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10 CFR 50.59
10 CFR 72.48

May 22, 2009
RA-09-039

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn.: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Oyster Creek Generating Station
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16
NRC Docket No. 50-219 and 72-15 (ISFSI)


Subject: Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Reports
For the Period 1/1/2007 through 12/31/2008

Enclosed are the 2007-2008 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Reports as required by 10 CFR 50.59 (d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48 (d)(2) for the period of January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this transmittal.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact R. A. Milos, Regulatory Assurance Engineer at 609-971-4973.

Sincerely,



Timothy S. Rausch, Vice President
Oyster Creek Generating Station

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator - NRC Region I
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
File No. 09036

IE47
NMS001

**EXELON GENERATION COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION**

Docket Nos. 50-219
72-15

**2007-2008
BIENNIAL 10 CFR 50.59 AND 10 CFR 72.48 SUMMARY REPORTS**

These summary reports are issued pursuant to reporting requirements for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. These reports address tests, experiments, and changes to the facility and procedures as they are described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System (TN-61BT Spent Fuel Cask at Oyster Creek). These reports summarize those tests, experiments, and changes that were implemented between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008.

**EXELON GENERATION COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NOS. 50-219**

BIENNIAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT

JANUARY 1, 2007 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2008

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION SUMMARIES

Evaluation Number: OC-2006-E-0002
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 06-16 (10/05/06)
Activity/Document No.: ECR OC-04-00575

Title:
Disable LPRM Downscale Auto Rod Block

Description of Activity:

This modification disables an automatic rod block that is initiated by a downscale condition on any single Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) that is associated with any Average Power Range Monitor (APRM). This is accomplished by installing one electrical jumper in each of the eight APRM channels such that only the LPRM downscale interlock with the Rod Block function is disabled. This modification does not disable any alarm function associated with the LPRM downscale condition nor does it affect any other LPRM interlock to the APRMs or any other APRM function.

Implementation of this activity removes the last subsection of Section 7.5.1.8.6 of the UFSAR regarding rod blocks associated with the LPRMs.

Implementation of this activity also requires a change to the bases of Section 4.10 of the Technical Specifications to delete reference to the LPRM downscale rod block.

Reason for Activity:

The APRM System currently has two conditions, either of which will cause an APRM downscale condition that will result in a rod block. These conditions are a) average reactor power as measured by the APRMs falls below the selected setpoint, and b) any LPRM associated with the particular APRM is in a downscale condition. The latter could occur even though the associated APRM is not in a downscale condition.

This configuration is inhibitive in that during reactor startups, conditions often exist in which an APRM can be above its downscale setpoint, but an LPRM associated with that APRM may be in a downscale condition, thus introducing a rod block if the reactor mode switch is in the Run mode.

This modification enhances Operator capability during startup by not having to place a downscale LPRM in bypass in order to continue reactor startup activities.

Effect of Activity:

This modification disables the automatic rod block that is initiated when any LPRM associated with any APRM goes downscale. This modification eliminates the need to clear unnecessary rod blocks during plant start up and allows operators to take the plant to Run at lower power levels. LPRM rod blocks are enabled only in the Run mode. Typically, plant operators wait until all LPRM channels are on scale before taking the plant to Run. This modification does not disable the APRM downscale rod block function. Disabling the automatic rod block generated

by an LPRM downscale condition eliminates the need for Operations to suspend or stop startup and power ascension activities until the downscale condition has cleared or the affected LPRM is bypassed, and the rod block is cleared or reset. APRM operability requirements remain unchanged.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

This activity does not result in more than minimum increase in a) the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR, b) the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, c) the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR, or d) the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This activity does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR or create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in UFSAR. This activity does not result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the UFSAR being exceeded or altered. This activity does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. This activity can be implemented without obtaining NRC approval.

Evaluation Number: OC-2007-E-0001
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 07-12 (06/22/07)
Activity/Document No.: ECR OC-07-00477

Title:
TCCP To Jumper All Reheat Stop/Intercept Valves Open Interlock

Description of Activity:

This activity installs a Temporary Configuration Change Package (TCCP) to jumper the “all combined reheat valves open prior to starting a test stroke interlock” in the combined reheat test circuit to allow testing of the combined reheat valves in surveillance procedure 625.4.002 section 6. The interlock will be enforced administratively while the jumper is installed.

