UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

May 7, 2009

Mr. Charles G. Pardee
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2009002;
05000374/2009002

Dear Mr. Pardee:

On March 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on April 16, 2009, with Plant Manager, Mr. Dave Rhoades, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no NRC-identified or self-revealed findings of safety significance were identified. One licensee-identified violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2009002; 05000374/2009002
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
Plant Manager - LaSalle County Station
Manager Regulatory Assurance - LaSalle County Station
Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations
Senior Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Braidwood, Byron and LaSalle
Associate General Counsel
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer,
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

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Letter to C. Pardee from K. Riemer dated May 7, 2009

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2009002;
05000374/2009002

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REGION III

Docket Nos:	05000373; 05000374
License Nos:	NPF-11; NPF-18
Report No:	05000373/2009002; 05000374/2009002
Licensee:	Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:	LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	Marseilles, Illinois
Dates:	January 1, 2009, through March 31, 2009
Inspectors:	G. Roach, Senior Resident Inspector F. Ramírez, Resident Inspector N. Shah, Region III Branch 2 Project Engineer D. Jones, Region III DRS Reactor Inspector R. Russell, Region III Emergency Preparedness Inspector M. Mitchell, Region III Radiation Protection Inspector C. Scott, Region III Branch 2 Reactor Engineer J. Yesinowski, Illinois Dept. of Emergency Management B. Metrow, Illinois Dept. of Emergency Management
Approved by:	Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000373/2009-002, 05000374/2009-002 1/01/2009 -3/31/2009; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2; routine integrated report.

The report covers a three-month period of resident inspection, and announced inspection in the areas of health physics, emergency preparedness, and in-service inspection. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions planned or taken by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP). This violation and its CAP tracking number is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1

The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On March 15, 2009, power was reduced to 66 percent for control rod pattern adjustment, channel distortion testing of 145 interior control rods, rod scram time testing, and steam valve surveillance testing. Full power was restored on March 15, 2009, where it remained for the rest of the inspection period.

Unit 2

The unit began the inspection period at 94 percent power in coastdown for L2R12. On January 18, 2009, Refueling Outage (RFO) L2R12 commenced. On February 10, 2009, following completion of the outage, the Unit 2 main generator was synchronized to the grid. Full power was achieved on February 12, 2009. On February 16, 2009, power was reduced to 90 percent to correct a failed normal level controller on the 25C low pressure feedwater heater. Full power was restored the same day. On March 1, 2009, power was reduced to 71 percent to perform repairs on the 2B turbine driven reactor feedwater pump minimum flow valve, the 2C condensate booster pump minimum flow valve, and to perform a control rod pattern adjustment. Full power was restored on March 2, 2009, where it remained for the rest of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:

- Unit 2B residual heat removal (RHR) after a maintenance outage;
- Unit 2 low pressure core spray (LPCS); and
- Unit 0 diesel generator (DG).

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify

system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:

- Unit 2 primary containment 673'4" (Fire Zone 3J);
- turbine building ground floor general area 710'6" (Fire Zone 5C11);
- Unit 2 heater bay zone 728'0", 731'0" and 662'4" (Fire Zone 5B2);
- Unit 2 elevation 761'0" (Fire Zone 3E);
- Unit 1 high pressure core spray (HPCS) cubicle 673'4" (Fire Zone 2I2); and
- Unit 2 division 2 RHR service water pump room 674'0" (Fire Zone 8C4).

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted six quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities (71111.08)

.1 Piping Systems ISI

a. Inspection Scope

From January 20 through 23, 2009, the inspectors conducted a review of the implementation of the licensee's Risk-Informed ISI Program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, and the risk-significant piping system boundaries. The inspector selected the licensee's Risk-Informed ISI Program components, and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler, and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, required components in order of risk priority as identified in Section 711111.08-03 of the inspection procedure, based upon the ISI activities available for review during the on-site inspection period.

The inspector observed the following three types of nondestructive examination (NDE) activities to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code Section XI and Section V requirements, and to verify that the indications, and defects (if present) were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code Section XI requirements, or a NRC approved alternative (e.g., relief requests):

- visual examination of studs and nuts removed from disassembled flanges, reactor pressure vessel to reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pipe, N7 Nozzle, IRI-2002B, Item 17;
- magnetic particle examination of HPCS pipe support lugs HP02-2841X; and
- ultrasonic examination (UT) of feedwater pipe to flued head weld 1FW-2005-08.

The inspector requested examinations completed during the previous outage with relevant/recordable conditions/indications that were accepted for continued service to verify that the licensee's acceptance was in accordance with the Section XI of the ASME Code. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the following record:

- Reactor pressure vessel nozzle to shell weld LCS-2-N2A, one acceptable indication was recorded, Examination Summary Sheet Report No. 2R11-008, dated March 13, 2007.

The licensee had not performed pressure boundary welding since the beginning of the preceding outage for Unit 2. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed a review of ISI related problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP, conducted interviews with licensee staff and reviewed licensee CAP records to determine if:

- the licensee had described the scope of the ISI related problems;
- the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying issues;
- the licensee had evaluated operating experience and industry generic issues related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity; and
- the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable) and taken appropriate corrective actions.

The inspector performed these reviews to ensure compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requirements. The CAP documents reviewed by the inspector are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted one ISI inspection sample as defined in IP 71111.08.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On March 24, 2009, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator training scenarios to verify that operator performance was adequate, instructors were identifying and documenting crew performance problems and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications.

The crew's performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in IP 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant systems:

- process radiation monitoring system; and
- 2A DG cooling water pump.

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:

- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in IP 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

- yellow risk in both units during 0 DG work;
- Unit 2 refueling bridge mast cable failure; and
- yellow risk in both units during 2B RHR service water valve work.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted three samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

- Unit 2 reactor vessel head lift exceeding reactor building crane capacity;
- Unit 2 evaluation of RHR snubber failures;
- Unit 2 A train RHR non-condensable gas voiding;
- Unit 2 reactor vessel head o-ring leak off line plugged;
- Unit 1 standby liquid control (SBLC) tank boron concentration;
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel crud/oxide layer – minimum critical power ratio penalty; and
- Unit 2 RCIC possible void in injection line.

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensee's evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of CAP documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This operability inspection constituted seven samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification(s):

- modification to Unit 2 turbine bypass valve position logic; and
- bypass of Unit 1 linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) to rotational variable differential transformer (RVDT) mismatch alarm.

The inspectors compared the temporary configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation information against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system(s). The inspectors also compared the licensee's information to operating experience information to ensure that lessons learned from other utilities had been incorporated into the licensee's decision to implement the temporary modification. The inspectors, as applicable, performed field verifications to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed; the modifications operated as expected; modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the temporary modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how extended operation with the temporary modification in place could impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed in the course of this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two temporary modification samples as defined in IP 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The following engineering design package was reviewed and selected aspects were discussed with engineering personnel:

- Unit 2 reactor control management system (RCMS).

The inspectors observed ongoing and completed work activities to verify that installation was consistent with design control documents. Specifically, the inspectors ensured the system was capable of single rod movement only in accordance with the LaSalle operating license. The modification removed the existing rod worth minimizer (RWM) and the reactor manual control system, which used discrete electronics and dynamic logic to direct control rod motion. The system was replaced with the RCMS, which incorporates the RWM within the system and uses a digital microprocessor-based system for control rod motion. Documents reviewed in the course of this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one permanent plant modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (71111.19)

.1 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:

- Unit 2 division 1 response time testing;
- Unit 2 automatic depressurization system drop test;
- Unit 2 refueling bridge crane weight testing;
- Unit 2 containment personnel hatch local leak rate test (LLRT);
- Unit 2 reactor recirculation flow control valve (FCV) retest;
- Unit 2 A containment ventilator VP chiller run after 2WS077A maintenance;
- Unit 1 LPCS water leg pump run; and
- standby gas treatment wide range gas monitor test.

These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):

the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion), and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CAP documents associated with PMT to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted eight PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)

.1 Refueling Outage (RFO) Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Plan (OSP) and contingency plans for the Unit 2 RFO, conducted on January 19 through February 10, 2009, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. During the RFO, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

- licensee configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the OSP for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out-of-service;
- implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing;
- installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error;
- controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that TS and OSP requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities;
- monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components;
- controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system;
- reactor water inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss;
- controls over activities that could affect reactivity;

- maintenance of secondary containment as required by TS;
- refueling activities, including fuel handling and sipping to detect fuel assembly leakage;
- startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the drywell (primary containment) to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction strainers, and reactor physics testing; and
- licensee identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one RFO sample as defined in IP 71111.20-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:

- LOS-RI-Q5: Unit 1 RCIC system pump cold quick start (Routine);
- LOS-RI-R3: RCIC system pump operability test (Routine) ;
- LES-DC-103A: Unit 2, Division I battery charger capacity test (Routine);
- LOS-DG-M3; Unit 1 B DG operability test (Routine);
- LOS-HP-Q1: Unit 1 HPCS inservice test; (IST);
- LTS-100-35: RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves LLRT for 2E12-F008, 2E12-F009 and LE12-F460 (CIV);
- LTS-300-4: Unit 2 primary containment integrated leak rate test (CIV); and
- LOS-NB-R2: Unit 2 reactor vessel leakage test (RCS).

