BSC

Criteria/Basis Change Notice

Complete only applicable items.

1. QA: QA
2. Page 1 of 7

3. Document Identifier:	4. Rev.:	5. CBCN:
000-3DR-MGR0-00300-000	002	006

ENG.20080312.0013

6a. Title:	6b. Safety Classification of SSC:
Basis of Design for the TAD Canister-Based Repository Design Concept	ITS / ITWI

7. Reason for Change:

The *Basis of Design for the TAD Canister-Based Repository Design Concept* (BOD), 000-3DR-MGR0-00300-000, criteria must be changed to agree with recently provided changes to the *Preclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases*, 000-30R-MGR0-03500-000-000. This CBCN addresses the changes to the nuclear facilities criteria in Chapters 3 through 6 of the BOD. This CBCN is being issued in conjunction with CBCNs that address the mechanical handling, Balance of Plant, waste package, Subsurface Facility, and the rest of the intra-site changes.

Although the NSDB is not issued yet, the BOD criteria will be confirmed before the License Application is submitted to be in conformance with the issued NSDB. The BOD currently carries a TBV to document this confirmation.

Impacts of this are minimal. The designers have been coordinating with the analysts providing input to the NSDB. Some design products may require updating to reflect the most recent text. These changes are in progress and will be issued concurrently with or immediately after these CBCNs or the final NSDB.

8. Supersedes Change Notice: ☐ Yes If, Yes, Change Notice: _____ ☒ No

9. Disciplines/Organizations Affected by this Change:

Nuclear Facilities Project Engr.	Balance of Plant Facilities Project Engr.	Subsurface Facilities Project Engr.
Civil/Structural/Architectural Discipline Engr. Manager	Electrical/I&C/Engr. Hazards/EQ Discipline Engr. Manager	Mechanical Discipline Engr. Manager
Nuclear & Radiological Discipline Engr. Manager	Thermal/Structural Analysis Discipline Engr. Manager	Mining Discipline Engr. Manager
LNS Document Review	PreClosure Safety Analysis Manager	ESH Review Coordinator
RPM Operations	RPM Construction/Startup	If 6b is ITS/ITWI: Quality Assurance: Quality Assurance

10. Description of Change:

Revise the following **IHF** criteria as follows:

3.2.3.1.1 Structural Integrity

The IHF structure shall be designed to maintain building structural integrity to protect ITS SSCs inside the building from external events and maintain building integrity to protect against building collapse onto waste containers (safety function).

- The mean frequency of building collapse due to:
  - -- extreme winds less than or equal to 120 mph shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- volcanic ashfall less than or equal to **a roof load of** 21 lb/ft^2 shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix B, Table B-1, Items IH.01, IH.02 and IH.04. However, TMRB-2007-011 (BSC 2007 [DIRS 182004]), TMRB Decision Proposal, Initial Handling Facility Seismic Design Basis, documented a project decision to design the facility to DBGM-2 to eliminate the need to obtain a source term for the naval SNF canister if the building structure collapsed onto the canister. It should be pointed out that the wind values provided here are different than the basic wind gust and tornado wind defined for ITS SSCs in Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 of the PDC (BSC 2007 [DIRS 179641]).]

(IHF criteria continued)

3.2.3.1.4 TEV Rails Inside the IHF

The rails for the TEV inside the **waste package loadout room** ~~IHF~~ shall protect against derailment of the TEV during loading of a waste package [into the TEV] (safety function).

- The mean frequency of TEV derailment due to the failure of the TEV rail system (at the loadout station) due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 1.0×10^{-04} /yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix B, Table B-1, Item IH.05.]

3.2.3.1.5 Shield Doors

The IHF shield doors (including anchorages) shall be designed to protect against direct exposure of personnel, ~~to~~ preclude collapse onto waste containers, and ~~to~~ protect against equipment shield door collapse onto a waste container (safety functions).

- Equipment **and personnel** shield doors shall have a mean probability of inadvertent opening of less than or equal to ~~2.0~~ **1** x 10^{-06} per waste container handled.
- The mean frequency of collapse of equipment shield doors (including attachment of doors to wall and frame anchorages) due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 6.0×10^{-06} /yr.
- **An** equipment shield door~~s shall be designed to preclude~~ falling onto a waste container **as a** result~~ing from~~ **of** an impact from a conveyance **shall be precluded.**

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]) Appendix B, Table B-1, Items IH.06 through 08. TMRB-2007-011 (BSC 2007 [DIRS 182004]), TMRB Decision Proposal, Initial Handling Facility Seismic Design Basis, documented a project decision to design the facility to DBGM-2 to eliminate the need to obtain a source term for the naval SNF canister if the building structure collapsed onto the canister.]

