UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

March 27, 2009

Mr. Kevin Bronson
Site Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
600 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, MA 02360-5508

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2009006

Dear Mr. Bronson:

On February 26, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 26, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. On the basis of the samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that Entergy was effective in identifying, evaluating and resolving problems. The team determined that Entergy's staff identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Entergy's staff generally prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with their safety significance and implemented timely, effective corrective actions. The team did, however, identify several examples of minor safety significance involving less than adequate evaluation or documentation of issues within the corrective action program.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available

electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Raymond J. Powell, Chief
Technical Support & Assessment Branch
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-293
License No. DPR-35

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000293/2009006
w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:
Vice President, Operations, Entergy Nuclear Operations
Vice President, Oversight, Entergy Nuclear Operations
Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Operations
Senior Vice President and COO, Entergy Nuclear Operations
Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations
R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
W. Irwin, Chief, CHP, Radiological Health, Vermont Department of Health
The Honorable Therese Murray
The Honorable Vincent deMacedo
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen
Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen
Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee
Plymouth Civil Defense Director
D. O'Connor, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources
J. Miller, Senior Issues Manager
Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Electric Power Division, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network
W. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer
J. Giarrusso, MEMA, SLO
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of Public Safety

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OFFICE:	RI/DRS		RI/DRP		RI/DRP	
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DATE:	03/20/09		03/26/07		03/27/09	

* See prior concurrence page **OFFICIAL RECORD COPY**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.:	50-293
License No.:	DPR-35
Report No.:	05000293/2009006
Licensee:	Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Facility:	Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Location:	600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360
Dates:	February 9 through February 26, 2009
Team Leader:	Frank Arner, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety
Inspectors:	Brian Smith, Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) Josephine Ambrosini, Project Engineer, DRP Sammy McCarver, Project Engineer, DRP
Approved by:	Raymond J. Powell, Chief Technical Support & Assessment Branch Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000293/2009-006; 02/09/2008 – 02/26/2009; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems.

This team inspection was performed by three NRC regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, December 2006.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team concluded that Entergy was effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Pilgrim personnel identified problems and entered them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) at a low threshold, and had taken actions to address previous NRC findings. The team determined that Entergy generally screened issues appropriately for operability and reportability, and prioritized issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems. Causal analyses appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The team determined that corrective actions addressed the identified causes and were typically implemented in a timely manner. However, the team noted several examples of minor safety significance involving less than adequate evaluation or documentation of issues within the corrective action program and one minor issue where corrective actions had not been successful in resolving an issue. These issues were entered into Entergy's CAP for resolution during the inspection.

Entergy's audits and self-assessments reviewed by the inspectors were sufficiently thorough and probing. The team concluded that Entergy adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience. Based on interviews, observations of plant activities, and reviews of the CAP and the Employees Concerns Program (ECP), the team determined that site personnel were willing to raise safety issues and to document them in the CAP.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) (71152B)

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the procedures that describe Entergy's CAP at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Entergy personnel identified problems by initiating condition reports (CRs) for conditions adverse to quality, plant equipment deficiencies, industrial or radiological safety concerns, or other significant issues. Condition reports are subsequently screened for operability, categorized by significance level (A most significant, through D, less significant), and assigned to personnel for evaluation and resolution or trending.

The team evaluated the process for assigning and tracking issues to ensure that issues were screened for operability and reportability, prioritized for evaluation and resolution in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance, and tracked to identify adverse trends and repetitive issues. In addition, the team interviewed plant staff and management to determine their understanding of, and involvement with, the CAP.

The team reviewed CRs selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to determine if site personnel properly identified, characterized, and entered problems into the CAP for evaluation and resolution. The team selected items from functional areas that included chemistry, emergency preparedness, engineering, maintenance, operations, physical security, radiation safety, and oversight programs to ensure that Entergy appropriately addressed problems identified in these functional areas. The team selected a risk-informed sample of CRs that had been issued since the last NRC PI&R inspection conducted in June 2007. Risk insights from the station's risk analyses were considered to focus the sample selection and plant walkdowns on risk-significant systems and components. The corrective action review was expanded to five years for evaluation of identified concerns within CRs relative to the residual heat removal (RHR) system and the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system.