The inspectors observed in plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:

- did preconditioning occur;
- were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency were in accordance with TSs, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedures, and applicable commitments;

- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, AMSE code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted four routine surveillance testing samples, one inservice testing sample, one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection sample, and two containment isolation valve samples as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation (71114.02)

.1 Alert and Notification System Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors held discussions with Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff regarding the operation, maintenance, and periodic testing of the ANS in the LaSalle County Station's plume pathway Emergency Planning Zone. The inspectors reviewed monthly trend reports and siren test failure records from January 2007 through December 2008. Information gathered during document reviews and interviews was used to determine whether the ANS equipment was maintained and tested in accordance with emergency plan commitments and procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This ANS inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing (71114.03)

.1 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and discussed with station EP staff the emergency plan commitments and procedures that addressed the primary and alternate methods of augmenting the on-shift Emergency Response Organization (ERO) as well as the provisions for maintaining the station's ERO emergency telephone book. The inspectors also reviewed reports and a sample of CAP records of unannounced off-hour augmentation tests, which were conducted from July 2007 through December 2008, to determine the adequacy of post drill critiques and associated corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the EP training records of a sample of approximately 40 ERO personnel assigned to key and support positions, to determine the status of their ERO position training. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This ERO augmentation testing inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)

.1 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of Nuclear Oversight (NOS) staff's 2007 and 2008 audits of the LaSalle County Station emergency preparedness program to determine that the independent assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspectors also reviewed critique reports and samples of CAP records associated with the 2008 biennial exercise, as well as various EP drills conducted in 2007 and 2008, in order to determine the licensee fulfilled drill commitments and to evaluate the licensee's efforts to identify, track, and resolve identified concerns. The inspectors reviewed a sample of EP items and corrective actions related to the facility's EP program and activities to determine whether corrective actions were completed in accordance with the site's CAP. The inspectors conducted tours of the emergency response facilities to evaluate the material condition and readiness of the facilities and equipment. Additionally, the inspectors conducted a review of the equipment and procedures used by the field monitoring teams to ensure the licensee was meeting emergency plan commitments. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This correction of emergency preparedness weaknesses and deficiencies inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Review of Licensee Performance Indicators (PIs) for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Occupational Exposure Control Cornerstone PI to determine whether the conditions resulting in any PI occurrences had been evaluated and whether identified problems had been entered into the licensee's CAP for resolution.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee controls and surveys for the following radiologically significant work conducted within radiation areas, high radiation areas, and airborne radioactivity areas in the plant to determine if radiological controls including surveys, postings, and barricades were acceptable:

- drywell RT suction flow orifice replacement;
- drywell safety relief valve activities; and
- control rod drive (CRD) pull/put activities.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed the RWPs and work packages used to perform these work activities and to access other high radiation work areas. The inspectors assessed the work control instructions and control barriers specified by the licensee. Electronic dosimeter alarm set points for both integrated dose and dose rate were evaluated for conformity with survey indications and plant policy. The inspectors interviewed workers to verify that they were aware of the actions required if their electronic dosimeters noticeably malfunctioned or alarmed.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors walked down and surveyed (using an NRC survey meter) these areas to verify that the prescribed RWP, procedure, and engineering controls were in place; that licensee surveys and postings were complete and accurate; and that air samplers were properly located.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas to verify barrier integrity and engineering controls performance (e.g., high-efficiency particulate air ventilation system operation) and to determine if there was a potential for individual worker internal exposures in excess of 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent:

- CRD push/put activities; and
- under-vessel sump activities.

Work areas having a history of, or the potential for, airborne transuranics were evaluated to verify that the licensee had considered the potential for transuranic isotopes and had provided appropriate worker protection.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's self-assessments, audits, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), and Special Reports related to the access control program to verify that identified problems were entered into the CAP for resolution.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed CAP reports related to access controls and any high radiation area radiological incidents (issues that did not count as PI occurrences identified by the licensee in high radiation areas less than one Rem per hour). Staff members were interviewed and CAP documents were reviewed to verify that follow-up activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk based on the following:

- initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;
- disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;
- identification of repetitive problems;
- identification of contributing causes;
- identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;

- resolution of non-cited violations (NCVs) tracked in the CAP; and
- implementation/consideration of risk-significant operational experience feedback.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's process for problem identification, characterization, and prioritization, and verified that problems were entered into the CAP and resolved. For repetitive deficiencies and/or significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution, the inspectors verified that the licensee's self-assessment activities were capable of identifying and addressing these deficiencies.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation packages for all occupational PI events occurring since the last inspection to determine if any of these PI events involved dose rates in excess of 25 Rem per hour at 30 centimeters or in excess of 500 Rem per hour at 1 meter. Barriers were evaluated for failure and to determine if there were any barriers left to prevent personnel access. Unintended exposures exceeding 100 millirem total effective dose equivalent (or 5 Rem shallow dose equivalent or 1.5 Rem lens dose equivalent) were evaluated to determine if there were any regulatory overexposures or if there was a substantial potential for an overexposure. There were no occupational PI events during the inspection period.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Job-In-Progress Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following three jobs that were being performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas for observation of work activities that presented the greatest radiological risk to workers:

- drywell reactor water cleanup suction flow orifice in-service inspection of welds;
- drywell safety relief valve activities; and
- CRD pull/put activities.

The inspectors reviewed radiological job requirements for these activities, including RWP requirements and work procedure requirements, and attended As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) job briefings.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

Job performance was observed with respect to the radiological control requirements to assess whether radiological conditions in the work area were adequately communicated to workers through pre-job briefings and postings. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of radiological controls, including required radiation, contamination, and airborne surveys for system breaches; radiation protection job coverage, including any applicable audio and visual surveillance for remote job coverage; and contamination controls.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed radiological work in high radiation work areas having significant dose rate gradients to evaluate whether the licensee adequately monitored exposure to personnel and to assess the adequacy of licensee controls. These work areas involved areas where the dose rate gradients were severe; thereby increasing the necessity of providing multiple dosimeters or enhanced job controls.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 High Risk-Significant, High Dose Rate, High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors discussed with radiation protection supervisors the controls that were in place for special areas of the plant that had the potential to become very high radiation areas during certain plant operations. The inspectors assessed if plant operations required communication beforehand with the radiation protection group, so as to allow corresponding timely actions to properly post and control the radiation hazards.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns to assess the posting and locking of entrances to high dose rate high radiation areas and very high radiation areas.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

.6 Radiation Worker Performance

a. Inspection Scope

During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation safety work requirements. The inspectors evaluated whether workers were aware of any significant radiological conditions in their workplace, of the RWP controls and limits in place, and of the level of radiological hazards present. The inspectors also observed worker performance to determine if workers accounted for these radiological hazards.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports for which the cause of the event was due to radiation worker errors to determine if there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause and to determine if this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems. Problems or issues with planned or completed corrective actions were discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency

a. Inspection Scope

During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated radiation protection technician performance with respect to radiation safety work requirements. The inspectors evaluated whether technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace, the RWP controls and limits in place, and if their performance was consistent with their training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work activities.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports for which the cause of the event was radiation protection technician error to determine if there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause and to determine if this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01–5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (ALARA) (71121.02)

.1 Radiological Work Planning

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's list of work activities ranked by estimated exposure that were in progress and reviewed the following five work activities of highest exposure significance:

- dry well reactor water cleanup (RT) suction flow orifice in-service inspection of welds;
- dry well safety relief valve activities;
- dry well scaffolding;
- CRD pull/put activities; and
- reactor vessel disassembly/reassembly.

For these five activities, the inspectors reviewed ALARA Planning and Controls work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements in order to verify that the licensee had established procedures and engineering and work controls that were based on sound radiation protection principles in order to achieve occupational exposures that were ALARA. The inspectors also determined if the licensee had reasonably grouped the radiological work into work activities, based on historical precedence, industry norms, and/or special circumstances.

This inspection supplements the sample(s) reported in Inspection Report 5000373/2008002; 05000374/2008002.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's process for constructing or placing shielding in high dose rate areas. The inspectors reviewed the shielding requests initiated by the radiation protection group to evaluate the estimated dose rate reduction. The inspectors also evaluated the responses of the engineering staff to the shielding requests, as applicable.

This inspection constituted one optional sample as defined in IP 71121.02-5.

The inspectors evaluated if the licensee's planning for radiological significant work activities included consideration of the benefits of dose rate reduction activities, such as shielding (provided by water filled components/piping), job scheduling, and shielding and scaffolding installation and removal activities.