Reason for Activity:

The TCCP is required because the “all combined reheat valves open prior to starting a test stroke interlock” circuit has lost electrical continuity and cannot be repaired with the plant online.

Effect of Activity:

The TCCP temporarily changes how the “all combined reheat valves open prior to starting a test stroke interlock” is accomplished. It is changed from an automatic electric action to an administrative action built into the surveillance test procedure. This interlock is described in UFSAR section 10.2.2.2.2 Combined Reheat Valves section. Plant operations will ensure the interlock requirement administratively.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

The activity does not result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident, the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, the consequences of an accident, the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety, the possibility for an accident of a different type, different results for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, or exceeded or altered design basis limits for a fission product barrier as evaluated in the UFSAR. The activity only changes an electrical automatic interlock to one that is administratively controlled. The frequency of performance of test using the interlock and the controls built into the TCCP package and the test procedure ensure the change to the risk of an error is minimal. All UFSAR accidents, malfunctions consequences and results are the same whether the cause is a failure of the electrical interlock or administrative interlock. The proposed activity does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses because it does not change any of the elements of the method described in the UFSAR or change any method described in the UFSAR to another method. This activity can be implemented with out prior NRC approval.

Evaluation Number: OC-2008-E-0001
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 08-01 (01/12/08)
Activity/Document No.: Tech Eval A2185795-02

Title:
Use of ESW in Lieu of SW During Power Operation

Description of Activity:
The Emergency Service Water (ESW) System will be cross connected with the Service Water (SW) System to provide cooling for the equipment cooled by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Heat Exchanger.

Reason for Activity:
This activity is implemented to facilitate the repair of a SW piping leak during power operation.

Effect of Activity:
The effect of this activity will be that the existing ESW-SW cross connect will provide cooling water to the SW loads by the ESW system. This cross connection has been used during refueling. It will be used during power operation. As such, one of the ESW and its associated Containment Spray System will need to be declared inoperable and an LCO will be entered. This operation will be implemented under specified compensatory actions, such that it will have no negative impact on plant safety or safe plant operation.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:
This 50.59 Evaluation has addressed the overall impacts of using ESW in lieu of SW during power operation by examining the systems, structures and components involved and their interfaces. Based on the responses to the 50.59 Evaluation Form, this activity does not involve a change in facility Technical Specifications or require a license amendment for the station and may be performed without prior NRC approval.

Evaluation Number: OC-2008-E-0002
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 08-04 (02/29/08)
Activity/Document No.: ECR OC-08-00164

Title:
Temp Lift Lead for PIP-26-27 Rod Overtravel Contact (S50)

Description of Activity:

This activity is a Temporary Configuration Change Package (TCCP) that will prevent Control Rod 26-27 from alarming annunciator H-5-a, ROD OVERTRAVEL. All other control rods will still be able to alarm annunciator H-5-a. The TCCP is lifting a connector pin at the Rod Relay Module.

Reason for Activity:

As documented in the Corrective Action Program, Control Rod 26-27 had locked annunciator H-5-a into alarm, even though it is not overtraveled. Control Rod 26-27 was moved to Position 0-0 (fully inserted) and declared inoperable. A connector for Control Rod 26-27 was disconnected at the Rod Relay Module in the Lower Cable Spreading Room. This cleared the annunciator to allow it to function for the other 136 Control Rods. This TCCP is disabling the alarming of annunciator H-5-a from Control Rod 26-27 by lifting one pin of the connector. The connector will then be connected back. This will allow Control Rod 26-27 to be returned to operable status. This TCCP will also help minimize Operator distractions.

Effect of Activity:

This TCCP will disable the alarming of annunciator H-5-a from Control Rod 26-27. With the TCCP installed and the connector connected, annunciator H-5-a is expected to clear. This will allow other Control Rods to alarm annunciator H-5-a should any of them have an overtravel event. The UFSAR describes the overtravel feature of the control rods in several sections. This feature will no longer be functional for Control Rod 26-27.

