

February 26, 2009

EA-08-351
EA-08-323

Mr. James A. Spina, Vice President
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Calvert Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2008502 AND
05000318/2008502; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Spina:

On January 14, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Emergency Preparedness inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP). The inspection included on-site inspection on November 17 through 21, 2008, and in-office inspection through January 14, 2009. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 14, 2009, with Mr. D. Bauder, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities and interviewed personnel.

This letter transmits one licensee-identified finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, which may require additional NRC inspection. The finding is associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Specifically, for the period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, the Calvert Cliffs' emergency action level (EAL) table's fission product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate threshold associated with the potential loss of the containment barrier. Constellation evaluated this condition and took prompt actions to correct the inaccurate EAL. This finding was assessed using the emergency preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP). The final resolution of this finding will be conveyed in separate correspondence.

The finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can be found on the NRC's Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement>.

In accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, we intend to complete our evaluation using the best available information and issue our final determination of safety significance within 90 days of the date of this letter. The significance determination process encourages an open dialogue between the NRC staff and the licensee; however, the dialogue should not impact the timeliness of the staff's final determination. Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you with an opportunity (1) to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of your receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a Regulatory Conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final SDP determination, in that by not doing either you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation Sections of Attachment 2 of IMC 0609.

Please contact James Trapp at 610-337-5186, and in writing, within 10 days from the issue date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation may change as a result of further NRC review.

Additionally, based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a licensee-identified Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to: (1) the Regional Administrator, Region I; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and (3) the NRC Resident Inspector at the CCNPP.

J. Spina

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

Sincerely,

/RA by Eugene W. Cobey for/

Darrell Roberts, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-317, 50-318
License Nos.: DPR-53, DPR-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502

J. Spina

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Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502

SUNSI Review Complete: JMT (Reviewer's Initials)

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OFFICE	OE/NSIR*	RI/DRS			
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DATE	02/11/09	02/26/09			

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* OE/NSIR provide review – pending DRS incorporation of comments received 2/5/09; S. LaVie, OE reviews at 2/11/09

** See Previous Concurrence Page

J. Spina

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cc w/encl:

M. Wallace, Vice-Chairman, Constellation Energy

H. Barron, President, CEO, & Chief Nuclear Officer, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC

W. Parran, President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners

C. Fleming, Esquire, Sr. Counsel – Nuclear Generation Group, LLC

J. Gaines, Director, Licensing, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

S. Gray, Program Manager, Power Plant Assessment Program, Maryland Department of
Natural Resources

K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel

P. Birnie, Esquire, Co-Director, Maryland Safe Coalition

R. Hickok, NRC Technical Training Center

L. Larragoite, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Security, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

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C Miller, FSME

G Pangburn, FSME

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Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV (C Evans, K O'Brien, K Fuller)

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M Williams, OCFO

DScrenci/NSheehan, RI

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M McLaughlin, RI

C O=Daniell, RI

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.: 50-317, 50-318

License Nos.: DPR-53, DPR-69

Report No.: 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502

Licensee: Constellation Generation Group, LLC (Constellation)

Facility: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Lusby, MD

Dates: November 17, 2008, through January 14, 2009

Inspectors: Neil Perry, Senior Project Engineer

Approved by: James Trapp, Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000317/2008502 and 05000318/2008502; 11/17/08 – 1/14/09; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes.

This inspection was conducted by one regional inspector. One apparent violation (AV) with potential low to moderate safety significance was identified (Preliminary White). The significance for most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Preliminary White: Constellation identified an apparent violation associated with the failure to meet emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). For the period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, the emergency action level (EAL) table's fission product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate threshold associated with identifying the potential loss of the containment barrier. The error was not identified by Constellation prior to implementation of the revised EAL table. Constellation evaluated this condition and took prompt actions to correct the inaccurate EAL.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality (EAL changes) attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding is associated with risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions." The NRC determined that the finding is preliminarily White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, that may require additional NRC inspection. Using Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply," the finding was determined to be a risk significant planning standard (RSPS) problem and an RSPS degraded function (White). Additionally, IMC 0609, Appendix B contains an example of Loss of RSPS Function for 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4); more than one Alert, or any Site Area Emergency would not be declared that should be declared, resulting in a White finding. There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding since it is not reflective of current licensee performance. (Section 1EP4)

