here.
14	I'd like you to remember to silence all
15	cell phones or electronic devices, if you could, and
16	those of you that are on the Webinar, please mute your
17	phones so that we won't get any background noise from
18	you.
19	Okay. Now, those of you who are here, if
20	you'd like to make any comments or questions, please
21	use the microphone that's provided. Identify your
22	MS. REED: Yeah, we've got microphones
23	throughout the table.
24	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Well, they are provided
25	on the table. Also, that one is active.

Is it? 1 MS. REED: 2 MR. TOVMASSIAN: The other microphone is 3 set up. 4 MS. REED: Excellent. 5 MR. TOVMASSIAN: So you can use either one. 6 7 all meeting participants, Now, whether the Webinar or here, are encouraged to 8 vou're on submit your comments in writing in response to the 9 10 Federal Register notice announcing this meeting. 11 Now, it's particularly important because 12 we get more accurate comments, and we'll understand your comments better if they're in writing. 13 So please 14 send them in if you can. 15 on advanced notices for proposed Now, 16 rulemaking, on March 14th, 2009, the NRC published an 17 advanced notice of proposed rulemaking announcing its 18 intention to conduct rulemaking to require fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for 19 individuals granted unescorted access to RTRs. 20 This 21 is required in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 22 Now, an ANPR is the most formal mechanism 23 for federal agencies to develop regulations through 24 enhanced public participation. Now, one thing that 25 should remember is even though an ANPR is you

Register, they are not to be mistaken for proposed rules. They do not require anybody to do anything, and they are not proposed rules. They are not final rules, and they do not represent a commitment by the NRC to publish proposed or final rules, except in cases where Congress has mandated rulemaking for the contemplated action, and in this case it has done so.

So in other words, what is going to happen after this ANPR process is completed, the public comments will be considered and resolved. A proposed rule will be published, and you will get another opportunity for public comment, and then a final rule will be developed after public comment is considered and resolved as well.

Now, generic requirements for fingerprint-based criminal history records check are not new to the NRC. We do these in other areas of NRC applications and we have experience doing this. What is new is the applicant of such generic requirements for RTR facilities.

Applying generic requirements to such a diverse group of facilities presents a unique challenge to the NRC. In our ANPR, and it is an ANPR, the NRC has presented its proposed approach to this

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problem and has posed a number of questions that it would like stakeholders to address.

Now, the answers to some of these questions will help the NRC develop the proposed regulations that we're going to come up with, but answers to other questions will address the impacts that these requirements may have and should provide a basis for a better regulatory analysis or a more informed regulatory analysis that will accompany the proposed and final rules.

So we actually want to accomplish a couple of things this morning. One of them is to answer questions that interested parties have about the intentions of NRC and what we mean by our ANPR so that we can formulate a better set of public comments that will inform us better for our rulemaking activities.

But in addition to that, we want to get a better appreciation of how these proposed requirements might influence the operations of various RTR facilities.

So with that, I'll give you Beth Reed.

Now, Beth, as she mentioned before, she's from the RTR

branch, and she is the technical lead for this
rulemaking.

Beth.

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MS. REED: Hi. Good morning. I thought that we would start this whole workshop, and you'll notice I emphasize "workshop" because this is not meant to be a meeting where I talk and you all listen; this is a workshop. We want input from everybody. So I'm going to kick it off first by just refreshing everybody's memory about what is happening and where we are now.

Pre-9/11 the regulations focused mostly on physical protection. Ten CFR 7360 and 67 covered requirements that included measures for storing and using special nuclear material, monitoring the controlled access areas, and insuring a response to all unauthorized activities.

Two thousand two to 2004, compensatory measures were issued for the site specific background investigations for individuals granted unescorted access. These were dependent on local restrictions and could be rather inconsistent depending on state laws, university laws, things like that.

In August 2005, the Energy Policy Act amended Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, when it gave the NRC authority to require fingerprint for research test reactors. The Atomic Energy Act has previously only covered nuclear power plants, and the

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Energy Policy Act then said, okay, let's cover research test reactors as well.

So in March 2007, the Commission directed NRC staff to issue orders to RTRs to require fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for individuals with unescorted access to facilities. Now, throughout the morning I may just say "fingerprint," but what I am actually talking about is the fingerprint-based criminal history record But just to make it simple, I'll just say "fingerprint."

The orders were to require fingerprinting only for individuals with unescorted access to risk significant areas of materials within the facilities. Then August 2007, an order imposing fingerprinting and criminal history record check requirements for unescorted access to research test reactors was issued.

Later, in August 2007, an order imposing fingerprinting and criminal history records check requirements for unescorted access to the General Atomics research test reactor was issued.

The Commission also directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking to determine if fingerprint-based criminal history record checks

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should be required for additional RTR personnel.

Harry mentioned earlier, and Ι So there will mentioned, this is a workshop. plenty of opportunities to ask questions or comments on the proposed approach discussed in the Federal Register notice. Because there are so many on the phone, I will stop every few slides for input. using the Webinar -- sorry, sorry -- for those using the Webinar, you just take your phone off mute, and you can then participate, and we ask that after you ask your question or state your comment, please put the phone back on mute.

We want this to be an interactive type of meeting, not one where I just stand up here and talk and you listen. Your input is desired and valued.

NRC proposes to revise 10 CFR 7360 that adding а Paragraph G will specify the requirements for fingerprints for individuals with access. Before determining the of proposed rule implementing nature а the requirements of the Energy Policy Act, the NRC is seeking comments on the language of the proposed rule.

Some of the language would be that each RTR licensee have a program for obtaining fingerprint-based criminal record checks for individuals granted

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_	unescorted access to areas or significance; a
2	procedure to assure that certain prohibited
3	information is not used as the basis for the denial of
4	unescorted access; specific procedures for the conduct
5	of fingerprinting; a procedure for correction of
6	completion of criminal record information; a procedure
7	for protection of information; and a procedure for
8	official review.
9	Let me stop at this point and ask if there
LO	are any questions or comments so far. Yes, Steve.
L1	MR. REESE: Yes. What kind of prohibited
L2	permission are you referring to in sub-bullet two?
L3	MS. REED: That's a good question. Linh,
L4	do you have more specifics?
L5	MS. TRAN: I think that's the SGI
L6	information.
L7	MR. REESE: No, it's talking about
L8	evaluation of a denial of unescorted access, and it's
L9	implying that there's information that's not allowed
20	for us to review. What type information would that
21	be?
22	MR. BUTLER: To be clear, the NRC doesn't
23	know what this sentence is?
24	MR. MYERS: Is this information from NRC
25	or is this information from the licensee? For

1	instance, criminal conviction for a minor.
2	MS. BROCK: I think that it is information
3	like, as you say, about the individual, yeah.
4	MR. MYERS: That would be provided by the
5	licensee.
6	MR. REESE: But the NRC is then making the
7	decision?
8	MS. TRAN: I think this is the I think
9	if you send in the information for the background
10	check and you don't use that information against the
11	person. I think that's what we're coming from with
12	this.
13	MR. REESE: I don't understand.
14	PARTICIPANT: That doesn't make sense.
	MR. STEVE MILLER: There is discussion
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15 16	about one of the orders describing the types of
	about one of the orders describing the types of information.
16	
16 17	information.
16 17 18	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please?
16 17 18	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please? MR. STEVE MILLER: There is a description
16 17 18 19	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please? MR. STEVE MILLER: There is a description of one of the orders that came out that describes the
16 17 18 19 20 21	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please? MR. STEVE MILLER: There is a description of one of the orders that came out that describes the type of information
16 17 18 19 20 21	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please? MR. STEVE MILLER: There is a description of one of the orders that came out that describes the type of information THE REPORTER: Please keep your voice up,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	information. MS. TRAN: Can you speak up please? MR. STEVE MILLER: There is a description of one of the orders that came out that describes the type of information THE REPORTER: Please keep your voice up, sir.

1	long about types of information that cannot be
2	considered. I don't recall everything that's in it,
3	but I believe it's things like minor traffic
4	conditions, things that perhaps have not been fully
5	adjudicated yet, things that might come up on an FBI
6	check that don't really apply to this, but there is a
7	discussion in one of the orders.
8	MR. BLOUNT: What it sounds like is we
9	need to go back and look at this, too, and make sure
10	we understand what that language is about.
11	MS. REED: Yes, yes. We'll make sure we
12	clarify that.
13	MR. BLOUNT: And understand.
14	MS. REED: And understand it and let
15	everybody know what exactly
16	MR. BLOUNT: further dialogue on that
17	aspect of it.
18	MS. REED: Any other questions, comments?
19	Anybody on the phone?
20	(No response.)
21	MS. REED: Okay. We'll move on. So at
22	this point in formulating the rule, the staff was
23	directed to strive for risk informed graded approach
24	that considers, among other things, the type of
25	significance of special nuclear material and other

sensitive materials, as well as the research and test reactor's licensed power level.

