



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 27, 2009

Vice President, Operations  
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.  
Indian Point Energy Center  
450 Broadway, GSB  
P.O. Box 249  
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249

SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: ALLOWABLE COMPLETION TIME FOR OFFSITE  
ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES (TAC NO. MD9348)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 260 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated July 30, 2008, as supplemented by letters dated February 2 and May 7, 2009.

The amendment revises the TSs by allowing a one-time extension to TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.4, to support replacement of a cooling oil pump on the station auxiliary transformer. Specifically, the Completion Time to restore operability of the offsite circuit associated with the station auxiliary transformer would be extended from 72 hours to 144 hours.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John P. Boska".

John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch I-1  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-247

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 260 to DPR-26
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ENERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 2, LLC

ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-247

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 260  
License No. DPR-26

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated July 30, 2008, as supplemented on February 2 and May 7, 2009, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 260, are hereby incorporated in the license. ENO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard V. Guzman, Acting Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch I-1  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the License and  
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 27, 2009

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 260

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

DOCKET NO. 50-247

Replace the following page of the License with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page  
3

Insert Page  
3

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page  
3.8.1-2

Insert Page  
3.8.1-2

instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

- (4) ENO pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; Amdt. 42  
10-17-78
- (5) ENO pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility. Amdt. 220  
09-06-01

C. This amended license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level

ENO is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 3216 megawatts thermal. Amdt. 241  
10-27-04

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 260, are hereby incorporated in the license. ENO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3) The following conditions relate to the amendment approving the conversion to Improved Standard Technical Specifications:

- 1. This amendment authorizes the relocation of certain Technical Specification requirements and detailed information to licensee-controlled documents as described in Table R, "Relocated Technical Specifications from the CTS," and Table LA, "Removed Details and Less Restrictive Administrative Changes to the CTS" attached to the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation enclosed with this amendment. The relocation of requirements and detailed information shall be completed on or before the implementation of this amendment.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p style="text-align: center;">-----  <b>- NOTE -</b>                      Only required if 13.8 kV offsite circuit is supplying 6.9 kV bus 5 or 6 and the Unit Auxiliary Transformer is supplying 6.9 kV bus 1, 2, 3 or 4.                      -----</p> <p>A.2      Verify automatic transfer of 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 to 6.9 kV bus 5 and 6 is disabled.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.3      Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power automatically available inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.4      Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 8 hours thereafter</p> <p>24 hours from discovery of no automatically available offsite power to one train concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s).</p> <p>72 hours</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>144 hours for a one time maintenance outage on the Station Auxiliary Transformer to be completed as conditions allow in 2009.</p>
<p>B. One DG inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1      Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuits.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 8 hours thereafter</p>



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 260 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-247

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 30, 2008, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML082180351, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (Entergy or the licensee) requested a license amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2). The proposed change would be a change to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 to allow a one-time extension to the Completion Time of Required Action A.4 to support replacement of an oil pump for the station auxiliary transformer (SAT). The Completion Time to restore operability of the offsite circuit associated with the SAT would be extended from 72 hours to 144 hours. This would allow sufficient time (with contingencies) to complete the cooling oil pump replacement. In response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's request for additional information, the licensee provided additional information in its letters dated February 2, ADAMS Accession No. ML090490835, and May 7, 2009, ADAMS Accession No. ML091390292. The supplemental letters dated February 2 and May 7, 2009, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The following explains the applicability of General Design Criteria (GDC) for IP2. The construction permit for IP2 was issued by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on October 14, 1966, and the operating license was issued on September 28, 1973. The plant GDC are listed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 1.3, "General Design Criteria", with more details given in the applicable UFSAR sections. The AEC published the final rule that added Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," in the *Federal Register* (36 FR 3255) on February 20, 1971, with the rule effective on May 21, 1971. In accordance with an NRC staff requirements memorandum from S. J. Chilk to J. M. Taylor, "SECY-92-223 - Resolution of Deviations Identified During the Systematic Evaluation Program," dated September 18, 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003763736), the Commission decided not to apply the Appendix A GDC to plants with construction permits issued prior to May 21, 1971. Therefore, the GDC which constitute the licensing bases for IP2 are those in the UFSAR.

As discussed in the UFSAR, the licensees for IP2 have made some changes to the facilities over the life of the unit that committed to some of the GDCs from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The extent to which the Appendix A GDC have been invoked can be found in specific sections of the UFSAR and in other IP2 licensing basis documentation, such as license amendments.