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by Constellation, has been reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by Constellation have been entered into their corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions (IRE-027-361) are listed in Sections 4OA2 and 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope (71114.04 - 1 Sample)

As discussed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000317/2008005 and 05000318/2008005, the inspector conducted a review of Constellation's 10 CFR 50.54(q) screenings for all the changes made to the Calvert Cliffs EALs implemented from December 2006 through October 2008. The review was conducted to identify any EAL change that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 4, and the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

Introduction: Constellation identified an apparent violation of emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) for the failure to maintain emergency plans which meet the requirements in 50.47(b) and Appendix E, IV.B. Specifically, for the period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, an inaccurate EAL threshold had the potential to impact Calvert Cliffs' ability to accurately and timely classify an emergency condition associated with the fission product barrier matrix. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," this licensee-identified potentially greater than Green finding is being evaluated and documented as if it was an NRC-identified finding.

Description: A project was initiated in 2004 to revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant emergency action level (EAL) scheme from NUMARC/NESP-007 based EALs to NEI 99-01 based EALs. The revised EALs were reviewed using the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process and were not submitted to the NRC for review and approval because Constellation identified no deviations from the NEI 99-01 bases intent document. Therefore, Constellation concluded that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan EALs. The new EALs became effective on August 31, 2005.

After the August 31, 2005, revision, the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Plan EAL Basis Document for potential loss of containment barrier correctly described the barrier threshold as containment pressure greater than 4.25 psig and the inability to meet any of the following conditions: (1) two containment spray pumps operating, (2) three containment air coolers (CACs) operating, or (3) one containment spray pump and two CACs operating. However, the EAL table's fission product barrier matrix for containment barrier, incorrectly omitted the first two conditions, and incorrectly documented the third condition. This error resulted in allowing fewer containment cooling systems available than necessary to maintain adequate containment cooling, and therefore, had a nonconservative impact on the EALs.

The following table provides the criteria that were documented in the EAL Basis Document (correct information per NEI 99-01) and the incorrect information that was provided in the EAL Table. During an event, operators refer to the EAL Table in order to correctly classify an event; they normally do not refer to the basis document unless they need clarification or other help in order to correctly classify the event.

Emergency Action Level Basis Document	Emergency Action Level Table
Containment pressure > 4.25 psig AND Cannot meet any of the following conditions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Containment Spray Pumps Operating • 3 CACs Operating • 1 Containment Spray Pump and 2 CACs Operating 	Containment pressure > 4.25 psig and NO Containment spray pumps and < two CAC units operating

During the Constellation 10 CFR 50.54(q) review of the change, a decrease in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan EALs was not identified since the intended wording for the EAL table was to be consistent with the information documented in the basis document. The error occurred during implementation of the change when the EAL table was developed, which for this change was done in parallel with the review of the change. When taken in conjunction with the thresholds for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and fuel clad barriers, this deficiency had the potential to prevent or impede the accurate and timely declaration of an Unusual Event (UE), a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and a General Emergency (GE). The error was not identified by Constellation prior to implementation of the revised EAL table. In April 2008, Calvert Cliffs operations training staff identified the inaccurate EAL. Constellation evaluated this condition and took appropriate corrective actions to restore the EAL table to be consistent with the basis document.

For the EAL Fission Product Barrier Matrix, Table H.5-1, the potential loss of containment barrier alone requires declaration of a UE. The potential loss of containment barrier with the loss of, or potential loss of, another barrier (either fuel clad or RCS) requires declaration of an SAE. The potential loss of containment barrier with the loss of the other two barriers (fuel clad and RCS) would require declaration of a GE.

Analysis: The performance deficiency is that Constellation did not establish and maintain adequate emergency action levels (EALs), which led to the potential to adversely impact Calvert Cliffs' ability to accurately and timely classify an emergency condition associated with the fission product barrier. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality (EAL changes) attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding is associated with risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions."

Following identification of this EAL error, Constellation performed an assessment of the incorrect EAL impact on Calvert Cliffs' capability to declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and a General Emergency (GE). They concluded that a GE would have always been promptly declared under alternate EAL thresholds (core exit thermocouple > 1200°F, and containment dose rate at 14,000 rem/hr). For the SAE, Constellation concluded that, for a number of accident types, the declaration would be delayed (more than 15 minutes from containment pressure reaching > 4.25 psig). The Constellation assessment concluded the SAE would have been ultimately declared based on an adverse trend in containment (pressure approaching containment design pressure) and using Emergency Director (ED) judgment. The ED judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant to determining if the containment barrier is potentially lost. Such a determination should include imminent barrier degradation (degradation will likely occur within two hours), barrier monitoring capability (loss or lack of reliable indicators) and dominant accident sequences (degradation of all fission product barriers and likely entry into Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-8, Functional Recovery Procedure).

