



Public Meeting with NRC Region III
April 29, 2009

# NextEra Energy Point Beach Public Meeting with NRC Region III

# **Agenda**

**Introductions** 

Opening Remarks Larry Meyer

**Substantive Cross-Cutting Themes** 

Corrective Action Brad Castiglia (Programmatic)

John Bjorseth (Plant Specifics)

**Documentation** Brad Castiglia (Programmatic)

Rob Harrsch (Plant Specifics)
Tom Vehec (Plant Specifics)

Safety Culture Larry Meyer (Overall)

Becky Deuel (NSCIT Perspective)

**Questions/Discussion/Conclusions** 

Closing Remarks Larry Meyer



# **OPENING REMARKS**

Larry Meyer
Site Vice President



# **OPENING REMARKS**

- This meeting will provide an update of actions identified and previously communicated via:
  - The last public meeting held on September 24, 2008
  - Our October 2, 2008, response to the 2008 Mid-Cycle Assessment letter
  - Our November 15, 2008, update on actions taken and planned to resolve deficiencies identified during the June 2008 SCWE Confirmatory Order Inspection
  - Our December 22, 2008, letter providing results and contemplated corrective actions in response to the 2008 culture survey
- This meeting is in response to the 2008 annual assessment letter issued on March 3, 2009
- The objective of this meeting is to demonstrate progress and show why our actions are more effective than in the past



# **KEY MESSAGES**

- We have completed the actions and met the closure effectiveness measures ahead of the timeline established in our October 2, 2008, letter
- We are confident our actions will be more effective than in the past




# **CONFIDENCE IN OUR ACTIONS**

- We understand the root causes and the drivers of each of the issues
- We have the organizational capability to address the causes
- We have oversight to ensure fixes remain in place
- Our recovery approach focuses on sustainability



# Sustainability




R<sub>T</sub> Typical RecoveryM Monitoring SystemF Foundation

Time



# Road to Excellence – "Progress On The Journey"



8

# THIS IS OUR MODEL FOR ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE



# **Nuclear Excellence Model**



Vision

We are a team that delivers consistent excellent performance

Mission

We will produce energy in a safe, reliable, cost effective way, while caring for our employees, communities and the environment

Values

Conduct all activities to demonstrate a deep respect for Nuclear Safety

Live the Safety Guiding Principles Be a Self-Improving Culture & Learning Organization Maximize the time spent on Prevention and Detection to minimize / eliminate Correction activities

Foster a work environment where we are the employer of choice

Core Principles Operationally Focused Passion for Excellence

Engaged Leaders

Standardized Processes Responsive to Stakeholders Effective Workforce Planning

Engaged Employees

Effective Long-Range Planning

Strong Teamwork

Strong Ownership & Accountability

**Effective Supervisors** 

Worklife Balance

Strategic Focus Areas Operational Excellence



Organizational Effectiveness



**Generation Reliability** 



Effective Business & Financial Performance







# **Nuclear Excellence Model**



#### **FPL Nuclear Code of Ethics**


We are committed to excellence and professionalism in the conduct of our activities, and we endorse the following principles:

- We regard the safety of the public and our fellow employees as our personal and moral responsibility.
- We efficiently use our resources to promote cost-effective electrical power generation.
- We conduct our nuclear activities in a manner which demonstrates commitment and integrity, and fosters a professional environment conducive to excellence in performance.
- We ensure that personnel responsible for supporting nuclear plant operations possess the necessary knowledge and experience to fully understand nuclear plant activities, events and problems.
- We avoid complacency, and establish an environment of continuous improvement. We encourage and accept constructive criticism.
- We ensure that plant systems and components are reliable and properly maintained. We protect the environment. We commit to an aggressive and timely approach to the resolution of problems.
- We adopt and maintain policies and practices that convey an attitude of trust, encourage communication, and foster teamwork among all groups that operate, maintain and support the nuclear plants.