3.2.3.1.6 Port Slide Gates

The cask port slide gate and waste package port slide gate shall be designed to protect against dropping a canister due to a spurious closure of the slide gate, protect against direct exposure to personnel, ~~and~~ preclude canister breach, ~~due to a spurious closure of the slide gate onto the canister~~ **and preclude canister drop onto floor** (safety functions).

- The mean probability of a canister drop resulting from a spurious closure of the ~~port~~ slide gate shall be less than or equal to:
  - -- ~~5.0~~ **2.0×10^{-06}** per transfer **for the cask port slide gate**.
  - -- **4.0×10^{-09} per transfer for the waste package port slide gate.**
- The mean probability of inadvertent opening of a slide gate shall be less than or equal to:
  - -- ~~4.0~~ **1.0×10^{-09}** per canister transfer **for the cask port slide gate**.
  - -- **2.0×10^{-06} per transfer for the waste package port slide gate.**
- Closure of the slide gate shall be incapable of breaching a canister.
- The waste package port slide gate shall be incapable of opening **without** ~~unless~~ a waste package transfer trolley ~~(~~with ~~shield ring) is positioned below it.~~ **waste package in position to receive a canister.**

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]) Appendix B, Table B-1, Items IH.HTC.01 through ~~06~~ 07. ~~A criterion number in not assigned for the last bullet.~~]

3.2.3.1.7 Cask Preparation Platform

The IHF cask preparation platform shall be designed to protect against ~~the collapse of the~~ platform **collapse** ~~onto a waste container~~ (safety function).

- The mean frequency of collapse of the cask preparation platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 9.0×10^{-04} /yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix B, Table B-1, Item IH.HMH.01.]

3.2.3.1.8 Waste Package Transfer Trolley Rails

In conjunction with the waste package transfer trolley, the IHF rails shall be designed to ~~preclude~~ protect against a tipover of **the** ~~a waste package on a waste package transfer trolley (~~WPTT~~)~~ **holding a loaded waste package** and protect against rocking ~~of a waste package on a waste package transfer trolley~~ (which induces an impact into a wall) **of a WPTT holding a loaded waste package** (safety function).

- The mean frequency of tipover of the WPTT due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06}/yr.

(IHF criteria 3.2.3.1.8 continued)

- The mean frequency of the rocking impact of the WPTT into a wall **or column** due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-05}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix B, Table B-1, Items H.IH.HL.05 and H.IH.HL.06. Also, see Chapter 13. Criterion that does not have a facility component (such as trolley speed) is not included here.]

Revise the following **CRCF** criteria as follows:

4.2.3.1.1 Structural Integrity

The CRCFs' structures shall be designed to maintain building structural integrity to protect ITS SSCs inside the building from external events and to protect against building collapse onto waste containers (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of building collapse due to:
  - -- extreme winds less than or equal to 120 mph shall not exceed 1×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- volcanic ashfall less than or equal to a roof ~~live~~ load of 21 lb/ft^2 shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Items CR.01, CR.02, and CR.04.]

4.2.3.1.3 Moderator Control

In conjunction with the fire detection and suppression systems, the CRCFs shall be designed to maintain moderator control (safety function).

- The mean probability of inadvertent introduction of ~~water from sources other than~~ fire suppression **water** into a canister shall be less than or equal to $1.0 \times$ ~~10^{-3}~~ $\mathbf{10^{-06}}$ over a 720-hour period following ~~the breach of a canister~~ **a radionuclide release.**
- ~~In conjunction with the fire detection and suppression systems, the mean probability of inadvertent introduction of fire suppression water into a canister shall be less than or equal to 1.0×10^{-6} over a 720 hour period following the breach of a cask canister system a radionuclide release.~~

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Items ~~CR.05,~~ FP.CR.01 and FP.CR.02. This criterion also partially satisfies PO&PR (BSC 2008 [DIRS 185008]), Section 2.6.2.]

4.2.3.1.4 TEV Rails Inside the CRCFs

The rails for the TEV inside the **waste package loadout room** ~~CRCFs~~ shall be designed to protect against derailment of the TEV during loading of a waste package [into the TEV] (safety function).

- The mean frequency of the TEV derailment due to failure of the TEV rail system (at the loadout station) due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 1.0×10^{-04}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Item CR.~~06~~ 05.]

4.2.3.1.5 Shield and Equipment Confinement Doors

The CRCFs' shield doors (including anchorages) and **equipment** confinement doors shall be designed to protect against direct exposure of personnel, ~~to~~ preclude collapse onto waste containers, ~~to~~ mitigate the consequences of radionuclide release, and ~~to~~ protect against equipment shield door collapse onto a waste container (safety functions).