This inspection constituted one optional sample as defined in IP 71121.02–5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Job Site Inspections and ALARA Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following three jobs that were being performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas to evaluate work activities that presented the greatest radiological risk to workers:

- dry well RT suction flow orifice in-service inspection of welds;
- dry well safety relief valve activities; and
- CRD pull/put activities.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's use of ALARA controls for the work activities. The licensee's use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions was evaluated to verify that procedures and controls were consistent with the licensee's ALARA reviews, that sufficient shielding of radiation sources was provided, and that the dose expended to install/remove the shielding did not exceed the dose reduction benefits afforded by the shielding.

This inspection supplements the samples reported in Inspection Report 5000373/2008002; 05000374/2008002.

Job sites were observed to determine if workers used low dose waiting areas and if workers were effective in maintaining their doses ALARA by moving to the low dose waiting area when subjected to temporary work delays.

This inspection constituted one optional sample as defined in IP 71121.02–5.

The inspectors attended work briefings and observed ongoing work activities to determine if workers received appropriate on-the-job supervision to ensure the ALARA requirements are met. The inspectors assessed whether the first-line job supervisor ensured that the work activity was conducted in a dose efficient manner by minimizing work crew size and by ensuring that workers were properly trained and that proper tools and equipment were available when the job started.

This inspection constituted one optional sample as defined in IP 71121.02–5.

The inspectors reviewed exposures of individuals from selected work groups to evaluate any significant exposure variations among workers and to determine whether any significant exposure variations were the result of worker job skill differences or whether certain workers received higher doses because of poor ALARA work practices.

This inspection constituted one optional sample as defined in IP 71121.02–5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous And Liquid Effluent Treatment And Monitoring Systems (71122.01)

.1 Inspection Planning

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the configuration of the licensee's gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems to confirm that radiological discharges were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure. The inspectors reviewed the performance requirements contained in General Design Criteria 60 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and in the licensee's Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS) and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The inspectors also reviewed any abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and any conditions since the last inspection when effluent radiation monitors were out-of-service to verify that the required compensatory measures were implemented. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's quality control program to verify that the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied and that discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated.

The inspectors reviewed each of the radiological effluent controls program requirements to verify that the requirements were implemented as described in the licensee's RETS. For selected system modification (since the last inspection), the inspectors reviewed changes to the liquid or gaseous radioactive waste system design, procedures, or operation, as described in the UFSAR and plant procedures.

The inspectors reviewed changes to the ODCM made by the licensee since the last inspection to ensure consistency was maintained with respect to guidance in NUREG-1301, 1302 and 0133 and Regulatory Guides 1.109, 1.21, and 4.1. If differences were identified, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's technical basis or evaluations to verify that the changes were technically justified and documented.

The inspectors reviewed the radiological effluent release reports for 2006 and 2007 in order to determine if anomalous or unexpected results were identified by the licensee, entered in the CAP, and adequately resolved.

The inspectors reviewed any significant changes in reported dose values from the previous radiological effluent release report, and the inspectors evaluated the factors which may have resulted in the change. If the change was not explained as being influenced by an operational issue (e.g., fuel integrity, extended outage, or major decontamination efforts), the inspectors independently assessed the licensee's offsite dose calculations to verify that the licensee's calculations were adequately performed and were consistent with regulatory requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's correlation between the effluent release reports and the environmental monitoring results, as provided in Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71122.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Onsite Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of selected components of the gaseous and liquid discharge systems (e.g., gas compressors, demineralizers and filters (in use or in standby), tanks, and vessels) and reviewed current system configuration with respect to the description in the UFSAR. The inspectors evaluated temporary waste processing activities, system modifications, and the equipment material condition. For equipment or areas that were not readily accessible, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's material condition surveillance records, as applicable. The inspectors reviewed any changes that were made to the liquid or gaseous waste systems to verify that the licensee adequately evaluated the changes and maintained effluent releases ALARA.

During system walkdowns, the inspectors assessed the operability of selected point of discharge effluent radiation monitoring instruments and flow measurement devices. The effluent radiation monitor alarm set point values were reviewed to verify that the set points were consistent with RETS/ODCM requirements.

For effluent monitoring instrumentation, the inspectors reviewed documentation to verify the adequacy of methods and monitoring of effluents, including any changes to effluent radiation monitor set-points. The inspectors evaluated the calculation methodology and the basis for the changes to verify the adequacy of the licensee’s justification.

The inspectors observed the licensee’s sampling of gaseous radioactive waste (e.g., sampling of waste steams) and observed selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive effluents if those activities occurred during the onsite inspection. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several radioactive effluent discharge permits, assessed whether the appropriate treatment equipment was used and whether the radioactive effluent was processed and discharged in accordance with RETS/ODCM requirements, including the projected doses to members of the public.

The inspectors interviewed staff concerning effluent discharges made with inoperable (declared out-of-service) effluent radiation monitors to determine if appropriate compensatory sampling and radiological analyses were conducted at the frequency specified in the RETS/ODCM. For compensatory sampling methods, the inspectors reviewed the licensee’s practices to determine if representative samples were obtained and if the licensee routinely relied on the use of compensatory sampling in lieu of adequate system maintenance or calibration of effluent monitors.

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test results for nonsafety-related ventilation and gaseous discharge systems (high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filtration) to verify that the systems were operating within the specified acceptance criteria. In addition, the inspectors assessed the methodology the licensee used to determine the stack/vent flow rates to verify that the flow rates were consistent with the RETS/ODCM.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for identifying any normally non-radioactive systems that may have become radioactively contaminated to determine if evaluations (e.g., 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations) were performed per IE Bulletin 80-10. The inspectors did not identify unidentified contaminated systems that may have been unmonitored discharge pathways to the environment.

The inspectors reviewed instrument maintenance and calibration records (i.e., both installed and counting room equipment) associated with effluent monitoring and reviewed quality control records for the radiation measurement instruments. The inspectors performed this review to identify any degraded equipment performance and to assess corrective actions, as applicable.

The inspectors reviewed the radionuclides that were included by the licensee in its effluent source term to determine if all applicable radionuclides were included (within detectability standards) in the licensee's evaluation of effluents. The inspectors reviewed waste stream analyses (10 CFR Part 61 analyses) to determine if hard-to-detect radionuclides were also included in the source term analysis.

The inspectors reviewed a selection of monthly, quarterly, and annual dose calculations to ensure that the licensee had properly demonstrated compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, and RETS dose criteria.

The inspectors reviewed licensee records to identify any abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges (for example, discharges resulting from misaligned valves or valve leak-by) to determine if the licensee had implemented the required actions. The inspectors determined if abnormal discharges were assessed and reported as part of the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.21.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's effluent sampling records (sampling locations, sample analyses results, flow rates, and source term) for radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents to verify that the licensee's information satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1501.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71122.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's self-assessments, audits, LERs, and Special Reports related to the radioactive effluent treatment and monitoring program since the last inspection to determine if identified problems were entered into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensee's self-assessment program was capable of identifying repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution.

The inspectors reviewed CAP reports from the radioactive effluent treatment and monitoring program since the previous inspection, interviewed staff, and reviewed documents to determine if the following activities were conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk:

- initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;
- disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;
- identification of repetitive problems;
- identification of contributing causes;
- identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;
- resolution of NCVs tracked in the CAP; and
- implementation/consideration of risk-significant operational experience feedback; and ensuring problems were identified, characterized, prioritized, entered into the CAP, and resolved.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71122.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours PI both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the third through the fourth quarter of 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports and NRC Inspection Reports for the period of July through December 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's Issue Report (IR) database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with Complications PI for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the third quarter through the fourth quarter of 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of July through December 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's IR database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours PI for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the third through the fourth quarter of 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, IRs, maintenance rule records, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of July through December 2008, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's IR database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Drill/Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled the licensee's PI submittals for Drill/Exercise Performance for the period from the second quarter through the third quarter of 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the number of reported drill and exercise opportunities and the licensee's critiques and assessments for timeliness and accuracy of the opportunities. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's documentation for control room simulator training sessions, the 2008 biennial exercise, and other designated drills to validate the accuracy of the submittals. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one drill/exercise performance sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled the licensee's submittals for the ERO Drill Participation PI for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records for the number of ERO members assigned to fill key positions and the percentage of ERO members who had participated in a performance enhancing drill or exercise to validate the accuracy of the submittals. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one ERO drill participation sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alert and Notification System (ANS)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled the licensee submittals for the ANS PI for the period from the second quarter 2008 through third quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the records of the licensee's reported

number of successful siren operability tests and the number of siren tests conducted during the reporting period to validate the accuracy of the submittals. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one ANS sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection

.1 Routine Review of items Entered Into the CAP

a. Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; that evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue. Minor issues entered into the licensee's CAP as a result of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Daily CAP Reviews

a. Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of the station's daily condition report packages.

These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors' daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Past operability determination for Issue Reports (IRs) generated during RFO L2R12

a. Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of IRs associated with safety-related systems and components that were entered to the CAP during the Unit 2 RFO for the period between January 19 and February 10, 2009. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's process to identify and resolve issues during the RFO and evaluated whether the operability justification documented in each IR accounted for current and past operability concerns. Since several of the degraded components identified during the RFO were not needed for operability while the reactor was shutdown (and an operability justification was not needed) the inspectors, in addition to reviewing IRs, reviewed plant procedures and interviewed plant personnel to ensure that the degraded components were operable in the modes of applicability and while the unit was operating at full power. Additionally, the inspectors ensured that the disposition of the IRs was timely and commensurate with the safety significance of the issue and that the actions taken were appropriately focused to correct the problem.

