


BWRVIP-86NP, Revision 1: BWR Vessel and Internals Project

Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan



NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

NOTICE: This report contains the non-propriety information that is included in the proprietary version of this report. The proprietary version of this report contains proprietary information that is the intellectual property of BWRVIP utility members and EPRI. Accordingly, the proprietary report is available only under license from EPRI and may not be reproduced or disclosed, wholly or in part, by any licensee to any other person or organization.

BWRVIP-86NP, Revision 1: BWR Vessel and Internals Project

Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance
Program (ISP) Implementation Plan

1016575NP

Draft Report, July 2008

EPRI Project Manager
R. Carter

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS PROJECT (BWRVIP) AND THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER BWRVIP, EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW, NOR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM:

(A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS REPORT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER'S CIRCUMSTANCE, OR

(B) ASSUMES ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF BWRVIP, EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR SELECTION OR USE OF THIS REPORT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT.

ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS REPORT:

ATI Consulting

NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

NOTICE: This report contains the non-propriety information that is included in the proprietary version of this report. The proprietary version of this report contains proprietary information that is the intellectual property of BWRVIP utility members and EPRI. Accordingly, the proprietary report is available only under license from EPRI and may not be reproduced or disclosed, wholly or in part, by any Licensee to any other person or organization.

NOTE

For further information about EPRI, call the EPRI Customer Assistance Center at 800.313.3774 or e-mail askepri@epri.com.

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER...SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

Copyright © 2008 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

CITATIONS

This report was prepared by

ATI Consulting
P.O. Box 5769
Pinehurst, NC 28374

This report was prepared for Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project and EPRI.

This report describes research sponsored by EPRI.

This report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:

BWRVIP-86NP, Revision 1: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2008. 1016575NP.

This report is based on the following previously published report:

BWRVIP-86-A: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA 2002. 1003346.

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

This report describes the boiling water reactor (BWR) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP). Based on recommendations from BWR Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) utilities, it was concluded that combining all separate BWR surveillance programs into a single integrated program would be beneficial. In the integrated program, representative materials chosen for a specific reactor pressure vessel (RPV) can be materials from another plant surveillance program or other source that better represents the target vessel materials. The basis for the integrated program was established in BWRVIP-78 (EPRI report TR-114228), and the implementation plan was given in BWRVIP-86 (1000888). Some aspects and details of the program as outlined in both documents were subsequently modified during the regulatory review process, and BWRVIP-86-A (1003346) incorporated those modifications into the implementation plan. Later, BWRVIP-116 (1007824) proposed the extension of the ISP into the license renewal period. With the license renewal ISP now approved by NRC, BWRVIP-86, Revision 1 (this report) merges BWRVIP-86-A and BWRVIP-116 into a single, updated implementation plan for the ISP covering plant operation to 60 years.

Results & Findings

Prior to the ISP, individual, 43 surveillance capsules remained to be tested through the end of original plant license dates. Evaluations performed as part of the ISP demonstrated that representative materials could be consolidated into 15 remaining untested capsules plus 9 capsules from the Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP). The ISP has been extended to support surveillance during the license renewal period by the testing of an additional capsule from each of the 13 ISP host plants later in life.

Challenges & Objectives

The objectives of this project were to define an integrated surveillance program that meets the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H; to identify specific capsules to be tested for the ISP and a schedule for testing; and, to define the plan for ISP test data sharing and utilization. The integrated program improves the quality of BWR surveillance data and results in a significant cost savings to the BWR fleet. Full participation by all U.S. BWRs ensures that the ISP provides the necessary data to properly monitor changes in embrittlement of the RPVs.

Applications, Values & Use

Data obtained from future capsules, plus data from prior tested capsules, are shared collectively to fulfill 10CFR50 Appendix H requirements for surveillance monitoring as an ISP for U.S. BWRs.

EPRI Perspective

Neutron irradiation exposure reduces the toughness of reactor vessel welds and base metals. Accurate methods for monitoring and predicting embrittlement are important for establishing plant operating pressure-temperature limits and pressure test temperatures. They also are critical for evaluating the remaining life of RPV materials. The ISP will result in significant cost savings to the BWR fleet and will provide more representative monitoring of embrittlement in vessel-limiting materials than current programs.

Approach

The project team collected available BWR reactor vessel fabrication records, surveillance program results, and the current status of each BWR surveillance program. They updated the ISP matrix presented in BWRVIP-78 and the previous edition of BWRVIP-86 to address NRC Staff comments and recommendations. From the revised matrix, the team developed a detailed ISP test plan, associating each plant's limiting materials with representative materials in ISP capsules. A withdrawal/testing schedule was developed for the ISP plant capsules to provide for integration of SSP capsule test data within the next few years and optimal ISP capsule testing thereafter. Researchers developed ISP project administration and management responsibilities for capsule testing, reporting, data sharing, and utilization, along with a plan for incorporating the ISP in each plant's licensing basis. A plan to extend the ISP through the license renewal period was developed.

Keywords

Reactor pressure vessel integrity
Reactor vessel surveillance program
Radiation embrittlement
Boiling water reactor
Charpy testing
Mechanical properties

RECORD OF REVISIONS

Revision Number	Revisions
BWRVIP-86	Original Report (1000888)
BWRVIP-86-A 1003346	<p>Report 1000888 was revised to incorporate changes proposed by the BWRVIP in responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information, recommendations in the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE), and other necessary revisions identified since the last issuance of the report. All changes except corrections to typographical errors are marked with margin bars. In accordance with a NRC request, the NRC SE is included here as an appendix and the report number includes an "A" indicating the version of the report accepted by the NRC Staff. Non-essential format changes were made to comply with the current EPRI publication guidelines.</p> <p>Appendix B added: NRC Final Safety Evaluation</p> <p>Details of the revision can be found in Appendix D.</p>
BWRVIP-86, Revision 1	<p>Report 1003346 was revised by merging the content of BWRVIP-116 (Report 1007824) into this document as a new Section 7. Browns Ferry 1 participation in the ISP was added. In addition, typographical and printing errors were corrected. Fluence values and chemistry estimates were also updated for the latest available data.</p> <p>Due the extensive number of changes to this report revision bars that previously marked changes have been removed.</p> <p>A new Appendix C was added: NRC Final Safety Evaluation for the ISP Implementation for License Renewal. A new Appendix D was added: NRC Staff Review of BWRVIP-86-A. The former Appendix C, Revision Details (to BWRVIP-86-A), was changed to Appendix E, and the details of BWRVIP-86, Revision 1 were added in Appendix F.</p>

ABSTRACT

This report describes the Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) for monitoring radiation embrittlement of BWR reactor pressure vessels (RPVs).

Each U. S. BWR has a surveillance program for monitoring the changes in RPV material properties due to neutron irradiation. These programs consist of surveillance capsules installed inside the RPV that include specimens from RPV plate, weld and heat affected zone materials. These specimens are removed at periodic intervals, tested and analyzed to monitor the radiation embrittlement of the RPV. Each BWR has its own surveillance program and the specimen selection, testing, analysis and monitoring is conducted on a plant-specific basis.

Because U. S. BWRs were licensed over a period of years, the requirements and content of the individual surveillance programs vary. For example, as a result of changes to industry standards and NRC regulatory guidance, some plants do not have surveillance specimens for the limiting RPV plate or weld material. In 1998, the BWR Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) developed an Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) using similar heats of materials in the surveillance programs of BWRs to represent the limiting materials in other vessels and improve the monitoring of embrittlement in BWR vessels. The ISP combines all the separate U. S. BWR surveillance programs into a single integrated program and adds data from the ongoing Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP). The ISP has been designed to meet the criteria for an integrated surveillance program in 10CFR50 Appendix H. The BWRVIP submitted a report in 1999 (BWRVIP-78) to describe the technical basis of the ISP related to material selection and the testing matrix. Then, BWRVIP-86 addressed the implementation plan for the ISP and testing schedule, with additional revisions to the testing matrix. During the regulatory review process some aspects of both documents (e.g., the test matrix and schedule) were modified to facilitate regulatory approval, and all modifications were reflected in BWRVIP-86-A. Extension of the ISP into the license renewal period was documented in BWRVIP-116.

The ISP replaces the individual plant surveillance monitoring programs with an integrated program using host reactor capsules containing selected representative materials. A test matrix was developed to identify those specimens that best meet the needs of each BWR. The materials for the ISP were specifically chosen to best represent the limiting plate and weld materials for each plant using specimens from the entire BWR fleet. Specimens that provide little or no added value are not included and need not be tested because other materials in the integrated program provide better quality and more representative data.

This report identifies the test matrix of capsules containing the representative weld and plate materials and the planned schedule for withdrawal and testing. The content of BWRVIP-116 (ISP for the License Renewal Period) has been merged with BWRVIP-86-A (ISP

Implementation Plan) to provide a single, comprehensive implementation plan for the ISP during both the original and renewed license period.

This report also describes methods of data evaluation and utilization for implementation through the BWRVIP. Under the ISP, fewer capsules will be tested but the quality of data gained from those tests will provide greater understanding of BWR vessel embrittlement than do the existing programs. The BWRVIP will share data from the host capsules with all participants. The greater efficiency that is inherent in the ISP will result in significant cost savings to the BWR fleet.

ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

10CFR50 Appendix H	Appendix H to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, “Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements”
Adjusted Reference Temperature	(ART) The reference temperature adjusted for irradiation effects by adding to the initial RT_{NDT} the transition temperature shift (due to irradiation) and an appropriate margin
ASME Code	American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
ASTM E-185	American Society for Testing and Materials E-185, “Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels”
Associated Material	An ISP candidate surveillance material which is given consideration because it has a good fluence match to a target vessel material, even though it may have a less representative chemistry match.
BWR	Boiling Water Reactor
BWROG	BWR Owners’ Group
BWRVIP	BWR Vessel and Internals Project
Capsule Set	A capsule set includes three or more capsules installed in a plant
EFPY	Effective full power year
ESW	Electroslag Weld
EOL	End-of-license
EOLE	End-of-license, Extended
Existing Surveillance Program	The set of surveillance capsules that were installed when each BWR was licensed. The surveillance capsules typically include specimens for plate, weld, and heat affected zone (HAZ) materials. The test results from the specimens are to be used for monitoring radiation embrittlement for the plant.

Full Charpy Curve	A Charpy curve based on Charpy tests of 8 or more specimens that are tested over a broad range of temperatures so that the shape of the curve can be clearly defined.
HAZ	Heat Affected Zone
ISP	BWR Integrated Surveillance Program
IVE	Individual Vessel Evaluation
Limiting material	The reactor vessel beltline material judged most likely to be controlling with regard to radiation embrittlement, based on calculation of the adjusted reference temperature (ART) defined by Reg. Guide 1.99 using best estimate chemistries and projected EOL and/or EOLE fluence estimates.
MLE	mils Lateral Expansion
Reg. Guide 1.99	U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials"
Representative Material	A plate or weld material that is selected from among existing surveillance programs or the SSP to represent the corresponding target plate or weld material in a plant.
Representative Data Set	The data set from the Charpy Impact test of the representative material that consists of three Charpy curves: 1) unirradiated, 2) 1 st irradiated, and 3) 2 nd irradiated.
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
SAW	Submerged Arc Weld
SMAW	Shielded Metal Arc Weld
SRM	Standard Reference Material is a material used to provide an independent check on the measurement of irradiation conditions for the surveillance materials.
SSP	BWR Supplemental Surveillance Program
Target material	A target weld or plate material is the specific vessel material to which the ISP test matrix assigns a representative surveillance material.
USE	Upper Shelf Energy

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION	1-1
1.1 Implementation Requirements	1-2
2 BACKGROUND.....	2-1
2.1 Historical Background.....	2-1
2.2 Development of the ISP	2-2
2.3 Benefits of the ISP	2-2
2.4 Review of Definitions Used in the ISP	2-3
2.4.1 Representative Materials	2-3
2.4.2 A Representative Data Set for the Limiting Plate or Weld Material.....	2-4
3 BWR SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS BEFORE THE ISP	3-1
3.1 Overview of BWR Surveillance Data	3-1
3.1.1 BWR Capsules and Vessel Materials	3-1
3.2 Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Data	3-2
4 ISP CAPSULE IRRADIATION, WITHDRAWAL AND TESTING	4-1
4.1 ISP Test Matrix	4-1
4.1.1 Development of the ISP Test Matrix	4-1
4.1.2 Changes to the ISP Test Matrix	4-10
4.2 ISP Test Schedule	4-17
4.3 Detailed ISP Test Plan.....	4-18
4.4 Results.....	4-25
5 PROJECT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION.....	5-1
5.1 Project Management Responsibilities.....	5-1
5.2 ISP Capsule Data Evaluation.....	5-1
5.3 Fluence and Dosimetry	5-3
5.4 Plan for Ongoing Vessel Dosimetry	5-4

5.5	ISP Capsule Data Sharing	5-4
5.6	Data Utilization.....	5-4
5.7	Planning for ISP Changes	5-5
6	LICENSING ASPECTS OF ISP IMPLEMENTATION	6-1
6.1	Implementation of ISP in Plant Technical Specifications or UFSAR.....	6-1
6.2	Continuing Licensing Considerations.....	6-1
7	ISP IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE LICENSE RENEWAL PERIOD	7-1
7.1	Design.....	7-1
7.1.1	Available Capsules.....	7-1
7.1.2	Testing Schedule	7-2
7.2	Evaluation of Testing Schedule	7-3
7.3	Program Management	7-7
7.4	Dosimetry and Fluence Calculations	7-7
7.5	Contingency Planning	7-7
7.6	Results	7-8
8	REFERENCES	8-1
A	INDIVIDUAL VESSEL EVALUATIONS.....	A-1
B	NRC FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION FOR BWRVIP-86 (EPRI REPORT 1000888).....	B-1
C	NRC FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION FOR BWRVIP-116 (EPRI REPORT 1007824).....	C-1
D	NRC APPROVAL OF BWRVIP-86-A	D-1
E	REVISION DETAILS TO BWRVIP-86-A (EPRI REPORT 1003346).....	E-1
F	REVISION DETAILS TO BWRVIP-86, REVISION 1	F-1

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1 Representative Data Set	2-4
Figure 4-1 Chemistry Plot for BWR Vessel and Surveillance Welds	4-15
Figure 4-2 Chemistry Plot for BWR Vessel and Surveillance Plates	4-16

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1 Schedule of Completed and Planned BWR Surveillance Capsule Testing Before Adoption of the ISP.....	3-4
Table 3-2 BWR Surveillance Capsule Plate Materials and Chemistry.....	3-5
Table 3-3 BWR Surveillance Capsule Weld Materials and Chemistry.....	3-6
Table 3-4 Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Specimen Matrix.....	3-7
Table 3-5 Capsule Locations of the SSP Materials Used in the ISP.....	3-10
Table 4-1 BWR Target Vessel Plate Materials.....	4-2
Table 4-2 BWR Target Vessel Weld Materials.....	4-3
Table 4-3 ISP Test Matrix.....	4-6
Table 4-4 Summary of ISP Surveillance Material Assignments.....	4-7
Table 4-5 ISP Capsule Test Schedule for the Original License Period.....	4-20
Table 4-6 Comparison of ISP Capsule Testing Schedule to Pre-ISP Schedule.....	4-21
Table 4-7 Detailed Test Plan by Plant.....	4-22
Table 4-8 ISP Test Matrix Results.....	4-26
Table 7-1 ISP(E) Capsule Test Schedule.....	7-2
Table 7-2 Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR Target Plates.....	7-5
Table 7-3 Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR Target Welds.....	7-6

1

INTRODUCTION

Boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the U.S. were built with at least three surveillance capsules installed to monitor neutron radiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel during its operating life. The capsules contain specimens representative of the vessel beltline materials. By periodically withdrawing a surveillance capsule and testing its specimens, embrittlement of the reactor vessel can be monitored. The irradiation-induced shift in the material properties of the capsule test specimens is used as an indication of embrittlement in the reactor vessel itself, which cannot be tested directly.

In the late 1990s, the BWR Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) utilities concluded that an integrated surveillance program would provide significant benefits over the individual plant surveillance programs. Report BWRVIP-78 [Reference 1] provided the program plan for an Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) for the BWR fleet in the U.S. The two primary benefits of the ISP are that the quality of BWR surveillance data is improved and overall costs to the BWR fleet are reduced.

The U.S. NRC Staff reviewed BWRVIP-78 and issued a Request for Additional Information (RAI) [2]. The BWRVIP provided a written response [3] and also issued Report BWRVIP-86 [4] to address implementation details. BWRVIP-86 refined the Program Plan outlined in BWRVIP-78, addressed NRC Staff comments from the first RAI, and presented the Implementation Plan and testing schedule for the ISP. A second RAI [5], addressing additional NRC Staff questions and recommendations regarding both reports, and the BWRVIP's response [6] ultimately led to the U.S. NRC issuance of a Safety Evaluation (SE) [7] regarding the BWR ISP in 2002. The BWRVIP then issued BWRVIP-86-A [8], which updated the Implementation Plan (BWRVIP-86) by incorporating all final changes to the ISP test matrix and test schedule to which the BWRVIP had committed during the regulatory review and approval process.

The primary focus of the ISP through 2002 was to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix H for the BWR 40-year operating period. However, from the earliest stages of the ISP design process, it was recognized that the ISP could be logically extended to meet the needs of individual BWR utilities seeking plant license renewal. As soon as the NRC approved the BWRVIP ISP for the original BWR operating license period, the BWRVIP began development of a plan to extend the ISP into the license renewal period. BWRVIP-116, *ISP Implementation for License Renewal* [9], presented that plan. The NRC Staff reviewed BWRVIP-116 and issued a Request for Additional Information (RAI) [10, 11]. The BWRVIP provided a written response [12] which revised some capsule withdrawal schedules and clarified some commitments, and the NRC subsequently approved the revised plan in a Safety Evaluation (SE) [13] in 2006.

This report combines BWRVIP-86-A and BWRVIP-116 to provide a comprehensive ISP Implementation Plan for both the original and the renewed license periods. The content from BWRVIP-116, which was added to this document as Section 7, was updated to reflect the changes to which the BWRVIP committed during the regulatory review and approval process [12].

Throughout this report, a capsule designated for withdrawal and testing during the extended license period will be called an "ISP(E) capsule," to differentiate it from ISP capsules withdrawn during the original license period.

1.1 Implementation Requirements

The results documented in this report will be utilized by the BWRVIP ISP and by individual utilities to demonstrate compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements. Therefore, the implementation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H govern and the implementation requirements of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 03-08, Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues, are not applicable.

2

BACKGROUND

2.1 Historical Background

A reactor pressure vessel (RPV) surveillance program is intended to monitor the changes in vessel material properties due to neutron irradiation. In July 1973, the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50, Appendix H [14], established the first legal requirements for comprehensive surveillance programs in nuclear plants. Plants already licensed prior to that time had installed irradiation test samples using the guidance of the 1961 (tentative), 1962, 1966, 1970 or the then-emerging 1973 version of ASTM E-185 [15]. Today, reactor pressure vessels that exceed a peak neutron fluence of 10^{17} n/cm² at the end-of-license are required to have an RPV material surveillance program that monitors radiation embrittlement in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix H.