Based on a review of UFSAR Section 8.1, the NRC staff identified the following UFSAR GDC as being applicable to the proposed amendment:

An emergency power source shall be provided and designed with adequate independency, redundancy, capacity, and testability to permit the functioning of the engineered safety features and protection systems required to avoid undue risk to the health and safety of the public. This power source shall provide this capacity assuming a failure of a single component (GDC 39 and GDC 24).

UFSAR Section 8.1.2 provides a discussion of the extent to which the IP2 design complies with Criteria 17 and 18 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."<sup>1,2</sup>

The following NRC requirements are also applicable to the NRC staff's review of the licensee's amendment request:

Paragraph 50.36(c)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR, "Technical specifications," requires that "[a] technical specification limiting condition for operation [LCO] of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the [criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D)]."

Paragraph 50.36(c)(3) of 10 CFR, "Technical specifications," requires that TSs include surveillance requirements (SRs), which "are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met."

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<sup>1</sup> 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, "Electric power systems," states, in part, that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components that are important to safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. The offsite power system is required to be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of loss of power from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded (a delayed access circuit available in sufficient time for safe shutdown satisfies this provision). One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds (immediate access circuit) following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained.

<sup>2</sup> GDC-18, "Inspection and testing of electric power systems," states that electric power systems that are important to safety must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing.

### 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

#### 3.1 Description of Offsite Power System

Offsite power is required by the TSs to be supplied from the offsite transmission network to the onsite alternating current electrical power distribution system by two qualified circuits. These two qualified circuits are a 138 kilovolt (kV) circuit to the SAT and a 138 kV/13.8 kV circuit to the gas turbine autotransformer. The 138 kV/SAT circuit consists of a 138 kV line from the Buchanan Substation to the SAT at the plant. The SAT then feeds the plant 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6. This 138 kV/SAT circuit is capable of supplying all IP2 loads including the four operating reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and engineered safety features (ESF) loads. The 138 kV/13.8 kV circuit consists of two 138 kV/13.8 kV transformers fed from a 138 kV bus in the Buchanan Substation. These two 13.8 kV transformers feed two 13.8 kV circuits which route power from the Buchanan Substation to the plant. One 13.8 kV circuit is primarily for IP2 and one is primarily for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3), although they can be cross-connected. Each 13.8 kV circuit then feeds a 13.8 kV/6.9 kV autotransformer (one at IP2 and one at IP3) which can feed the plant 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6. During normal operations, offsite power supplies 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, fed from the 138 kV/SAT offsite circuit. The 138 kV/SAT offsite circuit, in this lineup, satisfies the statement in GDC 17 that at least one of the two required circuits can, within a few seconds, provide power to safety-related equipment following a LOCA. The 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite circuit is considered a delayed access circuit in the normal lineup because operator action is required to supply offsite power to the plant 6.9 kV buses (5 and 6). This delayed access circuit is acceptable per GDC 17.

The plant non-safety power distribution system consists of 6.9 kV buses 1 thru 6. The safety-related 480 V safeguards buses are supplied from station service transformers (SSTs) via the 6.9 kV buses, which are normally supplied by the 138 kV/SAT offsite circuit. The 6.9 kV buses can also be supplied by the 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite circuit. In the normal plant lineup, 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 receive power from the main generator via the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT). Following a main generator trip in normal lineup, 6.9 kV buses 1 and 2 will auto transfer (fast bus transfer) to 6.9 kV bus 5, and 6.9 kV buses 3 and 4 will auto transfer (fast bus transfer) to 6.9 kV bus 6 in order to receive offsite power from the 138 kV/SAT circuit. When the 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite circuit is supplying 6.9 kV bus 5 or 6 as the immediate offsite circuit, the fast bus transfer is taken out of service (per TS 3.8.1) due to the inability of the autotransformer to power all the loads (e.g., four RCPs).

The onsite safety-related safeguards alternating current (AC) Power Distribution System consists of four 480 V safeguards power buses 5A, 6A, 2A, and 3A. The onsite emergency power system consists of three 480 V diesel generators (DGs) with one of the three DGs dedicated to each of the three safeguards power trains. Safeguards power train 5A (480 V bus 5A) is supported by DG 21; safeguards power train 6A (480 V bus 6A) is supported by DG 23; and safeguards power train 2A/3A (480 V buses 2A and 3A) is supported by DG 22. These DGs are continuously rated at 1750 kilowatt (kW) and each one can supply the necessary safe shutdown equipment during a loss of offsite power, per the UFSAR. However, two of the three safeguards power trains are needed to fulfill the safety functions for accident conditions. The operation of IP2 during this maintenance evolution (with the 138 kV/SAT offsite circuit unavailable) will consist of the 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite circuit in service as the immediate offsite circuit supplying 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, which in turn will be supplying 480 V safeguards buses 5A and 6A, respectively, via the 6.9 kV/480 V SSTs. The 480 V safeguards buses 2A and 3A