The rulemaking would generally require RTR licensees to insure that individuals granted unescorted access to risk significant areas and risk significant materials and RTRs are subject to an FEI fingerprint check or an acceptable alternative. we need help defining is what are the areas significance and can they be generally defined. constitutes unescorted access? Those are going to be the two main topics we'd like to tackle in this workshop today.

First let's discuss areas of significance.

As a result of the Energy Policy Act, the NRC is directed by Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act to require the licensee to obtain fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for individuals who are permitted unescorted access to either a utilization facility or radioactive material or other property subject regulations by the Commission.

The unique nature of each RTR makes it difficult to develop generically applicable definitions of utilization facilities that would result in an effective and implementable regulation. This objective would be better achieved by limiting

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this requirement to an area within the RTRs identified as the area of significance.

There are three proposed options for defining areas of significance. They are controlled access areas as defined in 10 CFR 73.2; areas of the facility as determined in each licensee security assessment or prescriptive locations.

Let's look at the first one, controlled The NRC believes that areas at the areas of access. facility that are designated as access controlled are already defined in each licensee's security plans or security procedures and access to these are already The definition of being controlled. 73.2 of controlled access area is any temporarily permanently established area which is clearly demarcated, access to which is controlled and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it.

There's a couple of questions associated with this first option. What would be the appropriate number of additional personnel that must be fingerprinted for unescorted access based on this definition?

Does anybody have any idea of how many more would have to be fingerprinted? How you thought

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1	about this before?
2	And I'm getting these. These were all
3	questions from the <u>Federal Register</u> notice, and that's
4	what the NRC is attempting to answer is those
5	questions in that <u>Federal Register</u> notice.
6	MR. O'KELLY: This is Sean O'Kelly,
7	University of Texas.
8	We would not for a controlled access
9	area, we would not have to fingerprint any more
LO	individuals that do not already have access to the
L1	area.
L2	MS. REED: Okay.
L3	MR. BUTLER: I would believe that to be
L4	true for most of the affected licensees.
L5	MS. REED: Okay.
L6	MR. BLOUNT: Are there any that would not
L7	who would have issues with additional
L8	fingerprinting? That's really, I guess, the group
L9	that we would want to focus on and see how we can
20	bring that group in, see what we would need to do to
21	minimize that impact. Is there anyone?
22	MR. TRUMP: This is Mark Trump at Penn
23	State.
24	MR. BLOUNT: Yeah.
25	MR. TRUMP: Right now we do allow access

of maintenance workers from the university into these areas without being continuously supervised. Thev vary, whether it was an air condition technician or an electrician. There's supervision on site. supervision to provide access in the area, but we do not require that they be continuously observed, and we not fingerprint these individuals. So it's rather large maintenance force, а varietv individuals. So it would have to have continuous monitoring or trying to get a core individuals that are cleared.

MS. REED: Okay. Good input.

MS. BLOUNT: So for that situation are there alternatives? Say you have a group of maintenance folks that are going into an area. Could you have that group with someone that was of that group that was fingerprinted that could provide that oversight?

MR. TRUMP: Procedurally, if there is one individual who has unescorted access and monitored them, if we would move to the definitions proposed, it would mean that I would potentially have an operator staying there watching them while they change air filters and perform other activities.

MS. REED: Okay.

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1	MR. TRUMP: So the burden is tying up an
2	operator continuously to monitor long time university
3	crafts personnel who are working on systems not
4	directly related to the reactor but in the areas of
5	significance.
6	MR. REESE: We have the reactor fuel is
7	designated as a what do they call it? vital area
8	based on the old definition. Under this condition we
9	have new employees that come in, new operators that
LO	have not yet received their full security clearance,
L1	but have been issued an interim clearance. We allow
L2	them to be in the controlled access areas but not in
L3	the vital access areas. So we would have a group of
L4	people that would not be allowed in the inner offices
L5	for a year or more under this definition.
L6	MR. BLOUNT: Which would be a significant
L7	impact.
L8	MR. REESE: Which would be very
L9	significant. DoD will issue an interim clearance or a
20	clearance waiver based on preliminary information
21	while their background checks and security clearances
22	are being processed.
23	MR. BLOUNT: So could we have an interim
24	clearance?
25	MR. REESE: Or even a waiver. You know,

1	they will or we have a security department that looks
2	at the application for a clearance, and based on the
3	information that they have at their disposal will
4	issue an interim clearance or a waiver, but we don't
5	generally accept those in lieu of a clearance for that
6	purpose.
7	MR. ADAMS: When you say "clearance," do
8	you mean a secret document, top secret clearance?
9	MR. REESE: Secret, yeah.
10	MR. ADAMS: But we're talking for the
11	purpose of this rule something much less than that.
12	MR. REESE: I understand, but that's what
13	we go after when somebody new comes in, is a secret
14	clearance if they're allowed access to the reactor.
15	So they're issued something less by the university in
16	the interim because a secret takes about a year to
17	adjudicate.
18	MR. ADAMS: Is that something less? Does
19	it match up with what we're asking for?
20	MR. REESE: No. The fingerprints are not
21	processed. We don't have results of a fingerprint
22	check until the security clearance comes through.
23	They do fingerprint them, but they're processed along
24	with the clearance.

MR. ADAMS: Would it be a problem to send

1 those fingerprint through our methodology also at the 2 same time? Because you get a turnaround much quicker 3 from us. 4 MR. REESE: We have a new person. We have been unable to contact that office for three weeks. 5 We've gotten no answers to E-mails, no answers to 6 7 Our phones are ringing. This is based phone calls. on the number that's published. 8 MR. BLOUNT: For us? 9 10 PARTICIPANT: I would actually reiterate 11 Steve's comment on vital areas. Typically the CAAs 12 larger in the vital areas I would imagine everybody's facility, correct? Where a vital area is 13 14 more consistent with the concern at hand, meaning access to the actual material itself. 15 16 The difference between a controlled access 17 area and a vital area I think you will find 18 significant for probably 60 to 70 percent of facilities where they're controlling access as opposed 19 to controlling access to the actual material itself. 20 21 This would actually have huge impact 22 because of the number of students, researchers, and 23 faculty that are involved in a control access area as 24 opposed to the vital area.

JENKINS:

MR.

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That would be true for

	Purdue as well. We do have to lingerprint 120 people a
2	year, and that's not something we can afford to do.
3	MR. O'KELLY: That would triple the number
4	of people we fingerprint.
5	MS. BROCK: And these people that come in,
6	they might not stay for many years. It might be
7	fingerprinted one year and they're gone nine months
8	later or something like that.
9	MR. JENKINS: They're students. We have a
10	lab next door to the reactor, and we teach classes in
11	there.
12	MR. REESE: So it depends on how you
13	define controlled access areas and how you define
14	vital areas, and I think we need to keep this focused
15	on vital areas and not talk about controlled access
16	areas.
17	PARTICIPANT: Speak up, please.
18	MS. TRAN: I don't think so because I
19	think we're going to a sample of security plans.
20	Control access area, I think I found that most people
21	have it, but vital area, I mean, some RTR and security
22	plants do not have vitals area, and that's where we
23	got stuck. Some do and some don't, and how we're
24	going to be able to define that if you don't have it.
25	MR. ADAMS: We spent a lot of time looking

1	at the definition of vital equipment and vital area,
2	and that seemed logical, but then when you started
3	looking at security plans, not everybody defined vital
4	areas, and if you look at the definition, it's a
5	pretty broad definition and has a lot of flexibility
6	to it. So that's one of the reasons we went to CAA,
7	was that's something that's defined in the
8	regulations, and it looked like at least, you know,
9	through the security plans that we sampled that's
10	pretty universal in security plans, vitals areas.
11	MR. REESE: But for those of us who do
12	have vital areas, it presents a problem because we've
13	defined both of these, and typically CAA's I would
14	assume is much larger encompassing.
15	MR. STEVE MILLER: Could this be
16	constructed so that the licensee has a choice of
17	definition in what to use?
18	MS. TRAN: This is for discussion. There
19	are other options that we are considering. We are
20	only on Option 1.
21	MR. STEVE MILLER: But for the final rule.
22	MS. TRAN: That's why we're talking
23	because we can't define or at least I can't, you know,
24	where the cutoff is. I can draw the boundaries, and
25	that's why I'm having a lot of problems. We went to

	vitals, and I think and I went to a couple of
2	inspections out there, and when I looked, they don't
3	have it.
4	MR. REESE: That actually brings up
5	another question which is where you know, some of
6	the discussions in the order originally came about is
7	we focused more on the individual rather than a
8	defined area because of this explicit problem. Has
9	that created an issue? Is there a reason why we're
LO	moving away from that philosophy?
L1	MS. TRAN: Because in the rulemaking you
L2	probably need to be a little bit more generic, and so
L3	that's what we're trying to write, something generic
L4	that everybody can use.
L5	MR. ADAMS: I think part of it is the fact
L6	that post 9/11 and post security assessments were a
L7	lot smarter about, you know, target sets and barriers
L8	and time lines, and a lot of stuff that we really
L9	didn't think about very deeply pre-9/11. So that's
20	part of it, too.
21	You know, also, it's framed against
22	certain aspects of getting the target sets that we're
23	looking at.
24	MR. BUTLER: What's wrong with the words
25	in the current order as you've got it defined in this