Each BWR plant was built with a surveillance program that included weld and plate materials. However, many plants did not have surveillance materials that represented the limiting plate and/or weld material of the RPV, and there are two reasons for this. First, many of the surveillance programs were implemented prior to the establishment of 10CFR50 Appendix H, and there were no specific requirements to choose materials that represent the limiting beltline material for plants built prior to 1973. Second, for some plants, a revision to Reg. Guide 1.99 [16] resulted in a change in the limiting beltline material for that vessel.

In addition, some plants have limited or no unirradiated surveillance specimen data. For some plants, the unirradiated specimens were misplaced. The unirradiated data is needed to measure the irradiation shift of the tested surveillance materials.

Given the limitations in the individual plant surveillance programs, a program called the Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) [17, 18] was introduced in the late 1980s to obtain additional BWR surveillance data on well-characterized BWR vessel materials. The SSP was designed to supplement the available vessel embrittlement database and to examine BWR specific irradiation trends. Selecting materials that are suitable for a fleet-wide correlation also resulted in a selection of materials representing a broad range of BWR fleet RPV materials chemistry. The SSP filled in gaps in the existing plant surveillance programs to match the BWR fleet limiting beltline materials. The scope of the SSP included 84 sets of BWR Charpy specimens that represent both BWR plate and weld materials. In fact, most of the materials in the SSP were actual BWR vessel archive materials. Each of the 84 sets also had an excellent set of unirradiated data.

2.2 Development of the ISP

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

2.3 Benefits of the ISP

The BWR ISP provides many advantages compared to the previous individual BWR capsule programs. The integrated program is based on those capsules that best meet the needs of the BWR fleet. The benefits of the ISP to the BWR fleet are as follows:

- Improve compliance for each plant with the current version of 10CFR50 Appendix H [14] and ASTM E-185 [15].
- Better matching capsule data to the limiting materials for each plant
- Sharing BWR data within the BWR fleet

- Provide additional data for BWR vessels with missing or incomplete data from their plant-specific surveillance programs
- Improve the knowledge of embrittlement effects in BWR vessels
- Support license renewal by identifying appropriate surveillance capsules
- Reduce cost, exposure and outage time for the BWR fleet by eliminating testing of surveillance capsule materials that have no direct bearing on the irradiation behavior of plant-specific limiting beltline materials
- Obtain SSP data that will improve the quality of materials used to assess embrittlement. Consequently, the ISP not only provides data that is considerably more representative of limiting materials, but the database will be larger and will be available well before actual end-of-license for the plants in the fleet. The quality of the data will be consistent because of the standard methods that will be used for subsequent testing and also improved because of the high quality of the unirradiated and irradiated specimens.

Therefore, there are substantial benefits to integrating the existing surveillance programs and the SSP for monitoring radiation embrittlement of BWR RPVs.

2.4 Review of Definitions Used in the ISP

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

2.4.1 Representative Materials

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

2.4.2 A Representative Data Set for the Limiting Plate or Weld Material

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Figure 2-1
Representative Data Set**

3

BWR SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS BEFORE THE ISP

3.1 Overview of BWR Surveillance Data

As part of the development of the ISP implementation plan, the BWRVIP conducted a survey of U.S. BWRs. The purpose of the survey was to document the (pre-ISP) status of capsule testing, i.e., number of capsules remaining, current withdrawal schedule, intentions to seek deferrals, and related information. The survey was distributed to BWRVIP members in June 2000 requesting verification of plant specific surveillance capsule information, confirmation of licensing commitments in plant Technical Specifications or UFSARs, explanation of unique aspects of surveillance monitoring to address issues other than reactor vessel integrity, determination of the basis and EPFY for current pressure-temperature limit curves, and understanding the status of vessel fluence calculations. The data gathered from this survey was used to substantiate or update the plant data in the BWRVIP-78 report. Applicable results of the survey are presented below.

3.1.1 BWR Capsules and Vessel Materials

For the individual (pre-ISP) surveillance programs, each plant had established a withdrawal schedule for its capsules consistent with 10CFR50 Appendix H [14]. BWR vessels were built with at least three capsules provided near the RPV wall. Several plants (e.g., Browns Ferry 2, Dresden 2 and 3) were provided with a complement of more than three surveillance capsules. Four plants (Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2) have near-core capsules as well as wall capsules. As discussed in the BWRVIP-78 report, near-core capsules are not included in the ISP.

In general, the first two capsules are scheduled for removal during the plant life and are used for monitoring radiation embrittlement. The third capsule is scheduled for removal at End-of-License (EOL) and may be held without testing or used for the purpose of license renewal.

In addition to the typical allotment of three surveillance capsules, at least ten plants have reconstituted previously-tested surveillance specimens and reinserted the capsules: Cooper, Duane Arnold, FitzPatrick, Hatch 1 and 2, Nine Mile Point 1, Perry, Susquehanna 1 and 2, and Columbia Generating Station (formerly WNP-2). The ISP regards these reconstituted/reinserted capsules as Standby capsules (except that, in the case of Cooper, it will be used as a license renewal capsule).

The status of the individual (pre-ISP) surveillance programs at the time of ISP design (circa 2000) is summarized in Table 3-1. The purpose of Table 3-1 is to tally the total number of capsule tests that would have been conducted under the individual plant surveillance programs before adoption of the ISP; this will be later compared to the total number of capsules that will

be tested under the ISP to demonstrate the savings provided by the ISP. For that reason, Browns Ferry 1 is shown on this table even though it was not an operating member of the BWR fleet in 2000 and did not join the ISP until after the ISP was adopted in 2002.

Table 3-1 shows actual and planned withdrawal dates (in Effective Full Power Years [EFPY]) together with the fluence of the capsule withdrawn and planned EFPY for future capsule withdrawals. In general, third (e.g., 32 EFPY), fourth and reconstituted/reinserted capsules (where applicable) are shown as Standby (SB) capsules, unless the utility survey response indicated a definitive intention or commitment to withdraw a third or fourth capsule at a specific EFPY prior to 32 EFPY.

A total of 43 capsules were scheduled for future withdrawal and testing under the individual surveillance programs. Thirty-seven capsules had been tested and 50 were available as Standby capsules. Therefore, there was a total set of 130 tested, future and Standby capsules. The identities of all surveillance materials contained in the capsules are provided in Table 3-2 (plate surveillance materials) and Table 3-3 (welds).

3.2 Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Data

The Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) is an important source of high-quality surveillance data for use in the ISP. Background information on the SSP and the reasons for including its materials in the ISP are discussed below.

The BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) initiated the Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) in the late 1980s to obtain additional BWR surveillance data [17, 18]. The purpose of the program was to supplement the available vessel embrittlement data so that an irradiation shift correlation could be developed specifically for BWR vessels as an alternative to Reg. Guide 1.99. Selecting materials that are suitable for a fleet-wide correlation also results in a selection of materials representing a broad range of BWR fleet chemistry. Although it was not the original intention of the SSP, this selection of materials is exactly what was needed to complement the existing plant surveillance programs to better match the BWR fleet limiting beltline materials. The SSP specimens are superior to many of the individual surveillance program specimens for several reasons:

1. Unirradiated data - Unirradiated Charpy specimens for each of the materials were fabricated from the same plate and under the same conditions as the irradiated specimens. The unirradiated specimens were tested at the initiation of the program.
2. Chemical composition - A broken unirradiated Charpy specimen half of each material was tested for carbon, manganese, phosphorus, sulfur, silicon, nickel, molybdenum, and copper.
3. Dosimetry – Neutron fluence monitors were included in each capsule so that fast flux and fast fluence of each specimen set could be individually determined. Each monitor is sensitive to a specific neutron energy range and increased accuracy in a flux-spectrum is achieved by the use of several monitors (up to eleven different types of flux wires).

4. Temperature Monitors – The inherent operating nature of the BWR, with temperature related directly to pressure according to the steam saturation relationship, makes the vessel wall temperatures quite constant, even from plant to plant. The annulus between the vessel wall and the core shroud in the region of the surveillance capsules contains a mix of water returning from the core and feedwater. Depending on the feedwater temperature, this annulus region is between 525°F and 535°F. Therefore, five (5) temperature monitors were designed to melt at temperatures within the range of 504°F and 580°F.
5. Flux/Fluence – The capsules were irradiated to target the BWR fleet mid- to end-of-license fluence ranges.
6. Standard Reference Material (SRM) – A SRM was added to the SSP to provide an independent check of the measurement of irradiation conditions for the surveillance materials. The material used in this program is HSST-02. This material could also be used to validate the assumptions regarding flux and fluence.

Twenty-five materials were selected for the SSP: 13 plate materials and 12 weld materials. A total of 84 sets of Charpy test specimens from these materials were inserted in nine capsules for irradiation in two host BWR reactors (Cooper and Oyster Creek). The nine capsules are identified as SSP-A through SSP-I. Table 3-6 provides an inventory of SSP materials by capsule.

Although the SSP had been initiated by the BWROG and the nine capsules had been inserted into the two host reactors, by the late 1990's there were no plans or ongoing programs for testing the SSP capsules. Initiation of the ISP and inclusion of the SSP capsules in it provided the mechanism for withdrawing and testing the capsules. All nine SSP capsules have now been tested under the ISP.

Although all SSP materials were tested and added to the BWR material irradiation database, only eleven of the 25 materials (4 plate heats and 7 weld heats) are formally used in the ISP test matrix as representative materials. Table 3-7 lists the SSP materials used in the ISP matrix and shows the specific SSP capsules in which they were located.

**Table 3-1
Schedule of Completed and Planned BWR Surveillance Capsule Testing Before Adoption of the ISP**

Plant Name	Total	BWR Type	1st Capsule Removal			2nd Capsule Removal			3rd or other Capsule Removal		
			Planned (EFPY)	Actual (EFPY)	Fluence (1x10 ¹⁷ n/cm ²)	Planned* (EFPY)	Actual (EFPY)	Fluence (1x10 ¹⁷ n/cm ²)	Planned** (EFPY)	Actual (EFPY)	Fluence (10 ¹⁷ n/cm ²)
Browns Ferry 1		4	TBD			TBD			SB		
Browns Ferry 2		4	8	8.2	1.52	14			20 & 26		
Browns Ferry 3		4	18			TBD			SB		
Brunswick 1		4	8	8.67	3.2	TBD			SB		
Brunswick 2		4	10	10.9	4.06	TBD			SB		
Clinton		6	9			20			SB		
Cooper		4	3	6.8	2.4	12	11.2	2.8	22 and SB		
Dresden 2		3	1	0.7	0.1	6	6.23	0.52	17.8 & 3-SB		
Dresden 3		3	3	2.65	0.3	6	5.98	0.71	17.6 & 3-SB		
Duane Arnold		4	6	5.9	4.9	15	14.36	11	2-SB		
Fermi 2		4	8	8	Not tested***	24			SB		
FitzPatrick		4	6	5.98	2.6	15	13.4	5	30 & 1-SB		
Grand Gulf		6	24			TBD			SB		
Hatch 1		4	6	5.75	2.4	15	14.3	4.6	2-SB		
Hatch 2		4	6	6.58	2.3	15			2-SB		
Hope Creek		4	6	6.01	1.42	15			SB		
LaSalle 1		5	6	6.5	0.9	15			SB		
LaSalle 2		5	6	6.98	1.15	15			SB		
Limerick 1		4	15			30			SB		
Limerick 2		4	15			30			SB		
Monticello		3	8	7.08	2.93	24			SB		
Nine Mile Point 1		2	6	5.8	3.6	8	7.98	4.78	16, 24, & 2 SB	16.76	10.0
Nine Mile Point 2		5	8	8.72	0.849	20			SB		
Oyster Creek		2	8	8.4	7.46	20			SB		
Peach Bottom 2		4	8	7.53	1.8	20			SB		
Peach Bottom 3		4	8	7.57	1.6	20			SB		
Perry		6	8	5.5	3.53	15			2-SB		
Pilgrim		3	5	4.17	2.3	18			SB		
Quad Cities 1		3	1	1.2	0.10	6	6.64	0.55	19 & 3-SB		
Quad Cities 2		3	1	1.6	0.17	6	5.63	0.66	18 & 3-SB		
River Bend		6	10.4	10.08	Not tested***	15			SB		
Susquehanna 1		4	6	6.7	1.4	15			2-SB		
Susquehanna 2		4	6	6.2	1.3	15			2-SB		
Vermont Yankee		4	8	7.54	0.45	24			SB		
Columbia GS (WNP-2)		5	8	7.2	1.55	24			2-SB		
TOTAL PLANNED	43			8			26			9	
TOTAL TESTED	37			27			9			1	
TOTAL STANDBY (SB)	50									50	
TOTAL	130			35			35			60	

* TBD - To be determined ** SB - Standby, End-of-License, 32 EFPY, or Reconstituted/Reinserted Capsule

***These capsules had been withdrawn but not yet tested prior to the adoption of the ISP; therefore, they are counted in the "Total Still Planned" tally. The River Bend capsule was tested by the ISP in 2002..

Table 3-2
BWR Surveillance Capsule Plate Materials and Chemistry

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Table 3-3
BWR Surveillance Capsule Weld Materials and Chemistry**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 3-4
Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Specimen Matrix

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 3-4
Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Specimen Matrix (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Table 3-4
Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) Specimen Matrix (Continued)**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 3-5
Capsule Locations of the SSP Materials Used in the ISP

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

4

ISP CAPSULE IRRADIATION, WITHDRAWAL AND TESTING

4.1 ISP Test Matrix

4.1.1 *Development of the ISP Test Matrix*

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Table 4-1
BWR Target Vessel Plate Materials**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-2
BWR Target Vessel Weld Materials

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Table 4-3
ISP Test Matrix**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-4
Summary of ISP Surveillance Material Assignments

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-4
Summary of ISP Surveillance Material Assignments (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-4
Summary of ISP Surveillance Material Assignments (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-4
Summary of ISP Surveillance Material Assignments (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

4.1.2 Changes to the ISP Test Matrix

The ISP test matrix will be re-evaluated periodically based on new information such as premature shutdown of a host plant. Where changes to the matrix are warranted, they will be submitted to the NRC for approval prior to implementation.

As discussed in the previous section, the ISP test matrix assigns representative surveillance materials to target vessel materials which were - at the time the ISP was established - the vessel limiting materials. If a representative surveillance material becomes unavailable in the future - due to, for example, premature shutdown of a host plant - then another representative surveillance material must be assigned. The IVEs in Appendix A provide a list of several alternates for each vessel that the BWRVIP will consider when choosing a new representative surveillance material.

Because the target vessel materials listed in the test matrix were based on the limiting vessel materials, the BWRVIP has evaluated the effects of changes in vessel limiting materials. Changes to the vessel limiting materials may occur when a vessel integrity evaluation updates the Adjusted Reference Temperatures (ART) of the beltline materials as a result of updated chemistry (Cu/Ni) or fluence information. Furthermore, changes to vessel limiting materials are

expected as an occasional consequence of the successful application of ISP surveillance data. After two or more capsules of a material have been tested, the fitted Chemistry Factor (CF) for a surveillance material may be less than its CF from the Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 tables. At the time of initial ISP test matrix development in 2000, few heats had 2 or more surveillance data points available. Therefore, for most vessels, the limiting materials – and thus the vessel target materials – were based on calculations using the chemistry factors from the Reg. Guide tables. As additional capsules have been tested, the resulting surveillance-based CF for a material is often less than its CF from the Reg. Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 tables; when that surveillance data may be used directly (e.g., vessel and surveillance heat numbers match), the vessel heat will have a lower ART, which in turn may make another heat the limiting material.

BWRVIP evaluation of the effects or consequences of changes in vessel limiting materials has shown that the ISP test matrix does not need to be changed when vessel limiting materials change. Therefore, the test matrix set of target vessel materials will remain “static” with regard to future changes in vessel limiting materials. The reasons are discussed below.

ASTM E185-82, Section 5.1, Materials Selection, requires surveillance materials to be selected from the vessel materials projected to be limiting at EOL, where that projection is made *at the time of surveillance test material selection*; the ISP test matrix development process complied with that requirement. ASTM E 185 does not require that different surveillance materials be fabricated and substituted in a surveillance program if the vessel limiting material changes later in life. A surveillance material, once selected, is the surveillance material for that vessel, independent of future changes in vessel limiting material. Therefore, the guidelines do not require that the ISP change the assigned representative surveillance material – or, the target vessel material, since the two are paired – when the limiting material changes. The list of target materials may remain static.

Because changes to the test matrix require significant resources to implement (e.g., revising ISP documentation and submitting for NRC review and approval), a change should be considered only if it has consequence – e.g., if it changes the vessel integrity evaluation. For example, changing the ISP test matrix by assigning a new limiting material as the revised target vessel material might be desirable if the change resulted in the assignment of a new representative surveillance material that provided new, valuable data for the vessel integrity evaluation. Therefore, this possibility was evaluated.

New data for vessel integrity evaluations would become available only if the following conditions are met: (1) the new representative surveillance material heat number exactly matches the vessel material heat number, and (2) the surveillance data was not available before the test matrix change was made. Unless both conditions are met, no new data (e.g., chemistry factor data) would be available, and the ART calculated for each vessel material will be the exactly the same as it was before the change. Without meeting these conditions, changing the assigned target vessel material – and thus the test matrix – would be a costly administrative exercise with neither benefit nor effect.

It is unlikely that both conditions necessary to provide useable new data would ever be met. The BWRVIP ISP provides all ISP surveillance data to all vessels containing that heat in its vessel, whether or not the heat is assigned to the vessel as its representative surveillance material. Therefore, there is no need to change the ISP test matrix to ensure that each plant considers all available data. For example, there are several materials in the SSP capsules which have been tested and evaluated but are not assigned as representative surveillance materials. The BWRVIP provides the surveillance data for those materials to all vessels containing the matching heats in their beltlines, and ISP guidance on use of ISP surveillance data requires its consideration in vessel integrity evaluations.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Finally, the BWRVIP evaluated the adequacy of the existing set of ISP surveillance materials to demonstrate, from a global viewpoint, that changes to the ISP test matrix are not required when a limiting material changes. The current set of ISP surveillance materials provides bounding coverage, from the standpoint of chemistry content, for all existing limiting materials and all potential future limiting materials.

- Figure 4-1 is a chemistry plot for the BWR vessel and surveillance welds. It shows all ISP surveillance weld materials (both from ISP host plants and from welds tested in SSP capsules); other available surveillance weld data – i.e., the surveillance welds in the deferred capsules not being tested in the ISP (only those “useable” deferred welds which have baseline data are shown); the limiting welds in all U.S. BWR vessels; and all BWR vessel beltline welds that are not the current limiting welds (but which will be considered as “potential limiting welds” for the purpose of this evaluation). Figure 4-1 demonstrates the following:
 - The current ISP/SSP surveillance welds provide excellent coverage in terms of chemistry content for both the current limiting vessel welds and all potential limiting vessel welds.
 - The current limiting vessel welds bound the potential limiting welds. Therefore, because the current set of ISP surveillance welds is adequately representative of the current limiting welds, it is representative of any welds that may become limiting in the future.
 - There are no deferred surveillance welds that improve the chemistry coverage beyond which is provided by the current ISP/SSP surveillance welds.
 - No change to the ISP test matrix would achieve any better chemistry coverage of the limiting welds or future limiting welds than does the existing ISP test matrix.