#### Value

Conduct all activities to demonstrate a deep respect for nuclear safety

























# **PBNP RECOVERY SUCCESSES**

	THEN	NOW						
	(2008 Low Point)							
	Manager and Supervisor Engageme	nt						
	Causal quality - 74	90						
Corrective Action Broaden	Overdue - 46	0						
Corrective Action Program	Extensions - 90/week	30/week						
	Health Index - 52.5	80						
Documented Job Observations (per month)	140	>400						
INPO Index (Station)	89	95						
Leadership Vacancies	15	3						
	Willingness to Deviate from Procedu	res						
Site HU Event Rate	0.036	0.022						
Outage Safety Grade	Unit 2 (Spring 08) - 74%	Unit 1 (Fall 08) - 90%						
Procedure Backlog	1952	500						
	Equipment Reliability							
Forced Outage Rate (Station)	22.85	0						
Equipment Reliability Index	Unit 1 - 57 Unit 2 - 68	Unit 1 - 66 Unit 2 - 78						
Corrective Maintenance (station)	36	6						
, , , ,	Operational Focus							
Operator Aggregate Distractions	240	190						
Open Operability Issues (both Units)	90	42						
	Work Management							
Work Management - Schedule Adherence	65	86						
Non-outage Elective Maintenance (station)	881	558						



# **Point Beach**



# 2009 Priorities

#### Safety – It's Fundamental in Our Work

Industrial - Radiological - Nuclear

Every member of the Point Beach team is responsible to prevent accidents, look out for each other and correct unsafe behaviors

#### Accelerate Focus on Equipment Reliability

Operations-Led, Top 10 Equipment List, Plant Health Committee, Minor Mods, Engineering Roles and Responsibilities, OPS Burdens, System Health

#### Dramatically Improve Work Management

T-Week Meetings, Schedule Stability, Schedule Adherence, Backlogs, Productivity, FIN Team, Operations Support, Engineering Involvement

#### Continued Focus on Strengthened Fundamentals

Corrective Action Program

Screening, Trending, Quality Evaluations and Actions, Backlogs, Department CARBs

Procedure Use and Quality

Procedure Quality, Procedure Use Expectations, Backlogs

Leader Engagement

Field and Training Observations, Coach of the Day, 2Cs Meetings, Administrative Burden, Supervisor Engagement

- Low Value Work Reduction
- Improve Plant Training Programs

Improve Training Committees, Line Ownership of Training, Training Ownership for Plant Performance, Conduct of Training, Training Evaluations

Unit 2 Outage Readiness/Execution

Unit 1 Lessons Learned, Scope Control, Schedule Preparation, Look Aheads, HIT Teams, Rapid Trending, IPTE Briefs, EPU, Projects, Modifications

Success in these areas is essential for any Operations-led organization.





# **Substantive Cross-Cutting Theme Update**

# CORRECTIVE ACTION Aspect P.1.d

Brad Castiglia
Performance Improvement Manager

John Bjorseth
Plant General Manager



# **CORRECTIVE ACTION**

## **Performance Improvement Manager**

# **Completed Actions Update**

- ACE Review Board implemented in 4Q08
- Departmental Corrective Action Review Boards (CARBs) implemented in 4Q08
- Management performance appraisal criteria for CAP quality and timeliness implemented in 1Q09
- Workdown curves and PIs for CAP backlog established in 1Q09
- New metrics established at department level as well as site level
- Root and Apparent Cause training lesson plans were developed in December 2008; training is in progress



# **CORRECTIVE ACTION** (continued)

## **Performance Improvement Manager**

# Results - October 2 letter forecasted results in 2Q09

- Average age of evaluations ≤30 days. Actual: <15 days</li>
- Average age of corrective actions ≤135 days. Actual: 97 days
- Corrective Action Review Board acceptance rate sustained for 3 months at 85% or greater. Actual: >85% YTD
- Continued low threshold on CAP initiation rate
  - 11,500 CAPs initiated in 2008; 2900 CAPs initiated in 1Q09
  - We have seen more CAPs initiated by our Auxiliary Operators and maintenance workers
- >90 days without an overdue CAP