The primary purpose of the annunciator is to alert the operators of a uncoupled control rod condition, which is a precursor to a Control Rod Drop Accident. The rod cannot overtravel unless it is uncoupled. This TCCP will disable the alarm for Control Rod 26-27 to allow the alarm to function for the other 136 control rods.

Normally, when a rod gets to Position 48, it is checked to see if it is uncoupled. If the rod is coupled, the overtravel annunciator will not alarm, the Position 48 PIP will stay lit, and the Red/Red indication from PIP 49 will stay lit. If the rod is uncoupled, the overtravel annunciator will alarm, the Position 48 PIP will go out, and the Red/Red indication will go out. Since the Position 48 PIP and the Red/Red indication are still functioning, Operators will still be able to identify an uncoupled rod. If the Position 48 PIP and the Red/Red indication from PIP 49 become inoperable for Control Rod 26-27, the rod will have to be declared inoperable.

Because there are separate connectors for each Control Rod, disconnecting the one connector to install the TCCP will only affect Control Rod 26-27. Because the annunciator circuit is being broken at the connector pin, it cannot affect the operation of the annunciator from the other Control Rods.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

This TCCP does involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a UFSAR described design function for one of the 137 control rods. The UFSAR describes the overtravel feature of the control rods in several sections. This feature will no longer be functional for Control Rod 26-27. Therefore, a 50.59 Evaluation is required.

All eight questions to 50.59 Evaluation OC-2008-E-0002 are answered NO. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the UFSAR being exceeded or altered. The TCCP does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Therefore, this TCCP can be implemented without prior NRC approval.

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Evaluation Number: OC-2008-E-0003
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 08-05 (03/10/08)
Activity/Document No.: ECR OC-08-00202

Title:
Temporarily Defeat Rod 30-35 "7" Input to Rod Drift Alarm

Description of Activity:

This activity is a Temporary Configuration Change Package (TCCP) that is removing two of the pins from the K9 plug-in relay for Control Rod 30-35. The TCCP will prevent Reed Switches S07, S17, S27, S37, and S47 for Control Rod 30-35 from alarming annunciator H-6-a, ROD DRIFT. The remaining odd Reed Switches (S01, S03, S05, S09, S11, S13, S15, S19, S21, S23, S25, S29, S31, S33, S35, S39, S41, S43, S45) for Control Rod 30-35 will still be able to alarm the annunciator. All odd Reed Switches for all other control rods will still be able to alarm annunciator H-6-a. The TCCP will also prevent the "7" unit display indication on Panel 4F from lighting when relay K9 energizes for Control Rod 30-35.

Reason for Activity:

Annunciator H-6-a, ROD DRIFT, has been alarming, then clearing several times a day with no rod movement. Troubleshooting has determined that the alarms are caused by the actuation of the K9 relay for Control Rod 30-35. The K9 relay is actuated from Reed Switches S07, S17, S27, S37, or S47. Installing this TCCP will prevent these spurious actuations of annunciator H-6-a for Control Rod 30-35.

Effect of Activity:

The TCCP will prevent Reed Switches S07, S17, S27, S37, and S47 for Control Rod 30-35 from alarming annunciator H-6-a, ROD DRIFT. The remaining odd Reed Switches (S01, S03, S05, S09, S11, S13, S15, S19, S21, S23, S25, S29, S31, S33, S35, S39, S41, S43, S45) for Control Rod 30-35 will still be able to alarm the annunciator. All odd Reed Switches for all other control rods will also still be able to alarm annunciator H-6-a. The TCCP will also prevent the "7" unit display indication on Panel 4F from lighting when relay K9 energizes for Control Rod 30-35.

The TCCP will not affect plant operations. All control rods will operate normally. No procedural actions will be affected. All alarms will function normally, except annunciator H-6-a for Control Rod 30-35. Annunciator H-6-a will still alarm on Control Rod 30-35 drifting, except it may take longer to alarm than normal. If the first reed switch that drifting Control Rod 30-35 passes is S07, S17, S27, S37, or S47, the alarm will be delayed until the control rod drifts to the next odd position.