The team selected items from various processes at Pilgrim to verify that they were appropriately considered for entry into the CAP. Specifically, the team reviewed a sample of engineering requests, both open and closed, operator workarounds, operability determinations, system health reports, equipment problem lists, work orders (WOs), and issues entered into the employee concerns program (ECP). In addition, the team reviewed a sample of plant log entries to determine whether problems described in the logs were entered into the CAP.

The team reviewed CRs listed in the Attachment to this report to assess whether Entergy personnel adequately evaluated and prioritized identified issues. The CRs reviewed encompassed the full range of evaluations, including root cause analyses, apparent cause

evaluations, and common cause analyses. A sample of CRs that were assigned lower levels of significance which did not include formal cause evaluations were also reviewed by the team to ensure they were appropriately classified. The team's review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The team assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and identified appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. As part of this review, the team interviewed various station personnel to fully understand details within the evaluations and proposed and completed corrective actions. The team observed several condition review group (CRG) meetings in which Entergy personnel reviewed new CRs for prioritization and assignment. Further, the team reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected CRs to verify these specific reviews adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of problems.

The team's review of CRs also focused on the associated corrective actions in order to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The team reviewed CRs for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The team reviewed Entergy's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. Lastly, the team reviewed CRs associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings since the last PI&R inspection in June 2007 to determine whether Entergy personnel properly evaluated and resolved the issues. Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Assessment

Identification of Issues

Based on the selected samples reviewed, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel, the team determined that Entergy personnel identified problems and entered them into the CAP at a low threshold. For the issues reviewed, the team noted the problems or concerns had been appropriately documented in enough detail to understand the issues. The team observed managers and supervisors at CRG meetings appropriately questioning and challenging CRs to ensure clarification of the issues. The team determined that Entergy trended equipment and programmatic issues and CR descriptions appropriately included reference to repeat occurrences of issues. The team concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. The team did not identify issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the CAP for evaluation and resolution.

Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The team determined that, in general, Entergy personnel appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problem. CRs were screened for operability and reportability, categorized by significance, and assigned to a department for evaluation and resolution. The CR screening review process considered

human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, and adverse trends during the conduct of reviews.

Condition report issues were categorized for evaluation and resolution commensurate with the significance of the issues. Based on the sample of CRs reviewed, the guidance provided by the Entergy implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of the issues. Operability and reportability determinations were performed when conditions warranted and the evaluations generally supported the conclusions. Causal analyses appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. During this inspection, the team noted that Entergy's root cause analyses were thorough, and corrective and preventive actions addressed the identified causes. Additionally, the identified causes were well supported.

However, there were several examples of less than adequate evaluation or documentation of evaluations within the CRs reviewed. The team identified several minor issues or concerns, for example:

- Condition Report 2007-04724 documented a problem with a capacitor within the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatic flow controller. The failure had resulted in the inability to automatically control the flow to its setpoint. In this case the flowrate during a system run had indicated a nominal 2200 gpm with actual flowrate later determined to be estimated around 5400 gpm. The team determined the past operability review had not adequately evaluated how the excessive flowrate would have impacted net positive suction head requirements, vortexing limitations and operation in the manual control mode given the unreliability of flowrate indication. Additionally, a UFSAR postulated transient had not been considered for the adverse impact on minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) margins for the inadvertent HPCI initiation at power event. The team considered the incomplete evaluation to be a minor performance deficiency because it was determined that there was no impact on the capability of the system to perform its required functions. Notwithstanding, the team determined that the past operability evaluation of the capacitor failure had been less than adequate with respect to implementation of EN-OP-104, which requires evaluations to be sufficient to address the capability of equipment to perform their function. Entergy entered this issue into their CAP as CR-PNP-2009-00496.