# **CORRECTIVE ACTION** (continued)

#### **Performance Improvement Manager**

# Results (continued)

- Prioritization of CAPs has improved according to risk
- CAP action backlog has been reduced from approximately 2200 in November 2008 to <1300 today</li>
- Self-assessments are critical and department CARBs are looking at the right things and are effective
- PI&R inspection concluded CAP is being effectively implemented with noticeable improvement in last six months



# **CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTS**

#### **Plant General Manager**

#### "Where the rubber meets the road"

- Polar Crane
- Façade Freeze
- Charging Pumps
- Service Water Pumps
- Closure of conservative assumptions substantive cross-cut
- Containment Closure improvements
- Human Performance in Maintenance



# **CORRECTIVE ACTION** (continued)

## **Plant General Manager**

#### We are still not satisfied –

- Continue to improve quality of closeouts
- Continue to reduce the backlog of open current actions
  - Site goal will be 950 open items in backlog by end of 2009
- Improve quality of trending
- Fleet standards will be raised



# **CONFIDENCE IN ACTIONS**



## **Plant General Manager**

(9/3/08)

Point Beach Nuclear Plant CAP Measures of Success

	Point Beach Nuclear Plant CAP Measures of Success														
	RCE Timeliness (Open-30 days)	RCE Quality (lass 5)	ACE Timeliness (Open-30 days)	ACE Quality (last 30 days)	CE Timeliness (Open-30 days)	Exensions (last7 days)	Overdue (Last 30 days)	Total Open Brais and Actions	CA Avg Age Callective	CAAvg Age@) Savara	CA Average Age (e) High 409 (93)	CA Average Age (#) Elevased	CA Average Age (#) Guarded	CA Average Age (#) Low 213 (622)	Long Tem CAs (#)
Overall Station Performance	4	99	8	81 (15)		54	3	1675		606 (10)		285 (122)	226 (180)		
Responsible Org	-	-					_	_			-	$\vdash$		_	_
Site VP															_
Bus and Strategic Planning Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	17	177	0	0	0	0	286 (7)	0
Licensing Manager	0	N/A	0	NA	1	0	0	31	161	0	594 (1)	0	21 (1)	175 (22)	0
Oversight Manager	0	N/A	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Human Resouce Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	8	252	0	0	0	0	446 (3)	0
Communication Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	2	54	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tane Manager															
Chemistry Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	2	0	93	64	0	187 (2)	103 (10)	15 (2)	70 (24)	0
Mainternance Manager	2	NA	0	68 (2)	2	7		223	75	180(1)	161 (3)	287 (6)	123 (9)	179 (33)	0
Operations Manager	0	88 (1)	1	NA	3	5	1	96	59	0	0	244 (3)	0	162 (10)	0
Production Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	3	0	57	58	0	0	0	63 (2)	102 (7)	0
Rad Protection Manager	0	93(1)	0	90 (1)	0	1	0	8	97	53 (3)	553 (1)	0	0	280 (12)	0
Salety and Health Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	1	126	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ske Engineering Director															
Engine oring Design Manager	-	NA	0	93 (3)	0	9	0	313	294	1243 (3)	250 (5)	418 (36)	391 (48)	309 (157)	0
Engineering Programs Manager	0	NA	0	70 (3)	0	3	0	202	251	481 (2)	504 (21)	268 (21)	238 (55)	203 (83)	0
Engineering Systems Manager	0	89 (2)	4	63 (5)	4	15	0	437	184	33 (1)	356 (51)	219 (35)	164 (30)	216 (160)	0
Sirector Plant Support	$\vdash$	-									-	$\vdash$			-
Emergency Preparedness Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	19	78	0	0	0	0	92 (12)	0
ISC Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	1	0	21	67	0	0	406 (1)	192 (2)	12(1)	0
IT Manager	0	NA	0	NA	0	1	0	22	85	0	0	0	0	109 (11)	0
Performance Improvement Manager	1	NA	0	NA	0	2	0	78	59	0	0	24 (3)	64 (3)	115 (29)	0
Project Manager	0	NA	1	NA	2	2	1	86	148	0	449 (5)	447 (4)	74 (26)	216 (15)	1
Security Manager	0	N/A		NA	0	0	0	8	46	0	0	0	0	48 (5)	0
Training Manager	0	89 (1)	2	94 (1)	0	3	0	102	80	0	466 (4)	200 (3)	52 (3)	99 (28)	0