The inspector reviewed the Constellation assessment and found it provided an adequate basis to conclude that the GE declaration would have been made in a timely manner under existing alternate EAL thresholds. However, the inspector was unable to reach a similar conclusion regarding the SAE declaration. The assessment credited the operations shift manager making the SAE declaration using the ED judgment threshold. Constellation's proposal relies upon the shift manager: (1) recognizing that containment cooling was less than 100 percent of the cooling requirement; (2) noting an adverse containment pressure trend; (3) referring to the EAL technical basis for potential loss of containment; (4) identifying the discrepancy between the basis and the EAL; and (5) concluding that the EAL basis was correct. Although the shift managers are trained in the EALs and the supporting information in the technical bases, Calvert Cliffs does not have a procedure or training lesson plan that requires the shift manager to consult the EAL technical bases during an emergency. The NRC finds that it is not reasonable to conclude that the declaration would always have been made; it could have been missed due to the shift manager not referring to the basis since there is no requirement to do so, or by not recognizing the discrepancy. Additionally, the inspector noted that the analysis determined that it was unlikely the shift manager would make the SAE declaration in a timely manner. Although NRC regulations do not explicitly establish a timeliness criterion for completing classifications, the NRC expects that licensees will complete the classification assessment and declare the emergency promptly within 15 minutes (in the absence of extenuating circumstances). Delays in declaring an emergency inappropriately delays notification of the offsite response organizations and may delay the initiation of response activities necessary for the protection of the public.

This finding affected the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, and is associated with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions." Although this condition resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, the condition is not the result of an inadequate review of the proposed change since the review was performed using the correct intended change and the review was accurate. The error occurred during implementation of the change. As such, traditional enforcement is not appropriate for this finding's assessment.

Using Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, IMC 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply," the finding is a failure to comply with a risk significant planning standard (RSPS). Since the SAE classification could be made in a delayed manner, the finding is not a Loss of RSPS function but rather a Degraded RSPS function (White). Additionally, IMC 0609, Appendix B contains the following example of Loss of RSPS Function for 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4): The EAL classification process would not declare more than one Alert, or any Site Area Emergency that should be declared (White finding). There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding since it is not reflective of current licensee performance.

The inspector determined an RSPS degraded function occurred because Calvert Cliffs Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 3.0, Immediate Actions, Revision 39, which contains the EAL table, deviated from the licensee's approved licensing basis and degraded the capability to perform a function in a timely manner. Specifically, it degraded the capability to declare one UE, one SAE, and one GE. As a result, Constellation might not have classified several events at the same level that would have resulted from use of the correct EAL criteria. The finding did not present an immediate safety concern, and was expeditiously corrected by Constellation.

Enforcement: 10 CFR 50.54(q) states in part, "A holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this part."

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part, "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures."

10 CFR 50 Appendix E, IV.B, "Assessment Actions," states in part, "The means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety."

Contrary to the above, on August 31, 2005, Constellation failed to maintain Emergency Plans which meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E, IV.B. Constellation failed to maintain a standard emergency classification scheme, which included facility system and effluent parameters, in use that the State and local response plans can rely on for information to determine minimum initial offsite response measures. Specifically, for the period of August 31, 2005, until April 10, 2008, the emergency action level (EAL) table for the fission product barrier matrix contained an inaccurate EAL threshold associated with potential loss of containment barrier. This is a degraded, not failed, risk significant planning standard (RSPS) function. The finding had no actual safety consequences, since no events occurred at Calvert Cliffs related to the

containment barrier, during the period in question. The issue was entered into the corrective action program at Calvert Cliffs (IRE-028-981) for resolution. Pending final determination of significance, this finding is identified as an apparent violation. **(AV 05000317 & 318/2008502-01: Failure to Maintain Emergency Plans)**

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 – 1 Sample)

Annual Sample: Calvert Cliffs Implementation of Emergency Action Levels

a. Inspection Scope

This inspection reviewed Constellation's identification and resolution of deviations from the standard NEI 99-01 based emergency action level (EAL) scheme in the Calvert Cliffs EALs. The deviations resulted from the 2004 project to revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant EAL scheme to the NEI 99-01 based EALs.