1	public <u>Federal Register</u> notice? Is this broken?
2	Because the research reactors, we've all
3	implemented the order, and we've had these in effect
4	for a number of years now. What's wrong to just
5	codify these words here?
6	It seems to be working for you. It seems
7	to be working for us.
8	MS. REED: That's a good question, Ralph.
9	That's one of the ones I had towards the end about,
LO	you know, has there been a burden implementing the
L1	orders. Has there been a problem with the orders?
L2	That way, you know, we're asking
L3	MR. BUTLER: We've already undergone the
L4	burden of reporting.
L5	(Laughter.)
L6	MS. REED: Right, and I think what NRC is
L7	trying to look at
L8	MR. BUTLER: What you're doing here is
L9	creating additional burden for us.
20	MS. REED: And what NRC is trying to look
21	at is can we lift that burden a little bit if we
22	choose a different definition and choose who enters
23	that area, to get back to your question, Steve, you
24	know, focusing on the people. That gets into the
25	unescorted access. Who has unescorted access?

Well, if we shrink the area of who, you know, needs fingerprints for unescorted access, maybe we'll shrink the number of people.

MR. REESE: Well, the beauty of the way the order was set up is that we have a lot flexibility in defining that area, which we assumed -and it sounds correctly so -- that each facility defines differently, and that was the beauty of it so we could each focus on the people who have access to the fuel, and it was not defined by area, but it was more of access, unescorted access to the actual fuel itself, which allowed us some flexibility.

MR. ADAMS: And that's true, Steve. Ι think one of the things we was that the saw of different interpretation the order from was licensee to licensee, and when you looked at those interpretations looked and at. the security assessments, there was some disconnects between them, between how those lined up, and that's why we looked at looking at a different way to define things.

Again, the orders were put in place to give us a certain level of protection while we went and did the security assessment. So that's why we're back at the table. We know a lot more now and, you know, based on individual licensees' implementation of

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1	the orders we see some places where what some licensee
2	has done and what we looked at in the security
3	assessments don't line up very well.
4	MS. BROCK: I think where we might be
5	going is Option 2, if we want to go to the next slide,
6	where the areas of the facility helps to determine
7	some of the definitions.
8	MR. REESE: Yes.
9	MR. RICHTER: Excuse me. This is Brian
10	Richter at NRR.
11	MS. REED: Yes.
12	MR. RICHTER: On the Webinar.
13	We're not getting the slides. We're still
14	on the cover sheet slide.
15	MS. REED: Is everybody having that same
16	problem on the Webinar?
17	PARTICIPANTS: Yes.
18	MS. REED: How about now?
19	MR. RICHTER: There we go.
20	PARTICIPANT: Thank you.
21	MS. REED: Thank you. Sorry
22	MR. KAUFFMAN: Also, could everyone lean
23	into the microphone. I'm having a lot of trouble
24	hearing what some people are saying.
25	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Who said that?

1 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sorry. This is Andrew at 2 Ohio State. Thank you. 3 MR. TOVMASSIAN: 4 MR. STEVE MILLER: On page 17117, third 5 column, about two-thirds of the way down on the proposed rule, it says, "Requiring fingerprinting only 6 7 for individuals with unescorted access to risk significant materials, i.e., fuel, within the research 8 and test reactor facilities." 9 10 That's really where we all should 11 heading. It's access to the fuel that 12 interested in, and in many of our facilities, you can be standing right on top of the core and not have 13 14 access to that material. In the case of Florida, 15 you've got several tons of concrete over it 16 MS. EPAct, TRAN: But the says 17 "unescorted access to utilization facilities." So I'm 18 going from a big picture and I'm trying to narrow it down so that it would fit. I just can't go and say 19 access to the field without go back and define, you 20 21 know, certain area. 22 MR. STEVE MILLER: They define the risk as the fuel. 23 24 MS. TRAN: Yes, and that's what we're 25 trying to do because in any way you argue it, the law

1	requires access to a utilization facility. So unless
2	you define a certain area of how you define a certain
3	area, that's where we're at right now.
4	MR. REESE: So the present order is
5	inconsistent with EPAct?
6	MS. TRAN: I wouldn't say inconsistent,
7	but to me when I went out and do the inspection, like
8	I said, most of the different people the latitude,
9	it's so wide range. Certain things I expect to be
10	fingerprinted and it's not, and you guys are doing it
11	by the letter of the order, and we're taking a step
12	back to make sure that, you know, everything is in
13	accordance with the EPAct.
14	Does that make sense?
15	MS. BROCK: So you're saying you need to
16	do a little bit of fine tuning based on what we've
17	learned.
18	MS. TRAN: Correct.
19	MS. BROCK: And what we know about the
20	act.
21	MS. REED: Does anybody on the phone have
22	any questions or comments about either Option 1, which
23	kind of bled over a little bit into Option 2?
24	MR. O'KELLY: This is Sean O'Kelly at the
25	University of Texas.

1	I think Steve Reese, although he calls the
2	order beautiful, I don't really agree with that, but I
3	certainly agree that that allows a greater for each
4	facility to determine based on their threat assessment
5	and local conditions to determine what constitutes an
6	unescorted access area and who are designated and has
7	unescorted access.
8	So I think the existing order allowed that
9	flexibility, and if there was a disconnect that should
10	have been determined in subsequent reviews.
11	MR. ADAMS: A disconnect between what?
12	MR. BLOUNT: What was being required of
13	the act and what the order was directing I believe is
14	what the disconnect that could have been or should
15	have been identified
16	MR. REESE: Is that what you're talking
17	about, Sean?
18	MR. O'KELLY: (Unintelligible.)
19	MR. BLOUNT: If I understood correctly,
20	what I understood was that there was a disconnect
21	between the act and the order. Then we should have
22	identified that during the inspections.
23	MR. REESE: Are we talking facility
24	specific implementation?
25	MR. O'KELLY: I was talking facility

specific implementation where each of us wrote a letter saying how we were going to implement the order.

MS. REED: So we've already covered Option

2. So let's move --

MR. ADAMS: Could we --

MS. REED: Sure.

MR. ADAMS: -- before we go to Option 2, licensees, I'd like you to think about for a second they're different, and all but the security assessments we did, and at some point we ran, you know, time lines for adversaries, and at some point we started that time line and started responses. least from a security assessment point of view any person that's sort of inside that boundary where the time line starts would be in an area of concern at least from the security assessment point of view.

So that's one thing to think about as you look at this one, and if you're thinking of having — you know, there's different levels of boundaries in your facility. If you're thinking of looking at a boundary that is not consistent with the security assessments, then you'd have to ask yourself and we'd have to ask ourselves what impact would that have on the work that we did and the conclusions we reached.

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1 MS. REED: Did everybody on the phone hear 2 what Al was saying? And did that make sense? 3 MR. ADAMS: 4 MR. O'KELLY: This is Sean, again. I hear it, Beth. 5 MS. REED: Okay. 6 7 MR. ADAMS: And did you understand what I was trying to say? Because I'm being cryptic. 8 Well, that's your job, but 9 MR. O'KELLY: my comment is --10 11 (Laughter.) 12 MR. O'KELLY: -- you're saying that if we assume that there are individuals who are trying to 13 14 gain access, start from some distance away from the 15 facility, then we start a time line from there, but as we move people closer and closer to the materials, 16 17 then you want to shift your time line or throw out 18 previous delays, and so that's where your unescorted access definition comes in. 19 That's one aspect to think 20 MR. ADAMS: 21 You know, part of this is making an assumption 22 about the reliability of people, and if an unreliable 23 person can defeat a detection barrier, then 24 question becomes, you know, from a security assessment

point of view where do I start my time line.

MR. O'KELLY: I agree with that, and Steve's point of the assumption that we would have a skilled group of people trying to gain access to our facility, those time lines were based on usually crash and run scenarios. Being in the facility, each individual facility, let's take on the burden of evaluating their psychology because the fingerprints don't do anything other than prove that they were caught.

So each facility has the director and the management and the reactor operators who have to — each student or person for physical plant and evaluate whether they are a risk, and you can't do that with fingerprints, and you can't do that with a definition.

And that's my comment. Τf MR. BUTLER: you take your example where the time line starts, in cases, the time line most of these started significant distance away from the special nuclear This would be probably even broader than what's in the EPAct, but most is access to facility. So we need to be careful how we define that as what portion of this security assessment we're talking about.