4/23/2009

PBNP Performance Improvement Measures of Success (04/22/09)

	ROE Avg Time to Complete (last 5)	ROE Quality (last5)	ACEAvg Time to Complete (but 90 clays)	AOE Quality (leat 90 days)	OE Avg Time to Complete (last 90 days)	Extens (last? days)	Overdise (Leat 90 days)	Total Open Byels	Total Open Actions	CA Avg Age Total	CAAvg Age(#) Severe	CA Average Age (#) Migh	OAAverage Age (#) Elevated	OA Average Age (#) Guarded	OA Average Age (#) Low	>365 daya GAs (GAPR)	#Actions Not Risk Ranked	Long Term CAs (F)	Average Age (LTG
BNP Performance	85	90	30 (21)	66 (20)	12 (165)	27	0	101	1260	97	24 (3)	a7 (16)	111 (70)	110 (126)	100 (1000)	96	24	209	567
Hespansiale Urg																			
No VP																			
Bus and Strate gic Planning	NA.	N/A	NA	N/A	14 (1)	0	0	. 0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	. 0	0	N/A
Licensing	NA.	N/A	NA	N/A	19 (1)	0	0	0	7	39	0	0	0	23 (1)	49(5)	0	. 0	7	215
Oversight	NA.	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA	0	0	0	2	56	0	0	0	o	110 (1)	0	0	0	N/A
Human Rescuces	NA.	N/A	NA	N/A	NA	0	0		12	119	0	0	0	0	129(10)	0	2	0	N/A
Communications	NA.	N/A	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	4	56	0	0	0	0	59(3)	0	1	0	N/A
lant Manager																			
Chemistry	NA.	N/A	NA	N/A	12 (5)	2	0	2	25	39	0	0	0	35 (5)	42 (17)	0	1	0	N/A
Maintenance	52 (1)	80 (1)	NA	88 (1)	11 (16)	4	0	7	153	8	0	61 (1)	50(10)			0	14	2	156
Operations	NA.	N/A	98 (1)	73 (2)	13 (24)	1	۰	7	59	3	0	44 (2)	0	90 (8)	67 (49)	0	0	2	204
Production	NA.	N/A	NA.	NA	9 (8)	2	0	1	15	41	0	0	62 (2)	47 (4)	87 (B)	0	1	0	N/A
Had Proposition	NA.	NA	55 (2)	NA	11(7)	0	۰	4	40	8	0	0	0	12 (2)			0	0	N/A
Safety s. Health	NA NA	N/A	NA	N/A	14 (6)	0	0	2	14	92	0	0	0	0	93 (13)	0	1	0	N/A
ile Engineering					Pustams Pro					125	14 (2)	104(8)	199 (50)	116 (73)	126 (394)	29	3	108	601
Engineering Design	NA	N/A	91 (S)	93 (3)		3	0	٠	164	162	0	0	210 (18)	169 (11)	161 (123)	19	1	50	732
Engineering Programs	44 (1)	S7 (1)		66 (1)	9 (10)	0	0		128	69	14 (2)	544(1)	154 (5)	79 (24)	65 (95)	3	0	27	730
Engineering Systems	85 (1)	87 (1)	31 (10)	93 (7)	14 (45)	6	0	36	221	117	0	41(7)	84 (25)	110 (27)	100 (158)	7	2	26	229
roje ets																			
Site Projects	NA.	N/A	NA.	N/A	10 (5)	-	_		26	-	40 (1)	43 (1)	70 (3)	410 (0)	72 (20)			6	425
Power Uprate	NA.	N/A	NA.	96 (1)	10 (6)	1 2	0		60	92 114	40 (1)	69 (1)	70 (5)	419 (2) 165 (5)	119 (48)	5		14	657
Projects Bridneering	NA.	N/A	26 (1)	N/A	12 (3)	0	ö	3	10	94	0	229(1)		0	77 (8)			57	598
Projects digitioning	PRA	1970	26 (1)	1970	12 (3)	0			10			229(1)			33 (37			ar .	296
ire con Plant Support																			
Emergency Propagationess	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA.	0	0		25	110			0	0	110(25)	1		0	N/A
ISC Transplanting	NA.	NA	NA.	800	10 (4)	ŏ	-	i	52	50	ő	42(1)			54 (24)	0	i i	ŏ	NA
IT	Na.	N/A	NA.	94 (1)	2 (4)	0	0		27	60	Ó	0	0	0	69 (27)			0	N/A
FORESTERNICO ESSOCIATIONS	MA	NA	NA	NA	18(11)	Ť	·	- 5	91	91	ó	ŏ	ŏ	94 (2)	96 (84)	i	ě	Ť	577
		85 (1)	NA.	100 (1)	14 (3)	o	0	3	10	30	- O	0	0	0	45(9)		-	0	N/A
Security	24 (1)																		