Reviews of the revised EALs and their bases were conducted by Calvert Cliffs staff and consultants, as part of the follow-up to issues identified at another power plant in 2007. Calvert Cliffs identified a number of deviations from the NEI 99-01 guidance, and evaluated each individually to determine if a decrease in effectiveness (DIE) had occurred. The inspector reviewed the disposition of identified deviations and discussed these with Constellation emergency preparedness personnel.

Two similar EAL changes were determined by Constellation to have resulted in a non-conservative change to the EALs; these two changes were also determined to have resulted in a DIE, in that the change could have caused incorrect event classification, or could have delayed the classification, for Alert level conditions, such that required notifications would not have been timely. The licensee evaluated this condition and took appropriate corrective actions to restore its EALs to comply with the requirements.

b. Findings and Observations

A licensee-identified violation associated with the two changes involving a decrease in effectiveness (DIE) is discussed in Section 4OA7. As identified in Constellation's causal analysis report, the root cause was determined to be that the processes and tools used to identify and validate information transferred from the NEI 99-01, Rev. 4 basis document to the plant's technical basis document lacked sufficient rigor to identify a misinterpretation. Specifically, changes made to emergency action levels (EALs) using the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process were not adequately reviewed to ensure that a DIE did not exist. The inspectors determined that the remaining emergency action level deviations were in accordance with the licensing basis.

Corrective actions included generating an Operations Night Order notifying operators of the EAL issue, and the EALs were restored to their original intent. Constellation initiated a Category 1 Condition Report - root cause required, and additional Condition Reports. The inspector determined Calvert Cliffs properly identified the root cause of the event

and provided adequate long-term corrective actions which included revising procedures to require a challenge board for any regulatory significant change to the Emergency Response Plan and for EAL changes. The inspector determined the licensee's initial and long-term corrective actions were timely and appropriate.

40A6 Meetings, including Exit

On January 14, 2009, the inspector conducted an exit meeting and presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. D. Bauder, Plant General Manager, and other members of the Calvert Cliffs' staff. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV): 10 CFR 50.54(q) states in part, "A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this part. The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of §50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to this part." 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part, "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee..." Contrary to the above, on August 31, 2005, the licensee decreased the effectiveness of their emergency plan as a result of revising classifiable conditions in two emergency action levels (EALs) and did not request Commission approval. The two EALs affected the capability to make Alert declarations as a result of a fire, explosion or tornado affecting one train of equipment or structure(s) required for Safe Shutdown. Constellation entered this issue in their corrective action program under IRE-027-361.

Changing an emergency plan resulting in a decrease in effectiveness (DIE) of the plan without prior Commission approval impacts the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function and is therefore processed through traditional enforcement, as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy, issued April 18, 2005. In accordance with Enforcement Policy Supplement VIII, this violation is appropriately characterized as Severity Level IV because, although these two EALs could not have been implemented as approved and were not part of a standard emergency classification scheme, planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) was met. These changes directly affected the planning standard for assessment capability at Calvert Cliffs, but this problem was isolated to two EALs and was not indicative of a functional problem with the EAL scheme. Because this violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy (EA-08-323).

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

Doug Bauder, Plant General Manager
Steven Speer, Director Emergency Preparedness
Greg Rudigier - Senior EP Analyst

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000317/318/2008502-01 AV Failure to maintain emergency plans
(Section 1EP4)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

CRs: IRE-028-435, IRE-027-551, IRE-028-981

Section 4OA2 and 4OA7:

EAL Disposition Plan, Rev. 6

IRE-027-361, Rev. 2, IRE-028-440, IRE-028-082

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Challenge Board
Emergency Action Level (EAL) Review, Rev. 3 – September 19, 2008

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAC	Containment Air Cooler
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DIE	Decrease in Effectiveness
EAL	Emergency Action Level
ED	Emergency Director
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
EP	Emergency Preparedness
GE	General Emergency
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
OA	Other Activities
NCV	Non-cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PS	Planning Standard
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RSPS	Risk Significant Planning Standard
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SDP	Significance Determination Process
UE	Unusual Event