This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) NRC "Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/175, ERO, Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator, Program Review"

The inspector performed TI 2515/175, ensured the completeness of the TI's Attachment 1, and then forwarded the data to NRC headquarters.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 16, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Rhoades, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

- The results of the baseline procedure 71111.08 were discussed with Mr. Dan Enright on January 23, 2009. The inspector returned proprietary information reviewed during the inspection prior to leaving the site.

- The results of the access controls to radiologically restricted areas and ALARA planning and controls inspection were discussed with the then Site Vice President, Mr. Dan Enright, on January 30, 2009. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

- The results of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment and monitoring systems inspection were discussed with the Plant Manager, Mr. D. Rhoades, on March 13, 2009. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

- The results of the emergency preparedness inspection were discussed with Mr. Dan Enright at the site on January 16, 2009. The emergency preparedness inspection interim exit meeting was finalized in a telephone interview with Mr. D. Rhoades, on February 17, 2009. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

- Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 3.4.a, Structural Integrity, requires the structural integrity of ASME Code class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with the ISI and Testing Programs. Technical Specification 3.4.a.1 requires that the structural integrity of ASME I Code class 1, 2, and 3 components be verified in accordance with the ISI Program. Contrary to this, during the L2R12 RFO, the licensee discovered two reactor water cleanup flow element dissimilar metal welds were misclassified and, therefore not volumetrically examined. The flow elements received a system pressure test during L1R12 and L2R11 with no indication of leakage. The flow element was replaced during the U2 current RFO with the U1 element to be replaced during the next outage. Based upon this, the violation was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as IR 865730.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

D. Enright, Site Vice President prior to March 2, 2009
D. Wozniak, Site Vice President after March 2, 2009
D. Rhoades, Plant Manager
K. Aleshire, Exelon EP Programs Manager
D. Amezaga, GL 89-13 Program Owner
J. Bashor, Site Engineering Director
L. Blunk, Operations Training Manager
H. Do, Corporate ISI Manager
J.C. Feeney, NOS Lead Assessor
B. Ginter, Engineering Programs Manager
F. Gogliotti, System Engineering Senior Manager
D. Henly, Design Engineer
W. Hilton, Engineering Supervisor – Mechanical/Structural
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight Manager
A. Kochis, ISI Engineer
R. Leasure, Radiation Protection Manager
S. Marik, Operations Director
J. Miller, NDE Level III
B. Rash, Maintenance Director
J. Rommel, Design Engineering Senior Manager
K. Rusley, Emergency Preparedness Manager
J. Shields, ISI Program Supervisor
T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager
K. Taber, Work Management Director
J. Vegara, Regulatory Assurance
H. Vinyard, Shift Operations Superintendent
J. White, Site Training Director
G. Wilhelmsen, Design Manager
S. Wilkinson, Chemistry Manager
C. Wilson, Station Security Manager

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Jacobs, NDE Level III
D. Anthony, NDE Level III
J. Miller, NDE Level III
K. Riemer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Closed

Temporary Instruction 2515/175	TI	Emergency Response Organization, Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator, Program Review"

Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LOP-DG-03E	Unit 0 DG Electrical Checklist	Rev. 9
LOP-DG-03M	Unit 0 DG Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 8
LOP-LP-02E	Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray System Electrical Checklist	Rev. 5
LOP-LP-02M	Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray System Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 12
LOP-RH-2BM	Unit 2 B RHR System Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 2

1R05 Fire Protection

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LSCS-FPR	LaSalle Fire Protection Report	Revs. 2 & 3

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
838126	BWRVIP Letter 2008-293 Implementation ; UT of Dissimilar Metal Welds	10/30/2008
869885	Indication Identified in Steam Dryer During IVVI Examinations	1/22/2009

NDE PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
ER-AA-335-014	VT-1 Visual Examination	Rev. 4
GE-MT-100	Magnetic Particle Examination	Version 8
GEH-PDI-UT-1	PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds	Rev. 6

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
2R11-008	GE Examination Summary Sheet	

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
ER-AA-310	Implementation of the Maintenance Rule	Rev. 6

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
577150	Recorder Drive Belt is Broken	1/9/2007
578215	Paper jam on 1D21-R600B	1/11/2007
579102	MCR Recorder Paper Carriage Broken	1/15/2007
579880	0D21-R600CC Arm Point 3-14 Erratic	1/17/2007
580874	RM-23 Effluent Flow Light Not Lit	1/19/2007
581029	LIS-PR-054/055 WGRM Functional Test Creates Nuisance Alarms	1/19/2007
583057	OOT (Failed), 2D18-K699A, Trend Code B3	1/25/2007
588645	Audio Alarm Not Working	2/7/2007
590606	NOS ID: Numerous Inaccuracies in IR# 588042	2/12/2007
592876	VC Intake Rad Monitor 2D18-K751A Failure	2/18/2007
596811	Trend Code B4 – 2D18-K601A Discrim Found Out of Tolerance	2/27/2007
596815	Trend Code B4 – 2D18-K601A H.V. Found Out of Tolerance	2/27/2007
597050	Trend Code B4 – 2D18-K601B H.V. Found Out of Tolerance	2/28/2007
597690	LOA-AR-201 Entry	3/1/2007
602128	VC Rad Area Detector's and System Issues/Questions	3/11/2007
603068	0D21-K602K RW Arm Alarmed Downscale	3/13/2007
603367	0D21-K602K "Radwaste Arm Down Scale" Alarm	3/13/2007
610977	Verify Calibration of OTC-VC010B for M&TE OOT Eval	3/30/2007
621281	Incorrect Arm Setpoints in Passport	4/24/2007
628637	Control Room Vent Ammonia Detector is Showing Fault 17	5/12/2007
662052	0B VC "C" Minitor Instrument Failure	8/18/2007
662052	0B VC "C" Monitor Instrument Failure	8/18/2007

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
668162	Results of 2B VC troubleshooting / Detector Replacement	9/5/2007
669671	Unit 1 Main Steam Line High Rad Alarms	9/10/2007
670651	B VC/VE Netdaq Bad Readings	9/12/2007
716315	'A' VC RAD monitors A and B Step Change	12/28/2007
717023	Refuel Floor Hi Range Rad Monitor Downscale Alarm	1/1/2008
717628	Off Gas Bldg Charcoal Valve Aisle Arm Oscillating Indication	1/3/2008
724616	Refuel Floor Hi Range Arm Downscale Alarm	1/19/2008
731386	RB High Rad Alarm	2/4/2008
745578	Radwaste Arm Down Scale Alarm	3/6/2008
751109	Modification would Result in Three Wires at One Term Point	3/18/2008
758944	Bearing Degradation Identified on 0VC01CA	4/3/2008
759978	Area Rad Recorder 2D21-R600C	4/7/2008
841704	Received Downscale Alarm	11/7/2008
842524	Area Rad Monitor Causing Spurious RW control Room Alarms	11/9/2008
846168	0D21-K601O Arm Downscale Alarm	11/17/2008
848374	Arm 1D21-K602E Hi and Downscale bypass Switches Malfunction	11/21/2008
850120	U-1 WS PRM Failed Source Check	11/27/2008
852431	Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria (A)(2) at Risk	12/4/2008
852431	Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria (A)(2) at Risk	12/4/2008
855242	1D18-K608 Replace WS PRM Indicator / Trip Unit	12/11/2008
859950	'C' VC Rad Monitor Failure	12/24/2008
860120	2A RHR WS PRM Indication Dropped After LOS-PR-M2	12/26/2008
862290	"C" VC Rad Monitor Failed Downscale	1/2/2009
873216	Shaw – 2DG01P Bolting Issue	1/28/2009
874094	2A DG DWP WO Task Issue	1/30/2009

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	2008 Failure Report [Process Radiation Monitoring (PR)]	2008
	Maintenance Rule Scoping (misc) [PR]	1/6/2009
	Performance Criteria Report For PR	1/6/2009
	Risk Significance Summary (misc) [PR]	1/6/2009

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
WO 1100429	2A DG Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test	4/29/2008
WO 1131013	2A DG Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test	7/29/2008
WO 1156762	2A DG Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test	10/28/2008
WO 1181966	2A DG Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test	1/13/2009
WO 848444	OP 2DG01P 2A DG Cooling Water Pump Inboard Bearing	4/30/2007
WO 945317	OP 2DG01P 2A DG Cooling Water Pump Outboard Bearing	4/30/2007

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LFP-100-1	Master Refuel Procedure	Rev. 46
LOA-FH-001	Irradiated Fuel Assembly Damage	Rev. 2

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
672407	1A DG Lube Oil Cooler Gasket Oil Leak on Cooling Water Inlet	9/17/2007
719194	Door Alarm Not Working	1/8/2008
814742	Security- Door 494 Will Not Throw Strike	9/6/2008
872750	Unit 2 RFB Mast –Braided Wire Load Cable 1 of 2 Failed	1/28/2009

