

Peter Stockton Comments to NRC Public Meeting, 2/3/09

- ⇒ Great job staff for recognizing there is a security problem at the power plants. Unfortunately, they were voted down on recent DBT increase and security information transparency issue.
- ⇒ We are agnostic on a policy statement. The current one states that reactor operators should not be drunk or asleep in the control room. The policy statement seems self-evident. But, the process of trying to identify these culture problems can be productive.
- ⇒ Problem starts at the top with NRC Commissioners
 - A year ago POGO interviewed each Commissioner. Some simply don't believe there is a serious terrorist threat to the nuclear power plants. One measure of this problem is the vote last week to turn down the staff recommendation to make the DBT more robust (the number of adversaries included and number of lethal weapons available to terrorists, 50 cal. Bangalore torpedoes and RPGs).
 - One Commissioner made misleading and disparaging remarks to Congress about a security whistleblower in a Senate Peach Bottom hearing, that lead to an IG investigation
 - Recently, Commissioners voted against increasing the transparency and public information about the results of security inspections. (TA-18)
 - President Obama should appoint someone to the Commission who has a commitment to nuclear security. This is an opportunity to show that he is serious about his commitment to [prevent nuclear terrorism](#).
- ⇒ Since 2002, POGO has interviewed or met with several hundred security officers. From those interviews, we believe security culture is a real problem.
- ⇒ Security officers recognize that the DBT is unrealistic and that they would be cannon-fodder in a real attack. They refer to the DBT as the “Dollar Based Threat.”
 - BRE - are iron coffins
 - They know they won't get effective outside help because of timelines
 - They know they will be outgunned
 - Excessive overtime leads to lack of attentiveness
 - When questioned about the lame DBT—NRC claims, “that is all you can expect of private guard force.” This is dangerous. This attitude trickles down to create a culture.
- ⇒ There is too much advance notice of security tests (force-on-force). There is a culture of wanting the plants to look good. Not a culture of: How well protected are the power plants? Should win overwhelmingly-no surprise, no speed, or no violence of action (the major advantages that terrorists have).
- ⇒ NFS/BWXT serious problems with DBT
- ⇒ Security officers' concerns are not taken seriously by the security contractor or the licensees. Security officers stop bringing up issues when nothing gets addressed. In a number of cases they are afraid to bring up issues because the fear of retaliation, including the threat to their jobs.
- ⇒ No real whistleblower protections.
- ⇒ Contractor and licensee responses to problems that are raised by saying “we don't have the money” or “we're in compliance with NRC regulations.”

- ⇒ At Peach Bottom, security officers went to the press instead of the NRC—didn't trust the NRC
- ⇒ Regional offices
 - McGaffigan experiences with Region 1 at Salem Hope Creek
 - Peach Bottom OIG report, no heads roll
 - March 2007 “no safety problems,” but then in September 2007, hearing about a potential video, it then became “possible safety problems”
- ⇒ Enforcement/Fines \$65K, sleeping guards cost NRC \$500K for investigations