- Equipment and personnel shield doors shall have a mean probability of inadvertent opening ~~due to interlock failure~~ of less than or equal to ~~2.0~~ **1.0** $\times 10^{-07}$ per waste container handled.
- An equipment shield door falling onto a waste container as a result of impact from a conveyance shall be precluded.
- The mean probability that the HVAC system in the CRCF confinement areas becomes unavailable during a 30-day mission time following a radionuclide release due to the simultaneous opening of **an** ~~any two or more doors that are either (a)~~ equipment confinement door~~s or (b) equipment shield doors with a confinement function~~ **and a cask unloading room shield door** shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-07}.
- The mean frequency of collapse of equipment shield doors (including attachment of door to wall and frame anchorages) due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 6.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Items CR.~~07~~ 06 through ~~10~~ 09. For the performance of the Surface Confinement HVAC System, see the criterion in Chapter 19.]

4.2.3.1.6 Slide Gates

The CRCFs' DOE canister slide gates, cask port slide gates, TAD slide gates and waste package port slide gates shall be designed to

(CRCFs criteria 4.2.3.1.6 continued)

protect against dropping a canister due to a spurious closure of the slide gate, protect against direct exposure to personnel, preclude canister breach, ~~due to a spurious closure of the slide gate onto the canister, and preclude criticality owing to colocation of multiple DOE SNF canisters without separator plates~~ **and preclude canister drop onto the floor** (safety functions).

- The mean probability of a canister drop resulting from a spurious closure of the slide gate shall be less than or equal to ~~5.0~~ **2.0** $\times 10^{-06}$ per transfer.
- The mean probability of occurrence of an inadvertent opening of a slide gate shall be less than or equal to 4.0 x 10^{-09} per transfer.
- Closure of the slide gate shall be incapable of breaching a canister.
- **The waste package port slide gate shall be incapable of opening without a waste package transfer trolley with waste package in position to receive a canister.**
- ~~The TAD slide gates shall be incapable of opening unless the canister transfer machine is centered over it.~~
- ~~The cask port slide gates shall be incapable of opening when as AO is underneath it, unless the canister transfer machine in centered over it.~~
- ~~The waste package port slide gates shall be incapable of opening when a waste package transfer trolley carrying a TAD waste package is underneath it, unless the canister transfer machine is centered over it.~~
- ~~The waste package port slide gate shall be incapable of opening unless a waste package transfer trolley (with shield ring) is positioned below it.~~

*[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Items CR.HTC.01 through ~~12~~ 13. ~~The last 4 bullets do not have assigned criteria numbers~~. **See Chapter 13 for criteria tying the slide gate operation to the CTM.**]*

4.2.3.1.8 Waste Package Transfer Trolley Rails

In conjunction with the waste package transfer trolley, the CRCF rails shall be designed to protect against a tipover of ~~a waste package on a waste package transfer trolley~~ **the WPTT holding a loaded waste package,** and protect against rocking ~~of a waste package on a waste package transfer trolley~~ (which induces an impact into a wall) **of a WPTT holding a loaded waste package** (safety function).

- The mean frequency of tipover of the WPTT due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0 x 10^{-06}/yr.
- The mean frequency of the rocking impact of the WPTT into a wall ~~or column~~ due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0 x10^{-05}/yr.

*[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix D, Table D-1, Items H.~~IH~~**CR**.HL.05 and 06. Also, see Chapter 13. Criterion that does not have a facility component (such as trolley speed) is not included here.]*

Revise the following **WHF** criteria as follows:

5.2.3.1.1 Structural Integrity

The WHF structure shall be designed to maintain building structural integrity to protect ITS SSCs inside the building from external events and protect against building collapse onto waste containers (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of building collapse of the WHF structure due to:
  - -- extreme winds less than or equal to 120 mph shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr,
  - -- volcanic ashfall less than or equal to a roof ~~live~~ load of 21 lb/ft^2 shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06} /yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Items WH.01, WH.02, and WH.04.]

5.2.3.1.3 Moderator Controls

In conjunction with the fire detection and suppression systems, the WHF shall be designed to maintain moderator control (safety function).

- The mean probability of inadvertent introduction of **fire suppression** water into a canister shall be less than or equal to:
  - -- ~~1.0×10^{-03}~~ **6.0×10^{-07}** over a 720-hour period following ~~the breach of a canister from sources other than fire suppression~~ **a radionuclide release.**
- ~~1.0×10^{-06} over a 720 hour period following the breach of a cask canister system from fire suppression.~~

(WHF criteria 5.2.3.1.3 continued)

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Items ~~WH.05 and~~ FP.WH.01 and 02. This criterion also partially satisfies PO&PR (BSC 2008 [DIRS 185008]), Section 2.6.2.]