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	Operations Log Entries	1/28/2009
	Operations Log Entries	3/16-17/2009
	Protected Equipment List	2/19/2009
WO 652137	MM Disassemble, Inspect Heat Exchanger	4/14/2008

DRAWINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
B-39968-3/ 22127-1	General Arrangement: DLW Transfer System	Rev. E
D-01677101-C	Cable, Assy: Main Hoist	Rev. 4

1R15 Operability Evaluations

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LLP-2009-02	Special Procedure: Filling RCIC Downstream of 2E51-F013 Valve	Rev. 0
LOP-RH-01	Filling and Venting the RHR System	Rev. 40
LOP-SC-05	Changing Sodium Penaborate Concentration in SBLC Solution Tank	Rev. 20
LOR-2H13-P601 -C509	Reactor Vessel Head Flange O-Ring Seal Leaking	Rev. 1
LOS-AA-S101	Unit 1 Shiftly Surveillance	Rev. 54
LOS-RI-M1	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inservice Test in Modes 1, 2, & 3	Rev. 15

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
798176	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (1E22-F026)	7/18/2008
798178	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (2E22-F026)	7/18/2008
798182	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (1E12-F340)	7/18/2008
798184	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (2E12-F340)	7/18/2008
798186	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (1E12-F053A)	7/18/2008
798198	NRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (2E12-F053A)	7/18/2008
811220	NRC GL 2008-01 Tech Evals –Fleet Wide Gaps	8/26/2008
813453	Need Confirmatory UT of Unit 1 HPCS System High Point	9/3/2008
816204	Air Pocket Detected in High Point of HPCS System Piping	9/10/2008
864756	Preoutage Snubber Failure: Snubber 2RH53-2848S	1/9/2009
864756	Preoutage Snubber Failure: Snubber 2RH53-2848S	1/9/2009
867935	Snubber 2RH53-2816S Failed Functional Test	1/16/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
869857	L1C13 PPLX Core Monitoring System Vulnerability	1/22/2009
873316	Small Air Void Identified by UT in a RHR SDC Piping	1/29/2009
876100	2E31-NO34 RX Vessel Flange Leak Detector Tubing Plugged	2/4/2009
876414	U-1 SBLC % Sodium Pentaborate and SBLC Tank Level	2/5/2009
882880	High Fuel Liftoff (Oxide & Crud) Measured on LS AREVA Fuel	2/19/2009
891474	2E51-F065 RCIC INJ Outboard test. Chk; 6 DPM leak from stem	3/16/2009
893704	RCIC Pipe believed to not be Completely Filled with Water	3/16/2009

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
WO 1010301	IM 2E31-No34 Drain / Blow Out RX VSL Head Flange Instr for RXS	5/16/2008
	Outage Control Center Log (Nights)	2/5/2009

OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
CC-AA-309-101	EC 37316, Rev 0; Evaluation of RHR Snubber Failure 2RH53-2816S & 2RH53-2848S	Rev. 10
EC 335 884	Evaluation of Amount of Water Drainage from the HPCS Piping in Event of Power Loss	
EC 374170	Evaluate Degraded / Plugged Line from Reactor vessel O-Ring Leak Off Monitoring System	Rev. 0
OE08-003	HPCS System (HP/E22): Description of degradation or nonconforming condition of SSCs	Rev. 0
OE 09-001	RCIC packing leak on injection outboard check valve (IR 891474)	Rev. 0
OE 00-001	Operability Determination: RCIC pump injection valve leak	Rev. 5

TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
EC 371494	Potential for Trapped Air in the HPCS System	Rev. 9
EC 371495	Potential for Trapped Air in the LPCS Systems	Rev. 9
EC 371496	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR “A” System	Rev. 9

TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
EC 371497	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR "B" System	Rev. 9
EC 371498	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR "C" System	Rev. 9
EC 371571	Potential for Trapped Air in Portions of RHR "A" & "B" Systems	Rev. 9
EC 374170	Evaluate Degraded / Plugged Line from Reactor Vessel O-Ring Leak Off Monitoring System	Rev. 0

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
ER-AA-335-007	Ultrasonic Water Solid Sedimentation Calibration Sheet	2/9/2009
IR 869141	Apparent Cause Evaluation: U2 RPV Head Lift Stopped due to High Weight Indication (LS-AA-125-1003)	2/26/2009
	LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 13 Core Operating Limits Report	Rev. 0
IR 869141	Equipment Prompt Investigation Report: U2 RPV Head Lift Stopped due to High Weight Indication	Rev. 13
LSCS-UFSAR	In-place Annealing of the Reactor Vessel is Unnecessary	Rev. 13
LSCS-UFSAR 7.7.15.2.6	Safety/Relief Valve Leak Detection	Rev. 15

DRAWINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
ISI-RH-1002	Inservice Inspection Isometric RHR System	Rev. A
ISI-RH-1005	Inservice Inspection Isometric RHR System	Rev. A
ISI-RH-1006	Inservice Inspection Isometric RHR System	Rev. A
M-142	P & ID Residual Heat Removal System	Rev. AZ
M-147	P & ID Reactor Core Isolation Coolant System (RCIC)	Rev. AL
5660-06	Sargent & Lundy Contractor Construction Approval Drawing : 6"-900" Tilt Disc Check Valve Pressure Seal, Butt Weld Ends, Exercisable from Closed Position	5/1/1977

1R18 Plant Modifications

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
607716	Declared U2 BPV #1 Inop Due to an EHC Leak	3/22/2007
761886	1A RR RVDT Error	4/11/2008
766354	LVDT For a RR FCV Not Responding Properly to Valve Motion	4/22/2008
785900	1A RR FCV RVDT Failure	6/12/2008
786131	1A RVDT Failure Alarm Reflashed	6/13/2008
787897	Unit 1A RR FCV Drifting Closed Following Bump Closed	6/19/2008
791320	Results of Des Eng Review of RVDT Troubleshooting Plan	6/27/2008
870486	Additional Coordination Problems for RCMS Circuits	1/23/2009
870672	U2 RCMS Issue	1/23/2009
870679	RCMS Issue with LPRM Indication	1/23/2009
870963	Annunciator Tile Inputs Swapped During RCMS Installation	1/23/2009
871406	Control rod 58-31 Lost Position Indication	1/25/2009
871608	Rod Block Monitor A Inconsistency	1/26/2009
871608	Rod Block Monitor A Inconsistency	1/26/2009
871641	42-03 Shows XX for Position	1/26/2009
871735	Plant Process Computer Not Showing Correct Rod Position	1/26/2009
871740	Low Power Setpoint and Alarm on PPC Labeled Wrong	1/26/2009
871778	22-55 RPIS Issue	1/26/2009
872112	CRD 06-27 RPIS Issue	1/26/2009
872113	CRD 38-03 RPIS Issue	1/26/2009
874133	Trolley Joystick malfunctions on Unit 2 Refueling Bridge	
874564	RCMS Controller Minor Software Error Identified	1/31/2009
874670	U2 RFB Main Grapple Redundant Z-Axis Encoder Failure	2/1/2009
874773	Joy Stick Failure for Up and Down of Mast	2/1/2009
874787	L2R12 LL Refuel Bridge MAST Loss of Power	2/1/2009
874872	Refuel Bridge Issue	2/2/2009
875342	Control Rod 10-19 Missing Position 02,12,22,32, and 42	2/3/2009
875566	Control Rod Missing Multiple Positions	2/3/2009
875572	Control Rod 38-19 Missing Multiple Positions	2/3/2009
875728	Control Rod 10-31 Missing Multiple Positions	2/3/2009
875730	Control Rod 06-35 Missing FI Indication	2/3/2009
875737	Control Rod 14-27 Missing Multiple Positions	2/3/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
875851	Rod 58-31 Exhibited Two Odd Notches between 14 and 16	2/4/2009
875885	RCMS Scram Time Test Signal	2/4/2009
876559	PPC Issues with RCMS Testing	2/5/2009
876617	RCMS Rod Withdraw Issue During Post Installation testing	2/5/2009
876617	RCMS Rod Withdraw Issue During Post Installation Testing	2/5/2009
878000	RCMS Trouble/Test Alarm	2/8/2009

DRAWINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
UFSAR G.5.2-1	Configuration of the RRFC System	Rev. 15
UFSAR G.5.2-2	Valve Actuator Hydraulic Power Unit	Rev. 0

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
EC 365184	Modify Unit 2 Main Turbine Bypass Valve #1 Position Alarm Logic	4/24/2007
EC 371362	Bypassing the Reactor Recirc Flow Control Valve LVDT to RVDT Mismatch Alarm. The RVDT Signal has Degraded.	10/3/2008
LST-2005-027	Work Verifications / GANG Sequences	1/26/2009
TCCP 337725	Bypass the Reactor Recirc Flow Control Valve RVDT Mismatch Alarm	Rev. 0
WO 1113726	IM 1B33-N452A Replace RVDT on 1A RR FCV	3/12/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LSCS-UFSAR	Feedwater Control System Instrumentation and Controls	Rev. 15
LSCS-UFSAR	Recirculation Flow Control System Instrumentation	Rev. 15