- Condition Report 2005-00341 documented a condition where the 'B' loop of RHR had elevated temperatures near the injection valve compared to the 'A' loop. The evaluation within the CR credited non-safety related keepfill pressure when determining the margin available to saturation temperature. This did not appear to be well justified considering the keepfill system pressure was not evaluated with respect to its capability to maintain pressure when postulating an accident where keepfill pressure may be lost prior to RHR pump start. The team considered this to be a performance deficiency of minor significance since margin was still available and there was no impact on system function. Entergy entered the issue into their CAP as CR-PNP-2009-00651.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The team concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, corrective actions were identified to prevent recurrence. The team concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs reviewed since the last PI&R inspection were timely and effective. The team did identify one example where corrective actions were not effective in addressing an issue. The team determined that ineffective corrective actions have been implemented with respect to ensuring reliability of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) ventilation damper position indication. The team noted that the EDG outside air engine cooling dampers and secondary outside damper position switches have resulted in six alarms since the end of 2007 during EDG surveillance runs. The alarm is common to both EDGs and indicates a damper out of position. The team noted that these position indication switches are not safety-related and have not resulted in any loss of EDG availability and therefore the performance deficiency was of minor safety significance. Notwithstanding this, the team was concerned that if a switch failed to indicate correctly during an unplanned EDG start in response to an event, it would create an additional burden for operators responding to the event. Entergy planned to address this concern within their CAP as CR-PNP-2009-00360.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected a sample of CRs associated with the review of industry operating experience (OE) issues to confirm that Entergy personnel appropriately evaluated the OE information for applicability to Pilgrim and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The team reviewed CR evaluations of OE documents associated with a sample of NRC generic letters and information notices to ensure that Entergy adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their CAP. The team also observed plant activities to determine if industry OE was considered during the performance of routine activities. A list of the documents reviewed is included in the Attachment to this report.

b. Assessment

The team determined that Entergy appropriately considered industry OE information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The team determined that OE was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed that industry OE was routinely discussed and considered during the performance of plant activities. For example, during shift briefing activities, relevant

industry OE was reviewed and discussed before the commencement of shift activities. Additionally, OE was routinely discussed at CRG review meetings.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of Quality Assurance (QA) audits, including a review of several of the findings from the most recent audit of the CAP, and a variety of self-assessments focused on various plant programs. These reviews were performed to determine if problems identified through these assessments were entered into the CAP, when appropriate, and whether corrective actions were initiated to address identified deficiencies. The effectiveness of the audits and assessments was evaluated by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection. A list of documents reviewed is included in the Attachment to this report.

b. Assessment

The team concluded that self-assessments, QA audits, and other assessments were sufficiently critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The team observed that these audits and self-assessments were completed in a thorough manner by personnel knowledgeable in the subject. The audits and self-assessments were completed to a sufficient depth to identify issues that were entered into the CAP for evaluation. Corrective actions associated with the issues were implemented commensurate with their safety significance. Entergy managers evaluated the results and initiated appropriate actions to focus on areas identified for improvement.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with many station personnel, the team assessed the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at Pilgrim. Specifically, the team interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The team also interviewed the station ECP coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regard to raising concerns. The team reviewed the ECP files to ensure that issues were entered into the CAP when appropriate. The team also reviewed a sample of anonymous CRs to gain insights into the SCWE.

b. Assessment

During interviews, plant staff expressed a willingness to use the CAP to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The team noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP. Based on these limited interviews, the team concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On February 26, 2009, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin Bronson, Site Vice President, and to other members of the Pilgrim staff. The team verified that no proprietary information was documented in the report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

B. Barrus	Control Rod Drive System Engineer
S. Bethay	Director, NSA
G. Bradley	SRV Component Engineer
K. Bronson	Site Vice President
D. Burke	Security Manager
R. Byrne	Sr. Licensing Engineer
B. Carroll	PM Engineer
G. Choquette	RBCCW System Engineer
K. DiMascio	Employee Concerns Program Coordinator
P. Doody	Design Engineer
S. Hudson	EDG System Engineer
J. Keyes	Corrective Action and Assessment Manager
W. Lobo	Sr. Licensing Engineer
L. Loomis	Senior Health Physics/Chemistry Specialist
J. Lynch	Licensing Manager
J. Macdonald	Assistant Operations Manager
W. Mauro	Radiation Protection Supervisor
F. Mulcahy	HPCI System Engineer
J. Priest	Radiation Protection Manager
L. Rayle	Chemistry Supervisor
D. Rydman	RHR System Engineer
R. Smith	General Manager, GMPO
T. Sowdon	Emergency Preparedness Manager
T. White	Design Engineering Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Audits and Self-Assessments

LO-HQNLO-2008-00001-CA-003, 2008 Operating Experience Program Self Assessment, 05-15-2008
LO-PNPLO-2008-00144, Focused Self Assessment, Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program, February 2008
LO-PNPLO-2008-0041, Focused Self Assessment of Preventive Maintenance Optimization July 2008
LO-PNPLO-2007-00071, Focused Self Assessment of Operability Determinations, August 2006 & October 2007
LO-08-0013, Component Design Baseline Inspection assessment, Engineering
LO-08-0072, Chemistry QA/QC, July 25, 2008
QA-02-2008-PNP-01, Quality Assurance Audit Report, Chemistry
QA-04-2008-PNP-01, Quality Assurance Engineering Audit
QA-06-2007-PNP-01, Quality Assurance Audit Report, Effluent and Environment Monitoring
QA-07-2008-PNP-01, Quality Assurance Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness Program
QA-10-2008-PNP-01, Quality Assurance Audit Report, Maintenance, June 2008