- Figure 4-2 is a chemistry plot for the BWR vessel and surveillance plates. It shows: all ISP surveillance plate materials (both from ISP host plants and from plates tested in SSP capsules); the limiting plates in all U.S. BWR vessels; other available surveillance plate data – i.e., the surveillance plates in the deferred capsules not being tested in the ISP (only those “useable” deferred plates having baseline data are shown); and all BWR vessel beltline plates that are not current limiting plates (once again, assumed to be “potential limiting plates”). Figure 4-2 demonstrates the following:
 - The current ISP/SSP surveillance plates provide excellent coverage in terms of chemistry content for both the current limiting vessel plates and all potential limiting vessel plates up to a Cu content of 0.22 wt.%
 - There are three limiting vessel plates with Cu > 0.22 wt.%. The current ISP surveillance plates were deemed adequate (at approval of the ISP program) to represent those limiting plates.
 - There are five non-limiting vessel plates (e.g., potential future limiting plates) with Cu > 0.22 wt.%. All have a Cu less than (or, in 1 case, equal to) the existing limiting plate at Cu = 0.27 wt.%. It is reasonable to conclude that, if the current ISP surveillance plates adequately represent the limiting plate at Cu = 0.27 wt.%, then the current set of ISP surveillance plates would adequately represent any of those five non-limiting plates were they to become limiting, since they are all less than or equal to an existing limiting plate.

- There is no non-limiting vessel plate whose Cu or Ni is greater than the highest Cu or Ni content of the original set of limiting plates upon which the ISP was based. Therefore, all potential, future limiting plates are bounded in this regard by the existing test matrix.
- There is one deferred surveillance plate (at Cu = 0.24 wt.%, Ni = 0.5 wt.%) that would appear to provide better Cu coverage for 4 of the 5 potential limiting plates with Cu > 0.22 wt.%. However:
 - Three capsules containing this heat were tested under the plant's previous individual surveillance program; therefore, surveillance data already exist for this heat.
 - This material was the subject of a well-documented material mix-up in its surveillance program. It is not a good candidate for inclusion in the ISP.
- Therefore, there are no deferred surveillance plates that improve the chemistry coverage beyond that which is provided by the current ISP/SSP surveillance plates.
- No change in the set of ISP representative surveillance plates would achieve better chemistry coverage of the limiting plates or future limiting plates than does the existing ISP test matrix.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Figure 4-1
Chemistry Plot for BWR Vessel and Surveillance Welds**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Figure 4-2
Chemistry Plot for BWR Vessel and Surveillance Plates**

4.2 ISP Test Schedule

This section discusses the ISP capsules to be tested, and the schedule for those tests, as approved for the original plant license period. The capsule tests supporting the license renewal period are discussed in Section 7 of this report.

The ISP capsule test schedule for the 13 ISP host plants and nine SSP capsules is illustrated in Table 4-5. In order to accommodate plant operating schedules, capsules will be withdrawn in the years indicated, plus or minus one year. This tolerance on testing does not materially affect the objectives of the testing program. If the BWRVIP needs to schedule a test outside of this tolerance, the NRC will be notified at least one year prior to either the year stated in Table 4-5 or the revised test year, whichever is earlier.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

4.3 Detailed ISP Test Plan

The previous sections have described the ISP matrix from the fleet perspective, which is useful for describing the structure and organization of the program. ISP implementation is ultimately performed at the plant level, however. Therefore, this section provides a detailed presentation of the ISP from the perspective of the individual plant.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-5
ISP Capsule Test Schedule for the Original License Period

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-6
Comparison of ISP Capsule Testing Schedule to Pre-ISP Schedule

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-7
Detailed Test Plan by Plant

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-7
Detailed Test Plan by Plant (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-7
Detailed Test Plan by Plant (Continued)

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

4.4 Results

The results of the ISP Test Plan discussed above are shown in Table 4-8. The table shows the disposition of all BWR surveillance capsules under the ISP. Plants that are not selected as ISP hosts are shaded.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 4-8
ISP Test Matrix Results

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

5

PROJECT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

The integrated surveillance program is more than just a compilation of data from separate irradiation capsules and resultant sharing of the data. It is designed to address both the short- and long-term requirements for acquiring irradiation data to support the continued operability of the BWR vessels. This will be accomplished by systematically collecting the representative materials data from the selected capsules, consistently evaluating the Charpy test results and comparing the fitted test results to the predicted embrittlement behavior. The evaluated results from the ISP will be used to evaluate embrittlement in the limiting materials for each of the target BWR vessels.

5.1 Project Management Responsibilities

ISP project management responsibilities will be assigned to the BWRVIP. The BWRVIP will manage capsule withdrawal and testing in accordance with the schedule contained in this plan. Project management activities will include:

- Working with utilities to identify required capsule withdrawals so that the utility can make necessary plans and arrangements.
- Shipping and testing of ISP capsules and associated dosimetry per applicable standards.
- Reporting the results of the surveillance specimen testing in a report as required by 10CFR50 Appendix H within one year of the capsule withdrawal date.
- Distributing capsule reports to all plants that have representative materials in the capsule.
- Planning for changes and contingencies in the ISP testing matrix.
- Consideration of surveillance needs for plant license renewal.

5.2 ISP Capsule Data Evaluation

The surveillance capsules in the ISP program will be withdrawn according to the designated schedule. Testing will be performed in a timely manner to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H, and ASTM E-185 [15]. The data from the testing of individual capsules will be summarized in a test report containing Charpy impact test results, tension test results (if applicable), dosimetry data from various locations within the capsule and chemistries of irradiated test specimens. An evaluation of the test data will be performed to determine the applicability to the BWR vessels. In particular, fitted curves will be developed for the irradiated transition temperature Charpy impact energy vs. temperature, lateral expansion vs. temperature, and percent shear vs. temperature data.

The method of Charpy curve-fitting to be employed will be the hyperbolic tangent (TANH) function:

$$Y = A + B \times \text{TANH}[(T-T_0)/C] \quad (1)$$

where

- Y = the toughness response measurement (i.e., energy, lateral expansion, or percent shear) at a given temperature, T
- A = the mid transition energy at a temperature T_0
- B = the difference between the mid transition and the upper shelf energy levels
- (A-B) = the asymptotic lower shelf energy level
- (A+B) = the asymptotic upper shelf energy level
- T_0 = the mid transition temp. corresponding to the value A
- C = a measure of the slope of the transition region (B/C is the actual slope)

These fitted Charpy curves will be evaluated together with the unirradiated data for the corresponding surveillance weld and plate materials. For both the unirradiated and irradiated transition temperature curves, the 30 ft-lb, 50 ft-lb and 35 mils lateral expansion values and upper shelf energies will be determined. The 30 ft-lb shift values (ΔT_{30}) will be calculated from the results of the fitted Charpy impact energy curves. The Charpy data from each capsule will be evaluated along with the unirradiated baseline data and any prior capsule test results for the same heats of weld or plate material. Data from both ISP and SSP capsules will be combined for the purpose of evaluation when the same heat of material is contained in multiple surveillance capsules. In particular, the surveillance data will be fitted as follows to obtain the best-fit chemistry factor (CF) per Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 [16]:

- (a) Calculate the fluence factors for each data point from the measured fluence values

$$\text{fluence factor}_1 = f_1^{(0.28 - 0.10 \log f_1)}$$

$$\text{fluence factor}_2 = f_2^{(0.28 - 0.10 \log f_2)}$$

where f = fluence in units of 10^{19} n/cm².

- (b) Calculate the best-fit CF from the least-squares fit equation

$$\text{best-fit CF} = \frac{(\Delta T_{30_1} \times \text{fluence factor}_1 + \Delta T_{30_2} \times \text{fluence factor}_2 + \dots)}{(\text{fluence factor}_1^2 + \text{fluence factor}_2^2 + \dots)} \quad (2)$$

The best fit CF is used to determine the measured RT_{NDT} shift in surveillance materials from the equation

$$\Delta RT_{NDT} = CF \times f^{(0.28-0.1 \log f)} \quad (3)$$

The evaluated test results will be compared to the predicted behavior from Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 for the CF values from the known chemistries of the surveillance materials. The measured vs. predicted embrittlement response will be documented in the ISP surveillance capsule report.

5.3 Fluence and Dosimetry

An evaluation of capsule fluences will be performed for each of the ISP capsules as part of the testing and reporting of the capsule. The flux wires will be removed from each capsule and analyzed for radioactivity content by gamma spectrometry. The analysis of dosimeters will be performed using standard, benchmarked methods. ISP capsule fluence evaluations will be performed in a consistent manner using a RPV neutron fluence calculational methodology that will meet current NRC Staff guidance in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.190 [19].

BWR facilities that will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules will determine vessel fluences, when required, utilizing an NRC-approved neutron fluence determination methodology.

BWR facilities, proposing to remove additional surveillance capsules for the purpose of assessing RPV integrity (e.g., host plants), will use an NRC-approved methodology for determining the fluence of the capsules and RPV. All ISP fluence evaluations will be performed using a RPV neutron fluence calculation methodology that will be consistent with the guidance in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.190 [19].

If a BWR facility proposes to change its neutron determination methodology, the methodology must be consistent with the guidance of U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.190 and approved by the NRC.

5.4 Plan for Ongoing Vessel Dosimetry

Under the ISP, capsules from some plants will be tested and capsules from some other plants will not. For a plant that has one or more future capsules tested, dosimetry will be available from the capsule as an updated basis for the projected vessel fluence. For a plant that does not have a future capsule tested, there are several options:

1. If a plant has previously tested a capsule, the dosimetry from that capsule is generally the basis for its current fluence projection. This plant's fluence projection will continue to be based on its capsule dosimetry unless a major change to the core design or management is undertaken in the future.
2. If a plant has not previously tested a capsule, but has tested a first cycle dosimeter, the first cycle dosimetry is generally the basis for its current fluence projection. Comparisons of first cycle and first capsule dosimetry results have consistently shown that first cycle dosimetry results are conservative. Therefore, this plant's fluence projection will continue to be based on its first cycle dosimetry unless a major change to the core design or management is undertaken in the future.
3. Alternatively, if a plant has not had a previous capsule tested, a selective neutron transport recalculation could be performed for this vessel using a benchmarked fluence methodology, dosimetry data from plants with similar design and any related information (e.g., ex-vessel dosimetry) that could improve the calculation of fluence in the vessel beltline region.

5.5 ISP Capsule Data Sharing

The data exchange and data sharing will be coordinated with all participants under the ISP. A program plan to manage data sharing will be developed in the implementation phase of the ISP.

5.6 Data Utilization

There are two options for applying the measured surveillance data:

1. Under option 1, if the heat of material does not specifically match the limiting heat of beltline material for that vessel, the chemistry factor for the limiting beltline material will be determined by the tables in Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2. The corresponding margin term as stated in Position C.1 will apply. Data from the representative material will be analyzed to confirm that the measured Charpy ΔT_{30} shift is within the normally expected scatter in the predicted shift. The same method (i.e., Position C.1) will be applied to calculate adjusted reference temperature (ART) for all weld and plate materials in the vessel beltline.
2. If two or more surveillance data sets with matching heat numbers are available for the limiting beltline material, Option 2 may be used to calculate adjusted reference temperature when the data has been determined to be credible. The chemistry factor and margin term are calculated using Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2, Position C.2. This data will only be used for evaluating the ART for the limiting beltline materials in the vessel that is being represented. The ART for all other materials in the beltline will be evaluated according to the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2, Position C.1.

Credibility of the surveillance data will be judged by the following criteria:

- a) Materials in the capsules should be those most likely to be controlling with regard to radiation embrittlement.
- b) Scatter in the plots of Charpy energy vs. temperature for the irradiated and unirradiated conditions should be small enough to permit the determination of the 30 ft-lb temperatures and upper shelf energies unambiguously.
- c) When there are two or more sets of surveillance data from one reactor, the scatter of ΔRT_{NDT} values about a best-fit line (given by Eq. 3) normally should be less than 28°F for welds and 17°F for base metal. Even if the fluence range is large (two or more orders of magnitude), the scatter should not exceed twice those values.
- d) The irradiation temperature of the Charpy specimens in the capsule(s) should match the vessel wall temperature at the cladding/base metal interface within $\pm 25^\circ\text{F}$.
- e) If correlation monitor material is available in the capsules, the surveillance data for the correlation monitor material should fall within the scatter band of the data base for that material.

Data points falling outside the normal 2-sigma scatter band for welds or plates will be evaluated in detail and compared to similar material test results to understand the embrittlement behavior. Applicability to individual BWR vessels will be considered on a plant-specific basis.

5.7 Planning for ISP Changes

Throughout the term of the ISP, the BWRVIP will monitor the progress, coordinate future actions such as withdrawal and testing of future capsules and reporting of surveillance capsule test results, and identify additional program needs. A reevaluation of the ISP test matrix and capsule withdrawal schedule will be performed on a periodic basis or when a significant event occurs that may require special consideration. Contingency planning for the ISP will need to address any major interruptions in plant operation such as early, permanent plant shutdown or an extended outage of one of the host plants. As time progresses, actual plant operating experience will provide more accurate data about each plant for predicting end-of-life vessel fluences and target capsule fluence values. This information will be factored into the ISP planning and, if necessary, adjustments will be made to the remaining capsule test matrix and withdrawal schedule in order to maintain an optimized program. Minor reassessments in the ISP test matrix will take into account plant-specific variations in scheduled withdrawal dates due to modifications in fuel cycles, or changes in target fluences caused by power uprates or variation in capacity factor.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

The BWRVIP will identify and implement changes to the program as the need arises. When specific changes are identified to the ISP testing matrix, withdrawal schedule, or testing and reporting of individual capsule results, these modifications will be submitted to the NRC in a timely manner so that appropriate arrangements can be made for implementation.

6

LICENSING ASPECTS OF ISP IMPLEMENTATION

The ISP is designed as a replacement for the existing individual BWR material surveillance programs. From a licensing perspective, each utility will continue to demonstrate compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix H by reference to the ISP in Plant Technical Specifications or Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports. In the implementation phase, the program documents and capsule test reports will be submitted to NRC through the BWRVIP. Throughout the program, the BWRVIP will continue to review the ISP program and, if necessary, will implement revisions to meet the licensing needs of utilities.

6.1 Implementation of ISP in Plant Technical Specifications or UFSAR

Upon receiving approval of the ISP program and implementation plans, individual BWR plant owners will submit requests to NRC to replace their existing material surveillance monitoring program with the ISP. This will require referencing the ISP program and implementation plans in the individual plant Technical Specifications or Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), as appropriate. Details of the ISP test matrix to be included in plant Technical Specifications or UFSAR involve identifying the specific representative weld and plate materials from host reactor capsules, and specifying the associated testing schedule for these replacement capsules. In many cases the representative weld and plate materials may be contained in different reactors with staggered test schedules. In some cases, one or more of the representative material surveillance capsules may have already been tested, and the implementation will simply require adopting the results from these capsule tests in lieu of their own capsule data.

A second step in the implementation process is the plant-specific review of existing plant operating P-T limit curves. An initial review of the new/replacement surveillance data will confirm that the projections of ART used in developing the present curves are still valid, or are conservative, for each BWR vessel. The period of validity (EFPY) for the existing curves will be evaluated based on the available information for each vessel, and a reassessment of the date for revision will be determined if changes to the P-T curves are deemed to be necessary.

A reassessment of the validity of P-T limit curves will continue on an ongoing basis as new data becomes available from the ISP Program and as the data is evaluated for embrittlement behavior of the limiting weld and plate materials for specific BWR vessels.

6.2 Continuing Licensing Considerations

The BWRVIP will continue to monitor licensing needs of the BWR utilities related to surveillance program requirements. As changes to the ISP are warranted due to unanticipated

shutdowns or outages, the BWRVIP will develop the appropriate documentation for licensing submittal. The affected utilities will submit corresponding requests to adopt the revised ISP program as specified in the BWRVIP reports. It is anticipated that such requests would be coordinated through the BWRVIP to maintain consistency in the submittals.

7

ISP IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE LICENSE RENEWAL PERIOD

Continuation of the ISP as BWR plants are granted renewed operating licenses was considered during the initial design of the ISP. The ISP was fundamentally designed to continue to serve the surveillance needs of the fleet as plants are licensed for extended operation. Capsules held in reserve at the ISP host plants were intended to be used for surveillance monitoring beyond 32 EFPY of plant operation.

Throughout this discussion, a capsule designated for withdrawal and testing during the extended license period is an “ISP(E) capsule,” to differentiate it from ISP capsules withdrawn during the original license period.

7.1 Design

The ISP during the license renewal period - hereafter, the ISP(E) - is a continuation of the ISP as described in the previous sections, with the testing program expanded to include the additional withdrawal and testing of one ISP(E) capsule from each of the thirteen ISP host plants. This will ensure that the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR 50 [14] continue to be met for BWR licensees participating in the BWRVIP ISP.

The design of the ISP(E) is based on the assumption that all plants in the BWR fleet will seek and be approved for license renewal. The possibility exists that some plants may not seek or be granted extended operating licenses. The ISP test matrix would be affected only if the plants(s) not approved for license renewal are ISP host plants. Still, the design of the ISP possesses the inherent flexibility required to handle such a possibility, and the contingency plans for addressing that issue are discussed later in this section.

7.1.1 Available Capsules

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

7.1.2 Testing Schedule

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Some uncertainty exists in the projections of the exact year these plants will reach the target EFPY; therefore, the BWRVIP will closely coordinate with the ISP plants and inform the NRC Staff of any schedule changes that exceed 2 years of the date given in Table 7-1.

**Table 7-1
ISP(E) Capsule Test Schedule**

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

This schedule is consistent with, and an extension of, the existing ISP test matrix. It incorporates the schedule changes made by the BWRVIP in Reference [12] in response to the NRC RAI [10, 11] regarding BWRVIP-116.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

7.2 Evaluation of Testing Schedule

The effectiveness of the proposed ISP(E) capsule test schedule has been evaluated.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

It is further noted that the fluence data for several plants have been updated since similar tables/information was provided in references [9] and [12]. Tables 7-2 and 7-3 reflect the updated plant fluence data that has been provided to the BWRVIP through 2007.

Tables 7-2 and 7-3 demonstrate that testing the ISP(E) capsules at the planned withdrawal EFPY will provide broad coverage of vessel limiting material EOLE $\frac{1}{4}$ T fluences. In most cases, more than 100% of the EOLE $\frac{1}{4}$ T fluence will be achieved by the ISP(E) capsule. On average, the ISP(E) capsules will achieve more than twice the EOLE $\frac{1}{4}$ T fluence of their target vessel limiting materials.

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 7-2
Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR Target Plates

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

Table 7-3
Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR Target Welds

**Content Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

7.3 Program Management

Program management, data handling/sharing responsibilities, and data utilization will continue under the ISP(E) in the same manner as under the ISP, addressed in Section 5.

7.4 Dosimetry and Fluence Calculations

The requirements of Section 5.3, Fluence and Dosimetry, apply for the extended license period.