5.2.3.1.4 Pool Structure

The WHF pool structure shall be designed to maintain pool integrity to protect against collapse onto waste containers and to maintain pool water retention capability (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of collapse of, or water loss from, the WHF pool due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Item WH.~~10~~ 08. The loss of water means the drainage of the entire pool due to building collapse, not leakage of water.]

5.2.3.1.5 Shield ~~and Confinement~~ Doors

The WHF shield doors (including anchorages) ~~and confinement doors~~ shall be designed to protect against direct exposure of personnel, preclude collapse onto waste containers, and protect against equipment shield door collapse onto a waste container (safety functions).

- Equipment shield doors shall have a mean probability of inadvertent opening of less than or equal to ~~2.0×10^{-06}~~ $\mathbf{1.0 \times 10^{-07}}$ per waste container handled.
- **An** equipment shield door~~s shall be designed to preclude~~ falling onto a waste container as a result of impact from a conveyance **shall be precluded**.
- ~~The mean probability that the HVAC system in the WHF confinement areas becomes unavailable during a 30-day mission time following a radiological release due to the simultaneous opening of any two or more doors that are either (a) equipment confinement doors or (b) equipment shield doors with a confinement function shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-07}.~~
- The mean frequency of collapse of equipment shield doors (including attachment of door to wall and frame anchorages) due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 6.0×10^{-06}/yr.

*[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Items WH.~~06~~ **05** through ~~09~~ **07** .]*

5.2.3.1.6 Slide Gates

The cask port slide gate and overpack port slide gate shall be designed to protect against dropping a canister due to a spurious closure of the slide gate, protect against direct exposure of personnel, and preclude **canister** breach ~~of the canister due to a spurious closure of the slide gate onto the canister~~ (safety function).

- The mean probability of a canister drop resulting from a spurious closure of the slide gate shall be less than or equal to ~~5.0~~ **2.0** $\times 10^{-06}$ per transfer.
- The mean probability of occurrence of an inadvertent opening of a slide gate shall be less than or equal to 4.0×10^{-09} per transfer.
- Closure of the slide gate shall be incapable of breaching a canister.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Items WH.HTC.01 through 06.]

5.2.3.1.7 Preparation Stations

Preparation Stations #1 and #2 shall be designed to protect against platform collapse ~~onto a waste container~~. Preparation Station #1 shall also be designed to protect against platform collapse or waste container breach due to an impact of the cask transfer trolley (safety function).

- The mean frequency of collapse of either preparation station platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-06}/yr.
- The mean frequency of Preparation Station #1 platform collapse or waste container breach from impact of the cask transfer trolley onto the platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-05}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]) Appendix E, Table E-1, Items WH.HMH.01 through 03.]

5.2.3.1.8 Aging Overpack Access Platform

The aging overpack access platform shall be designed to protect against platform collapse ~~onto a waste container~~ and protect against platform collapse or waste container breach due to an impact from the site transporter (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of collapse of the aging overpack access platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-06}/yr.

(WHF criteria 5.2.3.1.8 continued)

- The mean frequency of aging overpack access platform or waste container breach from impact of the site transporter onto the platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-05}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Items WH.HAC.01 and 02.]

5.2.3.1.9 TAD Closure Station ~~Platform~~

The TAD closure station shall be designed to protect against platform collapse ~~onto a waste container~~ (safety function).

- The mean frequency of collapse of the TAD closure station platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]) Appendix E, Table E-1, Item WH.HC.01.]

5.2.3.1.10 DPC Cutting Station ~~Platform~~

The DPC cutting station shall be designed to protect against platform collapse ~~onto a waste container~~ (safety function).

- The mean frequency of collapse of the DPC cutting station platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix E, Table E-1, Item WH.HD.01.]

Revise the following **Receipt Facility** criteria as follows:

6.2.3.1.1 Structural Integrity

The Receipt Facility structure shall be designed to maintain building structural integrity to protect ITS SSCs inside the building from external events, and protect against building collapse onto waste containers (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of building structural collapse due to:
  - -- extreme winds less than or equal to 120 mph shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- volcanic ashfall less than or equal to a roof ~~live~~ load of 21 lb/ft^2 shall not exceed 1.0×10^{-06}/yr.
  - -- the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix C, Table C-1, Items RF.01, RF.02 and RF.04.]