# **CONFIDENCE IN ACTIONS**

#### **Plant General Manager**

# We understand the DRIVERS for historical weak performance

- CAP was not a focus area of the management team
- Successful programs come from managers who own their CAP performance

#### Values/Beliefs

- Maintained MRCs & CARBs throughout the refueling outage
   7 days/week
- An overdue CAP is shocking (now) vs. routine (then)
- There is a visible difference in quality of products

# "It's the Way We Do Business"



# **Substantive Cross-Cutting Theme Update**

# DOCUMENTATION Aspect H.2.c

Brad Castiglia
Performance Improvement Manager

**Rob Harrsch Operations Manager** 

Tom Vehec Maintenance Manager



# **DOCUMENTATION**

#### **Performance Improvement Manager**

# **Completed Actions**

- Performed pre-work walk-downs to capture procedure issues
- Revised pre-job brief procedure to provide feedback on procedure quality
- Implemented performance indicator for procedure quality
- Training on use of N/A in procedures
- Senior craft ownership of procedures
- Dynamic evaluation activity conducted
- Extended "Coach the Coach" program to lead craft level personnel in Maintenance
  - In the last month Maintenance Leads performed >40 observations
- Training on reverse job briefs



**Performance Improvement Manager** 

# Results - October 2 letter forecasted results in 2Q09

- Procedure revision backlog reduced by 50% in 4Q08; Actual 50% in 4Q08 and 75% in 1Q09
- Satisfactory quality of upgraded procedures to be verified in 2Q09; Actual:
  - -- Only 1 procedure related site level event
  - -- Positive NOS observations on quality
  - -- Low numbers of corrective and temporary procedure change requests
- Workers demonstrating correct behaviors
- Procedure change requests are being prioritized to align with work management process so revisions are complete prior to walk down in the field; observations have shown improved results in work
- PCRs are continuing to be initiated at a healthy rate in 2009

"When the procedure works, we follow it; when it doesn't, we fix it."



#### **Operations Manager**

# **Results – Operations**

- Performed scrub of Operations procedures to identify potential Human Performance error traps, procedure changes initiated for identified issues
- Major upgrade to the Containment Closure Tracking procedure, resulted in significant performance improvement during fall 2008 outage
- Performed detailed review of open Operations Decision Making Issues to ensure threshold and actions are procedurally controlled
- Reduced the number of "Skill of the Craft" activities in Operations to provide additional formality in frequently performed evolutions

## Examples:

- Ice Melt Adjustments
- Minor Turbine Load Adjustments



**Maintenance Manager** 

# **Results - Maintenance**

- Bi-weekly observation roll-ups clearly indicate that workers are demonstrating the correct behavior of stopping when uncertain
- The upgrade of risk significant pump overhaul procedures to date has provided excellent results
- The Lead workers' observations reveal a high level of critical comments
- Craft level ownership of procedures has greatly enhanced procedure quality (Service water, Charging)
- On-Site vendor support of procedure revisions has greatly enhanced the level of detail included in the risk significant pump procedures