7.5 Contingency Planning

The capsule test plan for the ISP(E) outlined above is based on the assumption that all thirteen ISP host plants will seek and be approved for license renewal. At this time, that is a reasonable assumption. However, the ISP(E) must be prepared to implement an alternative test plan, should one or more ISP host plants not continue operation until their ISP(E) capsules are withdrawn.

Throughout the term of the ISP and ISP(E), the BWRVIP will monitor the progress, coordinate future actions such as withdrawal and testing of future capsules and reporting of surveillance capsule test results, and identify additional program needs. A reevaluation of the ISP test matrix and capsule withdrawal schedule will be performed on a periodic basis or when a significant event occurs that may require special consideration. Contingency planning for the ISP will need to address any major interruptions in plant operation such as early, permanent plant shutdown or an extended outage of one of the host plants.

The contingency plans under the ISP(E) are the same as under the ISP, should an ISP host plant prematurely shut down. Consideration would be given to retrieving the ISP(E) capsule from the facility prior to permanent shutdown if there were reasonable expectation that the target fluence were achieved. If removal of the capsule is not a viable option, then a new best representative material would be selected from the surveillance materials not currently being tested as part of the ISP. The Individual Vessel Evaluations (IVEs) presented in Appendix A identify several surveillance materials, other than the best representative material, that could represent a particular RPV's limiting plate or weld. One of these other candidates could be selected to be a replacement representative material for the orphaned target vessel materials. Having these IVEs, which constitute preestablished lists of available backup surveillance materials, the BWRVIP can act in a timely and efficient manner to arrange for the appropriate acquisition and evaluation of data from a backup material to support the goals of the ISP. Finally, should none of the IVE candidates be a viable option, the target plant's own capsules, which were deferred under the ISP but remain in the reactor or the pool, will be available as the ultimate contingency.

In addition to reevaluations associated with significant events such as major interruptions in ISP plant operations, the ISP test matrix will be reassessed when there are other changes that may substantially affect an ISP(E) capsule withdrawal date or the target capsule fluence established in this report. Plant-specific events or conditions to be evaluated include modifications in fuel cycles, power uprates, or variation in the capacity factor assumed in the EOLE fluence projections. Appropriate changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule in order to maintain the

target fluences will be submitted to the NRC for approval prior to the capsule withdrawal dates. If capsule withdrawal schedule changes are insufficient to ensure the timely availability of test data to user plants, then appropriate changes to the ISP test matrix will be submitted to the NRC for approval.

7.6 Results

A plan for the implementation of the Integrated Surveillance Program into the license renewal period has been presented. The plan consists of (1) continuation of the existing design (e.g., test matrix, implementation guidelines for data handling and data utilization, etc.) and (2) testing of 13 additional ISP capsules during the license renewal period. An evaluation of the plan demonstrates that the ISP will continue to provide high-quality surveillance data for the BWR fleet representative of the vessel EOLE fluence exposures.

8

REFERENCES

1. *BWRVIP-78: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan*, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and BWRVIP: 1999, TR-114228.
2. Letter from William H. Bateman (NRC) to Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman) , “Proprietary Request for Additional Information Regarding BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (BWRVIP-78) (TAC NO. MA91111),” dated June 19, 2000.
3. Letter from Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman) to Document Control Desk (NRC), “PROJECT NO. 704 – BWRVIP Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding BWRVIP-78),” dated December 15, 2000.
4. *BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project: BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan*, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and BWRVIP: 2000, TR-1000888.
5. Letter from William H. Bateman (NRC) to Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman), “Proprietary Second Request for Additional Information Regarding BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (BWRVIP-78) (TAC NO. MA9111),” dated February 14, 2001.
6. Letter from Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman) to Document Control Desk (NRC), “PROJECT NO. 704 – BWRVIP Response to Second NRC Request for Additional Information on the BWR Integrated Surveillance Program,” dated May 30, 2001.
7. Letter from William H. Bateman (NRC) to Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman), “Safety Evaluation Regarding EPRI Proprietary Reports BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78) and BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan,” dated February 1, 2002.
8. *BWRVIP-86-A: Vessel and Internals Project: BWR Integrated Surveillance Program*, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and BWRVIP: 2002, TR-1000888.
9. *BWRVIP-116: BWR Vessel and Internals Project Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal*, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1007824.
10. Letter from William H. Bateman (NRC) to Carl Terry (BWRVIP Chairman), “Proprietary Request for Additional Information – Review of BWR Vessel and Internal Project Report, BWRVIP-116, Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation for License Renewal,” dated March 29, 2004.

References

11. Letter from Matthew A. Mitchell (NRC) to Bill Eaton (BWRVIP Chairman), "Supplementary Request for Additional Information Regarding BWRVIP-116, BWR Vessel and Internals Project Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal," dated June 23, 2004.
12. Letter from William Eaton (BWRVIP Chairman) to Document Control Desk (NRC), "Project No. 704 – BWRVIP Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information on BWRVIP-116," dated January 11, 2005.
13. Letter from Matthew A. Mitchell (NRC) to Bill Eaton (BWRVIP Chairman), "Proprietary Safety Evaluation of the "BWRVIP Vessel and Internals Project, Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal (BWRVIP-116)," dated February 24, 2006.
14. 10CFR50, Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements," Appendix H to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1995.
15. ASTM E-185, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels," American Society for Testing and Materials, July 1982.
16. "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988.
17. General Electric Nuclear Energy Report GE-NE-523-93-0732, "BWR Supplemental Surveillance Program Phase 1 Report: Surveillance Data Collection and Evaluation," March 1989.
18. General Electric Nuclear Energy Report GE-NE-523-99-0732, "Progress Report on Phase 2 of the BWR Owners' Group Supplemental Surveillance Program," January, 1992.
19. Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence," March 2001.

A

INDIVIDUAL VESSEL EVALUATIONS

**Entire Appendix Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

B

**NRC FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION FOR BWRVIP-86
(EPRI REPORT 1000888)**



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 1, 2002

Carl Terry, BWRVIP Chairman
Niagara Mohawk Power Company
Post Office Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING EPRI PROPRIETARY REPORTS "BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS PROJECT, BWR INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM PLAN (BWRVIP-78)" AND "BWRVIP-86: BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS PROJECT, BWR INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN"

Dear Mr. Terry:

By letters dated December 22, 1999, and December 22, 2000, the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) submitted for staff review and approval the EPRI Proprietary Reports TR-114228, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)," and 1000888, "BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," respectively. These reports, along with BWRVIP responses (dated December 22, 2000, and May 30, 2001) to NRC staff requests for additional information (RAIs), described the technical basis for the development and implementation of an integrated surveillance program (ISP) intended to support operation of all U.S. BWR reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) through the completion of each facility's current 40-year operating license. The BWRVIP ISP was submitted under the regulatory provisions given in Appendix H to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50), Paragraph III.C., "Requirements for an Integrated Surveillance Program."

The BWRVIP-78 report described the technical basis related to material selection and testing on which the proposed BWRVIP ISP was constructed. The report principally addressed the methodology established to identify existing plant-specific surveillance capsules and surveillance capsules from the Supplemental Surveillance Program initiated by the Boiling Water Reactors Owners' Group in the late 1980s, which contain important surveillance materials for inclusion within the ISP. In this case, "important" surveillance materials may be understood to be those which best represent the actual limiting (in terms of predicted fracture behavior) plate and weld materials from which BWR RPVs were constructed. The report also established the connection between the identified surveillance materials and the specific BWR RPV plate or weld materials which they represent and provided a proposed test matrix for the ISP. Proposed "surveillance material"-to-"limiting RPV material" relationships and the test matrix were subsequently revised in response to NRC staff questions.

The BWRVIP-86 report was submitted to follow up on the material presented in the BWRVIP-78 report by establishing specific guidelines for ISP implementation. The BWRVIP-86 report addressed determination of ISP surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing dates, information on ISP project administration, additional information on neutron fluence determination issues, additional information on data utilization and sharing, and information on licensing aspects of

Carl Terry

-2-

ISP implementation. Information in this report, particularly that concerning determination of ISP surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing dates, was subsequently revised in response to NRC staff questions.

The NRC staff has completed its review of the BWRVIP-78 report, the BWRVIP-86 report, and the associated RAI responses. The staff finds that the final proposed BWRVIP ISP (as addressed in the attached safety evaluation) is acceptable for BWR licensee implementation provided that all licensees use one or more compatible neutron fluence methodologies acceptable to the NRC staff to determine surveillance capsule and RPV neutron fluences. "Compatible" in this case may be understood to mean neutron fluence methodologies which provide results that are within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation. This condition of ISP implementation is necessary to ensure that data from surveillance capsules included in the ISP may be appropriately shared between BWR facilities and that the basis for the neutron fluence determined for a specific capsule and the RPV which it is intended to represent are comparable. This issue is related to the requirements for an ISP found in items a., b., and c., of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III.C.1.

Therefore, the proposed ISP, if implemented in accordance with the conditions in the attached safety evaluation, has been determined to be an acceptable alternative to all existing BWR plant-specific RPV surveillance programs for the purpose of maintaining compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 through the end of current facility 40 year operating licenses. However, since implementation of the ISP may directly affect the licensing basis of every operating BWR in the U.S., licensees who elect to participate in the program will need to submit a license amendment to the NRC confirming their incorporation of the ISP into the licensing basis for each BWR facility. In addition, when these plant-specific license amendments are made, each licensee will be required to provide information regarding what specific neutron fluence methodology they will be implementing as part of their participation in the ISP. Each licensee will also be required to address the neutron fluence methodology compatibility issue as it applies to the comparison of neutron fluences calculated for its RPV versus the neutron fluences calculated for surveillance capsules in the ISP which are designated to represent its RPV.

Please contact Matthew A. Mitchell of my staff at (301) 415-3303 if you have any further questions regarding this subject.

Sincerely,



William H. Bateman, Chief
Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch
Division of Engineering
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: As stated

cc: See next page

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING EPRI PROPRIETARY REPORTS,
"BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS PROJECT, BWR INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM PLAN (BWRVIP-78)" AND "BWRVIP-86: BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS
PROJECT, BWR INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN"

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated December 22, 1999, and December 22, 2000, the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) submitted for staff review and approval the EPRI Proprietary Reports TR-114228, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)," and 1000888, "BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," respectively.^{1,2]} These reports, along with BWRVIP responses (dated December 22, 2000, and May 30, 2001) to NRC staff requests for additional information (RAIs), described the technical basis for the development and implementation of an integrated surveillance program (ISP) intended to support operation of all U.S. BWR reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) through the completion of each facility's current 40-year operating license.^{3,4]} The BWRVIP ISP was submitted under the regulatory provisions given in Appendix H to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Paragraph III.C., "Requirements for an Integrated Surveillance Program."

The BWRVIP-78 report described the technical basis related to material selection and testing on which the proposed BWRVIP ISP was constructed. The report principally addressed the methodology established to identify existing plant-specific surveillance capsules and surveillance capsules from the Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) initiated by the Boiling Water Reactors Owners' Group (BWROG) in the late 1980s which contain important surveillance materials for inclusion within the ISP. In this case, "important" surveillance materials may be understood to be those which best represent the actual limiting (in terms of predicted fracture behavior) plate and weld materials from which BWR RPVs were constructed. The report also established the connection between the identified surveillance materials and the specific BWR RPV plate or weld materials which they represent and provided a proposed test matrix for the ISP. Proposed surveillance material-to-limiting RPV material relationships and the test matrix were subsequently revised in response to NRC staff questions.

The BWRVIP-86 report was submitted to follow up on the material presented in the BWRVIP-78 report by establishing specific guidelines for ISP implementation. The BWRVIP-86 report addressed determination of ISP surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing dates, information on ISP project administration, additional information on neutron fluence determination issues, additional information on data utilization and sharing, and information on licensing aspects of ISP implementation. Information in this report, particularly that concerning determination of ISP surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing dates, was also subsequently revised in response to NRC staff questions.

ATTACHMENT

2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1 Regulatory Requirements

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, which is invoked by 10 CFR 50.60, specifies fracture toughness requirements for ferritic materials of pressure-retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including reactor pressure vessels (RPVs), during any condition of normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences and system hydrostatic tests. In order to support evaluations that demonstrate compliance with these requirements will be maintained, information regarding irradiated RPV material properties and the neutron fluence level of a licensee's RPV is necessary. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.60 also invokes Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix H), which requires licensees to implement a RPV material surveillance program to "monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the reactor vessel beltline region...which result from exposure of these materials to neutron irradiation and the thermal environment." In compliance with the requirements of Appendix H, licensees for all operating U.S. boiling water reactors (BWRs) have implemented plant-specific RPV material surveillance programs as part of each facility's licensing basis.

However, an alternative to individual plant-specific RPV surveillance programs is addressed in paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Pursuant to paragraph III.C. of Appendix H, an RPV integrated surveillance program (ISP) may be implemented, with the approval of Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by two or more facilities with similar design and operating features. Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H also sets forth specific criteria upon which approval of an ISP shall be based. The specified criteria include:

- a. the reactor in which the materials will be irradiated and the reactor for which the materials are being irradiated must have sufficiently similar design and operating features to permit accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage;
- b. each reactor must have an adequate dosimetry program;
- c. there must be adequate arrangement for data sharing between plants;
- d. there must be a contingency plan to assure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected; and,
- e. there must be substantial advantages to be gained, such as reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct result of not requiring surveillance capsules in all reactors in the set.

In addition, no reduction in the requirements for the number of materials to be irradiated, specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor is permitted. Finally, no reduction in the amount of testing is permitted unless authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

2.2 Additional Background Information

In early 1997, the NRC staff identified an issue with the existing Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance program.^[5] Based on the staff's review of a 1997 Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance capsule report, it was noted that the licensee for Brunswick Unit 2 lacked adequate unirradiated baseline Charpy V-notch (CVN) data for one of the materials in the Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance program. The NRC staff noted that this lack of baseline properties would inhibit the licensee's ability to effectively monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Subsequent NRC staff discussions with the BWRVIP led to the identification of several plants (Browns Ferry Unit 3, Brunswick Units 1 and 2, Dresden Unit 2, Fermi Unit 2, FitzPatrick, Hatch Unit 1, LaSalle Unit 2, Limerick Units 1 and 2, Monticello, Nine Mile Point Unit 1, Oyster Creek, Quad Cities Units 1 and 2) that potentially lacked adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data for at least one material in their plant-specific RPV surveillance programs. In total, 14 BWR surveillance welds and 7 BWR surveillance plates were identified as being potentially affected by this issue.^[1]

The NRC staff met with BWRVIP representatives on November 7, 1997, to discuss this issue and potential paths for its resolution.^[6] At that meeting, BWRVIP representatives indicated that they had attempted to locate unirradiated archival material samples and/or additional sources of baseline data for the potentially affected RPV surveillance program materials. This effort was not successful with regard to resolving the issue. As a result, the BWRVIP representatives indicated that they were pursuing the development of a BWR RPV ISP to address this issue and meet the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for all BWR licensees. The NRC staff agreed that such an approach, if appropriately developed, would be expected to resolve any outstanding issues regarding BWR RPV surveillance programs. The BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports, as amended by BWRVIP responses to NRC staff RAIs, which were subsequently developed and submitted for NRC staff review and approval, were the result of the BWRVIP efforts in this area.

3.0 INDUSTRY EVALUATION

The information discussed in this section of the safety evaluation (SE) will address the technical and regulatory considerations addressed by the BWRVIP regarding the development of, and proposed implementation plan for, their BWR ISP. In response to NRC staff questions, substantial changes were made by the BWRVIP to the proposed ISP. Regarding specific provisions of the ISP, the information addressed in this section will reflect the final version of the ISP as contained in both the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports, as well as information submitted in BWRVIP responses to NRC staff RAIs.

It should be noted that in addition to addressing the issue raised by the NRC staff regarding the lack of adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data, the BWRVIP proposed that their implementation of an ISP would also have additional benefits. The BWRVIP stated that when the original surveillance materials were selected for plant-specific surveillance programs, the state of knowledge concerning RPV material response to irradiation and post-irradiation fracture toughness was not the same as it is today. As a result, many facilities did not include what would be identified today as the plant's limiting RPV materials in their surveillance programs. Hence, this effort to identify and evaluate materials from other BWRs which may better represent a facility's limiting materials should improve the overall evaluation of BWR RPV embrittlement. Second, the inclusion of data from the testing of BWROG SSP capsules

(discussed further in Section 3.1) will improve overall quality of the data being used to evaluate BWR RPV embrittlement. Finally, implementation of an ISP is also expected to reduce the cost of surveillance testing and analysis for the BWR fleet since surveillance materials that are of little or no value (either because they lack adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data or because they are not the best representative material for any U.S. BWR) will no longer be tested.

3.1 Surveillance Material Selection for the BWR ISP

The fundamental technical basis for the BWRVIP's approach to developing an ISP involves the BWRVIP's process for the selection of surveillance materials for inclusion in the ISP. This process was presented in the BWRVIP-78 report. First, the BWRVIP identified all available surveillance plate and weld materials which could potentially be used within the BWR ISP. This group of materials included all surveillance materials in existing U.S. BWR plant-specific surveillance programs and materials included in the BWROG's SSP.^[7,8] The BWROG SSP was originally developed as an irradiation and testing program for acquiring additional surveillance data with the intent of developing an irradiation shift correlation specifically for BWRs as an alternative to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The BWROG SSP was developed from unirradiated, archival samples of BWR plate and weld materials related to several U.S. BWR plant-specific surveillance programs along with additional material from U.S. RPV fabricators and other sources. In total, 13 different plate and 12 different weld materials were included in the BWROG SSP. Samples of these materials were fabricated into 84 sets of Charpy specimens and placed into 9 SSP surveillance capsules. Three of the SSP surveillance capsules were inserted into the Cooper RPV and six were inserted into the Oyster Creek RPV for irradiation. A complete listing of available U.S. BWR surveillance program and SSP materials, along with their respective copper and nickel weight percents, was provided in Tables 2-1 through 2-4 of the proprietary BWRVIP-78 report.

The next step in the BWRVIP process was to identify the limiting beltline materials (in most cases, one plate and one weld) for each operating U.S. BWR RPV based on the materials' projected level of embrittlement at the end of each facility's current operating license. The end of license (EOL) embrittlement projections were based on the available unirradiated material properties of each material (initial reference temperature), each materials' chemical composition (weight percent copper and nickel), and the projected neutron fluence at the 1/4-T depth for the highest fluence location for that material. Changes in material embrittlement as a result of irradiation were evaluated using the correlations in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The limiting RPV materials were identified in Tables 2-5 and 2-6 of the BWRVIP-78 report for each operating U.S. BWR.

Based on the information discussed above, the BWRVIP program then sought to identify and associate available surveillance materials with RPV limiting materials. The concept employed by the BWRVIP was to assume that a set of approximately six "candidate" surveillance materials could be identified as matches for each BWR limiting material (also referred to as a "target material" in the matching process). These lists of candidate surveillance materials were provided in Appendix B, "Individual Vessel Evaluations," of the BWRVIP-78 report. Candidate materials were evaluated and identified based on a specific set of criteria which included:

- a. How well does the copper content of the surveillance material match the copper content of the target material?

