February 24, 2009

Mr. Peter W. Smith
Director, Nuclear Development-Licensing 337 WCB
Detroit Edison Company
7337 WCB
2000 2ND Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226-1279

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LETTER NO. 3 RELATED TO THE SRP SECTIONS 08.03.02 AND 14.03.06 FOR THE FERMI 3 COMBINED LICENSE APPLICATION

Dear Mr. Smith:

By letter dated September 18, 2008, Detroit Edison Company (Detroit Edison) submitted for approval a combined license application pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is performing a detailed review of this application to enable the staff to reach a conclusion on the safety of the proposed application.

The NRC staff has identified that additional information is needed to continue portions of the review. The staff's request for additional information (RAI) is contained in the enclosure to this letter. To support the review schedule, you are requested to respond within 30 days of the date of this letter. If changes are needed to the safety analysis report, the staff requests that the RAI response include the proposed wording changes.

If you have any questions or comments concerning this matter, I can be reached at 301-415-8148 or by e-mail at jerry.hale@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jerry Hale, Project Manager
ESBWR/ABWR Projects Branch 1
Division of New Reactor Licensing
Office of New Reactors

Docket Nos. 052-033

eRAI Tracking Nos. 2169 and 2170

Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information

Mr. Peter W. Smith
Director, Nuclear Development-Licensing 337 WCB
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Detroit, MI 48226-1279

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Dear Mr. Smith:

By letter dated September 18, 2008, Detroit Edison Company (Detroit Edison) submitted for approval a combined license application pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is performing a detailed review of this application to enable the staff to reach a conclusion on the safety of the proposed application.

The NRC staff has identified that additional information is needed to continue portions of the review. The staff's request for additional information (RAI) is contained in the enclosure to this letter. To support the review schedule, you are requested to respond within 30 days of the date of this letter. If changes are needed to the safety analysis report, the staff requests that the RAI response include the proposed wording changes.

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Jerry Hale, Project Manager
ESBWR/ABWR Projects Branch 1
Division of New Reactor Licensing
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Docket Nos. 052-033

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Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information
Distribution:

PUBLIC	CPatel	RidsNroDsraSbpb	JCruz
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OFFICE	EEB/TR	EEB/BC	NGE1/L-PM	OGC	NGE1/PM
NAME	APal	RJenkins	CPatel	MCarpentier	JHale
DATE	2/17/09	2/17/09	2/20/09	2/17/09	2/23/09

***Approval captured electronically in the electronic RAI system.**

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Request for Additional Information No. 2169 Revision 0

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 08.03.02 - DC Power Systems (Onsite)
Application Section: 8.3.2

QUESTION for Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB)

08.03.02-1

FSAR Section 8.3.2.1.1, with EF3 SUP 8.3-2, states that training and procedures to mitigate an Station Blackout Outage (SBO) event are implemented in accordance, with FSAR Sections 13.2 and 13.5. According to NUMARC 87-00, endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155 and referenced by SRP 8.4, the SBO response procedures include (1) Station Blackout Response Guidelines, (2) AC Power Restoration, and (3) Severe Weather Guidelines. Confirm that the training and procedures addressed in Section 8.3.2.1.1 include these three topics.

Request for Additional Information No. 2170 Revision 0
SRP Section: 14.03.06 - Electrical Systems - Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Application Section: 14.3.6

QUESTION for Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB)

14.03.06-1

Section 4, “Interface material” of DCD, Tier 1, rev.4 of the ESBWR design states that an applicant for a combined license (COL) that reference the ESBWR design must provide design features or characteristics that comply with the interface requirements for the plant design and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) for the site-specific portion of the facility design, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(c). However, no interface requirements were identified for the offsite power system in the ESBWR design. In RAIs 14.3-394 and 14.3-394 S1 for the ESBWR design certification application, the NRC staff asked GEH to revise Section 4 of DCD, Tier 1 to include interface requirements for the offsite power system for demonstrating the capacity and capability of the offsite power system. In response to RAI 14.3-394 S1, on December 9, 2008, GEH stated that a COL applicant referencing the ESBWR design shall develop an ITAAC to verify that the as-built offsite portion of the preferred power supply (PPS) from the transmission network to the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS satisfy the applicable provisions of GDC 17. Specifically, the ITAAC shall verify:

(1) At least two independent circuits supply electric power from the transmission network to the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS.

(2) Each offsite circuit interfacing with the onsite portions of the PPS is adequately rated to supply the load requirements during design basis operating modes.

(3) During steady state operation, the offsite portion of the PPS is capable of supplying voltage at the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS that will support operation of safety-related loads during design basis operating modes.

(4) During steady state operation, the offsite portion of the PPS is capable of supplying required frequency at the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS that will support operation of safety-related loads during design basis operating modes.

(5) The fault current contribution of the offsite portion of the PPS is compatible with the interrupting capability of the onsite fault current interrupting devices.

Provide an ITAAC to verify that the as-built offsite portion of the preferred power supply (PPS) from the transmission network to the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS satisfy the applicable provisions of GDC 17.