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
839987	Review IR Database for Seasonal Pattern	12/31/2008
872155	FME Found in Main Steam Piping During SRV Flange Inspection	1/26/2009
874844	"A" RR FCV Servo Not Responding Properly	2/2/2009
876280	2A FCV Actuator Stroke Length Shorter Than Proc. Allowable	2/4/2009
891599	New WRGM Pump from Stores Failed to Produce Rated Pressure	3/11/2009

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LIS-PR-055	Standby Gas Treatment System Wide Range Gas Monitor Functional Test	Rev. 25
LIS-RR-210A	Unit 2 Recirculation HPU Loop A Control and 2B33-F060A Limit Switch Calibration	Rev. 5
LOP-VP-02	Startup, Operation and Shutdown of Primary Containment Chilled Water and Ventilation System	Rev. 33
LTS-300-2	Drywell Personnel Air Lock Local Leak Rate Test	Rev. 15

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
WO 1058185	ES Integrated Division 1 ECCS Response Time Pumps and Diesel	1/24/2009
WO 1058266	Unit 2 Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Operability Test	1/30/2009
WO 1063570	DW Personnel Air Lock LLRT (Barrel)	11/26/2008

1R20 Outage Activities

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LGP-2-1	Normal Unit Shutdown	Rev. 79

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
868501	Control Rod 34-59 Took 20 Minutes to Insert	1/19/2009
868668	Contamination of Three Boilermakers	1/19/2009
868704	Elevated Dose Rates Identified during L2R12	1/19/2009
868736	RX Cavity Workers Receive Dose Rate Alarms	1/20/2009
868768	Unit 2 Plant Process Computer Shut Down	1/20/2009
868773	Operators Observed Oil Pouring Out of Motor on Start	1/20/2009
869001	Packing Leak on 2B21-F022D MSIV	1/20/2009
869141	U2 RPV Head Lift Stopped Due to High Weight Indication	1/20/2009
869235	Control Rod Settle Issues during L2C12 S/D	1/20/2009
869856	Alarm Panel S-Switch Inadvertently Bumped Off	1/22/2009
869857	L1C13 PPLX Core monitoring System Vulnerability	1/22/2009
869942	Lesson Learned: Refuel Bridge Delays Fuel Movement	1/22/2009
869948	Single Blade Guides will not Grapple with U2 RFB	1/22/2009
870368	2B21-F032A Check Valve Fails LLRT	1/22/2009
870634	Security-Declared Contraband at Security Checkpoint	1/23/2009
871310	Slight Increase in Cobalt 60 Observed in a Chemistry Sample	1/24/2009
871319	Low DIV 1 SWGR Temps Entered LOA-VX-201	1/24/2009
871353	Sipping Results Indicate Fuel Leaker	1/25/2009
871560	Unit Crane #1 has Inadvertently Dropped the Load Three Feet	1/25/2009
871632	Jet Pump 15 main Wedge Wear INR 09-07	1/26/2009
871998	Deformation on Vessel guide Rod at 180 degrees; INR 09-11	1/26/2009
872347	FME Removed During Suppression Pool Inspection	1/27/2009
872457	U-2 RCIC Trip and Throttle Valve Failed to Trip	1/27/2009
872660	Small Air Void Identified by UT Exam in 2A LPCI Piping	1/27/2009
872750	U2 RFB Mast – Braided Wire Load Cable 1 of 2 Failed	1/28/2009
872798	2A VP Chiller Trips on High Motor Temp.	1/28/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
872887	As Left Leakrate of 2VQ026 Exceeds Warning Limit 15 SCFH	1/28/2009
874244	Shaw – Lost Ed in DW	1/30/2009
874413	Increased Exposure Observed after Shielding Installed	1/30/2009
874657	Shaw – Sea Van Slides off of Truck Backing into Refuel Pad	2/1/2009
874803	Contaminated Flashlight Found in MAF	2/1/2009
875318	Cracks Found in Body of Valve	2/3/2009
875366	Floor Drain in Bullpen Reading 2 Rem/Hr	2/3/2009
875502	Shaw – 4 PCE's on Refuel Floor	2/3/2009
875829	Knurled Knob for Garden Sprayer Missing in RX Cavity	2/4/2009
875841	2RE08 Overflow in 673 RCIC Room	2/4/2009
875842	L2R12 – FME Identified in Dryer Sep Pit and Cavity Wall	2/4/2009
875845	IRM "A" Spiked Full Scale Causing a Half Scram	2/4/2009
875852	Found 2RE013A Stuck Open	2/4/2009
876412	2H IRM Spiked Causing Half Scram	2/5/2009
878001	Minor Issues from U-2 Drywell Closeout with NRC	2/8/2009
878589	Coordination Issue between Turbine Roll and Switching	2/10/2009

DRAWINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
BIF DWG 8-236275	Reactor Water Cleanup System	Rev. A
ISI-RT-2001	Inservice Inspection Isometric Reactor Water Clean-up System	Rev. A
J-2961	Universal Venturi Tube	Rev. B
M-143	P & ID Reactor Water Clean-Up	Rev. AK

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	L2R12 Scope deletion/deferral list (since start of L2R12)	1/27/2009
	Shutdown Load Profile	
IR 868704	Equipment Issue Report: Dose Rates in Containment higher than Expected	1/21/2009

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
IR 868768	Equipment Issue Report: Unexpected Shutdown of Unit 2 PPC	1/20/2009
IR 869837	Human Performance Issue: Error in L1C13 POWERPLEX-III input deck.	Rev. 13
OU-LA-104	Shutdown Safety Management Program	Rev. 11

1R22 Surveillance Testing

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LES-DC-103A	Division 1 Battery Charger Capacity Test	Rev. 17
LOS-DG-M3	1B (2B) Diesel Generator Operability Test	Rev. 69
LOS-HP-Q1	HPCS System Inservice Test	Rev. 60
LOS-NB-R2	Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Leakage Test	Rev. 03
LOS-RI-M1	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inservice Test in Modes 1, 2, & 3	Rev. 15
LOS-RI-Q5	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability, Valve Inservice Tests in Modes 1,2,3 and Cold Quick Start	Rev. 30
LOS-RI-R3	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Pump Operability Test	Rev. 32
LTS-100-35	RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test	Rev. 16
LTS-300-4	Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test	Rev. 26

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
872843	Leakage Past 2G33-F101 Prevents LLRT of Isolation Valves	1/28/2009
872887	As Left Leakrate of 2VQ026 Exceeds Warning Limit 15 SCFH	1/28/2009
874088	2E51-F028/69 Fails PMT LLRT	1/30/2009
874363	2G33-F004 Exceeds LLRT Warning Limit	1/30/2009
875874	2C Outboard MSIV Packing Leak	2/4/2009
875875	Packing Leaking Steady Stream of Water	2/4/2009
876556	LOS-NR-R2 HCU-D5027-107 Leak	2/5/2009
876558	LOS-NR-R2 HCU 10-23 107 VLV Solid Stream	2/5/2009
876568	LOS-NR-R2 HCU 38-51-107 1 DPS Leak	2/5/2009
876572	LOS-NR-R2 2E31-N013-LLD Leaks 2 Drops per Minute	2/5/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
876632	LOS-NR-R2 HCU 42-03 107 Valve Leak 30 DPM	2/5/2009
876636	LOS-NB-R2 HCU 14-19 107 Valve Seat Leakage 1 Drop/Sec	2/5/2009
876673	LOS-NB-R22 HCU 38-27 107 Valve Leak 2 DPM	2/5/2009
876679	LOS-NB-R2 HCU 42-35 107 Valve 1 DPM Leak	2/5/2009
876830	Dilution Trash Rake Cable Disconnected from Rail	2/5/2009
876859	2B33-F023B has Moisture Noted at Packing During Hydro	2/5/2009
876860	CRD Flange Leakage Identified During L2R12 Vessel Leak Test	2/5/2009
876868	CRD Flange Leakage Identified During L2R12 Vessel Leak Test	2/5/2009
876876	CRD Flange Leakage Identified During L2R12 Vessel Leak Test	2/5/2009
876908	Flange Leakage noted During Hydro at LPRM, Core Location 16	2/5/2009
876921	Flange Leakage Noted During Hydro at LPRM, Map Location 12	2/5/2009
876929	Flange Leakage Noted During Hydro at LPRM, Map Location 33	2/5/2009
876934	Flange Leakage Noted During Hydro at LPRM, Map Location 61	2/5/2009
876991	Packing Leakage Detected During System Leakage Test	2/5/2009
876993	Valve Packing Leak	2/5/2009

WORK DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LOS-HP-Q1	Tech Spec Surveillance Unit 1 HPCS Pump Run, Att. 1A	1/9/2009
WO 1051264	Inspect Div 1 125 Volt battery Charger	11/11/20008
WO 1051593	U-2 Div 1 125 VDC Battery Charger Capacity Test	11/11/2008
WO 1126100	LLRT, 2E12-F009	11/7/2008
WO 1181276	LOS-RI-Q5 U1 RCIC Cold-Quick Start	1/13/2009