- b. How well does the nickel content of the surveillance material match the nickel content of the target material?
- c. Does the heat number of the surveillance material match the heat number of the target material?
- d. Was the fabricator of the surveillance material the same as the fabricator of the target material?
- e. Does the available unirradiated, baseline data for the surveillance material constitute a full CVN curve?
- f. Is the candidate material a potential representative material for more than one target material?

From the list of candidate materials, one was selected as the "best representative" for a specific target material and included in an initial material list for the ISP. Each best representative material in this initial ISP material list was further required to have a full unirradiated baseline CVN curve and to be included in a sufficient number of surveillance capsules such that at least two irradiated CVN curves could be produced.

Working from this initial material list, the BWRVIP then used an iterative process to review the entire set of materials and make modifications to the ISP based on other considerations. The BWRVIP considered whether a single surveillance material could be used as the best representative material for a number of RPV limiting materials, thereby allowing for a reduction in the overall number of surveillance materials included in the ISP. If a particular surveillance material, which could serve as the best representative material for one or more RPV limiting materials, did not make the first draft of the ISP because of a lack of adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data, the BWRVIP considered whether actions could be taken to acquire such information. The BWRVIP also considered whether it was feasible to use both the surveillance weld and surveillance plate from a particular plant-specific surveillance program within the ISP. This was preferable since it reduced the overall number of surveillance capsules which would have to be removed and tested to support the ISP. Finally, although the ISP was not explicitly designed to address license renewal, the BWRVIP also considered whether additional capsules (beyond the minimum of two) were available for each material so that extension of the test matrix to higher neutron fluences was possible to address future license renewal surveillance program concerns.

After the best representative materials were selected, the BWRVIP sought to determine the specific time at which surveillance capsules incorporated within the ISP should be withdrawn and tested to optimize the usefulness of the data acquired. In any surveillance program, whether plant-specific or integrated, some degree of latitude exists in selecting the time when a particular capsule will be removed for testing. Usually, the time at which a capsule is to be withdrawn is selected based on comparing the neutron fluence level that the capsule is believed to have achieved (later confirmed by dosimetry wire measurements) to a fluence level of significance for the RPV material which it represents. For BWRs, the most significant issue related to RPV integrity evaluations is the development of pressure-temperature (P-T) limit curves in accordance with Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. P-T limit curves are indexed to the embrittlement of a RPV's limiting material at the 1/4-T and 3/4-T throughwall depths because of

the size of the postulated flaw used in the fracture evaluation associated with P-T limit curve determination. P-T limits curves may be defined for any period of operation (i.e., number of effective full power years (EFPY) of operation), but are commonly indexed to end of license (EOL) conditions and thereby bound operation of the vessel through EOL.

As a result of the BWRVIP ISP development process and NRC staff questions, the BWRVIP evaluated if it would be appropriate to acquire surveillance data points at or near the projected EOL 1/4-T neutron fluence values for limiting materials from the BWR fleet. Although the BWRVIP noted that no technical requirement exists for having capsules at the projected EOL RPV 1/4-T fluence level, it was acknowledged that the proposed withdrawal dates in Reference 4 would achieve a better consistency between capsule fluences and EOL RPV 1/4-T fluences than the withdrawal dates originally proposed in the BWRVIP-78 or BWRVIP-86 reports.

The information in Tables 4-1 through 4-5 of Reference 4 provided a complete overview of the ISP. Table 4-1 graphically showed the relationship between surveillance capsules and the target RPV welds or plates they are intended to represent. Table 4-2 provided similar information, but included details regarding the heat numbers for the ISP materials. Table 4-3 graphically showed the current projected withdrawal dates (years) for surveillance capsules included within the ISP, and Table 4-4 added information on which plant-specific capsules were associated with those withdrawal dates. Finally, Table 4-5 combined the information into a detailed test plan, which added information regarding the projected fluences of RPV limiting materials and the surveillance capsules that were intended to represent them.

3.2 Evaluation of ISP Compliance with Appendix H Criteria

After establishing a proposed set of surveillance materials for the ISP, the BWRVIP's development process then continued with the evaluation of whether the ISP complied with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. In order to assure that these requirements would be met, the BWRVIP considered the need to demonstrate the similarity of plant operating environments, the need for RPV neutron dosimetry program modifications or enhancements, contingency plan development, and data sharing arrangements. These specific topics were also considered to be directly related to the subject of ISP implementation, and information to address them was included not only in the BWRVIP-78 report but also in the BWRVIP-86 report.

On the topic of similarity of plant operating environments, the BWRVIP evaluation focused on consideration of operating temperatures and the neutron energy spectrums for the BWR fleet. The BWRVIP noted that normal operating temperatures in the downcomer region of BWRs range from 525 °F to 535 °F. The BWRVIP concluded that this temperature variation was minor and would not be significant with regard to the ability to monitor embrittlement for the BWR fleet through the use of the ISP. Regarding the neutron energy spectra issue, the BWRVIP cited the fact that neutron energy spectra for BWRs have been determined by General Electric over the years using neutron transport calculations. These determinations have been made for various BWR models, at original and uprated power levels, with original and new fuel designs, and with original and revised core loading patterns. Although the magnitude of flux may vary from plant to plant based on specific operating characteristics, the neutron energy spectrum was found to be essentially the same at similar plant locations. Hence, the BWRVIP concluded that the overall operating environments for all reactors in the U.S. BWR fleet were sufficiently similar to support data sharing and the implementation of an ISP.

Regarding the availability of dosimetry data and the ability to adequately determine both RPV surveillance capsule and BWR RPV fluences, several potential options were noted depending on what category a facility falls into. For the 13 BWRs that will continue to remove and test surveillance capsules as part of the ISP, there will be little or no change in the availability of dosimetry data. For those facilities that will not be testing capsules as part of the ISP, two current sources of dosimetry wire data may exist. First, a facility may have previously removed and tested one or more surveillance capsules, as would be the case for 15 BWRs, and have dosimetry data available from that capsule. For the remaining 6 BWRs, at a minimum, first cycle dosimetry data would exist. The BWRVIP concluded that, given the availability of an acceptable, benchmarked fluence calculational methodology, these sources of data would continue to provide an accurate estimate of the RPV neutron fluence values unless a major change in core design is undertaken in the future. The BWRVIP noted that facilities which identify a need for additional dosimetry data to improve their RPV neutron fluence calculations may also consider the installation of ex-vessel dosimetry for that purpose.

Regarding the criterion for adequate data sharing, the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports commit the BWRVIP to the development of a program plan to exchange surveillance data (capsule reports) among BWR facilities as it becomes available. The ability to integrate and distribute data to all BWR licensees through the BWRVIP is a common feature which has been successfully implemented in many other BWRVIP programs. The BWRVIP-86 report, however, also identifies that each BWR facility will continue to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Appendix H by reference to the ISP in facility Technical Specifications or Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports. As such, the individual BWR licensees who comprise the BWRVIP will continue to be subject to regulatory requirements that ensure that sharing of surveillance data will be achieved in order to support their continued compliance with the requirements of Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50.

Regarding the need for contingency planning, the BWRVIP-78 report identifies several options that may be undertaken by the BWRVIP to ensure that adequate surveillance data continues to be obtained in the event of the indefinite shutdown of a facility that is supplying capsules for the ISP. First, consideration would be given to retrieving the necessary surveillance capsules from the facility prior to permanent shutdown. If removal of the capsules is not a viable option, a new best representative material would be selected from the surveillance materials not currently being tested as part of the ISP. This option highlights the inherent contingency plan which is available in the BWRVIP ISP. The work performed to develop the ISP has identified several surveillance materials, other than the best representative material, that could represent a particular RPV's limiting plate or weld. Surveillance capsules containing the other potential representative materials will not be removed from their host reactors, but will instead continue to be irradiated during the course of normal plant operation. As such, these other surveillance materials will continue to be available for removal and testing should the reactor which houses the best representative surveillance material undergo an indefinite shutdown.

The final criterion regarding the identification of substantial advantages to be gained as a direct result of implementation of the ISP, was addressed based on information previously noted in this SE. The ISP would address the issue raised by the NRC staff regarding the lack of adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data for some BWR surveillance materials by identifying and substituting other materials as the method of monitoring changes in RPV material fracture toughness for some BWRs. In addition, the BWRVIP proposed that the implementation of an ISP would also have additional benefits. The BWRVIP stated that when the original

surveillance materials were selected for plant-specific surveillance programs, the existing state of knowledge about which RPV materials would be limiting with regard to fracture toughness after irradiation was not the same as it is today. As a result, many facilities did not include what would be identified today as the plant's limiting RPV materials in their surveillance programs. Hence, this effort to identify and evaluate materials from other BWRs, which may better represent a facility's limiting materials, should improve the overall evaluation of BWR RPV embrittlement. The inclusion of data from the testing of BWROG SSP capsules will improve overall quality of the data being used to evaluate BWR RPV embrittlement. Finally, implementation of an ISP is also expected to reduce the cost of surveillance testing and analysis for the BWR fleet since surveillance materials that are of little or no value (either because they lack adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data or because they are not the best representative material for any U.S. BWR) will no longer be tested.

The BWRVIP also submitted information to address the positions raised in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 that state that an ISP shall entail no reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor and no reduction in the amount of testing. Although some surveillance capsules will be deferred and not tested as part of the ISP, all capsules that were previously credited as part of plant-specific surveillance programs will continue to be irradiated in their host reactors. Therefore, all irradiated material samples continue to remain available to the ISP, if needed, and no overall reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor occurs as a result of the ISP.

With regard to the number of specimens tested, the structure of all BWR plant-specific surveillance programs would have required, according to Table 3-1 of the BWRVIP-86 report, a total of 78 surveillance capsules to be tested (not including capsules that could be held as standby capsules per currently approved facility surveillance programs). With two applicable CVN specimen sets per capsule (one weld and one plate), this equates to a total of 156 irradiated CVN specimen sets to be tested under the current plant-specific programs. The ISP will incorporate 51 capsules from plant-specific surveillance programs (36 already tested and 15 yet to be tested) and 84 sets of CVN specimens from the SSP capsules. This equates to a total of 186 sets of irradiated CVN specimens to be tested under the ISP. Therefore, no reduction in the required amount of CVN testing would result from the implementation of the proposed ISP.

Based on the consideration of these factors, the BWRVIP concluded that the regulatory criteria in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for the approval of an ISP had been met.

3.3 Additional Topics Regarding the ISP

Beyond the scope of the information discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this SE, additional topics related to the proposed ISP were presented in the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports. First, the topic of how the data acquired through the ISP would be utilized in plant-specific RPV integrity evaluations was discussed. The BWRVIP proposed that two options existed for facilities covered under the ISP. If the best representative surveillance material included in the ISP has the same material heat number as a facility's limiting RPV plate or weld, the data acquired as part of the ISP could be used to directly predict the embrittlement of the RPV material using the methodology outlined in Position C.2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. Any adjustments to the data required because of chemical compositional differences could be resolved based on the use of adjustment methodologies that have been

approved by the NRC staff. If the heat number of the best representative material does not match the heat number of a facility's limiting plate or weld, the licensee would utilize Position C.1 and the chemistry factor tables in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 as the basis for their RPV integrity evaluations. In this case, the data from the ISP surveillance program serves as a general method for monitoring RPV embrittlement for the facility, but does not provide the level of data compatibility necessary to make plant-specific integrity evaluations based on the use of Position C.2.

A second topic which was discussed involved plans for the overall administration of the ISP by the BWRVIP. The BWRVIP-86 report identifies specific activities relating to the administration of the ISP which will be performed by the BWRVIP. These activities include:

- (1) Working with licensees to identify required capsule withdrawals so that the licensee can make necessary plans and arrangements,
- (2) Shipping and testing of ISP capsules and associated dosimetry per applicable standards,
- (3) Reporting the results of the surveillance specimen testing in a report as required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 within one year of the capsule withdrawal date,
- (4) Distributing capsule reports to all licensees that have representative materials in the capsule,
- (5) Planning for changes and contingencies in the ISP testing matrix,
- (6) Consideration of surveillance needs for plant license renewal.

Of these items, (1), (2), and (3) are straightforward. Items (4) and (5), as they relate to data sharing and contingency planning, were discussed in Section 3.2. Planning changes to the ISP based on new information and/or consideration of license renewal needs will also be a significant function for the BWRVIP. The BWRVIP noted that periodic re-evaluations of the ISP test matrix will be performed based on new information such as updated fluence predictions for the BWR RPVs or for the ISP surveillance capsules. Minor changes may be required to surveillance capsule withdrawal dates based on these changing fluence predictions. When specific changes are identified to the ISP testing matrix, withdrawal schedule, or testing and reporting of individual capsule results, the BWRVIP committed to submitting these modifications to the NRC in a timely manner so that appropriate arrangements can be made for implementation.

Although the version of the ISP which is described by the BWRVIP-78 report, the BWRVIP-86 report, and associated RAI responses was not intended to address BWR surveillance program concerns through a period of extended operation, as noted in item (6) above, consideration has been given to being able to extend the ISP at a later date. Based on the materials and surveillance capsules selected for inclusion in the ISP, a total of 13 additional surveillance capsules containing materials already in the ISP were identified as being specifically considered to address BWR license renewal concerns. In addition, 62 other deferred surveillance capsules would also be available if needed. The staff understands that the BWRVIP is currently engaged in developing a program plan for extending the ISP to cover license renewal issues and that a submittal to the NRC on this topic may be expected in 2002.

4.0 NRC STAFF EVALUATION

The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the BWRVIP in References 1 through 4 against the criteria specified in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for the establishment of an ISP. The staff has also reviewed the technical basis for, and comprehensive description of, the proposed ISP against the objectives of being able to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials due to irradiation and providing adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations. The staff has concluded that, subject to the conditions discussed in this section and in Section 5.0 of this SE, the proposed BWR ISP is acceptable. Additional details regarding the staff's evaluation of the ISP are provided below.

4.1 Surveillance Material Selection for the BWR ISP

The NRC staff has completed its review of the technical criteria used by the BWRVIP to select the surveillance materials to be included within the ISP and the proposed ISP capsule withdrawal schedule. The staff has concluded that the BWRVIP's material selection process was adequate to ensure that materials which effectively provide meaningful information to monitor changes in fracture toughness for BWR RPV materials were included within the scope of the ISP. The criteria used (chemical composition, material heat number, fabricator, etc.) were consistent with the best available technical understanding of irradiation damage mechanics for identifying surveillance materials that would best represent the limiting plate and weld materials in U.S. BWR RPVs. The staff also found that the criteria for having adequate unirradiated baseline data (or the ability to acquire such data) directly results in the ISP addressing the issue originally raised by the NRC staff with regard to Brunswick Unit 2. Finally, the staff found that the BWRVIP's consideration of test matrix minimization based on use of a single surveillance material to represent more than one limiting BWR RPV material was also acceptable. Test matrix minimization led, in some cases, to a material which was not the absolute "best" representative surveillance material being used to represent a specific BWR RPV material. The staff found this to be acceptable because it was not necessary in all cases to use the absolute "best" representative material when a technically adequate material was already to be included in the program to represent a different BWR RPV material.

It should, however, be noted that although a surveillance material may be determined to be the "best" representative material for a specific RPV material, the similarity between the surveillance material and the RPV material may not be sufficient to justify direct use (see Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, position C.2) of the surveillance data in determining the behavior of the RPV material. This topic is discussed further in Section 4.3 below. It is sufficient to mention at this point that additional differences between surveillance materials and RPV materials (e.g., heat treatment during fabrication) can complicate the direct use of such surveillance data, particularly if advanced fracture mechanics-based evaluations (i.e., the Master Curve methodology), which are outside of the scope of this submittal, were to be employed.

The staff has also reviewed the outcome of the BWRVIP material selection and surveillance capsule withdrawal date selection process. The outcome of this process was taken to be the surveillance materials selected for the ISP, the assignment of specific surveillance materials to represent specific BWR RPV limiting plates or welds, and the selection of surveillance capsule withdrawal dates (years) in order to achieve meaningful projected surveillance capsule fluence levels. The final version of this information was submitted to the NRC in Tables 4-1 through 4-5 of Reference 4. Based on the above, the NRC staff concluded that the program described by

these tables was acceptable to meet the objectives of being able to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials due to irradiation and providing adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations.

The staff did note, however, that one weakness existed regarding the proposed surveillance capsule withdrawal dates. Significant questions have been raised recently concerning the methodologies used to calculate BWR RPV neutron fluences. The staff is aware that the methodologies which have been used for this purpose prior to September 2001 would not conform to the recent NRC staff guidance published on this topic in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.190.^[9] However, given that existing fluence predictions have been accepted in current facility licensing bases, the available projected neutron fluence values for the capsules and the BWR RPV limiting materials have been determined by the staff to be adequate for the purpose of establishing the initial withdrawal schedule for the ISP surveillance capsules. The staff expects that the BWRVIP will evaluate the need to modify the ISP surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule as it obtains additional results that may modify the information in Table 4-5 of Reference 4. The NRC staff's evaluation of dosimetry and neutron fluence calculation issues is addressed further in Section 4.2 below.

4.2 Evaluation of ISP Compliance with Appendix H Criteria

After concluding that an acceptable technical basis existed for the proposed ISP, the NRC staff next evaluated the proposed ISP against the criteria for an ISP specified in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Each of the criteria is addressed below.

First, the NRC staff concluded that sufficient similarity exists regarding the design of U.S. BWRs such that accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage can be made for the BWR fleet through an ISP. The staff accepts that no significant plant-to-plant difference in neutron energy spectra should be expected at similar BWR RPV wall or surveillance capsule locations based on current operating practice. The staff also accepts that the range of operating temperatures for the BWR fleet (525 °F to 535 °F) cited by the BWRVIP bounds the current operating characteristics of these units. Plant-to-plant temperature differences of this magnitude are minor and may be corrected for, as necessary, to support direct use of surveillance data (see Position C.2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2) based on the use of adjustment methodologies that have been approved by the NRC staff. In addition, the staff accepts that no other effects that may contribute to plant-to-plant differences in irradiation conditions (e.g., significantly different gamma flux levels, etc.) are known to exist.

The next criteria the NRC staff considered was the need for an adequate dosimetry program for each reactor participating in the ISP. The staff recognized that in order to define what an "adequate" dosimetry program may be, it was necessary to examine the underlying purpose of a RPV dosimetry program. RPV dosimetry programs were considered to be necessary to support the determination of RPV neutron fluence values for limiting RPV materials through the application of neutron fluence calculational methodologies. In addition, the dosimetry data associated with each surveillance capsule directly provides information important for the accurate determination of the surveillance capsule fluence. Therefore, the staff considered whether the information provided by the ISP was sufficient to conclude that acceptable RPV fluence and surveillance capsule fluence values could continue to be determined given implementation of the ISP.