MR. ADAMS: Right, and that's exactly what we saw, was

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1 MR. BUTLER: Ιt would end up 2 fingerprinting everyone in the neighborhood. 3 MR. ADAMS: Well, let me ask 4 question. If in the end we, you know -- and when I say time line starting, I think, you know, what I'm 5 talking about is the time line started at the point of 6 7 That's when the response forces first detection. 8 would start moving. If you're saying I need to fingerprint at 9 10 a barrier that's further into that, you know, that 11 becomes the area of concern. Then the question is do 12 I, NRC, need to go back and look at my evaluations again starting at a different point of detection. 13 14 PARTICIPANT: (Unintelligible.) We can't understand you. 15 MR. TOVMASSIAN: In my mind, the fingerprint 16 MR. BLOUNT: to your behavioral observation program. 17 rule gets Essentially it says who are we going to look at to 18 make sure that we have as much information as possible 19 to understand are they a worthy valued, yaddy-yadda, 20 21 person versus is this individual going to be -- is 22 this someone who is have none or will do, et cetera. 23 It weeds out or make a separation. It's part of the 24 standing ongoing process versus an active barrier, if

you will.

So actually I think all we're trying to do is identify a small cadre or relatively small cadre of folks that we're going to actually make sure this group is the trustworthy group, whatever that happens to be.

MR. O'KELLY: Well, I agree, and I think Al mentioned first detection. So those individuals who have access to the facility and can clear security systems would change the dynamics of my security assessment. If I felt like the people who have access to turn off my security system or disable an alarm, those are the individuals that have unescorted access. They can change the time line, but if the alarms are set and people are in place, the time lines doesn't change. Still it's a first detection, and that's a first alarm.

MR. ADAMS: That's right, John. If someone can say prop open the door that we assumed would be, you know, alive to detect the adversaries; if someone has the capability to prop that door open and not be detected, then, you know, I think that's a person whose reliability needs to be confirmed to some extent.

MR. REESE: sure, but I think that the original orders should have covered people like that.

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As a matter of fact, there was specific language in there about having the ability to defeat security systems and having the knowledge and not only security systems, electronic security systems, but physical barriers, to remove physical barriers, too.

MR. STEVE MILLER: And exercise control over the material.

MR. REESE: Yeah, that being the ultimate endpoint.

MR. STEVE MILLER: Right.

MR. ADAMS: Again, we saw different interpretations of that, and they varied. I can't go into details about that, you know. That's what we saw.

MR. O'KELLY: And each one of those would be a case-by-case justification because if the language of the order allows flexibility for those facilities that have the best intentions without compromising security or causing an undue burden on the facility, but those who read the order that I could do almost nothing in accordance with this order as written, there is a disconnect between how they were written. I think in good faith I was obviously not because I Don't mention that. I would hope the securities would make a best effort to meet the goals

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of both.

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MR. ADAMS: And I think something was said that it's knowledge and capability and the security assessments made assumptions about knowledge, capability, tool sets and things like that. know, there's a lot of information there to look at in like determining things that, you know, what constitutes knowledge, what constitutes capabilities.

MR. BUTLER: I think we just need to end up that we've got to be careful how we define this first bullet under Option 2.

MS. REED: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: That might need to be behind closed doors.

MR. ADAMS: Yeah. If this is the way it goes, I would see that being a case-by-case discussion between the licensee and the NRC.

MR. REESE: But aren't you already there with the way we do it now? I mean, I keep coming back to the fact why change anything. If there's a discontinuity or if there's a specific licensee, a discontinuity between the way they fingerprint and results of a BA, then that's probably a discussion you should have with the individual licensee, but I'm not sure it warrants changing the way we implement the

order.

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MR. ADAMS: I think that's a very good thought. Maybe that's, you know, something that we to think about, is, you know, we need memorialize something here because we need to go from orders which were not meant to be permanent for all What we're doing is we're taking those ideas time. and throwing them in something that's permanent, but in the process of doing that, you know, if it's a case where we believe maybe the implication of the earlier orders need to be tweaked, you know, discussion we can have, but I don't think we have -we have not pursued that I don't think

MR. BUTLER: And I think we agree that the purpose of rulemaking is to allow for comment by the public and by the licensees, to develop regulations, and there's real disadvantages to regulating by orders. So we believe this is the appropriate path to go down to rulemaking.

Our thinking is perhaps maybe there's one or two facilities that perhaps did get a little tweaking, but the majority of us, that thing is broke. So why not just codify the current language in the order and you all go have a little conversation with the one or two facilities that need to have a

1	conversation.
2	That would be minimizing the impact to all
3	the rest of us.
4	MR. HANSON: I guess saying don't reinvent
5	the wheel on this, what we have there, and we will
6	make it work.
7	MS. REED: That's very good input. I
8	think
9	MS. BROCK: That's what we're looking for.
10	MS. REED: Yeah, exactly. That's what
11	we're looking for. Some of these ideas we were think
12	that it would make it a little bit more consistent,
13	maybe less of an impact, but if it's making it more
14	confusing, you know, through these discussions we're
15	finding out, you know, that's the type of input that
16	we need. Wonderful. Thank you.
17	On the phone, anybody else have comments?
18	(No response.)
19	MS. REED: Okay. Let's discuss Option 3
20	then for
21	MR. BLOUNT: Purposes of completeness.
22	MS. REED: Exactly. For defining areas of
23	significance. One of the other ideas to try to narrow
24	the area down is to use descriptive locations, which
25	for example would be the reactor, the spent fuel

1 storage areas, fresh storage areas. So it would be 2 very prescriptive and possibly a smaller area. Any comments on this approach, defining 3 4 what the areas of significance would be as opposed to what is now in the orders? 5 Would this, indeed, narrow the area? 6 7 Well, maybe it would, but JENKINS: this is certainly reinventing the wheel. 8 I disagree. 9 MR. O'KELLY: Everything 10 covers fuel, but we start getting into the control 11 room and I can't speak for all of us, but then you 12 don't really have access to the fuel. You can control the reactor, but given key control and other 13 14 you can't really reach the fuel. 15 think the original definition, Ι 16 think, as Jere said, if you're talking about special 17 nuke material and the fuel, that's the risk, not the and I can't look at all of the 18 control room, engineering safety feature equipment, but that also 19 doesn't gain access to the fuel, which is as we all 20 know the risk at the small package. 21 22 BLOUNT: So just for the sake 23 discussion, if the rule read something along the lines 24 of what the existing order language is or there was an 25 option to look at a specific or specify on a facility

1	specific basis particular areas, so you had a choice;
2	a licensee could choose in your security plan to do it
3	this way or do it that way. Would that be of any
4	value?
5	MR. JENKINS: We already do that, don't
6	we?
7	MR. O'KELLY: Yeah, I agree. I think
8	we're already allowed to do that. Nothing prevents me
9	from fingerprinting people in the control room who
10	have access to the control room, but an individual
11	case-by-case decision.
12	MR. REESE: Yeah, we've already really
13	kind of done that, right? So we make a determination
14	on where people can go, how they can gain access, and
15	in some cases that is determined by an area and in
16	other cases that may not be determined by an area.
17	MR. BLOUNT: Okay.
18	MR. ADAMS: Can I add something? And it
19	was a comment about small reactors, and you know,
20	we're looking at the entire fleet of reactors here,
21	and there are some facilities that if you can get to
22	engineered safety features and prevent them from
23	performing their intended functions, that can lead to
24	fuel damage in some scenarios.

MR. O'KELLY: That's what I was saying.

In some cases the control room is alongside the reactor. There's no separate room. So you by default when you had access to fuel, you have access to the control room.

MR. BUTLER: Well, I think what they've got outlined here is two different items. One is on theft and one is on sabotage, for the larger facilities where we have to consider sabotage. where the control room and the safety features I think you're talking about, Al.

I know for us we already do this.

MR. ADAMS: And you know, prescriptive locations, that set of locations might not be applicable to each and every licensee.

So on page 17117 where it MR. O'KELLY: says "i.e., fuel," as an example, not as a definition, you could -- as prescriptive, the difficulty with prescriptive is you start making a list and everybody either feels obligated to do control room monitoring because that's the new regulation, but giving example but defining areas that be not must controlled.

We know we have to control to controlled access area fuel access, and I agree with Ralph saying that there are safety features that are in the control

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1 room that could cause problems with the reactor. 2 MR. REESE: In some cases. MR. O'KELLY: 3 I think those are defined. 4 If you would define vital area, you would have control 5 for those, too. MR. STEVE MILLER: The way it's currently 6 defined, vital area has a short definition. I believe 7 exercise control over the fuel, and there's a few 8 other things, but that in itself would be guidance for 9 10 each facility to determine where those areas are. 11 MR. ADAMS: The definition of vital area 12 simply the vital area is where the vital says equipment is 13 located, and when you go to 14 equipment, it's a longer definition, but it's material 15 and it's interesting. It's material and/or equipment. 16 If it gets damaged, it can have an impact on health 17 and safety, and without the rules in front of me, 18 that's, you know, my paraphrase of it. So it's a very short definition that has a 19 20 lot of room for interpretation and to cover a lot of 21 the waterfront because it's not only equipment, but 22 it's also the material which could be, you know, a vital area. It could be where the fuel is because it 23 24 talks about material, too, and then you get the health

and safety of the public angle in there.