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
Fig. RCS P/T Limits 3.4.11-4	P-T Curves for Hydrostatic or Leak Testing up to 20 EFPY	
LOS-NB-R2	Visual Inspection Location Record: Leakage and Abnormalities Inspection	6/9/2008

1EP2 Alert and Notification (ANS) Evaluation

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
564530	LaSalle Alert and Notification System Reached a 25 Percent Outage	12/2/2006
806699	Midwest Siren Outage	8/13/2008
858894	Loss of 13 of 50 EP Sirens	12/20/2008
860464	LaSalle Alert Notification System Reached an Outage Greater than 25 Percent	12/27/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	Design Report Updated, Upgraded Public Alert and Notification System (ANS), LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP), Final	10/31/2008
	LaSalle Monthly Siren Availability Report (Telemetry)	1/2008 - 12/2008
	LaSalle Monthly Siren Availability Report (Telemetry)	1/2007 - 12/2007
	LaSalle Off-Site Siren Test Plan	12/2008
	LaSalle Plant, Warning System Maintenance and Operational Report	1/9/2007 - 3/1/2007
	LaSalle Plant, Warning System Maintenance and Operational Report	12/17/2007 - 1/25/2008
	LaSalle Siren Daily Operability Reports	1/2008 - 12/2008
	LaSalle Siren Daily Operability Reports	1/2007 - 12/2007

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
619412	NOS ID: RP Issue with EP Storage Locker at St. Mary Hospital	4/19/2007
647665	FASA Identified Weakness – EP Vulnerability – RPTS	7/6/2007
796802	EP Call-In Drill Duty Team Members Did Not Respond	7/15/2008
856846	EP FASA 843943 – Deficiency in Staffing Response Time	12/16/2008
856855	EP FASA 843943 – Deficiency in Augmentation Drills Time/Day	12/16/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	ERO Augmentation Memo, Call-In Augmentation Drill Results, Site and Corporate	7/2007 – 12/2008
	Exelon Nuclear Corporate Emergency Preparedness, Radiation Emergency Response, St. Mary's Hospital, Streator, IL Radiation Emergency Response, Fire Department/EMS/Hospital Training	3/3/2005
	LaSalle Station ERO Roster	1/9/2009
	Letters of Agreement between Exelon and Off-Site Medical and Fire Agencies	2008
EP-AA-1000	Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan	Rev. 19
EP-AA-1000	Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan, Table B-1: Minimum Staffing Requirements for the Exelon ERO	Rev. 19
TQ-AA-113	ERO Training and Qualification	Rev. 12

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
619217	NOS ID EP Corrective Action Narrowly Focused	4/19/2007
660465	FASA Results: Maintenance Schedule Adherence	8/14/2007
672329	Off-Year EP Exercise – Unsatisfactory TSC Demo Criteria	9/17/2007

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
672939	Off-Year Exercise – Unsatisfactory OSC Demo Criteria	9/19/2007
718948	01/07/08 High Temperature Reading of 84 Degrees in the TSC	1/7/2008
725732	TSC Room Temp HI Alarm	1/23/2008
749602	Control Room Habitability Review of NEI 99-03 Reveals Deltas	3/14/2008
752376	EP PI - November 2007 Correction to Participation Data	3/20/2008
752398	EP PI - July 2007 Correction to DEP Data	3/20/2008
752478	EP Pre-Exercise DEP Failure to Classify in a Timely Manner	3/20/2008
755103	EP Pre-Exercise Facility Objective J.1 Failure – TSC	3/26/2008
758605	EP Pre-Exercise Simulator Demonstration Criteria Failure	4/3/2008
764322	NOS Identified Obsolete PING Running in Old OSC	4/17/2008
764375	NOS ID: Unresolved TSC HVAC Issues	4/17/2008
765070	NOS ID: EP 1Q08 Performance Rated as Yellow	4/18/2008
767316	EP Procedures and Expectations Are Not Fully Aligned	4/24/2008
780438	Training – Failed DEP during 08-3 OBE	5/29/2008
815733	NOS Identified Issue Regarding EP Equipment Status	9/9/2008
822349	TSC PING Fails Source Check	9/25/2008
839684	EP NRC DEP PI Value Incorrect for 3rd Quarter 2008	11/3/2008
856865	EP FASA 843943 – Deficiency in ERO Participation	12/16/2008
865133	TSC Room HI Temp Alarm	1/10/2009
881701	EP NRC Concerns with Detection Limits Associated with Radioiodines and Thyroid Dose Assessment	2/17/2009

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
EP-AA-112-500-F-01	Field Monitoring Team Checklist	Rev. D
EP-AA-113	Personnel Protective Actions, Attachment 4	Rev. 4
EP-AA-113	Personnel Protective Actions	Rev. 9
EP-MW-110-200	Dose Assessment	Rev. 5
EP-MW-123-1002	Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation (DAPAR) Program Technical Basis	Rev. 3

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LS-AA-126-1001	FASA Self-Assessment Report, Emergency Preparedness, NRC EP Exercise Inspection Readiness, # 707324, Attachment 2	3/24/2008
LS-AA-126-1005	Check-In Self-Assessment Report, Emergency Preparedness, 2009 NRC Baseline Program Inspection, # 843943, Attachment 2	12/17/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	Emergency Preparedness Audit NOSA-LAS-07-04, AR# 576578, LaSalle Station	4/16 – 4/20/2007
	Emergency Preparedness Audit NOSA-LAS-08-03, AR# 713024, LaSalle County Station	4/14 – 4/18/2008
	GPU Nuclear Memorandum, Subject: Evaluation of the Front Loaded Iodine Cartridge Using Various Survey Equipment	5/12/1988
	NOS Objective Evidence Report, 2007 Emergency Preparedness Audit, Offsite Agency Interface, AR # 574311-11	5/18/2007
	NOS Objective Evidence Report, 2008 Emergency Preparedness Audit, Offsite Agency Interface, AR# 713024-13	4/14 – 4/18/2008
	Root Cause Investigation Report, Untimely Emergency (EP) Event Classification Due to Inconsistent Use of the EAL Basis, # 752478	3/19/2008

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
832223	Radioactive Material Container Not Posted	10/13/2008
854228	NOS Identified: Radiological Posting and Boundary Issues	12/9/2008
835637	High Rad Rounds Not Proactive Enough	10/24/2009
836939	NOS Identified: Clean Island Missing Radiological Postings	10/28/2008
856456	Chemistry Personnel Contamination During Sampling	12/15/2009
868654	Issues Identified by Radiation Protection Behavior Correction Specialist	1/19/2009
868668	Contamination of Three Boilermakers in Reactor	1/19/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	Cavity	
867955	L2R12 Scaffold Issues Preventing Locked High Radiation Controls	1/16/2009
868736	Reactor Cavity Workers Receive Dost Rate Alarms	1/19/2009
868742	NOS Identified Individuals Bypassed Greeters	1/19/2009
869144	Dose Rate Alarm in RHR Corner Room	1/20/2009
869175	Standards Team - Radiation Protection Posting Issue	1/20/2009
869227	Luse Worker Contamination Events	1/20/2009
869786	Shaw Insulator Dose Rate Alarm in Drywell	1/21/2009
870346	Standards Team Identifies Radiation Worker Practice Issues	1/22/2009
870926	Master-Lee Individual Received Contamination	1/23/2009
872082	L2R12 Reactor Building Dose Rate Alarm	1/26/2009
872094	Shaw – Two Carpenters Received Dose Rate Alarms in Drywell	1/26/2009
873922	Personnel Contamination – Shaw Laborer Contaminated in Clean Area	1/30/2009
874803	Contaminated Flashlight Found in Main Access Facility	2/1/2009
875366	Floor Drain in Bullpen Reading 2 Rem per Hour	2/3/2009
875502	Shaw – Four Personnel Contaminations on the Refuel Floor	2/3/2009
832223	Radioactive Material Container Not Posted	10/13/2008

RADIATION WORK PERMITS REVIEWED

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
10009379	L2R12 RT Suction Flow Orifice Weld In-Service Inspection	Rev. 0
10009393	Drywell Reactor Recirculation Motor Activities	Rev. 1
10009413	L2E12 Refuel Floor IVVI Activities	Rev. 0

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
869666	Higher Dose Rates Found in the Suppression Pool L2R12	1/21/2009
873749	Extra Dose Moving Control Rod Drive Boxes to the Refuel Floor	1/29/2009
874413	Increased Exposure Observed After Shielding Installed	1/30/2009

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
MA-AA-716-017	Equipment Readiness and Reliability	Revision 1
OU-AA-101-1007	Outage Scope Control	Revision 5
RP-AA-401	Operational ALARA Planning and Controls	Revision 9
WC-AA-101-1002	On Line Scheduling Process	Revision 8

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
Assignment Number 804909-08	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas and ALARA Planning and Controls Self-Assessment Report	11/6/2008