Currently, a limited amount of dosimetry data exists from each operating BWR, either as a result of the analysis of first cycle dosimetry capsules or as a result of previously tested surveillance capsules. Implementation of the ISP would ensure that facilities which supply surveillance capsules for the ISP will continue to obtain additional dosimetry data, while facilities which are not required to remove additional capsules may (e.g., through the installation and testing of ex-vessel dosimetry) or may not acquire additional dosimetry data. For those facilities which supply capsules to the ISP, the amount of dosimetry data which will be obtained through participation in the ISP will be equal to or greater than the amount of data which would have been acquired as a result of continuing with a plant-specific surveillance program. Therefore, given that these facilities' current surveillance programs have been determined to be adequate, the NRC staff concluded that their access to dosimetry data will continue to be adequate through implementation of the ISP. Finally, the dosimetry data from each surveillance capsule included in the ISP ensures that adequate dosimetry data is available for the determination of surveillance capsule fluences.

However, adequacy of dosimetry data for BWR facilities which will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules will be dependent upon the methodology utilized by each licensee to determine their RPV fluences. Currently, at least one NRC-approved neutron fluence determination methodology exists for BWRs which provides adequate results with little or no plant-specific dosimetry data.^[10] Additional neutron fluence determination methodologies which may offer the same capability could be developed. Computational methodologies have been, or will be, benchmarked against existing dosimetry databases to demonstrate their adequacy for determining BWR RPV fluences. Therefore, given the use of an acceptable methodology as described above, the NRC staff has concluded that the dosimetry data which would be available for BWR facilities that will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules as part of the ISP will be sufficient to ensure that adequate RPV neutron fluence determinations continue to be performed.

Based on the information above, one condition of the NRC's approval of the ISP is that an individual BWR licensee who wishes to participate in the BWR ISP shall provide, for NRC staff approval, information that defines how it will determine RPV and/or surveillance capsule fluences based on the dosimetry data which will become available for its facility. The staff will require that this information be submitted concurrently with each licensee's submittal to replace their existing plant-specific surveillance program with BWR ISP as part of their facility's licensing basis. The information submitted must be sufficient for the staff to determine that:

- (1) RPV and surveillance capsule fluences will be established based on the use of an NRC-approved fluence methodology that will provide acceptable results based on the available dosimetry data, and
- (2) if one "best estimate" methodology is used to determine the neutron fluence values for a licensee's RPV and one or more different methodologies are used to establish the neutron fluence values for the ISP surveillance capsules which "represent" that RPV in the ISP, the results of these differing methodologies are compatible (i.e., within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation).

Regarding the criterion of adequate data sharing between plants, the NRC recognizes that BWRVIP processes have been demonstrated in other programs to be sufficient for establishing methods to share data between BWR facilities. The staff accepts the commitment by the

BWRVIP in the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports to develop a "program plan to manage data sharing...in the implementation phase of the ISP." The NRC staff, however, would also note that by the incorporation of the ISP into the licensing basis for each participating BWR facility, each licensee is further responsible for ensuring that they acquire and evaluate in a timely manner all relevant ISP data which may affect RPV integrity evaluations for their facility. Hence, after implementation of the ISP, a performance basis should become available from NRC staff licensing reviews to evaluate whether acceptable data sharing is occurring as part of the ISP.

Regarding the criterion for establishing a contingency plan to ensure that the ISP will not be jeopardized by an extended outage of a reactor from which surveillance capsules are to be obtained, the NRC staff concluded that the BWR ISP has inherently established an adequate contingency plan. The evaluational work which was performed by the BWRVIP to select the "best representative" materials for inclusion in the ISP also identified other surveillance materials in other BWR RPVs that could be used to monitor changes in fracture toughness properties for the BWR fleet. These other, "backup" surveillance materials could be used by the BWRVIP in the event that one or more facilities which are currently slated to provide capsules to the ISP are forced to sustain an indefinite shutdown or unanticipated termination of operations. By having this preestablished list of available backup surveillance materials, the BWRVIP could act in a timely and efficient manner to arrange for the appropriate acquisition and evaluation of data from a backup material to support the goals of the ISP. Based on the availability of this information, and the periodic reviews to be conducted by the BWRVIP to assess whether any changes to the ISP are necessary, the NRC staff has concluded that the BWRVIP has adequately addressed the need to consider ISP contingency planning in its submittals.

The NRC staff also concluded that there are substantial advantages to be gained by the implementation of a BWR ISP. First, the proposed ISP program will address the concerns raised by the staff regarding the current reliance by some BWR licensees on surveillance materials that lack unirradiated baseline CVN data to meet the requirements of Appendix H. Second, by not testing some existing plant-specific capsules as part of the ISP, significant savings may be realized by the BWR fleet relating to the cost of capsule removal, shipping, testing, time added to outage critical path schedules, etc. Third, the ISP will improve the overall quality of data that will be obtained and reported based on the formal incorporation of the SSP capsules in the ISP test matrix (without approval of the ISP, no requirement would exist for the testing of the SSP capsules). Other advantages of the ISP may be identified, however, the staff has found that those noted above are substantial.

Finally, regarding the positions raised in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 which state that an ISP shall entail no reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor and no reduction in the amount of testing, the NRC staff has concluded that the proposed ISP complies with these provisions. The staff has concluded that the continued availability of all capsules which were previously credited as part of plant-specific surveillance programs supports the determination that no overall reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor would result from ISP implementation. Further, based on a comparison of the number of irradiated CVN specimen sets which would be required under the current plant-specific surveillance programs versus the number which would be required to be tested under the ISP, the staff has concluded that no reduction in the required amount of CVN

testing would result from the implementation of the proposed ISP (which, as noted previously, includes the SSP capsule materials which were not incorporated into any plant-specific surveillance program).

Based on the consideration of these factors, the NRC staff concludes that the regulatory criteria in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for the approval of an ISP have been met.

4.3 Additional Topics Regarding the ISP

The NRC staff also reviewed the other topics regarding the ISP which were addressed in the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports. The staff has concluded that the BWRVIP proposal for how surveillance data resulting from the ISP may be used to support BWR RPV fracture toughness (integrity) evaluations was acceptable. Consistent with current practice based on the use of data from plant-specific surveillance programs, data which is to be used directly (see position C.2. of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2) to modify RPV integrity evaluations should come from surveillance material samples with the same heat number as the limiting RPV material. If position C.2. is used, appropriate adjustments for chemistry and irradiation temperature differences between the surveillance material and the RPV limiting material must be addressed. The NRC staff will review the direct utilization of surveillance data resulting from the ISP program as part of plant-specific RPV integrity evaluations. Surveillance materials which do not share the same heat number with the limiting RPV material may be used for general monitoring, but not for direct determination of RPV embrittlement. In such cases, the chemistry factor table of position C.1. of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 should be used.

Finally, regarding the objectives and actions submitted related to BWRVIP administration of the ISP, the NRC staff agrees with the provisions set forth in the BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86 reports. The staff has concluded that the BWRVIP should conduct periodic re-evaluations of the ISP test matrix based on new information such as updated fluence predictions for the BWR RPVs or for the ISP surveillance capsules. The BWRVIP shall submit any changes regarding the ISP testing matrix, withdrawal schedule, or testing and reporting of individual capsule results to the NRC for review and approval prior to implementing these changes. Further, the BWRVIP will perform testing and submit surveillance capsule reports to the NRC in accordance with the provisions found in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 on behalf of BWR licensees. This is acceptable to the NRC staff. However, with regard to the application of test data acquired through the ISP, individual BWR licensees must retain the responsibility for addressing the implication of ISP surveillance capsule results to the RPV integrity evaluations for their RPVs. These revised RPV evaluations must be conducted by individual BWR licensees in a timely manner to ensure they maintain compliance with the requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

The NRC staff has concluded that the ISP proposed by the BWRVIP in the BWRVIP-78 report, the BWRVIP-86 report, and as amended by responses dated December 22, 2000 and May 30, 2001, to NRC staff RAIs, is acceptable, subject to the conditions discussed below. The approved ISP adequately addresses the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for BWR licensees through the end of current facility 40 year operating licenses. In particular, the information contained in Tables 4-1 through 4-5 of Reference 4, was found by the staff to be

acceptable for defining the ISP test matrix, surveillance capsule withdrawal dates, and material associations for the BWR ISP. Other aspects of the ISP, in particular plant-specific data utilization, were also found to be acceptable provided appropriate adjustments are made for chemical composition and irradiation temperature differences when data is shared between facilities.

The staff's approval of the ISP is further predicated on the adoption of the ISP by all BWR facilities who are identified within the ISP test matrix as supplying surveillance capsules for the ISP. If any BWR licensee which should be providing surveillance capsules to the ISP elects not to participate, the BWRVIP must submit, for NRC staff review and approval, changes to the ISP that must be made to address this event.

Finally, in order to complete ISP implementation, individual BWR licensees who wish to participate in the BWR ISP must provide, for NRC staff review and approval, information which defines how they will determine RPV and/or surveillance capsule fluences based on the dosimetry data which will be available for their facilities. This information must be submitted concurrently with each licensee's submittal to replace their existing plant-specific surveillance program with the BWR ISP as part of their facility's licensing basis. The information submitted must be sufficient for the staff to determine that:

- (1) RPV and surveillance capsule fluences will be established as based on the use of an NRC-approved fluence methodology that will provide acceptable results based on the available dosimetry data,
- (2) if one methodology is used to determine the neutron fluence values for a licensee's RPV and one or more different methodologies are used to establish the neutron fluence values for the ISP surveillance capsules which "represent" that RPV in the ISP, the results of these differing methodologies are compatible (i.e. within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation).

6.0 REFERENCES

- [1] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Project No. 704 - BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)," December 22, 1999.
- [2] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Project No. 704 - BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," EPRI Technical Report 1000888, December 22, 2000.
- [3] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "PROJECT NO. 704 - BWRVIP Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding BWRVIP-78," December 15, 2000.
- [4] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "PROJECT NO. 704 - BWRVIP Response to Second NRC Request for Additional Information on the BWR Integrated Surveillance Program," May 30, 2001.

- [5] D.C. Trimble (USNRC) to C.S. Hinnant (Carolina Power and Light), "Request for Additional Information Regarding the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (TAC No. M98710)," May 23, 1997.
- [6] C.E. Carpenter (USNRC) to E.J. Sullivan (USNRC), "Meeting Summary for November 5 and 6, 1997, Meetings with Boiling Water Reactors Vessel and Internals Project Technical Chairs, Regarding BWRVIP-07 Safety Evaluation Report and to Discuss Issues Related to BWR Licensee Vessel Surveillance Programs, Relative to Monitoring Radiation Embrittlement at BWR Facilities," December 9, 1997. [Attachments proprietary.]
- [7] General Electric Nuclear Energy Report GE-NE-523-93-0732, "BWR Supplemental Surveillance Program Phase 1 Report: Surveillance Data Collection and Evaluation," March 1989.
- [8] General Electric Nuclear Energy Report GE-NE-523-99-0732, "Progress Report on Phase 2 of the BWR Owners' Group Supplemental Surveillance Program," January, 1992.
- [9] USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence," March 2001.
- [10] S.A. Richards (USNRC) to J.F. Klapproth (GE), "Safety Evaluation for NEDC-32983P, 'General Electric Methodology for Reactor Pressure Vessel Fast Neutron Flux Evaluation' (TAC No. MA9891)," September 14, 2001.

C

NRC FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION FOR BWRVIP-116 (EPRI REPORT 1007824)

The Proprietary version of the NRC Safety Evaluation of BWRVIP-116 has been replaced here with the non-proprietary version.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

BWRVIP 2006-091F

March 1, 2006

Bill Eaton, BWRVIP Chairman
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Echelon One
1340 Echelon Parkway
Jackson, MS 39213-8202

SUBJECT: NON-PROPRIETARY SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE "BWRVIP VESSEL AND
INTERNALS PROJECT, INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (ISP)
IMPLEMENTATION FOR LICENSE RENEWAL (BWRVIP-116),"
EPRI REPORT TR-1007824, JULY 2003

Dear Mr. Eaton:

By letter dated July 29, 2003, the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) submitted the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Proprietary Report TR-1007824, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal, (BWRVIP-116)," for U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review. It was supplemented by a BWRVIP letter dated January 11, 2005, in response to the NRC's request for additional information (RAI) raised in the NRC's letters dated March 29, 2004, and June 23, 2004.

The BWRVIP-116 report, along with the BWRVIP responses dated January 11, 2005, provides the technical basis for the development and implementation of the integrated surveillance program for the extended period (ISP(E)) intended to support operation of all U.S. BWR reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) through the completion of each facility's proposed extended period of operation (60 year operating license). The BWRVIP ISP(E) was submitted under the regulatory provisions given in Appendix H to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 50 (Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50), Paragraph III.C., "Requirements for an Integrated Surveillance Program."

The NRC staff has completed its review of the BWRVIP-116 report and the associated RAI responses. The staff finds that the final proposed BWRVIP ISP(E) (as addressed in the attached safety evaluation) is acceptable for BWR licensees implementation provided that all licensees continue to use one or more compatible neutron fluence methodologies acceptable to the NRC staff, i.e., which comply with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence," to determine surveillance capsule and RPV neutron fluences. Compatible in this case may be understood to mean neutron fluence methodologies which provide results that are within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation. This condition of ISP(E) implementation is necessary to ensure that data from surveillance capsules included in the ISP(E) may be appropriately shared between BWR facilities and that the basis for the neutron fluence determined from a specific capsule and the RPV which it is intended to represent are comparable. This issue is related to the requirements for an ISP found in items a., b., and c., of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III.C.1.

- 2 -

The staff requests that the BWRVIP submit the proprietary and non-proprietary versions of the -A document of the BWRVIP-116 report within 180 days of receipt of this letter. Please contact Meena Khanna of my staff at 301-415-2150 if you have any further questions regarding this subject.

Sincerely,



Matthew A. Mitchell, Branch Chief
Vessels & Internals Integrity Branch
Division of Component Integrity
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

cc: BWRVIP Service List

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING EPRI PROPRIETARY REPORT,
"BWR VESSEL AND INTERNALS PROJECT, INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM (ISP) IMPLEMENTATION FOR LICENSE RENEWAL (BWRVIP-116)"

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

By letter dated July 29, 2003^[1], the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) submitted the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Proprietary Report TR-1007824, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal, (BWRVIP-116)" dated July 2003, for U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review. It was supplemented by a BWRVIP letter dated January 11, 2005^[2], in response to the NRC's request for additional information raised in the NRC's letters dated March 29, 2004^[3], and June 23, 2004^[4].

In a letter dated February 1, 2002^[5], the NRC approved BWRVIP-78, "BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan," and BWRVIP-86, "BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," as supplemented by the BWRVIP letters to the NRC dated December 15, 2000^[6], and May 30, 2001^[7], for use during each boiling water reactor (BWR) facility's original 40-year operating license. The recommendations provided in the February 1, 2002, letter were incorporated into the final approved version of the report, BWRVIP-86-A, "Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan."

The primary objective of BWRVIP-86-A was to satisfy the requirements of Appendix H to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations Part 50* (Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50) for the original 40-year operating licenses of the BWR fleet. However, during the design of this program, it was recognized that the ISP could be extended to meet the needs of individual BWR facilities submitting license renewal applications. Therefore, BWRVIP-116 was developed to extend the guidelines of BWRVIP-86-A for the extended period of operation, by expanding the capsule withdrawal schedules to include the withdrawal and testing of an additional surveillance capsule from each ISP host plant based on the criteria approved in the NRC's February 1, 2002, letter. In addition, the ISP during the license renewal period (hereafter referred to as ISP(E) to differentiate it from the ISP for the original 40-year license period) will continue to be designed, implemented, and managed to the same requirements of the current ISP detailed in BWRVIP-86-A.

The BWRVIP-116 report, along with the BWRVIP responses dated January 11, 2005, provides the technical basis for the development and implementation of the ISP(E) intended to support operation of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) in all U.S. BWRs through the completion of each facility's proposed extended period of operation (60 year operating license). The BWRVIP ISP(E) was submitted under the regulatory provisions given in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III.C., "Requirements for an Integrated Surveillance Program."

1.2 Purpose

The staff reviewed the BWRVIP-116 report and the supplemental information that was submitted to the staff to determine whether it will provide an acceptable RPV material surveillance program in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for all operating U.S. BWR plants for the extended period of operation. The data from this program will be used to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials due to irradiation and provide adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations, such as those required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, "Fracture Toughness Requirements."

1.3 Regulatory Requirements

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, which is invoked by 10 CFR 50.60, "Acceptance Criteria for Fracture Prevention Measures for Lightwater Nuclear Power Reactors for Normal Operation," specifies fracture toughness requirements for ferritic materials of pressure-retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including RPVs, during any condition of normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences and system hydrostatic tests. In order to support evaluations that demonstrate compliance with these requirements will be maintained, information regarding irradiated RPV material properties and the neutron fluence level of a licensee's RPV is necessary. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.60 also invokes Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, which requires licensees to implement a RPV material surveillance program to "monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the reactor vessel beltline region...which result from exposure of these materials to neutron irradiation and the thermal environment." In compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, licensees for all operating U.S. BWRs had implemented plant-specific RPV material surveillance programs as part of each facility's licensing basis.

However, in early 1997, the NRC staff identified an issue with the existing Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance program⁽⁹⁾. Based on the staff's review of a 1997 Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance capsule report, it was noted that the licensee for Brunswick Unit 2 lacked adequate unirradiated baseline Charpy V-notch (CVN) data for one of the materials in the Brunswick Unit 2 RPV surveillance program. The NRC staff noted that this lack of baseline properties would inhibit the licensee's ability to effectively monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Subsequent NRC staff discussions with the BWRVIP led to the identification of several plants [] that potentially lacked adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data for at least one material in their plant-specific RPV surveillance programs. In total, 14 BWR surveillance welds and 7 BWR surveillance plates were identified as being potentially affected by this issue⁽⁹⁾.

The NRC staff met with BWRVIP representatives on November 7, 1997, to discuss this issue and potential paths for its resolution⁽¹⁰⁾. At that meeting, BWRVIP representatives indicated that they had attempted to locate unirradiated archival material samples and/or additional sources of baseline data for the potentially affected RPV surveillance program materials. This effort was not successful with regard to resolving the issue. As a result, the BWRVIP representatives indicated that they were pursuing the development of a BWR RPV ISP to address this issue and meet the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for all BWR licensees. The NRC staff agreed that such an approach, if appropriately developed, would be expected to resolve any outstanding issues regarding BWR RPV surveillance programs.

This alternative to individual plant-specific RPV surveillance programs is addressed in paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Pursuant to Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, an RPV ISP may be implemented, with the approval of Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by two or more facilities with similar design and operating features. Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H also sets forth specific criteria upon which approval of an ISP shall be based. The specified criteria include:

- a. the reactor in which the materials will be irradiated and the reactor for which the materials are being irradiated must have sufficiently similar design and operating features to permit accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage;
- b. each reactor must have an adequate dosimetry program;
- c. there must be adequate arrangement for data sharing between plants;
- d. there must be a contingency plan to assure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected; and,
- e. there must be substantial advantages to be gained, such as reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct result of not requiring surveillance capsules in all reactors in the set.

In addition, no reduction in the requirements for the number of materials to be irradiated, specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor is permitted. Finally, no reduction in the amount of testing is permitted unless authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

2.0 SUMMARY BWRVIP-116 REPORT

The information provided by the BWRVIP for the ISP(E) expands on the current ISP for the 40-year license period, while retaining the administrative and implementation requirements previously approved in the BWRVIP-86-A report.