**Maintenance Manager** 

# We are still not satisfied -

- Training on revised procedure use and adherence requirements focusing on the mechanics of this process is in progress
- Revision to risk significant maintenance procedures continues
- Procedure quality effectiveness reviews scheduled
- Increased focus on work package quality
- Fleet assessment of corrective actions to be performed by 2Q09



# CONFIDENCE IN ACTIONS TAKEN Plant General Manager

- Values: Culture changed to stop and address procedure deficiencies
- Process improved to be more effective and efficient encouraging more PCRs
- Observations by outside organizations, such as INPO, have been favorable



# **SAFETY CULTURE**

Larry Meyer
Site Vice President

Becky Deuel
Nuclear Safety Culture
Improvement Team Member



# **CONFIRMATORY ORDER**

# **Completed Actions**

As committed in the November 15, 2008, update, all actions have been completed and sustainability measures have been implemented.

- All "Quick Hitters" were completed by December 15, 2008
- Communications Action Plan
  - Crucial Conversations training was completed in January 2009
- Knowledge Transfer/Succession Planning
  - Staffing/Knowledge Retention/Succession Plans were implemented
- RP Resources
  - Departmental staffing completed
- Communicating Status of Equipment
  - Top 10 Equipment List rolled out



# **CONFIRMATORY ORDER**

# **Remaining Actions**

- Effectiveness review of overall SCWE Order actions to be completed by May 15, 2009
- Monitoring of actions will continue



# **CULTURE SURVEY**

- Evaluation and Contemplated Actions Submitted to NRC on December 22, 2008
- Numerous actions taken promptly to address key areas illuminated by survey:
  - Staffing/Workload
  - Confidence in Corrective Action Program (CAP)
  - Leadership Effectiveness
  - Balancing Safety and Production
- Since Then:
  - Contemplated Actions are On Track
  - Staffing/Workload Low Value Added Work Reduction Program
  - CAP
    - -- Reduction of Backlogs and continued Strengthening of CAP
    - -- Personnel are getting feedback on their CAPs
  - Leadership Effectiveness Established Team with Lateral Integration



# **CULTURE SURVEYS**

# **Actions in Progress**

- Outlier Departments have taken action
  - Procedures & Document Control
  - Performance Improvement
  - Operations
  - Maintenance
  - Supply Chain
  - Radiation Protection
  - Information Management
  - Emergency Preparedness
- An independent assessment of actions will be performed by June 30, 2009



# **CULTURE SURVEYS**

## Results

- "Walking Around" feedback indicates "cautious optimism" is accumulating
- PI&R Inspection concluded the positive results regarding SCWE
- INPO Organizational Effectiveness survey results



# **CONFIDENCE IN ACTION TAKEN**

- We have an effective structure
- We understand the drivers
- We have reorganized the safety culture improvement team



# WE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURE



# SAFETY CULTURE

# We Understand and are Addressing the Drivers

# Imbalance Between Staffing and Workload

- Site staffing levels
- Priorities
- Low value work

#### CAP Effectiveness

- Leadership focus
- Feedback/Communications
- Backlog of issues

## Leadership Effectiveness

- Leadership instability
- Leadership availability
- Leadership accountability and engagement
- Vertical/lateral alignment

# Balance Between Production & Safety

- Leadership messages
- Outage performance
- Corporate influence
- Core values



# **NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE IMPROVEMENT TEAM**

- New Members
- New Focus
  - NSCIT members assigned to each Outlier Dept
  - More presence in the field
- New Meeting Agenda
  - What is happening?
  - Is it effective?
- New Outlook
- Conclusions





Monday, March 16, 2009

# **Nuclear News**

News for the employees at POINT BEACH

#### What's Inside

Engineering in Action: Engineering Recovery Plan Implemented Page 3

Service Anniversaries
Page 4

Comings & Goings
Page 4

# Have an idea for Nuclear News?

Nuclear News will be published three times a week on Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

Please e-mail your stories to **Laura Drida** or **Sara Cassidy**for the next publication.

# What is the Role of the Safety Culture Improvement Team? Providing Oversight & Championing The Cause A Message from Larry

How much do you know about the Nuclear Safety Culture Improvement Team (NSCIT)? Maybe you didn't even know that the site had such a team, but we do and the team has made some solid strides in improving our overall nuclear safety culture.