Condition Reports

2004-02010	2007-00398	2007-02161	2007-04609
2005-01136	2007-00425	2007-02291	2007-04724
2005-02216	2007-00425	2007-02326	2007-04740
2005-02245	2007-00703	2007-02487	2008-00020
2005-02373	2007-00844	2007-02705	2008-00067
2005-03073	2007-00949	2007-02919	2008-00075
2005-03643	2007-01089	2007-03096	2008-00090
2006-01802	2007-01130	2007-03327	2008-00095
2006-02282	2007-01144	2007-03443	2008-00173
2006-03701	2007-01169	2007-03447	2008-00223
2007-00012	2007-01363	2007-03497	2008-00249
2007-00012	2007-01503	2007-03507	2008-00276
2007-00023	2007-01509	2007-03521	2008-00294
2007-00025	2007-01510	2007-03677	2008-00295
2007-00036	2007-01567	2007-03685	2008-00318
2007-00046	2007-01568	2007-03693	2008-00323
2007-00081	2007-01570	2007-03880	2008-00335
2007-00160	2007-01599	2007-03914	2008-00350
2007-00218	2007-01783	2007-04161	2008-00352
2007-00356	2007-01880	2007-04189	2008-00365
2007-00359	2007-01894	2007-04192	2008-00368
2007-00386	2007-02092	2007-04324	2008-00595

2008-00856	2008-01915	2008-03288	2009-00502*
2008-01044	2008-01970	2008-03344	2009-00512*
2008-01080	2008-01995	2008-03436	2009-00651*
2008-01111	2008-02111	2008-03474	
2008-01132	2008-02296	2008-03556	
2008-01201	2008-02353	2008-03575	
2008-01219	2008-02364	2008-03584	
2008-01259	2008-02420	2008-03585	
2008-01354	2008-02430	2008-03611	
2008-01497	2008-02442	2008-03685	
2008-01527	2008-02563	2008-03736	
2008-01602	2008-02564	2008-03741	
2008-01604	2008-02565	2008-03818	
2008-01619	2008-02569	2008-03859	
2008-01641	2008-02578	2008-03879	
2008-01669	2008-02669	2008-03911	
2008-01675	2008-02939	2009-00043	
2008-01729	2008-03011	2009-00117	
2008-01788	2008-03026	2009-00360	
2008-01801	2008-03154	2009-00496*	

*NRC Identified During Inspection

Drawings
M67-96, Diesel Generator Ventilation System Drawing, Rev. E7
M-191, Temperature and Moisture Elements Inside Drywell, Rev. 1
M-243, HPCI System P&ID, Rev. 51
M-280, Diesel Generator Ventilation System Drawing, Rev. 23
M-289, Diesel Generator Ventilation System Drawing, Rev. E17

ECP Program Review
ECP Closed Investigations Log Review, January 2009
Employee Concerns Program, Volume 1, Issue 5, December 2008

Evaluations
Apparent Cause Evaluation, HPCI Flow Controller Capacitor Failure, CR 07-04724
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Dose Rate Alarms, CR 08-3276
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Reactor Building Exhaust Fans Without Tagout, CR 08-3036
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Inspection and Testing SCBA Equipment, CR 08-2578
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Master Surveillance Tracking Program, CR 08-2692
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Failures Emergency Light Batteries, CR 08-1889
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Upper Elevation Drywell Temperatures, CR 08-1393
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Electronic Dosimeters, CR 08-2353
Apparent Cause Evaluation, A EDG Fuel Oil Leak, CR 08-852