The "7" unit display on Panel 4F being prevented from lighting when relay K9 energizes for Control Rod 30-35 has no affect because the TCCP prevents K9 from energizing.

The UFSAR describes that the Rod Drift alarm is actuated from the odd Reed Switches for each control rod. With this TCCP installed, this feature will no longer be functional for Reed Switches S07, S17, S27, S37, and S47 of Control Rod 30-35.

The analyses in the UFSAR are not affected by this TCCP. The Uncontrolled Control Rod Withdrawal accidents described in UFSAR assume no operator action. Therefore, delaying when the Rod Drift annunciator alarms does not affect the analyses.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

This TCCP does involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a UFSAR described design function for one of the 137 Control Rods. The UFSAR describes that the Rod Drift alarm is actuated from the odd Reed Switches. With this TCCP installed, this feature will no longer be functional for Control Rod 30-35 Reed Switches S07, S17, S27, S37, and S47. Therefore, a 50.59 Evaluation is required.

All eight questions to 50.59 Evaluation OC-2008-E-0003 are answered NO. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TCCP does not create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in UFSAR. The TCCP does not result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the UFSAR being exceeded or altered. The TCCP does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Therefore, this TCCP can be implemented without prior NRC approval.

Evaluation Number: OC-2008-E-0004
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 08-15 (10/23/08)
Activity/Document No.: PM Task PM00311M

Title:
Temp Mods for Trunnion Room "Door Open"

Description of Activity:

The activity being evaluated is a Temporary Configuration Change to Secondary Containment barrier in the Oyster Creek Trunnion Room. This activity moves the barrier for Secondary Containment associated with the Trunnion Room from the Trunnion Room walls and door, to the penetrations from the Reactor Building to the Trunnion Room and the walls that contain these penetrations. In addition, the Main Steam and Feedwater lines located in the Trunnion Room up to and including the Primary Containment Isolation Valves will become Secondary Containment boundaries. This temporary change removes the Trunnion Room as part of Secondary Containment and allows the Tech Spec required administrative controls for the Trunnion Room Door to be relaxed. This change is allowed only when the Plant is in Cold Shutdown and Primary Containment is not required.

The Technical Specification Bases for TS 3.5, page 3.5-11 discusses the use of the Trunnion Room door to maintain Secondary Containment. The bases only allows for momentary opening of the Trunnion Room door based on the supposition that Secondary Containment integrity is not maintained with the door open. If Secondary Containment Integrity can be maintained separate from the Trunnion Room door, then opening the door would not be a deviation from the requirements in Technical Specifications.

Administrative controls will be established to ensure the following conditions are met whenever the Trunnion Room door is not used to maintain Secondary Containment Integrity:

1. The Reactor is in the Cold Shutdown condition and Primary Containment is not required.
2. Secondary Containment boundary will be established at the ventilation and drain penetrations into the Trunnion Room. This boundary will be controlled through the Temporary Configuration Change process.
3. Testing will be performed to verify the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) to maintain the design negative pressure in the Secondary Containment with the Trunnion Room door open. Performance of the routine SGTS surveillance test can be used to demonstrate the ability of the installed penetration barriers to maintain Secondary Containment.
4. Controls will be in place to periodically inspect the barriers in the Trunnion Room providing Secondary Containment Integrity. These inspections will be controlled in accordance with approved work processes and shall include routine (e.g. daily) inspection on the condition of the barriers and their installation.
5. Isolation for a Main Steam Line and the Feedwater Supply line penetration will be maintained at a point inside Secondary Containment whenever the penetration is breached

inside the Trunnion Room. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and Feedwater Check Valves in the Trunnion Room can be used to provide isolation from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) or Primary/Secondary Containment as long as there is no breach of the penetration. The controls for containment isolation with a breach in a Trunnion Room penetration will use approved Exelon processes such as Clearance & Tagging, Temporary Configuration Change or Maintenance controls through MR90.