1 MS. REED: One of the things I guess we 2 can go ahead and we've talked about the significant 3 areas, and the next slide is actually asking for other 4 options, which I think we heard other options. 5 stick with the language in the orders. Is that what I'm understanding? 6 7 MR. BLOUNT: Correct. 8 MS. REED: So are there any preferable ways to define areas of significance? Again, areas of 9 10 significance isn't defined in the orders, is it? 11 MR. REESE: It doesn't even show up, 12 right? 13 MS. REED: Right. So what I'm hearing is 14 don't define areas of significance. We don't need to define that. is that what I'm hearing? 15 MR. REESE: It's 16 the problem 17 encountered before, is trying to define an area. We 18 came back to let's let the facilities decide who has 19 access, to beat a dead horse. 20 MS. TRAN: So I guess in that way then, 21 you want it to be like a prescriptive rule in which we 22 can say we'd like to see you have a program for this, and then you would describe whatever you have for 23 24 EPAct, the rule, and so you have to send us something 25 for you. This is my area and this how I'm going to

_	control it. So if you picter a prescriptive
2	MR. REESE: No, no.
3	MS. TRAN: versus the one that we define
4	an area.
5	MR. REESE: Because if it gets issued like
6	the order or if the order gets issued, promulgated in
7	regulation, no one should be sending any mail. There
8	shouldn't be any correspondence. There shouldn't be
9	any correspondence. We shouldn't have to justify the
10	program that we're already implementing through orders
11	just because it promulgated through regulation.
12	I certainly wouldn't imagine anybody wants
13	to send this correspondence in. See what I mean?
14	MR. JENKINS: Your inspectors visit us
15	once a year.
16	MS. BROCK: As part of the inspection.
17	MR. JENKINS: But you do. I mean we
18	didn't
19	MR. BLOUNT: We inspect the program. That
20	should be the existing program.
21	MR. REESE: Because the inspector
22	specifically came out to inspect those things after
23	the orders.
24	MR. BLOUNT: And that's what your
25	inspection
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1 MR. REESE: Specific order related 2 inspections. 3 MR. O'KELLY: But let me -- this is Sean 4 O'Kelly. 5 Are we talking about inspections on the orders? The NRC staff can correct me, but 6 7 inspector's job is to see if we've implemented what we've committed to you in a separate letter. 8 don't come out and make any on-site -- at least my 9 10 inspector doesn't interpret the rules or regulations 11 on site. They just verify that we are doing what we said we would do. 12 And what we're saying is 13 MR. JENKINS: 14 that we don't need to resubmit that telling them again 15 what we're going to do. We've already told you what we're going to do. 16 17 O'KELLY: Well, that's what MR. T ' m I know when we talk about inspectors, and I 18 saying. think that's a separate issue, we submit many letters 19 to the NRC and through changes of our security plan 20 21 how we work them, if we change the definition or the 22 wording of the order by regulation, new regulation, we 23 start this whole thing all over again. 24 That would be a burden. I can tell you 25 that.

1	MR. ADAMS: How does the the NRC deal with
2	those licensees that we believe need to tweak what
3	they're doing a little bit? You know, if we clarified
4	the order, then that means we're completely I guess
5	that sends a message we're completely satisfied with
6	the way the orders are written, and I'm not 100
7	percent sure that's a true statement, or the way the
8	orders were being interpreted.
9	MR. REESE: Yeah, but can't the NRC simply
10	start a dialogue with the licensee to say what needs
11	to be said?
12	MR. BLOUNT: When we do an inspection on
13	our existing licensees and identify that Licensee A is
14	not implementing the manner in which we expect to,
15	then we should be able to deal with that licensee
16	specifically.
17	You know, we have not documented that as
18	an issue, abut we would need to do that. That's how I
19	would think that we would apply that. So if we've got
20	outliers out there, we know who the outliers are.
21	Then we need to go talk to them, now, today, versus
22	waiting for anything else.
23	MR. REESE: Before this would get
24	promulgated.

MR. BLOUNT: There would be no need to

1 wait for that. I mean, the regulation, the order is 2 what you're operating under. MR. STEVE MILLER: Get rid of the order. 3 4 MR. BLOUNT: Exactly. So, therefore, if 5 I've got issues, I need to go deal with those issues. Am I missing something? 6 7 That's the PA. MR. JENKINS: if 8 MR. O'KELLY: Yeah, there are individual facilities that took the flexibility in the 9 10 order to the extreme, case by case, NRC's issue with 11 that facility and I guess however the NRC would start 12 that dialogue of special inspection of just a phone call that starts the special inspection, I don't know, 13 14 but if there are outliers as you say that are not meeting the intent of the order, that is really a case 15 by case of the facilities. 16 It should have never got to that point, 17 but when you go back and rein us in. 18 MS. REED: One of the steps, I think, that 19 NRC would take with the whole rulemaking process is 20 21 after a rule has been developed, develop a regulatory 22 quide that would help assist interpretations unlike 23 with the orders. I hear that there are some varying 24 interpretations.

So part of this process would include a

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1	reg. guide.
2	MR. BLOUNT: That certainly would help
3	with the background because there would be guidance
4	documents. There would be a deeper understanding made
5	available for folks to recognize this is what's
6	intended in this area hopefully.
7	So what I think we found in other areas
8	like this is that it's the reg guide and the guidance
9	documents after the rule which provide the best
10	opportunity to enhance the understand which insures
11	that people are lined up and everybody is on the same
12	page. When you have issues, you go back to the
13	guidance document and say this is what we say and this
14	is what we are aligned around. This is what we agreed
15	to, and then people go on to say, "Oh, sorry. Missed
16	that, and we go on about our way."
17	MS. REED: So that we
18	re not confusing our transcriber any more than he is,
19	folks on the phone, if you're not talking, could you
20	please put your phone on mute?
21	Thank you.
22	MR. O'KELLY: Oh, that's not your PA
23	system. Okay.
24	(Laughter.)

MR. O'KELLY: On my comment on the reg.

1	guide
2	MS. REED: Right.
3	MR. O'KELLY: when we start getting
4	specifics about the security, is the reg. guide going
5	to be a controlled document?
6	MS. BROCK: We'll assess that when we work
7	on it. Again, I think you used "control" well.
8	MS. REED: It depends on, I guess, how
9	specific we get, but that would definitely be one of
10	the questions we'll have to answer when we start
11	developing it.
12	MR. REESE: You're going to have to
13	because you're going to have to provide examples that
14	will get uncomfortably close.
15	MS. REED: Okay.
16	MR. BLOUNT: And there could be subparts
17	to the document, you know, broad guidance, shallow
18	guidance, and then specific areas which are limited
19	and which would be controlled with the limited
20	documents. So there are words to handle that.
21	MR. TOVMASSIAN: We would have to do that
22	anyway because reg. guides are going to have to go out
23	and they'll be published in no the <u>Federal Register</u> ,
24	but they'll be published and they'll be public. So
25	portions of them may actually

MR. BLOUNT: Right.

MR. TOVMASSIAN: -- if they have security information in them. That's not a problem though.

MS. REED: Okay. Well, the next topic we're going to move to is discussing the unescorted access, and you know, it already sounds like areas of significance may not be a term we'll be using since that's really not in the orders, but for discussing purposes, this is what was proposed in the <u>Federal Register</u> notice in the ANPR as the definition for unescorted access.

"The NRC plans to define an individual with unescorted access to the utilization facility as any individual who has the ability to access licensee designated areas of significance without continuous direct supervision or monitoring by an authorized individual."