Apparent Cause Evaluation, A EDG KW swings, CR 08-1201
Apparent Cause Evaluation, Declining Trend in Component Mispositioning, CR 08-1757
Apparent Cause Evaluation, C SSW Pump High Vibration, CR 08-3736
Apparent Cause Evaluation, RCIC System Not Reach Rated Flow, CR 08-3356
Root Cause Analysis Report, Evaluation of Personnel Contamination Event, CR 07-3880, 10/06/2007
Root Cause Analysis Report, Manual Turbine Trip due to Increasing Vibration, CR 08-1117 05/05/2008
Root Cause Analysis Report, Low Vacuum Turbine Trip and Scram, CR 07-3231, 07/31/2007
Root Cause Analysis Report, A Emergency Diesel Generator KW, CR 07-1229, 05/02/2007
Root Cause Analysis Report, Unplanned EDG A Inoperability, CR 08-2442, 09/06/2008
Root Cause Analysis Report, Untimely Evaluation of Plant Intake Low Level Transient CR 08-1527, 06/09/2008
Root Cause Analysis Report, RCIC Controller Aged Capacitors Lead to Degraded Controller CR 08-3344, 11/17/2008

Licensed Event Report
LER-2007-002-00, EDG Kilowatt Power Oscillations

Miscellaneous
Control Room Logs, February 2,10&11, 2009
Corrective Action Plan for Emergency Light Unit System, Rev. 5
Current Listing of Security Post Orders
Daily Plant Status Report, Top Ten Equipment Reliability Issues, 12/17/2008
Engineering Change 000011356, Bypass Switch, October 2008
Engineering Change 0000005447, Vortex Suppression CST, June, 2008
Engineering Change 5000071098, Modify K-117, October 2008
EPRI Report, Chemistry Monitoring and Control for Fuel Reliability, 2004
MRSSC05, Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Emergency Lighting System, Rev. 1
NRC Information Notice IN-08-020, Failures of MOV Actuator Motors with Magnesium Alloy Rotors
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 2008 Plant Data Review Results, Entergy Corporate Assessments Group
Safety Day 2008 Announcement, What Is The Employee Concerns Program?
SC05-03, Potential to Exceed Low Pressure Technical Specification Safety Limit, March 2005
Synergy Report 2006
System Health Report, Emergency Lights, Third Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Standby Liquid Control System, Third Quarter 2008
System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal System, Second, Third Quarter, 2008
Training Evaluation and Action Requests (TEAR)-PNPS-2008-171
Training Evaluation and Action Requests (TEAR)-PNPS-2008-497

Non-Cited Violations
50-293/07-004-01, 10 CFR 50.65 SSW Exhaust Fan
50-293/07-004-02, TS 5.5.4.c. Rad Effluent
50-293/07-006-01, TS 5.4.1 Inadequate Procedure Lubrication Governor EDG
50-293/08-006-03, License Condition 3.L.b.7

50-293/08-007-02, Inadequate Corrective Actions in Response to an Intake De-Watering Event
50-293/08-007-04, Non-Conservative Calculation for SSW Pump Minimum Flow

Procedures
EN-DC-205, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, Rev. 2
EN-EC-100, Guidelines For Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program
EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Rev. 13
EN-MA-121, Fluid Leak Management Program, Rev. 1
EN-NF-102, Corporate Fuel Reliability, Rev. 0
EN-OE-100, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 6
EN-PL-187, Safety Conscious Work Environment Policy
EN-RP-502, Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection Equipment, Rev. 4
EN-WM-105, Planning, Rev. 4
EOP-01, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control, Rev. 9
EOP-11, Figures, Cautions, Rev. 2
PNPS 6.7.1-201, Operation of the SCBA Air Compressor, Rev. 9
RP-STD-58, Control of Safety Equipment in Contaminated Areas
2.2.8, Standby AC Power Systems (Diesel Generators), Rev. 94
2.2.108, Diesel Generator Cooling and Ventilation, Rev. 42
3.M.4-114, Preventive Maintenance Program for the HVAC System, Rev. 13
8.C.24, Operations Equipment Lubrication Surveillance, Rev. 65
8.1.11.7, HPCI Check Valve Operability Test, Rev. 11
8.5.2.10, RHR Piping Temperature and Pressure Monitoring, Rev. 13
8.5.4.8, Hydrodynamic Test for Measuring Leakage Through HPCI, Rev. 11
8.7.1.5, LLRT of Primary Containment Penetrations and Isolation Valves, Rev. 50

Work Orders
154563
161695
170190
181333
51524187

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
IN	NRC Information Notice
LER	Licensee Event Report
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OE	Operating Experience
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PI&R	Problem Identification and Resolution
QA	Quality Assurance

RHR	Residual Heat Removal
ROP	Reactor Oversight Program
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment
SLC	Standby Liquid Control
SSW	Salt Service Water
WO	Work Order