Reason for Activity:

This activity is developed to establish conditions where it is acceptable to maintain the Trunnion Room door in the open condition. This allows required work on MSIVs, Feedwater Check Valves and other components located in the Trunnion Room to be performed during Cold Shutdown conditions with Primary Containment not required. Without this ability, some work would not be able to be performed due to the need for equipment to extend across the Trunnion Room door opening.

Effect of Activity:

This activity will result in the Trunnion Room no longer being a part of Secondary Containment. There will be no impact on Plant operations since this activity can only be performed during Cold Shutdown conditions and controls and testing will be in place to ensure that the Secondary Containment boundary is maintained and SGTS operation will not be affected by this configuration change. Controls on the Main Steam Lines and Feedwater supply lines will be used to ensure that the isolation boundaries for these penetrations are maintained within the Secondary Containment boundary should the penetrations need to be breached in the Trunnion Room (e.g. outboard MSIV rebuild).

There is no impact on any design basis due to this configuration change. Although the outside Primary Containment Isolation Valves for the Main Steam and Feedwater supply lines will no longer be within Secondary Containment structure, the penetrations and isolation valves themselves are considered to be Secondary Containment boundaries. Since the MSIVs and Feedwater Check Valves act as the barrier between the RPV and the Turbine Building, they also act as the barrier between Primary Containment and Secondary Containment and the Turbine Building. Therefore, an intact Primary Containment boundary passing through Secondary Containment can be used as a Secondary Containment boundary.

There is no impact on any safety analysis described in the UFSAR. The Secondary Containment, with the exception of the SGTS, is a passive SSC that cannot and will not result in any accident, transient or malfunction described in the UFSAR or any licensing bases.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

This activity moves the barrier for Secondary Containment associated with the Trunnion Room from the Trunnion Room walls and door, to the penetrations from the Reactor Building to the Trunnion Room and the walls that contain the penetrations. In addition, the Main Steam and Feedwater lines located in the Trunnion Room up to and including the Primary Containment Isolation Valves will become part of the Secondary Containment boundary. This temporary change removes the Trunnion Room as part of Secondary Containment and allows the

Technical Specification (TS) required administrative controls for the Trunnion Room Door to be relaxed.

No change to the function or operation of the Secondary Containment or Standby Gas Treatment System is being enacted by this temporary change. Therefore, changing the Secondary Containment barrier in the Trunnion Room to remove the Trunnion Room from Secondary Containment cannot result in any change to the frequency or consequence of an accident or transient, or a malfunction of any SSC previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The potential for release from outside Primary Containment isolation valves located in the Trunnion Room remains bounded by the established Local Leak Rate limits because of the controls required for these penetrations while this change is in place. The isolation valves inside Primary Containment for these penetrations, or other approved and controlled closures for these penetrations, will be verified intact prior to breaching piping located in the Trunnion Room with the Trunnion Room door open. Testing and administrative controls similar to that required for the Trunnion Room Door will be put into place before the Secondary Containment barrier is relocated. Therefore, no increase in the likelihood of malfunction of Secondary Containment is associated with this activity and no chance of an accident of a different type or the malfunction with a different result than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Under the Cold Shutdown Conditions required to implement this activity, the Secondary Containment can act as Primary Containment (TS 3.5 Bases) and is therefore evaluated as a fission product barrier. No design basis limit for the Secondary Containment or any Secondary Containment function is changed by this activity. Therefore, the proposed activity does not result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the UFSAR being exceeded or altered.

No evaluations or methods of evaluations are being used or affected by this activity.

Additional reviews and approvals by the NRC are not required, this activity can be implemented per plant procedures without obtaining a License Amendment.

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Evaluation Number: OC-2008-E-0006
PORC Review Meeting No. (Date): 08-19 (12/16/08)
Activity/Document No.: ECR OC-08-00781

Title:

Isolation Condenser Clean Water Make-up Project Completion

Description of Activity:

ECR OC-08-00781 completes the installation of the actuator and controls for air-operated valve, V-11-257 (previously installed). This valve was installed into the Condensate Transfer (CT) System Isolation Condensers System (ICS) makeup piping by a separate activity. Currently, V-11-257 is isolated and its bypass valve, V-11-259, is being maintained open to provide the required makeup flow path.