Now, what this is, it's linking the Energy Policy Act where they specifically say utilization facility to our definition of who gets unescorted access. Because we're defining in this definition that the utilization facility basically has areas of significance, and these are the ones that need to be fingerprinted. At least that's the way I'm reading it. This is that tie to cover that term "utilization"

1	facilities."
2	Is this proposed definition of individuals
3	who has unescorted access reasonable and sufficient?
4	Okay, Steve.
5	MR. REESE: I would argue you could just
6	replace that whole second half of the sentence with
7	what was put into page 17117, where we talked about
8	orders were issued only for individuals with
9	unescorted access to risk significant materials, i.e.,
10	fuel, within the research and test reactor facilities.
11	You could say within the utilization facility
12	MS. REED: What exactly page are you on?
13	MR. REESE: Third column, second
14	paragraph, bottom of the second paragraph, the last
15	sentence. "In implementing the requirements."
16	MS. REED: Got it.
17	MR. REESE: If you need to tie the words
18	"utilization facilities" that can easily be done and
19	not identify this function of area.
20	MS. REED: Okay. So risk significant
21	materials within the research and test reactor
22	facilities as opposed to
23	MR. REESE: Replace research and test
24	reactor facilities with utilization facilities.
25	MS. TRAN: So how do you define risk

significant area though? I have to have like a room,
like a boundary.
MR. REESE: In this case it's risk
significant materials.
MS. TRAN: But that doesn't define me an
area. So
MR. BLOUNT: Where do we keep them?
MR. REESE: But that's the problem we ran
into, right? That's the reason why we're looking for
individual areas.
MS. TRAN: I tried to make the connection
before, but I just couldn't do it, and that's why we
have to go back and do the ANPR, because I could not
make the connection between this, because they wanted
to have like an area. Risk significant area could be
anywhere.
MR. BLOUNT: But the situation with the
materials.
MS. TRAN: Materials, but the material has
to be within an area.
MR. BLOUNT: That's right, but if I attach
it to that material, let the material where it's
located define the area. So the risk of that area
becomes that area where the material is store.
MS. BROCK: Which then is in that

1	facility.
2	MR. BLOUNT: Correct. It may very well be
3	different, but if it
4	MS. TRAN: So if you consider the control
5	room a risk significant area?
6	MR. REESE: It may not be in some of these
7	facilities. In a lot of facilities it's not going to
8	be.
9	MR. ADAMS: And I think your area has to
10	be one of the boundaries that's in a security system,
11	so to speak, you know, that if you have a room that's
12	not secure, that can't be secured in and of itself,
13	I'm not sure that can be the boundary, that that
14	boundary has to be going outward from that place, the
15	first place you run into where, you know, can secure a
16	boundary.
17	But, again, you know, that's just a
18	thought
19	MS. REED: But that also then tied back to
20	definition Option 3 where we talk about prescriptive
21	locations as areas of significance. The ones listed
22	are basically where the material is located, the
23	reactor, the spent fuel storage, not the control room,
24	yeah, as John was noting. I think most people don't
25	agree with that, but these are just suggestions. We

1 can delete or add, but if I understand what you're saying, Steve, it sounds like we're almost tying this 2 this Option 3 where the material is 3 4 prescriptive locations, which is basically a little 5 inconsistent because each facility is different, but it also makes it a little bit easier to combine, I 6 7 believe. Well, it has the possibility 8 MR. ADAMS: of being more than just where the material is located. 9 For some facilities we're back to it could be where 10 11 engineered safety features are located or equipment is 12 located. Then if that equipment is damaged, it can lead to fuel damage. So it's not only direct access 13 14 to the material or the ability to hold that material in a way that's unacceptable to public health and 15 16 safety. 17 MR. REESE: But that's the language of the order directly, isn't it? Well, I mean paraphrasing 18 19 the order. So that should already exist. 20 MR. STEVE MILLER: There is some language to that effect in there. 21 22 MS. REED: In the reg. quide we would give specific examples of that definition. 23 So the 24 regulation would be pretty broad, but in the req.

guide we would define and discuss what examples would

1	be covered by that.
2	MR. JENKINS: Well, if you say control
3	room, that means the control room is a risk
4	significant area.
5	MS. TRAN: But do you think that people
6	can enter the control room that's operating need to be
7	fingerprinted?
8	MR. STEVE MILLER: It depends on the
9	facility. In the control room, you can't remove fuel.
10	You can't damage fuel. So the access to the reactor
11	where the safety features were, it's located. The
12	control room would do very little good if you were
13	trying to harm something.
14	MS. TRAN: Okay.
15	MR. MYERS: Beth, I have a question about
16	this.
17	MS. REED: Yes.
18	MR. MYERS: Monitoring doesn't necessarily
19	mean visual options, correct?
20	MS. REED: That is one thing that would be
21	up for, you know in the reg. guide if we would give
22	examples of what monitoring is, and that is definitely
23	an option that is not actually being in the room.
24	MR. BLOUNT: Or the right visual
25	observation.

1	MS. REED: Right. Did everybody hear that
2	on the phone?
3	MR. O'KELLY: Could you repeat it please?
4	MR. MYERS: I asked if monitoring in this
5	last slide necessarily meant direct visual
6	observation, and the answer was no.
7	MR. O'KELLY: Okay.
8	MS. REED: Okay. The next slide is
9	implementation of the orders. When you folks first
LO	started talking about the orders, I said, you know, we
L1	were kind of already reading my slides and this is why
L2	we're closing up, is discussing the orders and what
L3	has worked well and has not and why.
L4	And from what I'm hearing of the
L5	discussion, you seem to feel that orders are the
L6	language in there is fine. Is that what I'm hearing,
L7	or are there areas of the orders that you think that
L8	we could tweak in the rulemaking?
L9	PARTICIPANT: That came past the original
20	order.
21	MR. MYERS: This was brought up by Steve.
22	If there was some allowance in the regulation, if
23	there was some allowance for interim security.
24	MS. REED: Security.
25	MR. TRUMP: This is Mark Trump at Penn

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One of the things I was wondering about, why do we have to submit plans through the NRC to the FBI and, in fact, through again? It does result in sometimes substantial delays, although it has gotten better.

I think that actually goes MR. PURDY: EPA Act and how the FBI back the wants They actually prefer coordinate. to coordinate through the NRC, and I think it might actually say that through the -- in the revised Atomic Energy Act, that things go through the Commission.

In the materials world, all the materials licensees that need to be fingerprinted, all 70,000 of their fingerprints come through the NRC, that come through that way, even from the agreement states. The agreement states aren't even allowed to directly submit fingerprints to the FBI through this program So everything comes through us.

MR. MYERS: What about reciprocity? You have somebody coming from the military or somebody comes from DOE?

MR. PURDY: Well, on our side when we do the fingerprinting, anybody who has been adjudicated with an FBI criminal history, if you're a fed. or DOE,

DoD, somebody like that, you don't have to go through the process again. You've already been done, as long as it's current, and that's the thinking.

MR. STEVE MILLER: What about somebody who has come from another facility that has gone through it?

MR. PURDY: In our proposed rule on the material side, the radioactive material side, we're going to be -- we're allowing for that TMI to be transferred.

And while I've got the mic, I'm going to jump back to a question that talked about -- right up front that talked about information that you can't use in the determination, and what we're doing anyway, with the criminal history record, sometimes they tend to be incomplete. There may be a record of an arrest, but there's no endpoint. What happened? Was he put in prison? Were the charges dropped?

It's that kind of information that you can't use. If an arrest is more than a year old, which there's no information on the disposition of the arrest, we can't use that to say this person is not trustworthy and reliable, or an arrest that resulted in a dismissal of the charges cannot be used to say that this person is not trustworthy and reliable. You

can't use that single point of information.

But for us, we also throw in the criminal history record checks, education, employment, credit history, those sorts of things. We throw all of that in as part of the T&R determination, but it's just an example of things that you can't use, for us anyway in the radar materials world.

MR. TOVMASSIAN: I would just like to throw out that I think the sense of this question when we wrote the ANPR was that when you implemented the orders, were there things that were particularly onerous that you felt did not add anything to your security? And could those resources be used in any better way, more effective way?

So that was kind of the sense of lessons learned from the implementation of the orders, and that's the kind of feedback that we were looking for in that particular question. So I didn't know if any of you would have any input on that. Of course, you could write it in if you don't E-mail.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ FRANTZ: This is Stephen Frantz at Reed College.

This is probably specific to me, but virtually everybody I do a fingerprint check on is under 21 and there's never a record. I'm not sure

1	there's some way for the age to be changed or
2	exemptions for students could be made.
3	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Thank you.
4	MR. O'KELLY: This is and this is just
5	information for the group. This is Sean O'Kelly from
6	University of Texas.
7	We have had an individual who had a
8	background check and came back at 17 with a record.
9	So they will go back to the age of 17 at least in
10	Texas.
11	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Thanks.
12	MR. O'KELLY: So you've just been lucky
13	having good kids.
14	(Laughter.)
15	MR. FRANTZ: We've never had anything on
16	any of our reports. That's three students as opposed
17	to Texas.
18	(Laughter.)
19	MR. TOVMASSIAN: We can't hear you, sir.
20	MS. REED: Can you speak up and restate
21	your name, please?
22	MR. GEORGE MILLER: George Miller.
23	MS. REED: Thanks.
24	MR. GEORGE MILLER: In Irvine California,
25	everyone who works as students has to go through
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1	LiveScan, FBI checks for criminal history record, and
2	for us it would be nice if some kind of reciprocity
3	could be gained there so somehow that could get to the
4	NRC and so forth because we have these LiveScan
5	systems that are much easier to send people to get
6	fingerprints than the old fashioned cards. We found
7	that somewhat burdensome and we had to do something
8	rather special in order to get records to send to NRC.
9	It may be that there's nothing you can do about it,
10	but if there is any way to have that information
11	somehow from California transferred to the main FBI
12	files and get a note to the NRC that this person is
13	cleared, that would certainly be less burdensome for
14	us.
15	MS. REED: That's an interesting question.
16	MR. UNLU: This is Kenan Unlu from Penn
17	State. Sorry. I joined late.
18	I have this question. What's going to
19	happen to the foreign students or the foreign
20	individuals?
21	MS. BROCK: That's one of the questions we
22	have.
23	MR. UNLU: I mean this question of the
24	fingerprinting, but you know, in terms of the record,
25	I don't think that the FBI or anyone else has records.