2.1 Surveillance Material Selection for the BWR ISP(E)

The current ISP uses surveillance capsules from [] ISP host plants and [] capsules from the Supplemental Surveillance Program (SSP) to provide surveillance for the U.S. BWR fleet. The SSP was originally developed by the Boiling Water Reactors Owners Group (BWROG) as an irradiation and testing program for acquiring additional surveillance data with the intent of developing an irradiation shift correlation specifically for BWRs as an alternative to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.99, Revision 2¹¹. The BWROG SSP was developed from unirradiated, archival samples of BWR plate and weld materials related to several U.S. BWR plant-specific surveillance programs along with additional material from U.S. RPV fabricators and other sources. In total, [] different plate and [] different weld materials were included in the

BWROG SSP. Samples of these materials were fabricated into [] sets of Charpy specimens and placed into [] SSP surveillance capsules. [] of the SSP surveillance capsules were inserted into the [] RPV and [] were inserted into the [] RPV for irradiation.

The ISP in Table 4-6 of BWRVIP-86-A previously proposed [] surveillance capsules, [] surveillance capsule from each of the [] ISP host plants, for the proposed 60-year operating period. The ISP(E) will use these [] surveillance capsules originally proposed in BWRVIP-86-A for the 60-year operating period. There are also [] deferred surveillance capsules that will be available on a contingency basis. Table 3-1, "Detailed Test Plan by Plant, Capsule Already Tested," and Table 3-2, "Detailed Test Plan by Plant, Future ISP and ISP(E) Capsule Testing," of BWRVIP-116 documents the limiting material for each BWR plant and the representative surveillance material source capsules.

BWRVIP-116 also notes that [] BWR plants rely on representative materials that are only in the SSP surveillance capsules. These SSP surveillance capsules are being tested in the current ISP and, therefore, no SSP surveillance capsules will be available for testing under the ISP(E). However, the material in these SSP capsules will have accumulated neutron fluence values that represent the target vessel's estimated end-of-life for the extend period (EOLE) 1/4 thickness (1/4 T) fluence values. Therefore, the SSP surveillance capsules tested under the current ISP will also provide the required surveillance data for the 60-year operating period under the ISP(E).

2.2. Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule

The surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule for the ISP(E) was developed based on the expectation that license renewal (60-year operating period) would increase the BWR facilities effective full power years (EFPY) of operation from 32 EFPY to 48 EFPY. The BWRVIP proposes that the additional [] ISP(E) surveillance capsules be tested at 40 EFPY, which is an extension of, and consistent with the methodology of the current ISP, except for the [] surveillance capsule. The [] surveillance capsule was scheduled for withdrawal in [] as part of the current ISP, but the BWRVIP proposes to defer this capsule's withdrawal until [] for use under the ISP(E). The basis for determining that this capsule be deferred and used in the ISP(E) is provided below.

- This [] capsule would provide the [] irradiated data set for weld heat [] and the [] irradiated data set for plate heat []. Only two irradiated data sets are required to realize a representative data set in accordance with RG 1.99, Revision 2.
- Withdrawing this [] surveillance capsule at [] is unproductive from the viewpoint of obtaining useful data, since the neutron fluence which was achieved by the [] material in SSP Capsule [] is greater than what would be achieved by the [] capsule.
- The only remaining [] capsule available after the withdrawal of the [], is a reconstituted capsule that was reinserted in the early 1990's. Since the [] surveillance capsule will have been exposed to a greater neutron fluence, it will provide better irradiated data than the reconstituted capsule.

The surveillance capsule test schedule was presented in Table 2-2 of BWRVIP-116. This schedule was determined by evaluating the projected neutron fluences of the ISP(E) surveillance capsules at 40 EFPY against the estimated 1/4 T neutron fluence values of the target vessels at EOLE, which is 48 EFPY. The results of this evaluation were presented in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of BWRVIP-116 for the limiting plates and welds, respectively. This qualitative evaluation was made using assumptions in estimating the EOLE neutron fluence values since most plants did not have these neutron fluence calculations for the extended period of operation. These assumptions included:

- Lead factors of the ISP(E) capsules are unknown and are assumed to be the same as recent surveillance capsules tested.
- A nominal capacity factor of 80 percent is assumed, and actual plant operation may vary from this assumed value.
- Neutron fluence values of each capsule at 40 EFPY are assumed to be 1.25 times the neutron fluence calculations for 32 EFPY.
- Since the EOLE 1/4 T neutron fluence values of the target vessels limiting materials are not available from formal vessel neutron fluence calculations, they are estimated by multiplying the 32 EFPY 1/4 T fluences by a factor of 1.5, except for [], which is based on a recent neutron fluence calculation for 48 EFPY.

Since there are uncertainties in these estimates of the exact year that these plants will reach 40 EFPY, the BWRVIP will coordinate with these plants and inform the NRC staff of any schedule changes that exceed 2 years of the date given in Table 2-2. In addition, the BWRVIP will continue to update the plants EOLE neutron fluence values as the neutron fluence reevaluations are performed.

BWRVIP-116 stated that Tables 2-3 and 2-4 demonstrated that testing the ISP(E) surveillance capsules at 40 EFPY will, in most cases, have fluence levels greater than 100 percent of the EOLE 1/4 T fluence of their target vessel's limiting material, thereby meeting the requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E185 and RG 1.99, Revision 2. In the cases where the surveillance capsule neutron fluence values are less than 100 percent of the target RPV 1/4 T fluence values and the capsules are not the same heat as the target vessel material, the target plants will utilize RG 1.99, Revision 2, Tables 1 and 2 to determine a chemistry factor for calculating predicted embrittlement shifts. Since the representative material's Charpy shift data are not used directly to predict embrittlement in these cases, there is no effect on the surveillance capsules being less than 100 percent of the target RPV's EOLE 1/4 T fluence values. For the instances where the surveillance capsule neutron fluence values are less than 100 percent of the 1/4 T fluence values and the capsules is the same heat as the target vessel material, the ISP(E) host reactor vessel is also the target reactor vessel. The surveillance capsules in these plants lag the reactor vessel material in terms of neutron fluence exposure, and therefore it is not possible for these capsules to achieve 100 percent of the EOLE 1/4 T neutron fluence. However, three or more irradiated data points will still be obtained, and these plants will be able to calculate a surveillance based chemistry factor for calculating predicted embrittlement shifts in accordance with RG 1.99, Revision 2.

2.3 Evaluation of ISP Compliance with Appendix H Criteria

The ISP(E) is an extension of the current ISP providing additional surveillance data for the extended period of operation and uses the same methodology in determining compliance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. The guidelines of developing the ISP(E) are therefore based on the current ISP in BWRVIP-86-A which are discussed below.

On the topic of similarity of plant operating environments in Paragraph III.C.a of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, the BWRVIP noted that normal operating temperatures in the downcomer region of BWRs range from 525 °F to 535 °F. The BWRVIP concluded that this temperature variation was minor and would not be significant with regard to the ability to monitor embrittlement for the BWR fleet through the use of the ISP. Regarding the neutron energy spectra issue, the BWRVIP cited the fact that neutron energy spectra for BWRs have been determined by General Electric over the years using neutron transport calculations. These determinations have been made for various BWR models, at original and uprated power levels, with original and new fuel designs, and with original and revised core loading patterns. Although the magnitude of neutron flux may vary from plant to plant based on specific operating characteristics, the neutron energy spectrum was found to be essentially the same at similar plant locations. Hence, the BWRVIP concluded that the overall operating environments for all reactors in the U.S. BWR fleet were sufficiently similar to support data sharing and the implementation of an ISP.

Next, the BWRVIP considered the requirements in Paragraph III.C.b of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, pertaining to the availability of dosimetry data and the ability to adequately determine both RPV surveillance capsule and BWR RPV fluences. The BWRVIP concluded that, given the availability of an acceptable, benchmarked fluence calculational methodology, these sources of data would continue to provide an accurate estimate of the RPV neutron fluence values unless a major change in core design is undertaken in the future. The BWRVIP noted that facilities which identify a need for additional dosimetry data to improve their RPV neutron fluence calculations may also consider the installation of ex-vessel dosimetry for that purpose. In addition, BWRVIP-116 stated that BWRs that will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules will determine vessel fluence during the extended period utilizing an NRC approved neutron fluence determination methodology.

Regarding the criterion for adequate data sharing in Paragraph III.C.c of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, BWRVIP-86-A committed the BWRVIP to the development of a program plan to exchange surveillance data (capsule reports) among BWR facilities as it becomes available. The ability to integrate and distribute data to all BWR licensees through the BWRVIP is a common feature which has been successfully implemented in many other BWRVIP programs. This commitment continues to apply for the ISP(E) as stated in Section 2.4 of BWRVIP-116. In addition, since all of the BWR participants have referenced the implementation of the current ISP in their facility's Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs), each BWR facility demonstrates compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

Regarding the need for contingency planning in accordance with Paragraph III.C.d of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 2.6 of BWRVIP-116, states that the contingency plans under the ISP(E) are the same as the current ISP. The first part of this plan would be to consider retrieving the necessary surveillance capsules from the facility prior to permanent shutdown. If removal of the capsules is not a viable option, a new best representative material would be selected from the surveillance materials not currently being tested as part of the ISP(E). This option highlights the inherent contingency plan which is available in the BWRVIP ISP(E). The work performed to develop the ISP(E) has identified several surveillance materials, other than the best representative material, that could represent a particular RPV's limiting plate or weld. Surveillance capsules containing the other potential representative materials will not be removed from their host reactors, but will instead continue to be irradiated during the course of normal plant operation. As such, these other surveillance materials will continue to be available for removal and testing should the reactor which houses the best representative surveillance material undergo an indefinite shutdown. Finally, if none of the potential representative capsules are a viable option, the target plant's own capsules, which were deferred under the ISP(E) but remain in the reactor, will be available as the last contingency.

The final criterion in Paragraph III.C.e of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, regarding the identification of substantial advantages to be gained as a direct result of implementation of the ISP(E), was addressed based on information previously noted in this safety evaluation (SE). The ISP(E) would address the issue raised by the NRC staff regarding the lack of adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data for some BWR surveillance materials by identifying and substituting other materials as the method of monitoring changes in RPV material fracture toughness for some BWRs. In addition, the BWRVIP proposed that the implementation of the ISP(E) would also have additional benefits. The BWRVIP stated that when the original surveillance materials were selected for plant-specific surveillance programs, the existing state of knowledge about which RPV materials would be limiting with regard to fracture toughness after irradiation was not the same as it is today. As a result, many facilities did not include what would be identified today as the plant's limiting RPV materials in their surveillance programs.

Hence, this effort to identify and evaluate materials from other BWRs, which may better represent a facility's limiting materials, should improve the overall evaluation of BWR RPV embrittlement. The inclusion of data from the testing of BWROG SSP capsules will improve overall quality of the data being used to evaluate BWR RPV embrittlement. Finally, implementation of the ISP(E) is also expected to reduce the cost of surveillance testing and analysis for the BWR fleet since surveillance materials that are of little or no value (either because they lack adequate unirradiated baseline CVN data or because they are not the best representative material for any U.S. BWR) will no longer be tested.

Table 3-3 of BWRVIP-116 provides information in regards to Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 that state that an ISP shall entail no reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor and no reduction in the amount of testing. Although some surveillance capsules will be deferred and not tested as part of the ISP(E), all capsules that were previously credited as part of plant-specific surveillance programs and carried forward under the current ISP will continue to be irradiated in

their host reactors. Therefore, all irradiated material samples continue to remain available to the ISP(E), if needed, and no overall reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor occurs as a result of the ISP(E).

With regard to the number of specimens tested for the extended period, Table 3-3 shows that the [] host plants that will be testing one surveillance capsule each under the current ISP will also be testing an additional surveillance capsule for the ISP(E). Therefore, there will be no reduction in the required amount of specimens tested from the implementation of the proposed ISP(E).

Therefore, based on the consideration of these factors, the ISP(E) meets the regulatory criteria in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

3.0 NRC STAFF EVALUATION

The NRC staff has reviewed the information in the BWRVIP-116 report against the criteria specified in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for the establishment of an ISP. The staff has also reviewed the technical basis for, and comprehensive description of, the proposed ISP(E) against the objectives of being able to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials due to irradiation and providing adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations. The staff has concluded that, subject to the conditions discussed in this section and in Section 4.0 of this SE, the proposed BWR ISP(E) is acceptable. Additional details regarding the staff's evaluation of the ISP(E) are provided below.

3.1 Surveillance Material Selection for the BWR ISP(E)

The NRC staff has completed its review of the technical criteria used by the BWRVIP to select the surveillance materials to be included within the ISP(E) for all U.S. BWRs for the license renewal period. The NRC staff notes that the [] application to renew their license is currently being reviewed at the NRC. Therefore, the NRC staff in a letter dated June 23, 2004, requested the BWRVIP to discuss how [], which was not included in BWRVIP-116, would be incorporated into the ISP(E). In a BWRVIP letter dated January 11, 2005, an individual vessel evaluation was provided for [] including the final selection of the best representative weld and plate materials using the methodology and criteria previously established in BWRVIP-86-A. The individual vessel evaluation will be added to Appendix A of BWRVIP-86-A, to provide a complete list of the evaluations of all BWR vessels in the ISP and the proposed ISP(E).

The BWRVIP proposed that the best representative weld material for [] is SSP heat [], which is the same heat as the vessel limiting material. The BWRVIP also stated that SSP heat [] has been tested from SSP capsules [], with capsule [] receiving the highest neutron fluence at [] at the 1/4T location. The NRC staff notes that the [] response to a request for additional information in regards to the license renewal application, the licensee provided in a letter dated January 31, 2005⁽¹²⁾, a fluence value of [] at the 1/4T location for the vessel weld heat [] for the extended period of operation. Therefore, the SSP capsule I for this heat still bounds the fluence value of the [] vessel for the extended period of time. Weld heat [] will

be a new addition to the list of ISP(E) representative surveillance materials, but will not require additional capsule testing since SSP capsule I has been tested already and provides the necessary surveillance data for the [] limiting weld. The best representative plate material for [] plate heat [] which is already proposed to be tested under the ISP(E).

The staff has concluded that the BWRVIP's material selection process was adequate to ensure that materials which effectively provide meaningful information to monitor changes in fracture toughness for all BWR RPV materials, including [] were included within the scope of the ISP(E). The criteria used (chemical composition, material heat number, fabricator, etc.) were consistent with current ISP, which included the best available technical understanding of irradiation damage mechanics for identifying surveillance materials that would best represent the limiting plate and weld materials in U.S. BWR RPVs. The staff also found that the criteria for having adequate unirradiated baseline data (or the ability to acquire such data) continues to be addressed under the ISP(E). Finally, the staff found that the BWRVIP's consideration of test matrix minimization based on use of a single surveillance material to represent more than one limiting BWR RPV material was also acceptable. Test matrix minimization led, in some cases, to a material which was not the absolute "best" representative surveillance material being used to represent a specific BWR RPV material. The staff found this to be acceptable because it was not necessary in all cases to use the absolute "best" representative material when a technically adequate material was already to be included in the program to represent a different BWR RPV material.

It should, however, be noted that although a surveillance material may be determined to be the "best" representative material for a specific RPV material, the similarity between the surveillance material and the RPV material may not be sufficient to justify direct use (see RG 1.99, Revision 2, position C.2) of the surveillance data in determining the behavior of the RPV material. Therefore, if position C.2 is used, appropriate adjustments for chemistry and irradiation temperature differences between the surveillance material and the RPV limiting material must be addressed. The NRC staff will review the direct utilization of surveillance data resulting from the ISP(E) as part of plant-specific RPV integrity evaluations. Surveillance materials which do not share the same heat number with the limiting RPV material may be used for general monitoring, but not for direct determination of RPV embrittlement. In such cases, the chemistry factor table of position C.1. of RG 1.99, Revision 2 should be used. It is sufficient to mention at this point that additional differences between surveillance materials and RPV materials (e.g., heat treatment during fabrication) can complicate the direct use of such surveillance data, particularly if advanced fracture mechanics-based evaluations (i.e., the Master Curve methodology), which are outside of the scope of this submittal, were to be employed.

3.2 Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule

The staff has also reviewed the BWRVIP's selection of surveillance capsule withdrawal/test dates (years) in order to achieve meaningful projected surveillance capsule fluence levels. The capsule test schedule is presented in Table 2-2, "ISP(E) Capsule Test Schedule" of BWRVIP-116, and detailed in Table 2-3, "Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR

Limiting Plates,” and Table 2-4, “Evaluation of ISP(E) Capsule Testing for BWR Limiting Welds.” The NRC requested in a letter dated June 23, 2004, that the BWRVIP discuss how they ensure that the objectives of being able to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties due to irradiation and being able to provide adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations are met, since some of the test dates of the surveillance capsules are performed after the end of the target plant’s extended license. In a letter dated January 11, 2005, the BWRVIP provided a proposed schedule consistent with the method suggested by the NRC staff to withdraw the ISP(E) capsules from the affected plants in the approximate year when the ISP(E) capsule fluences as a percentage of EOLE 1/4T fluence is estimated to be approximately equal to 100 percent of the EOLE 1/4T fluence of the most limiting plant. This resulted in a schedule that would allow the target plants to use the surveillance data in their required RPV integrity evaluations and to monitor changes in fracture toughness properties during their extended period of operation. The BWRVIP noted that the [] ISP(E) capsule attained only [] percent of the plant’s limiting weld EOLE 1/4T fluence instead of 100 percent. This, however, is acceptable to the NRC staff since it is approximately 100 percent while providing surveillance data that can be used by the limiting plant prior to the end of its extended period of operation. The NRC staff notes that the new capsule test schedule in Table 1 of the BWRVIP letter dated January 11, 2005, should replace Table 2-2 of BWRVIP-116.

Section 2.6 of BWRVIP-116 provides contingency planning for the ISP(E) to address any major interruptions in plant operation such as early, permanent plant shutdown or an extended outage of one of the host plants. However, this section does not address minor reassessments that take into account plant-specific variations in scheduled withdrawal dates due to modifications in fuel cycles, or changes in target fluences caused by power uprates or variations in capacity factors. In a letter dated January 11, 2005, the BWRVIP provided additional requirements to be added to Section 2.6 of BWRVIP-116 to address these situations. The NRC staff agrees with the information provided and the requirement that changes to the capsule withdrawal schedules will be submitted to the NRC for approval. This is in addition to the BWRVIP commitment in Section 3 of BWRVIP-116 to update the plant neutron fluence values as the plants perform fluence reevaluations for the extended period of operation. Since these reevaluated fluence values can affect the withdrawal schedules, the BWRVIP will implement changes to the withdrawal schedule and submit them for NRC approval as required by Section 2.6 of BWRVIP-116.

