

ACCESSION #: 9910290135

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Unit 1 PAGE: 1 OF 5

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000424

TITLE: CONTROL ROOM DOOR PAINTING RESULTS IN LOSS OF POSITIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY

EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999 LER #: 1999-003-00 REPORT DATE: 10/22/1999

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: VEGP-UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 05000425

OPERATING MODE: 1 POWER LEVEL: 100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION:  
50.73(a)(2)(i)  
50.73(a)(2)(v)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME: Mehdi Sheibana, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

TELEPHONE: (706) 826-3209

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:  
REPORTABLE EPIX:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

On September 22, 1999, personnel were painting the pair of control room entry doors that adjoin the east side of the control room. Both the inner and outer doors were opened to facilitate painting the edges of the doors. The shift superintendent noticed that both doors were open and confirmed with the shift support supervisor (SSS) that only one door should be opened. Shortly thereafter, the doors were closed.

Review of this event determined that this represents a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident since opening the doors degrades the ability of the CREFS units to create a positive pressure.

Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirement SR 3.7.10.5 requires each control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) train to be capable of maintaining positive pressure in the control room. The plant operated in a condition prohibited by the TS when the capability for maintaining positive pressure in the control room was lost.

The cause of this event was an inadequate pre-job briefing. The pre-job briefing did not advise personnel of the limitation of opening only one control room door at a time. This event will be discussed in meetings with plant

support personnel emphasizing the need for compliance with all work instructions.

END OF ABSTRACT

TEXT

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#### A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) because a condition existed that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. It is also required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because both units operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) when the capability for maintaining positive pressure in the control room was lost.

#### B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent of rated thermal power (RTP). Unit 2 was operating at 98 percent RTP. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

#### C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 22, 1999, personnel were preparing to paint the pair of control room entry doors on the east side of the joint Unit 1 / Unit 2 control room. Permission had been obtained from the support shift supervisor (SSS) to paint one door the previous day and to paint the other door on this day. A security officer was assigned to compensate for opening a door between a protected area and a vital area. Both the Unit 1 shift supervisor and the Unit 2 shift supervisor were aware of the activity and the need to secure the open door if the control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) was actuated.

At approximately 1049 EDT both the inner door and the outer door that adjoin the control room were opened to facilitate painting the edges of the doors. At 1050 EDT, the shift superintendent noticed both doors open and confirmed with the SSS that only one door should have been opened. At 1058 EDT, the doors were closed.

On October 20, 1999, at 1025 EDT, further review of this event determined that this represents a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the

consequences of an accident since opening the doors degrades the ability of the CREFS units to create a positive pressure. The NRC Operations Center was notified of this condition at 1353 EDT. Additionally, surveillance requirement SR 3.7.10.5 requires each CREFS train to be capable of maintaining positive pressure in the control room. While both doors were open, the CREFS trains would be unable to maintain the required positive pressure. Since both

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CREFS trains for both units were affected by the open doors, the plant operated in a condition prohibited by the TS.

#### D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was an inadequate pre-job briefing. The pre-job briefing did not advise personnel of the limitation of opening only one control room door at a time. Also contributing to the occurrence of this event was a cognitive personnel error on the part of the plant personnel who concurrently opened both control room doors. Open doors are controlled by Repositioned Door Forms (RDFs). One RDF for one of the subject doors was approved on September 21, 1999, for that day's work. The second RDF was approved for the other door on September 22, 1999. Again, it was approved only for work on that day. Furthermore, the RDFs specifically indicated that only one of the two doors may be opened at any given time. However, the plant personnel performing the painting did not realize that the approvals were for one day only and did not understand that only one of the two doors could be opened at a time. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that contributed to the occurrence of this error by the licensee employees involved.

#### E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

During this event, both unit shift supervisors were aware that painting was in progress, that a door would be opened, and they were prepared to close the open door had a control room isolation occurred. Furthermore, the plant personnel performing the painting and security officer were prepared to close the door(s) when requested by control room personnel. Because no control room isolation event occurred and CREFS units were not actuated during the period of time involved, there was no challenge to the ability to maintain a positive control room pressure. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This event represents a safety system failure.

#### F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) The doors were closed upon discovery by control room personnel that they were both open.

2) By December 17, 1999, this event will be discussed in meetings with plant support personnel and appropriate supervision emphasizing the expectations of the conduct of pre-job briefings, the requirements of the door usage procedure, and the need for compliance with all work instructions.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:

None

2) Previous Similar Events:

None

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Control Room Emergency Filtration System - VI

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October 22, 1999

Docket No. 50-424  
50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-99-003  
CONTROL ROOM DOOR PAINTING RESULTS IN LOSS OF POSITIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY**

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits a Vogtle Electric Generating Plant licensee event report for a condition that occurred on Unit I and Unit 2 on September 22, 1999.

Sincerely,

J.B. Beasley, Jr

JBB/JPC

Enclosure: LER 1-99-003

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Mr. J. T. Gasser

Mr. M. Sheibani

SNC Document Management

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