RADIATION WORK PERMITS REVIEWED

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
10009369	ALARA Work-In-Progress Review: L2R12 Dry Well General Electric In-Service Inspection	1/23/2009
10009379	ALARA Plan: L2R12 Dry Well RT Suction Flow Orifice In-Service Inspection of Welds	Rev. 0
10009381	ALARA Plan: L2R12 Dry Well Safety Relief Valve Activities	Rev. 0
10009386	ALARA Plan: L2R12 Dry Well Scaffolding	Rev. 0
10009395	ALARA Plan: L2R12 Control Rod Drive Pull/Put Activities	Rev. 0
10009412	ALARA Plan: L2R12 Reactor Vessel Disassembly/Reassembly	Rev. 0

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous And Liquid Effluent Treatment And Monitoring Systems

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
CY-LA-170-000	Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Programs	Rev. 3
CY-LA-0100	Personnel Familiarization Guide for REMP, MET, RGPP and REC Programs	Rev. 2
CY-LA-170-200	Radioactive Effluent Controls Program	Rev. 1
CY-AA-170-310	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Administration	Rev. 2
CY-LA-170-1100	Quality Assurance for Radiolo0gical Monitoring Programs	Rev. 1
CY-LA-170-2000	Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report	Rev. 2
CY-LA-170-2100	Estimated Errors of Effluent Measurements	Rev. 0
CY-AA-170-3100	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revisions	Rev. 3
CY-LA-170-4160	Radioactive Groundwater Protective Program Scheduling and Notification	Rev. 1
LOP-WX-32	Interim Radioactive Storage Facility General Use Procedure	Rev. 10
LRP-5820-30	Wide Range Gas Monitor Low Range Detector Calibration	Rev. 6
LRP-5820-30	Wide Range Gas Monitor Low Range Detector Calibration	Rev. 7
LRP-5820-31	Wide Range Gas Monitor Mid/ High Range Detector Calibration	Rev. 9
LRP-5820-31	Wide Range Gas Monitor Mid/ High Range Detector Calibration	Rev. 10
LRP-5820-33	Station Vent Stack and Standby Gas Treatment Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Effluent Release Alarm and Trip Set-Points	Rev. 2
LRP-5820-34	Off-Gas Post Treatment Monitor Alarm and Trip Set-Points	Rev. 10
LS-AA-1120	Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative Voluntary Communication	Rev. 10
RP-AA-228	10 CFR 75(g) and 10 CFR 72.20 Documentation Requirements	Rev. 0
LCP-810-30	Gamma Spectrometer Systems Calibration	Rev. 5

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
606826	Off-Gas Pre-Treat Sample Trouble Alarm Received in the Main Control Room	3/21/2007
627381	Potentially Degraded Barrels Identified	5/9/2007

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
641290	Declared Unit-1 WS Process Radiation Monitor Inoperable	6/17/2007
651040	Step Change in WS Radiation Monitor	7/18/2007
654533	Found Evidence of Oil Intrusion Inside the Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Skid	7/27/2007
668677	Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Has No Flow	9/6/2007
707332-02	Radiological Groundwater Protection Program (Tritium Management) Focused Area Self-Assessment	12/16/2008
713026	NOSA-LAS-08-04 Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report	4/2/2008
782742	Actions Needed to Address Source Detector Orientation	6/4/2008
792943	Unexpected Control Room Alarm: WS Effluent Radiation High	7/2/2008
821548	Unplanned Entry ODCM REC/TRM Action Statements – SVS Wide Range Gas Monitor	9/24/2008
839987	SVS Wide Range Gas Monitor Was Found Non-Isokinetic	11/4/2008
843954	Transition of Radiation Protection Setpoint Determination Procedures	11/12/2008
885878	Nuclear Oversight Identified Chemistry Focused Area Self-Assessment Issues	2/26/2009

WORK ORDERS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
WO 881152	Stand-by Gas Treatment System Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration	6/27/2007
WO 889083	Station Vent Monitor Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor	7/27/2007
WO 996431	Stand-by Gas Treatment System Flow Rate Monitor Calibration	8/5/2008
WO 998337	Main Stack Effluent and Sampler Flow Calibration	7/31/2008
WO 1170747	Stand-by Gas Treatment System Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration	12/22/2008
WO 1180721	Station Vent Monitor Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor	1/12/2009

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	LaSalle County Station Update Final Safety Analysis Section 11	Rev. 13

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LS-AA-2010	Monthly Data Elements for NRC/WANO for Unit/Reactor Shutdown Occurrences	July – December, 2008
LS-AA-2030	Monthly Data Elements for NRC for Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours	July – December, 2008

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	Performance Indicator Data for Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours	July – December, 2008
	Performance Indicator Data for Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours	July – December, 2008
	Performance Indicator Data for Unplanned Power Fluctuations	July – December, 2008

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
LIS-PC-207B	Unit 2 Post Accident Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring System Panel 2PL77J (Div 2) Calibration and Gas Bottle Replacement	Rev. 8
LS-AA-2110	Monthly Data Elements for NRC Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation, Attachment 1	4/2008 – 9/2008
LS-AA-2120	Monthly Data Elements for NRC Drill/Exercise Performance, Attachment 1	4/2008 – 9/2008
LS-AA-2130	Monthly PI Elements for NRC Alert and Notification System Reliability, Attachment 1	4/2008 – 9/2008
LOS-SC-R1	Unit 2 SBLC Injection Test	Rev. 28

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
868501	Control Rod 34-59 Took 20 minutes to Insert	1/18/2009
869457	Approximately 2 GPM Water Leak from 2B21-F019 Packing during MSL Draining	1/21/2009
871870	LPRM 40-09A Upscale	1/26/2009

CAP DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
872599	2B33-F345B Abnormal Indication When Opening	2/26/2009
874740	Division 2 Post LOCA Oxygen is Reading Low	2/1/2009
870124	Broken Connector on 2C41-F004B	1/22/2009
872457	U-2 RCIC trip and Throttle Valve Failed to Trip	1/27/2009
874114	L2R12 2B21-F032A Disc Rotation	1/30/2009
874417	L2R12 LL Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Testing	1/30/2009
868937	Duct Tape found on CRD Line in Drywell	1/20/2009
872155	FME Found in Main Steam Piping During SrV Flange Inspection	1/26/2009
AR 872457	System Engineering to assess for MRFF and/or CCF Clock issues	2/3/2009
874692	Bonnet Cap Screws on Valve Torqued Higher than Required	1/31/2009
873406	2IN035 Required Adjustment During LOS-IN-R3	1/28/2009
872416	2B33-F344B Displayed Abnormal Indications in Open Direction	1/27/2009
874804	RF Pumpdown Functional Test Failed to Shutdown when Expected	2/1/2009
888664	Issues on Final Clear of 2FP136	3/3/2009
886819	2C CD/CB min Flow Failed Open, MCR Unexpected Alarm	2/28/2009

MISCELLANEOUS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
	EP Memo, Designation of NRC DEP (Drill and Exercise Performance) Opportunities for LORT	07/06 – 08/06

OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
EC 373825	Evaluation of Lost Parts During L2R12	Rev. 0
EC 374122	Pressure Regulator 2IN035, Evaluation of Lower Regulated Pressure	Rev. 0

WORK ORDERS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
1165382	Div II PA Containment 02 & H2 Mon Panel 2PL77J	11/11/2008
1191860	Div II PA Containment 02 & H2 Mon Panel 2PL77J	2/10/2009

4OA5 Other Activities

CAP DOCUMENTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
872488	Spiking on SBGT WRGM Recorder (0D18-R519) Mid-High Range Pens	1/27/2009
874097	NRC Identified Exposed Cable in Drywell	1/30/2009
878001	Minor Issues from U2 Drywell Closeout with NRC	2/8/2009
873789	NRC Identified Sparks Leaving Weld Area in LPHB during L2R12	1/29/2009
876842	NRC ID 2E12-F090A has small packing leak	2/5/2009
876846	NRC ID 2E12-F090B has one drop/minute leak	2/5/2009
876850	NRC ID 2E51-F063 has a one drop/minute packing leak	2/5/2009
882312	NRC ID – Minor surface corrosion on 1B RHRWS Line	2/18/2009
889612	Scaffold stacked higher than the storage rack	3/6/2009
890575	NRC ID – 1PL76J “Power on” Light Burned Out	3/9/2009

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
ALARA	As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable
ANS	Alert and Notification System
ARM	Area Radiation Monitor
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRD	Control Rod Drive
DC	Direct Current
DG	Diesel Generator
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
HCU	Hydraulic Control Unit
HPCS	High Pressure Core Spray
IP	Inspection Procedure
IR	Issue Report
ISI	Inservice Inspection
LLRT	Local Leak Rate Testing
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
LOOP	Loss of Off-site Power
LPCI	Low Pressure Coolant Injection
LPCS	Low Pressure Core Spray
MRFF	Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
MSIV	Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSL	Mean Sea Level
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NDE	Non Destructive Testing
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OSP	Outage Safety Plan
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI	Performance Indicator
PI&R	Problem Identification and Resolution
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RETS	Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications
RFO	Refueling Outage
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
RWM	Rod Worth Minimizer
RWP	Radiation Work Permit
SBLC	Standby Liquid Control
SRV	Safety Relief Valve
TS	Technical Specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

UT	Ultrasonic Testing
WO	Work Order