1	The only records they have is they have the visa.
2	MS. REED: Good question. As a matter of
3	fact, I have that a couple of slides after this that I
4	wanted to put out on the table for discussion. Since
5	you've already brought it up, let's go ahead and
6	discuss it though.
7	MR. UNLU: Well, in my opinion, that you
8	have any graduate students coming from abroad, since
9	they are going to be or they're coming with a visa and
10	the visa requirement is that they already have the
11	fingerprinting as well as the security check and et
12	cetera, and what kind of things should apply for them?
13	Because having them fingerprinted and also searching
14	their record and et cetera from here to aborad is
15	almost impossible.
16	So do we have to assume that that's
17	already done because they have the visa to be here, or
18	what you should follow on with?
19	MS. BROCK: Yeah, I think we're going to
20	have to follow on to that. I don't know the answer,
21	but it's a common problem I think with the facilities.
22	MR. TOVMASSIAN: That's why we asked the
23	question.
24	MS. BROCK: Yes.
25	MR. REESE: But doesn't the State
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1	Department vet those people?
2	MS. BROCK: I think that's what Ken is
3	saying.
4	MR. PURDY: Well, what we had found, many
5	things came up but what we had found about five years
6	ago is no, that it wasn't adequate for us when we had
7	the T&R determination for access to radioactive
8	material, that just the I forget the number on the
9	form but just that form was not adequate at that
10	time.
11	Now, maybe they've improved the process
12	that we were not aware of right now, but at that time
13	it was not adequate.
14	MS. BROCK: Okay. Maybe we can reach
15	across somehow and talk with both.
16	MR. BLOUNT: Yeah, involve the State
17	Department and find out what's done there.
18	MS. REED: Right yea.
19	MS. BROCK: What about are any facilities
20	having trouble with any university rules or did you
21	get past that pretty well about fingerprinting
22	students? In fact, there might have been some
23	problems with fingerprinting the students. Are you
24	okay with aligning with the university rules on that?
25	MR. O'KELLY: This is Sean O'Kelly at the

University of Texas.

We have only fingerprinted those students who became operators. I know it's different at some facilities. The way we've defined access and control, we haven't had to touch on that, but our university is very leery about fingerprinting students.

MS. BROCK: Was it a burden then to go through that process --

MR. O'KELLY: Yes.

MS. BROCK: -- after you signed it?

MR. O'KELLY: At least at UT, the students in particular, even though we said you're going into the nuclear field and you're going to be fingerprinted the rest of your life, we had problems with some.

MR. REESE: We ran into a problem when we first started this, and it took about a year to work through all of the lawyers, but what it came down to is our lawyers felt that the order was in direct conflict with FRPA law about student protection of information, and so the compromise we reached is that we had a form for just students, not employees, but specifically students that identified this issue, and the check part said we do not want to -- the student cannot make an option if it's inspected by the NRC to not having any individually, specifically identifiable

1 information on the form handed to the NRC, and then it's clear that if the NRC wishes to find out who that 2 3 individual is, that they have to get essentially a --4 what is the legal term for a judge issuing it? MR. O'KELLY: Court order? 5 MR. REESE: Court order ordering us to 6 7 identify who the individual is. So far it hasn't come up, but that was the compromise that had to 8 reached, and I was up front with the inspector about 9 it, and we had a preliminary discussion with some 10 11 lawyers at the NRC if I remember correctly, who first 12 started this, and they said okay. Okay. Thanks. 13 MS. BROCK: 14 MR. FRANTZ: Steve, this is Steve Frantz 15 from Reed College. 16 could you submit fingerprint How 17 information without people's names on it? I must have 18 missed something there. No. For inspection after that 19 MR. REESE: 20 happens. 21 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, I see. 22 MR. REESE: So they have to agree to go through the background check and the fingerprint 23 24 analysis, but after that is concluded and I make a 25 determination on whether it's reliable and

1	trustworthy, prior to giving me any of that
2	information, they're going to check a box so I'm aware
3	of what the restrictions are on any information I
4	collect.
5	MR. FRANTZ: I see. I see.
6	MS. REED: So we've discussed the
7	alternative methods and we talked about foreign
8	nationals.
9	MS. BROCK: For the benefit of people,
10	which slide are you on?
11	MS. REED: We're on Slide 19. We were. I
12	want to go back to Slide 18, talking about the orders,
13	and you guys have lived with them. You folks have
14	lived with them for a couple of years. So are there
15	any enhancements that could be made to the orders?
16	We've said that you pretty much like the language. Is
17	there anything that we have not discussed yet that
18	could enhance the orders in your opinion?
19	MR. BUTLER: I think the only guidance
20	that would help is on the foreign national issue and
21	if we all start over with that issue.
22	MS. REED: Okay.
23	MR. BUTLER: If we all developed our own
24	ways of dealing with that outside of the order.
25	MS. REED: Okay, excellent.

1	MR. O'KELLY: This is Sean O'Kelly,
2	University of Texas.
3	I don't know if it's appropriate in the
4	regulation or not, but one way of reducing the burden
5	on some of the small facilities is to waive the fee to
6	have this check done based on the same reasoning on
7	why the universities don't pay the annual licensing
8	fee.
9	MR. PURDY: That's actually passe through
LO	what FBI charges us, and I think then we tack on a
L1	couple of bucks for our processing.
L2	MR. STEVE MILLER: There's also a very
L3	small amount of money in the long range.
L 4	MR. O'KELLY: So we should go to the FBI.
L5	MR. PURDY: Well, the FBI will charge you
L6	just about the same amount as you do to go through us.
L7	I think we I forget the dollar value, but I think
L8	it's three to five dollars, something like that that
L9	we've put on top of the charge for what FBI charges us
20	to process the fingerprinting.
21	I might be able to get rid of the three to
22	\$5 charge, but not the 30-something that the FBI
23	charges.
24	MS. REED: But that is an avenue that may
25	be worth pursuing though. Are there options? Can we
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1	work with the FBI for the smaller facilities, as you
2	said, to see about is it possible to waive the fee or
3	reduce the fee?
4	We'll put that down and pursue that. Any
5	other possible enhancements?
6	MR. GEORGE MILLER: This is George Miller
7	again at Irvine.
8	It's sort of a related issue. If we
9	use in California anybody who is a teacher or even
LO	our students to go on outreach, you go and give a
L1	presentation in a high school and you have to be
L2	fingerprinted. And so our students are used to this
L3	in that sense because we have a lot of students going
L4	out there.
L5	But if we could use that information
L6	rather than having to add onto it another cost to
L7	send something to the NRC, that would certainly be
L8	beneficial to us.
L9	PARTICIPANT: This goes back to
20	reciprocity.
21	MS. BROCK: Are there any other states
22	like that? Anybody else have that?
23	MR. JENKINS: No, but being able to submit
24	the individual fingerprints would be a huge help to
25	us.

1 MR. STEVE MILLER: Yes. We've had several 2 people whose fingerprints came through in a fax poorly 3 enough that the third time through the process got --4 MS. REED: Sorry. What was that? 5 MR. STEVE MILLER: We've had several fingerprints couldn't 6 people whose be processed 7 through the faxing and all of that. MR. FRANTZ: This is Stephen at Reed. 8 We've had individuals getting kicked back 9 10 five times because they can't read 11 fingerprints. Also we have a lot of trouble getting 12 the fingerprints taken. We don't have the facilities 13 on campus, and our local county won't do it, and we 14 end up going two counties away to have someone fingerprinted. 15 MS. REED: Interesting. 16 17 I'll offer up one more item MR. PURDY: 18 from the materials world. We actually allow facility to take their own fingerprints. 19 course, and I think that it might even be on line, 20 21 that the FBI provides to show you how to take proper 22 fingerprints so that they can be processed. 23 MR. STEVE MILLER: We do it. 24 MR. O'KELLY: Thank you. 25 MR. PURDY: I don't know whether you want

1	to do that in the research and test reactor world.
2	PARTICIPANT: Is that training
3	MR. PURDY: NO, it's online.
4	MR. FRANTZ: fingerprints, but some
5	people smear no matter what we do. So we send them
6	down to the county.
7	MR. STEVE MILLER: One percent of the
8	population doesn't have fingerprints.
9	MR. TRUMP: This is Mark Trump at Penn
LO	State.
L1	I don't know that this is on the table,
L2	but the radioactive material quantities of concern
L3	rule is different, and of course one of the things
L4	there is reference checks, which become pointless
L5	or excuse me difficult, particularly, again,
L6	once you go into 18 year olds and foreign students.
L7	How does that all fit into this? Are we just going to
L8	have two sets of requirements?
L9	MS. REED: Are you talking in terms of
20	transporting the material?
21	MR. TRUMP: No, I'm talking about access
22	to areas of the facility that contain radioactive
23	materials, quantities of concern, not of the
24	reactor. It may or may not depend on what state
25	you're in be of interest to the NRC anymore.