will be fed by 6.9 kV buses 2 and 3, respectively, via their SSTs, with buses 2 and 3 supplied from the station UAT. With a main generator or reactor trip, 480 V safeguards buses 2A and 3A would de-energize (since auto-bus transfers are disabled in this line-up per TS 3.8.1) and operators would have to manually align offsite power after verifying load shedding on 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4. When 480 V buses 2A and 3A de-energize, DG-22 will automatically start. Operators could then close the DG output breakers to re-energize buses 2A and 3A if desired.

### 3.2 Evaluation of Proposed Change

The one-time TS change is requested to allow replacement of a failed SAT cooling oil pump in plant modes 1, 2, 3, or 4. Otherwise the plant would have to be shut down and cooled to 200 °F to perform the maintenance. The next refueling outage is scheduled for spring 2010, but replacement of the oil pump is desired before then for reliability reasons. The cooling oil pump replacement requires removal of the SAT from service, which makes one of the offsite power circuits, the 138 kV/SAT power circuit, inoperable. During the maintenance, the plant will be operating on the remaining operable 138 kV/13.8 kV power circuit.

Normally there are two banks of cooling in operation on the SAT. Each bank consists of one cooling oil pump and three cooling fans. One bank is in constant operation and is called the lead bank. The second bank, known as the lagging bank, starts when the local hot spot temperature detector senses a temperature of 75 °C. The local hot spot temperature detector is monitoring winding temperature for hot spots. In the current degraded condition of the SAT cooling system, a local hot spot temperature of 75°C or higher will not be reduced since the second bank of cooling is not available, which could result in accelerated degradation to the transformer winding insulation. Loss of the lead bank with the lagging bank already out of service would require shutdown of the transformer.

LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.4 currently requires, in part, that if one required offsite power circuit (in this case, SAT) is inoperable, the required offsite circuit be restored to operable status within 72 hours. A plant shutdown is required if the second offsite circuit is not restored to operable status within 72 hours. The proposed change is to allow a one-time extension to TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.4, to support replacement of one of the SAT cooling oil pumps in plant modes 1, 2, 3, or 4. Specifically, the Completion Time to restore operability of the offsite circuit associated with the SAT would be extended from 72 hours to 144 hours. The licensee states that this would allow sufficient time (with contingencies) to complete the cooling oil pump replacement.

During its review, the NRC staff evaluated the offsite circuit lineup described in the licensee's license amendment request (LAR), and the supplemental information supplied by the licensee in its letter dated February 2, 2009. The licensee stated in its letter of February 2, 2009, that the 138 kV/13.8 kV circuits, based on design calculations, have the capacity to supply all safety loads necessary for mitigating design-basis accidents, and are immediately available in the proposed lineup (one circuit for IP2 and one for IP3). This conforms with TS 3.8.1 and the GDC 17 statement on the immediate access circuit. Therefore, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the proposed lineup (138 kV/SAT circuit out of service, 138 kV/13.8 kV circuit in service as the immediate access circuit for IP2) to be used during this evolution is acceptable.

The NRC staff evaluated the scope of work with respect to the requested TS Completion Time in terms of reasonable allowances for contingencies during implementation. In its response of

February 2, 2009, ADAMS Accession No. ML090490835, the licensee provided detailed work schedule information taking into account the age of the transformer, the condition of the second oil pump and the unpredictability of the weather. The NRC staff finds that the 144-hour duration is reasonable to perform the work, since the licensee has adequately planned the work while properly accounting for uncertainties.

The NRC staff evaluated the compensatory measures identified in the LAR with respect to their adequacy in light of the unavailability of the 13.8 kV/SAT offsite circuit associated with the SAT during this evolution. The actions specified are as follows:

- Equipment in the TS relied upon for postulated transients and accidents will be administratively controlled and protected to ensure the equipment remains operable and available for the duration of the planned SAT outage. This equipment includes the EDGs, the turbine driven and motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, Service water, Component cooling water, etc. Protection includes any planned activities to remove TS equipment from service for testing and/or maintenance.
- Procedures will be developed and issued for using the Unit 3 Appendix R diesel and the Unit 2 Appendix R/SBO [station blackout] diesel as backup power supplies for the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. The feeder 13W93 with its autotransformer, the Unit 3 Appendix R diesel and the Unit 2 Appendix R/SBO diesel will be kept available as backup power supplies.
- Operations will restrict plant work activities with the potential to create a plant trip. This includes hot work limitations [welding].
- Equipment used during normal operation that is not in TS but would be useful for any transient or accident (e.g., charging pumps, primary water pumps), will be powered from buses 5A and 6A to the extent feasible. This eliminates the potential for that equipment to be stripped.
- During this extended outage time all activity in the switchyards will be closely monitored and controlled. There will be no elective switchyard work (Consolidated Edison [the transmission system owner] will be contacted to assure they are not performing elective work in the switchyard) that could challenge the operability of the 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite power supply.
- The Grid operator will be consulted regarding grid stability prior to removal of the SAT from service.
- The work planning will consider weather conditions. Work planning will also consider the weather forecast and avoid times when there will be a strain on the grid. There will be discussions with the grid operator. Similarly, the work will not be planned during the periods when severe weather is forecast. The work is projected to be complete in less than three days but may take up to six days so the work window is well within the short term weather forecast window.

- Alternate power sources will be kept available for the duration while the SAT is inoperable. The alternate power sources are as follows:
  1. If the loss of 13.8 kV power occurs due to a failure of the autotransformer associated with preferred feeder 13W92, then feeder 13W93 with its autotransformer is available as a backup source of offsite power. There are procedural controls for the use of one 13.8 kV feeder for both units. Power can be restored in 60 minutes.
  2. The Emergency Diesel Generators, which normally provide on-site AC power with a loss of offsite power, will be maintained operable.
  3. The Unit 3 Appendix R diesel is available to supply power to the Unit 2 480 V buses. This diesel normally supplies 2,500 kW at 6.9 kV and can be started and manually load sequenced within 60 minutes. The Unit 3 Appendix R diesel can be aligned to supply power to the 6.9 kV buses 5 or 6 which can be routed to any of the 480 volt buses. Procedural controls will be put in place governing the operation and electrical alignment needed to accomplish this function.
  4. The Unit 2 Station Blackout/Appendix R diesel generator (SBO/App R DG) is available to supply power to the Unit 2 480 V buses. The Unit 2 SBO/App R DG supplies 2,435 kW at 13.8 kV and can be started and manually load sequenced within 60 minutes. The Unit 2 SBO/App R DG can be aligned to supply power through SBO Transformer 13.8 kV - 6.9 kV to the 6.9 kV buses 5 or 6 which can be routed to any of the 480 volt buses. Procedural controls will be put in place governing the operation and electrical alignment needed to accomplish this function.

In the supplemental letter dated February 2, 2009, the licensee stated that vital direct current (DC) systems were included in TS systems to be protected and controlled as part of the compensatory measures during this evolution. In addition, the licensee stated that the IP3 Appendix R Diesel will have procedures to align it to IP2 safety-related buses within an hour and that it has the capacity, based on design calculations, to supply the necessary safe shutdown loads for IP2. Given that one safety-grade DG (continuously rated 1750 kW) can supply the necessary safe shutdown equipment, the NRC staff concludes that the IP3 Appendix R diesel (continuously rated at 2500 kW) has the capacity and availability (available within 1 hour) to serve as a backup to the delayed access offsite source which will not be available because of the SAT being out of service. In addition, in a letter from the licensee dated May 7, 2009, the licensee confirmed that the 138 kV/13.8 kV transformers in the Buchanan Substation (supplies to the 138 kV/13.8 kV offsite circuits) will be administratively controlled and protected to ensure availability throughout the SAT outage.

Based on maintaining operability of necessary systems, controlling the substation maintenance and operation, coordination with the grid operator concerning grid reliability, using weather forecasting information and the added availability of the IP3 Appendix R DG as an additional delayed access AC source, the NRC staff finds that the proposed compensatory measures provide adequate assurance that the unavailability of the second offsite circuit during the extended Completion Time of Required Action A.4 of TS 3.8.1 will be adequately mitigated.

The NRC staff finds that there are sufficient sources of AC power available to compensate for the extended outage on the 138 kV/SAT circuit. The licensee's regulatory commitments to implement compensatory measures provide assurance of the availability of the remaining sources of AC power during the extended Completion Time. This will provide reasonable assurance of the availability of AC power to the plant safety systems during the extended Completion Time of Required Action A.4 of TS 3.8.1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (73 FR 50649). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Kenneth Miller

Date: May 27, 2009

May 27, 2009

Vice President, Operations  
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.  
Indian Point Energy Center  
450 Broadway, GSB  
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Buchanan, NY 10511-0249

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

*/ra/*

John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch I-1  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-247

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ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML091030404

\*See memo dated 3/27/09

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