6.2.3.1.3 ~~Moderator Control~~ Deleted

~~The Receipt Facility structure shall be designed to maintain moderator control (safety function).~~

- ~~The mean probability of inadvertent introduction of water from sources other than fire suppression into a canister shall be less than or equal to 1.0×10^{-06} over a 720 hour period following the breach of a canister.~~
- ~~In conjunction with the fire detection and suppression systems, the mean probability of inadvertent introduction of fire suppression water into a canister shall be less than or equal to 1.0×10^{-06} over a 720 hour period following the breach of a cask canister system.~~

***[This requirement is no longer in the** Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]) ~~Items RF.05, FP.RF.01, and FP.RF.02. This criterion also partially satisfies PO&PR (BSC 2008 [DIRS 185008]), Section 2.6.2.]~~*

6.2.3.1.4 Shield ~~and Confinement~~ Doors

The Receipt Facility shield doors (including anchorages) ~~and confinement doors~~ shall be designed to protect against direct exposure of personnel, preclude collapse onto waste containers, ~~mitigate the consequences of radionuclide release,~~ and protect against equipment shield door collapse onto a waste container (safety functions).

- Equipment shield doors shall have a mean probability of inadvertent opening of less than or equal to ~~2.0×10^{-06}~~ **1.0×10^{-07}** per waste container handled.
- **An** equipment shield doors ~~shall be designed to preclude~~ falling onto a waste container **as a** result~~ing from~~ **of** an impact from a conveyance **shall be precluded**.
- ~~The mean probability that the HVAC system in the Receipt Facility confinement areas becomes unavailable during a 30-day mission time following a radionuclide release due to the simultaneous opening of any two or more doors that are either (a) equipment confinement doors or (b) equipment shield doors with confinement function shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-07}.~~

(Receipt Facility criteria 6.2.3.1.4 continued)

- The mean frequency of collapse of equipment shield doors (including attachment of door to wall and frame anchorages) due to the full spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 6.0×10^{-06}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix C, Table C-1, Items RF.~~06~~ 05 through ~~09~~ 07.]

6.2.3.1.5 Slide Gates

The Receipt Facility cask port slide gate and aging overpack port slide gate shall be designed to protect against dropping a canister due to a spurious closure of the slide gate, protect against direct exposure to personnel, and preclude canister breach~~ due to a spurious closure of the slide gate onto the canister~~ (safety function).

- The mean probability of a canister drop resulting from a spurious closure of a slide gate shall be less than or equal to 5.0×10^{-06} per transfer.
- The mean probability of occurrence of an inadvertent opening of a slide gate shall be less than or equal to 4.0×10^{-09} per transfer.
- Closure of a slide gate shall be incapable of breaching a canister.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix C, Table C-1, Items RF.HTC.01 through 06.]

6.2.3.1.6 Cask Preparation and Lid Bolting Room Platforms

The Receipt Facility cask preparation and lid bolting room platforms shall be designed to protect against collapse ~~of the platform onto a waste container~~ and to protect against platform collapse or waste container breach due to an impact from the cask transfer trolley (cask preparation) or site transporter (lid bolting room) (safety functions).

- The mean frequency of collapse of the platforms due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 3.0×10^{-06}/yr.
- The mean frequency of platform collapse or waste container breach from the impact of the cask transfer trolley (cask preparation) or site transporter (lid bolting room) into the platform due to the spectrum of seismic events shall be less than or equal to 2.0×10^{-05}/yr.

[Preclosure NSDB (BSC 2008 [DIRS 184200]), Appendix C, Table C-1, Items RF.HMH.01, RF.HMH.02, RF.HMC.01, and RF.HMC.02.]

Revise the following conformance verification tables as follows:

4.2.3.1.5 Shield and Equipment Confinement Doors
5.2.3.1.5 Shield ~~and Confinement~~ Doors
5.2.3.1.9 TAD Closure Station ~~Platform~~
5.2.3.1.10 DPC Cutting Station ~~Platform~~
6.2.3.1.3 ~~Moderator Control~~ Deleted
6.2.3.1.4 Shield ~~and Confinement~~ Doors

11.	REVIEWS AND APPROVAL		
Printed Name	**Title**	**Signature**	**Date**
11a. Preparer: David S. Rhodes	Discipline Engineering Manager		3-11-08
11b. Concurrence: Richard Foster	Manager of Discipline Engineering	Richard Foster	3-11-08
11c. Concurrence: N/A	Project Engineering Manager	N/A	N/A
11d. Approved: Barbara Rusinko	Engineering Manager	BJ Tosetti	3-~~13~~ 12-08 DSR 3/12/08