MR PURDY: It's of interest that we're doing that rulemaking right now, Part 37. We're going to have a brand new part, and yes, we are going to have the additional background checks, and we do foreign recognize that there is an issue with nationals and 18 year olds. Sometimes people haven't been in the country long enough to have a criminal record.

(Laughter.)

MR. PURDY: But they have -- yeah, they've got to go through it.

MS. REED: Gary, can you let the folks on the phone know what part of the NRC you're from?

MR. PURDY: Oh, I'm from the Office of Nuclear Security Incident Response, and I've been working with radioactive material security since I joined the office back in 2004, and I'm on the rulemaking team that's producing our enhanced security requirements for, as was mentioned, the quantities of concern, radioactive materials and quantities of concern.

And right now we're working on a brand new part to the code, a Part 37, and you can go out to regulations.gov and you can see what we're proposing in that rule. All three options are now out.

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We're not at the proposed rule state. We've it out. We're following an enhanced put participation process for this rulemaking, and so all three pieces, the access authorization, the physical security, and the transportation parts have been put out on the Web for early public comment, and yes, with those parts we intend to keep moving forward for that access to require beyond fingerprinting and a criminal history records check that you do the employment history, educational history, references, and there will be a credit history requirement if it goes as proposed right now, a credit history, and we recognize that some people may not have any of that, but you go through the process and write it down what you were able to do in making your determination for trustworthy and reliability.

MS. REED: Thank you, Gary.

MR. KAUFFMAN: This is Andrew Kauffman at Ohio State.

And we have plenty of concerned sources that we have to meet the requirements of the State of Ohio, and currently for the reviewing official, we have to have an NRC reviewing official for the purpose of the reactor and a State of Ohio reviewing official for the purposes of the finding of concerned sources.

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1 It would be very helpful for us if 2 could be worded such that an NRC approved or agreement state approved reviewing official has reviewed this. 3 4 Currently we have to have two separate document trails 5 to show that persons for the same lab are okay. that MS. BROCK: Okay. Thanks for 6 7 comment. 8 MR. KAUFFMAN: Sure. MR. GEORGE MILLER: George Miller again at 9 California. 10 I'm not sure how relevant this is, but it 11 12 appears that on our campus there are three kinds of 13 these things going on. One is to the biohazard lab, 14 and so it would be wonderful if the government could 15 put that together and have rather similar rules rather 16 than three sets, which is what we seem to have at the moment. 17 18 MS. REED: Good comment. Thank you. The government coordinating, that's always 19 20 a good move, I think, to happen, and I think that 21 would fall under one of the discussions we just had 22 earlier about reciprocity. Can we pursue that? 23 if you've already got fingerprints through another 24 way, can we accept those?

So thank you for that comment.

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75 We're still on Slide 18. The other question we have up there, has the implementation of the orders identified any new issues that should be addressed through rulemaking? I think we touched on that with the foreign nationals, and I think Reed College also mentioned or I think it was mentioned the under 21 not having too many records. So I think that's two of the possible things that have come up through these orders. Anything else? MR. REESE: I don't know if somebody else jumped in, but it would seem to me that those kinds of issues could be better handled through a req. guide.

MS. REED: Right.

MS. BROCK: But that's part of the whole umbrella process. We want to develop the guidance as we develop the rules so that we can coordinate it, and anything like that we'd love to hear your comments.

MS. REED: Thanks.

MR. TOVMASSIAN: Can I ask one question before you move on? You said that one percent of people you're finding have no fingerprints. How are you determining trustworthy and reliability in those cases?

MR. REESE: The way the NRC and the FBI

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1	have agreed, at least in the correspondence I'm
2	getting, is you go through it three times, and if the
3	third time you can't receive a good fingerprint, they
4	ask you to send three more cards, and if that doesn't
5	come back, they tell you ahead of time, "If we can't
6	determine from these three future cards, then we're
7	just going to use name, Social Security number, and do
8	our own search."
9	MR. FRANTZ: This is Stephen from Reed.
10	My experience has been if they take it to
11	five or six attempts and then you send them six cards.
12	(Laughter.)
13	MR. FRANTZ: That's what the big board
14	says.
15	MR. WURTZ: Are those electronic
16	fingerprints or ink?
17	PARTICIPANTS: Ink.
18	MR. WURTZ: Okay. If you get your
19	fingerprints done electronically, the device that
20	scans will tell if they're acceptable or not. They
21	actually reject your fingerprints if they're not
22	acceptable.
23	MR. REESE: The problem is we know ahead
24	of time that they're going to be rejected.
25	MS. REED: That's one of the advantages of

1	us pursuing can we accept digital fingerprint. That
2	will be one of the avenues we'll pursue based on your
3	comments. That was brought up earlier.
4	MR. STEVE MILLER: And then you get back
5	to the equipment and resources to take electronic
6	fingerprints.
7	MR. PURDY: I think we can accept the
8	electronic fingerprinting, but it's more of the up
9	front equipment cost that might be prohibitive.
10	MR. O'KELLY: And we're talking
11	electronically. My hand was scanned on a scanner and
12	they printed out the prints onto the card, which I
13	then submitted. So they can print out as many cards
14	as you want from one scan, but they don't give me a
15	CD.
16	MR. FRANTZ: I hadn't thought about that,
17	that we can get all six copies made at one sitting.
18	MR. O'KELLY: Right. If you go to one of
19	those places that have a scanner.
20	MR. FRANTZ: We do that, yeah.
21	MS. REED: Okay.
22	MR. STEVE MILLER: And then you'd have six
23	unusable copies.
24	(Laughter.)
25	PARTICIPANT: It satisfies the
	NEW 5 05000

1 requirement, but it might not get the result you're 2 looking for. 3 JENKINS: Well, the scanner, people 4 who ink doesn't work for, the scanner tends to pick 5 them up, and then another step beyond that is the ones who nothing is going to work. So if we can have the 6 7 digitally scanned one sent in, that would. MR. STEVE MILLER: Probably so. 8 MS. REED: So any other comments before we 9 10 wrap this workshop? 11 (No response.) MS. REED: 12 In conclusion, the rulemaking 13 will provide RTR licensees and other 14 interested stakeholders several opportunities to 15 the proposed requirements. comment on Harry was 16 talking about that at the very beginning, that this is 17 there will be other just а first step and opportunities for stakeholder input. 18 One bit of housekeeping. 19 The Webinar, if you are on the phone, you called in but you're not 20 21 using the Webinar, could you please identify yourself 22 so that we have a record of your attendance for this 23 meeting? MR. UNLU: Kenan Unlu from Penn State. 24 25 MS. REED: Can you spell that please?

1	MR. UNLU: Kenan Unlu, K-e-n-a-n; last
2	name is U-n-l-u.
3	MS. REED: Thank you.
4	Do we have anybody else on the phone that
5	was not logged in through Webinar?
6	(No response.)
7	MS. REED: Okay. Well, thank you,
8	everybody for all of your valuable input. I think we
9	had some good discussions, and given us some
LO	directions on next steps.
L1	MR. TOVMASSIAN: Also, just two other
L2	things. There's some feedback sheets in the back. If
L3	you would, would you go ahead and fill those out and
L4	give us some feedback? You can take them back with
L5	you and mail them in postage free.
L6	Anybody here that has not signed in,
L7	please make sure that you sign in before you leave.
L8	Okay?
L9	And otherwise thank you very much for your
20	participation. Anything else?
21	MS. REED: Tom, do you want to say
22	anything in closing?
23	MR. BLOUNT: Basically have a good flight,
24	but thank everyone for being here. We do appreciate
25	folks engaging in the process. We certainly here at
l.	

1	the NRC don't have all the answers, although sometimes
2	we might like to think we do.
3	But with that being said, this is an
4	opportunity for everyone that has a stake in this
5	activity to engage in it, to provide input and to get
6	us to where we need to be.
7	With that, I appreciated the conversation
8	that we have had today, the dialogue that we've had
9	today. I think we'll have a far better product at the
10	end, as a result of that.
11	So with that, that's all I have to say and
12	thank you very much.
13	MS. REED: Thank you.
14	(Whereupon, at 10:13 a.m., the workshop
15	was concluded.)
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