This activity consists of the following:

- Make V-11-257 fully functional as an air-operated valve
- Change normal valve positions as follows:
 - Open the V-11-257 upstream and downstream isolation valves, V-11-256 and V-11-258,
 - Close the V-11-257 bypass valve, V-11-259
 - Close V-11-257

V-11-257 is designed to fail open (safe position) on loss of air or loss of control power. The actuator is equipped with two solenoid valves, either of which independently will vent the actuator diaphragm and isolate the air supply, allowing the actuator spring to open the valve. The two solenoid valves allow the valve to be operated from either the Main Control Room (MCR) or the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP). The valve, valve actuator and solenoid valves are Augmented Quality. The air supply is non-safety-related. V-11-257 is non-seismic, consistent with the design of the CT System. The air supply is also non-seismic, consistent with the design of the Instrument Air System.

The solenoid valves are powered by Vital AC power supplies that are battery-backed. An air accumulator is provided to maintain the valve in the closed position in the event of an unplanned loss of the Instrument Air supply. These features minimize the likelihood that the valve will inadvertently open and potentially contaminate the ICS.

All other aspects of ECR OC-08-00781 screened out of a 10CFR50.59 Evaluation per Screening OC-2008-S0233.

Reason for Activity:

This activity is required to make the Demineralized Water (WD) System the "preferred" source of makeup water for the Isolation Condensers during Isolation Condenser operation. This is being done because the CT System contains Tritium. Providing the ability to use the WD System for makeup will minimize the likelihood of undesirable releases of Tritium to the

atmosphere during Isolation Condenser operation. Keeping the CT system isolated from the Isolation Condenser with V-11-257 during normal operating conditions will minimize the likelihood of contaminating the Isolation Condensers. The CT System will continue to be the primary makeup water source to satisfy regulatory requirements.

Effect of Activity:

The current plant design considers the primary source of Isolation Condenser makeup water to be the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) via a CT System Pump. The secondary source is the Fire Water System. An emergency makeup source is the Core Spray System from the Torus. This activity completes modifications that allow the WD System to be the "preferred" makeup source. Use of WD as a makeup source, as well as all other aspects of this project previously screened out, as documented in other 50.59 Reviews. The CT, Fire Water and Core Spray Systems will still be available for makeup to the Isolation Condensers. To initiate makeup from the CT System, the UFSAR describes that the operators open one normally-closed valve. This activity will add an additional valve that needs to be opened, V-11-257. This is considered to be a minor impact on the Operators. There are no changes to design bases or safety analyses described in the UFSAR. However, the UFSAR will be revised to reflect the changes made to the plant per this activity.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:

This activity maintains the design basis requirements for make-up to the Isolation Condensers. However, there is one adverse effect on the Isolation Condenser Makeup function as described in the UFSAR. The addition of a normally-closed valve in the CT System makeup line for the Isolation Condensers could decrease the reliability of the makeup function. This aspect required additional review under a 50.59 Evaluation. All other aspects of this modification, including installation aspects, screened out.

This Evaluation concluded that the resulting decrease in reliability of the ICS makeup function is small and acceptable. The AOV design assures high reliability by using a proven fail-safe valve actuator style, redundant pilot solenoid valves, two remote locations for valve operation (MCR and RSP), and a full-flow manual bypass valve. The 10CFR50 Appendix K LOCA analysis does not credit operation of the Isolation Condensers and UFSAR Chapter 3 and 15 events do not rely on Isolation Condenser makeup to mitigate consequences (dose). The proposed activity may be implemented without prior NRC approval.

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End of 10 CFR 50.59 Report

**EXELON GENERATION COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 72-15**

BIENNIAL 10 CFR 72.48 REPORT

JANUARY 1, 2007 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2008

10 CFR 72.48 EVALUATION SUMMARIES

There were no 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations performed by Exelon for the Oyster Creek Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation during this reporting period. 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations performed by Transnuclear, as holder of NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks, are reported to the NRC separately by Transnuclear, Inc.

End of 10 CFR 72.48 Report