When I first arrived on site, I spent a number of Saturdays reviewing the action plans and initiatives taken in response to the various safety culture surveys and was disappointed to learn that we had not really penetrated this area very well. I heard there was a safety culture improvement team and was surprised to learn that most of the actions for improving safety



Site Vice President Larry Meyer thanks NSCIT co-chair Steve Aerts for his contribution.

culture had, frankly, been abdicated to the team. To me this is a cop out. The line department managers need to be fully engaged and accountable for driving cultural improvements. Let me just say that the team should not have been in that role – it was and is senior management's job to ensure the health of the site's nuclear safety culture and ensure the appropriate actions are being taken.

As a result, we have redefined the roles and responsibilities of the team, to turn them from being responsible for executing the improvement plan actions to providing oversight and championing the cause. First, **Providing Oversight**—by this I mean the team will be the group in the field gauging the actions already taken and determining if they are making any difference in the work group. Were the actions done? Did they have a beneficial impact? Is anything missing? An oversight role also empowers the team to suggest new actions to department managers to more effectively improve nuclear safety culture. The oversight role provides me with assurance that station workers are watching to ensure our actions are really doing something, and not just on paper. In a way, it allows us to have the workers hold the managers accountable in a healthy way for doing the right thing.

The other role of the team in to **Champion the Cause** As champions of nuclear safety, the team can help departments improve their communication practices and gain input into what's working and where we can improve existing plans. A champion, in this sense, supports the both the line management and the employees to make improvements in nuclear safety culture.



Nuclear News March 16, 2009

#### What is the Role of the Safety Culture Improvement Team? (Cont'd from page 1)

I see the team members for example as key spokespeople for our improvement initiatives, as well as acting on behalf of the workforce to drive new issues. In this area, another role is for the team members to be very involved with the 2Cs meeting to ensure they are effective and that issues receive follow-up.

#### So what kind of results have we seen so far?

In the areas of staffing and work load, which was a major focus area out of the 2008 nuclear safety culture survey, we've filled key positions in the site leadership team and increased staffing levels across the site, including the operations pipeline. Since the survey execution, many new hires have been added to the team and, at present, the site has 650 full-time employees. The site continues to actively recruit for the best, most-qualified candidates. But, addressing this equation does not mean just hiring people, it also means we should stop doing work that does not add value.

As far as reducing work load, we've embarked on a low-value work reduction initiative. While this initiative is still in the infancy stage, there area examples of low-value work that has been eliminated. Examples include:

- Chemistry has eliminated 10 hours per week of surveillance testing by moving to standard testing frequencies.
- Departments have used the alternate qualification process to allow personnel from other FPL sites to perform work at Point Beach.
- The site has reduced the duration of or eliminated some meetings.
- Editorial procedure changes can now be done with minimal reviews.
- Some low-value system health reports were eliminated or incorporated into other reports.

The third leg of this equation, after hiring and eliminating low value added work, is prioritizing our effort so that we are working on the most important things. The site has been pursuing repairs to long-standing equipment issues, through prioritization—such as of the Top 10 Equipment and the operational concerns lists. Examples include:

- Repairing the radiation monitoring system, also known as RMS, so that all monitors are now functional
- Overhauls to the diesel generator air dryers and updating the preventive maintenance to keep them running.
- Purchasing new lab equipment for Chemistry to replace obsolete or failing equipment.

Additional actions are still being worked at the site and department levels. Next week, we will be rolling out where we are in terms of nuclear safety culture from a site perspective. I'd like to thank the NSCIT for their hard work in making our plant a little better every day.





**III 2** 

# CONCLUSIONS

- PBNP has done what we said we were going to do; closure effectiveness measures were met ahead of schedule
- PBNP has confidence that our actions are more effective and sustainable
  - Drivers are understood
  - Organizational capacity exists to address the causes
  - Oversight will ensure fixes remain in place
  - Approach to recovery focuses on sustainability





# **QUESTIONS**



# **CLOSING REMARKS**

Larry Meyer
Site Vice President