The staff also finds the BWRVIP’s basis for the deferral of the withdrawal of the [] surveillance capsule from [] (as part of the current ISP) until [] (under the ISP(E)) to be acceptable. Irradiated data currently exists for the same heats of material in the [] surveillance capsule (weld heat [] and plate heat []) based on previous plant-specific and SSP testing. Deferring the testing of the [] surveillance capsule will provide irradiated data that is more consistent with the fluences that will be seen in the target RPV during the 60-year extended licensing period. Therefore, since the deferral of the [] surveillance capsule will provide better irradiated data for the target plants to utilize for their RPV integrity evaluations, the NRC staff has no objections to deferring this capsule. However, deferring this capsule for use under the ISP(E) will reduce the number of capsules tested under the current ISP. The acceptability of the number of test capsules in the current ISP and ISP(E) is discussed in Section 3.3 of this SE.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concluded that the program described by these tables was acceptable to meet the objectives of being able to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of RPV materials due to irradiation and providing adequate information for required RPV integrity evaluations.

3.3 Evaluation of ISP Compliance with Appendix H Criteria

After concluding that an acceptable technical basis existed for the proposed ISP(E), the NRC staff next evaluated the proposed ISP(E) against the criteria for an ISP specified in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 as was done for the current ISP. Each of the criteria is addressed below.

First, concerning Paragraph III.C.a of Appendix H, the NRC staff concluded that sufficient similarity exists regarding the design of U.S. BWRs such that accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage can be made for the BWR fleet through an ISP. The staff continues to accept that no significant plant-to-plant differences in neutron energy spectra should be expected at similar BWR RPV wall or surveillance capsule locations based on current operating practice. This is based on the current ISP plant designs, including the addition of [] which is of the same design and construction as [] currently in the ISP. The staff also accepts that the range of operating temperatures for the BWR fleet (525 °F to 535 °F) cited by the BWRVIP bounds the current operating characteristics of these units. Plant-to-plant temperature differences of this magnitude are minor and may be corrected for, as necessary, to support direct use of surveillance data (see Position C.2 of RG 1.99, Revision 2) based on the use of adjustment methodologies that have been approved by the NRC staff. In addition, the staff accepts that no other effects that may contribute to plant-to-plant differences in irradiation conditions (e.g., significantly different gamma flux levels, etc.) are known to exist.

The next criteria the NRC staff considered was that specified in Paragraph III.C.b of Appendix H concerning the need for an adequate dosimetry program for each reactor participating in the ISP(E). The staff recognized that in order to define what an "adequate" dosimetry program may be, it was necessary to examine the underlying purpose of a RPV dosimetry program. RPV dosimetry programs were considered to be necessary to support the determination of RPV neutron fluence values for limiting RPV materials through the application of neutron fluence calculational methodologies. In addition, the dosimetry data associated with each surveillance capsule directly provides information important for the accurate determination of the surveillance capsule fluence. Therefore, the staff considered whether the information provided by the ISP(E) was sufficient to conclude that acceptable RPV fluence and surveillance capsule fluence values could continue to be determined given implementation of the ISP(E).

The proposed ISP(E) will continue to utilize dosimetry as delineated under the current ISP. Under the current ISP, a limited amount of dosimetry data exists from each operating BWR, either as a result of the analysis of first cycle dosimetry capsules or as a result of previously tested surveillance capsules. The BWRVIP provided additional information in a letter dated January 11, 2005, that BWR plants removing additional surveillance capsules for the purpose of assessing RPV integrity will also use an NRC-approved methodology for determining neutron fluences. The BWRVIP further clarified that all ISP(E) fluence evaluations, whether host or target plant, will be performed in a consistent manner using a RPV neutron fluence calculational methodology consistent with the guidance of RG 1.190¹³⁹. As a continuation of the

current ISP in BWRVIP-86-A, the implementation of the ISP(E) would ensure that each facility which supplies surveillance capsules for the ISP(E) will continue to obtain additional dosimetry data. For those facilities which supply capsules to the ISP(E), the amount of dosimetry data which will be obtained through participation in the ISP(E) will be equal to or greater than the amount of data which would have been acquired as a result of continuing either with the current ISP, or with a plant-specific surveillance program. Therefore, given that the current ISP has been determined to be adequate, the NRC staff concluded that their access to dosimetry data will continue to be adequate through implementation of the ISP(E). Finally, the dosimetry data from each surveillance capsule included in the ISP(E) ensures that adequate dosimetry data is available for the determination of surveillance capsule fluences.

As a continuation of the current ISP in BWRVIP-86-A, facilities which are not required to remove additional capsules may (e.g., through the installation and testing of ex-vessel dosimetry) or may not acquire additional dosimetry data. However, adequacy of dosimetry data for BWR facilities which will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules will be dependent upon the methodology utilized by each licensee to determine their RPV fluences. Section 2.5 of BWRVIP-116 provides information about dosimetry for BWR plants that will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules. These BWR plants will determine vessel fluences during the extended license period utilizing an NRC-approved neutron fluence determination methodology. Currently, at least one NRC-approved neutron fluence determination methodology in NEDC-32983P which was approved by NRC letter dated September 14, 2001⁽¹⁾, in accordance with RG 1.190 exists for BWRs which provides adequate results with little or no plant-specific dosimetry data. Additional neutron fluence determination methodologies which may offer the same capability could be developed. It is noted that the staff has approved the BWRVIP Radiation Analysis Modeling Application (RAMA) fluence methodology in its SE dated May 13, 2005. However, it should be noted that calculational methodologies have been, or will be, benchmarked against existing dosimetry databases to demonstrate their adequacy for determining BWR RPV fluences.

Since all BWR plants have implemented the current ISP and use neutron fluence determination methodologies that have been or will be benchmarked against existing dosimetry data bases, except for Duane Arnold and FitzPatrick which are in-process of implementing the current ISP, the NRC staff concludes that the dosimetry data which would be available for BWR facilities that will not be required to remove additional surveillance capsules as part of the ISP(E) will be sufficient to ensure that adequate RPV neutron fluence determinations continue to be performed. However, if a BWR facility proposes to change its neutron fluence determination methodology, the facility must request approval from the NRC staff to determine its acceptability, and whether the neutron fluence determination methodologies have been or will be benchmarked against existing dosimetry data bases. The information submitted to the NRC staff must be sufficient for the staff to determine that:

- (1) RPV and surveillance capsule fluences will be established based on the use of an NRC-approved fluence methodology that will provide acceptable results based on the available dosimetry data, and

(2) if one "best estimate" methodology is used to determine the neutron fluence values for a licensee's RPV and one or more different methodologies are used to establish the neutron fluence values for the ISP(E) surveillance capsules which "represent" that RPV in the ISP(E), the results of these differing methodologies are compatible (i.e., within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation).

Regarding the criterion of adequate data sharing between plants in Paragraph III.C.c of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, the NRC recognizes that BWRVIP processes have been demonstrated in other programs to be sufficient for establishing methods to share data between BWR facilities. The staff also notes that the data sharing will continue under the ISP(E) in the same manner as addressed and committed to in the current ISP. Therefore, the NRC staff accepts the continued commitment by the BWRVIP in the development and implementation of a "program plan to manage data sharing." The NRC staff, however, would also note that by the incorporation of the ISP(E) into the licensing basis for each participating BWR facility, each licensee is further responsible for ensuring that they acquire and evaluate in a timely manner all relevant ISP(E) data which may affect RPV integrity evaluations for their facility. Hence, after implementation of the ISP(E), a performance basis should become available from NRC staff licensing reviews to evaluate whether acceptable data sharing is occurring as part of the ISP(E).

Regarding the criterion in Paragraph III.C.d of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for establishing a contingency plan to ensure that the ISP(E) will not be jeopardized by an extended outage of a reactor from which surveillance capsules are to be obtained, the NRC staff concluded that the BWR ISP(E) has inherently established an adequate contingency plan, which is the same as under the current ISP. The evaluational work which was performed by the BWRVIP to select the "best representative" materials for inclusion in the ISP(E) also identified other surveillance materials in other BWR RPVs that could be used to monitor changes in fracture toughness properties for the BWR fleet. These other, "backup" surveillance materials could be used by the BWRVIP in the event that one or more facilities which are currently slated to provide capsules to the ISP(E) are forced to sustain an indefinite shutdown or unanticipated termination of operations. By having this preestablished list of available backup surveillance materials, the BWRVIP could act in a timely and efficient manner to arrange for the appropriate acquisition and evaluation of data from a backup material to support the goals of the ISP(E). However, to assure that these backup material are available for possible future testing, these backup material, which includes any surveillance material with unirradiated baseline data, must be kept in a condition which allows for testing. Therefore, the BWRVIP-116 report should include the necessary information to ensure the contingency plan continues to meet the criterion in Paragraph III.C.d of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. This information should ensure:

- All surveillance material with unirradiated CVN baseline data, which includes tested/broken CVN specimens and partially and/or untested surveillance capsule material, must be kept in a condition to allow for possible future testing.
- If these surveillance materials are removed from the RPV, without the intent to test them, these capsules must be stored in a manner which maintains them in a condition which would support possible re-insertion into an RPV, if necessary under the contingency plan.

- Prior to any changes to the storage of these materials, the BWRVIP must be notified to determine whether these changes are acceptable. The BWRVIP must obtain NRC approval for any changes that would prevent the possible testing of these surveillance materials under the contingency plan.

Based on the inclusion of the above mentioned information in the BWRVIP-116 report, the availability of these backup materials, and the periodic reviews to be conducted by the BWRVIP to assess whether any changes to the ISP(E) are necessary, the NRC staff has concluded that the BWRVIP has adequately addressed the need to consider ISP(E) contingency planning in its submittal.

The NRC staff also concluded that there are substantial advantages to be gained by the implementation of the BWR ISP(E) in response to the criterion in Paragraph III.C.e of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. First, the proposed ISP(E) will address the concerns raised by the staff regarding the current reliance by some BWR licensees on surveillance materials that lack unirradiated baseline CVN data to meet the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Second, by not testing some existing plant-specific capsules as part of the ISP(E), significant savings may be realized by the BWR fleet relating to the cost of capsule removal, shipping, testing, time added to outage critical path schedules, etc. Third, the ISP(E) will improve the overall quality of data that will be obtained and reported based on the formal incorporation of the SSP capsules in the ISP(E) test matrix. Other advantages of the ISP(E) may be identified, however, the staff has found that those noted above are substantial.

Finally, regarding the positions raised in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 which state that an ISP shall entail no reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor and no reduction in the amount of testing, the NRC staff has concluded, based on the following, that the proposed ISP(E) complies with the following provisions:

- The staff has concluded that the continued availability of all capsules which were previously credited as part of current ISP, which includes all capsules in the previous plant-specific surveillance programs, supports the determination that no overall reduction in the number of materials being irradiated, number of specimen types, or number of specimens per reactor would result from implementing the ISP(E).
- As discussed above in Section 3.2 of this SER, the deferral of the [] surveillance capsule from the current ISP to the proposed ISP(E) will affect the number of surveillance capsules tested under the current ISP. To determine if the current ISP still meets the requirements of no reduction in the amount of testing, the NRC staff evaluated this change in the current ISP using the criteria in the staff's letter dated February 1, 2002, that originally determined that the current ISP did not result in a reduction in the required amount of CVN testing from the plant-specific surveillance programs. Since the total number of CVN specimen sets to be tested under the current ISP was [], as determined in the February 1, 2002, letter, deferring the [] surveillance capsule (two CVN specimen sets per capsule) will bring the total number of CVN specimen sets to []. This still exceeds the total number of [] specimen sets that were approved under the previous plant-specific programs.

- With regard to the number of specimens tested for the extended period, the NRC concludes that no reduction in the required amount of CVN specimen set testing would result from the implementation of the proposed ISP(E) since each of the [] host plants currently testing under the current ISP, will be testing an additional surveillance capsule under the ISP(E). In addition, with these [] additional surveillance capsules ([] CVN specimen sets), and the [] CVN specimen sets in the current ISP which are incorporated into the ISP(E), a total of [] CVN specimen sets will be tested under the ISP(E). This is essentially equivalent to the estimated [] CVN specimen sets that would have been tested under plant-specific programs. The estimated number of CVN specimen sets for the plant-specific programs was based on the EOLE operating period, the projected EOLE neutron fluence values, and the guidelines of ASTM Standard E185.

Based on the consideration of these factors, the NRC staff concludes that the regulatory criteria in Paragraph III.C. of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for the approval of an ISP have been met.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The NRC staff has concluded that the ISP(E) proposed by the BWRVIP in the BWRVIP-116 report, and as amended by its responses dated January 11, 2005, to NRC staff RAIs, is acceptable, subject to the conditions discussed in Sections 3 and 4 of this SE. The ISP(E) adequately addresses the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 for BWR licensees through the end of facility's proposed 60 year operating license. In particular, the information contained in Tables 2-2, 3-1 and 3-2 of BWRVIP-116 was found by the staff to be acceptable for defining the ISP(E) test matrix, surveillance capsule withdrawal dates, and material associations for the BWR ISP(E). Other aspects of the ISP(E), in particular plant-specific data utilization, were also found to be acceptable provided appropriate adjustments are made for chemical composition and irradiation temperature differences when data is shared between facilities.

The staff's approval of the ISP(E) is further predicated on the adoption of the ISP(E) by all BWR facilities who are identified within the ISP(E) test matrix as supplying surveillance capsules for the ISP(E). If any BWR licensee which should be providing surveillance capsules to the ISP(E) elects not to participate, the BWRVIP must submit, for NRC staff review and approval, changes to the ISP(E) that must be made to address this event.

It is the staff's understanding that the BWRVIP will produce a program document which will be all inclusive, i.e., the updated version of the BWRVIP-116 report will include the RPV surveillance program for all operating U.S. BWR plants for the current 40-year term as well as through the period of extended operation and, therefore, will replace the BWRVIP-86-A report. BWR licensees who wish to participate in the ISP(E) must complete the ISP(E) implementation as follows, based on the status of its license renewal application:

- a. BWR licensees that have already been approved for a 60 year license by the NRC shall implement the ISP(E) as dictated in the SER that approved their renewed license by revising their licensing basis to replace the BWRVIP-86-A reference with the approved version of the BWRVIP-116 report.

- b. BWR licensees that have their license renewal applications currently being reviewed by the NRC as of the date of this SER shall either:
 - (1) revise their proposed licensing basis for the extended period by replacing the BWRVIP-86-A reference with the approved version of BWRVIP-116, if early in the license renewal process; or
 - (2) implement the ISP(E) of BWRVIP-116 as will be specified in the staff's upcoming license renewal SER.
- c. BWR licensees that will submit a license renewal application shall implement the ISP(E) by revising their licensing basis to include the approved version of BWRVIP-116 in its application and the proposed licensing basis for the extended period of operation.

Modifications to the facilities' licensing bases, as discussed above, may be implemented through the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The NRC staff notes that by the incorporation of the ISP(E) into the licensing basis for each participating BWR facility, each licensee is further responsible for ensuring that they acquire and evaluate in a timely manner all relevant ISP(E) data which may affect RPV integrity evaluations for their facility.

In addition to the information in the BWRVIP's letter dated January 11, 2005, which amends BWRVIP-116, the BWRVIP shall include in the approved version of BWRVIP-116, the following concerning the withdrawal schedule and contingency plans as discussed in this SE.

- a. NRC staff notes that the new capsule test schedule in Table 1 of the BWRVIP letter dated January 11, 2005, should replace Table 2-2 of BWRVIP-116.
- b. The BWRVIP-116 report should include the necessary information to ensure the contingency plan continues to meet the criterion in Paragraph III.C.d of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. This information should ensure:
 - (1) All surveillance material with unirradiated CVN baseline data, which includes tested/broken CVN specimens and partially and/or untested surveillance capsule material, must be kept in a condition to allow for possible future testing.
 - (2) If these surveillance material are removed from the RPV, without the intent to test them, these capsules must be stored in a manner which maintains them in a condition which would support possible re-insertion into an RPV, if necessary under the contingency plan.
 - (3) Prior to any changes to the storage of these materials, the BWRVIP must be notified to determine whether these changes are acceptable. The BWRVIP must obtain NRC approval for any changes that would prevent the possible testing of these surveillance material under the contingency plan.

Finally, if a BWR facility proposes to change its neutron fluence determination methodology, the facility must request approval from the NRC staff to determine its acceptability, determine whether the neutron fluence determination methodologies are compatible for use in the ISP(E) and determine if the methodologies have been or will be benchmarked against existing dosimetry data bases. The information submitted to the NRC staff must be sufficient for the staff to determine that:

- (1) RPV and surveillance capsule fluences will be established as based on the use of an NRC-approved fluence methodology that will provide acceptable results based on the available dosimetry data, and
- (2) if one methodology is used to determine the neutron fluence values for a licensee's RPV and one or more different methodologies are used to establish the neutron fluence values for the ISP(E) surveillance capsules which "represent" that RPV in the ISP, the results of these differing methodologies are compatible (i.e. within acceptable levels of uncertainty for each calculation).

5.0 REFERENCES

- [1] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Project No. 704 - BWRVIP-116: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal," July 29, 2003 [ADAMS Accession No. ML032130239]
- [2] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Project No. 704 - BWRVIP Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information on BWRVIP," January 11, 2005 [ADAMS Accession No. ML050130319]
- [3] S. Coffin (USNRC) to C. Terry (BWRVIP), "Request for Additional Information - Review of BWR Vessel and Internals Project Report, BWRVIP-116, Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation for License Renewal," March 29, 2004 [ADAMS Accession No. ML041000031]
- [4] S. Coffin (USNRC) to C. Terry (BWRVIP), "Supplementary Request for Additional Information Regarding BWRVIP-116, Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation for License Renewal," June 23, 2004 [ADAMS Accession No. ML041810614]
- [5] W. H. Bateman (USNRC) to C. Terry, "Safety Evaluation Regarding EPRI Proprietary Reports "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)" and "BWRVIP-86: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," February 1, 2002 [ADAMS Accession No. ML020380691]
- [6] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "PROJECT NO. 704 - BWRVIP Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding BWRVIP-78," December 15, 2000 [ADAMS Accession No. ML003778471]

- [7] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "PROJECT NO. 704 - BWRVIP Response to Second NRC Request for Additional Information on the BWR Integrated Surveillance Program," May 30, 2001 [ADAMS Accession No. ML011560296]
- [8] D.C. Trimble (USNRC) to C.S. Hinnant (Carolina Power and Light), "Request for Additional Information Regarding the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (TAC No. M98710)," May 23, 1997 [ADAMS Accession No. 9705290341]
- [9] C. Terry (BWRVIP) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Project No. 704 - BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)," December 22, 1999
- [10] C.E. Carpenter (USNRC) to E.J. Sullivan (USNRC), "Meeting Summary for November 5 and 6, 1997, Meetings with Boiling Water Reactors Vessel and Internals Project Technical Chairs, Regarding BWRVIP-07 Safety Evaluation Report and to Discuss Issues Related to BWR Licensee Vessel Surveillance Programs, Relative to Monitoring Radiation Embrittlement at BWR Facilities," December 9, 1997 [Attachments proprietary.] [ADAMS Accession No. 9712160051]
- [11] USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," May 1988
- [12] T. Abney (Tennessee Valley Authority) to U.S. NRC Document Control Desk, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, and 3 - License Renewal Application - Reactor Vessel and Internals Mechanical System Sections 3.1, 4.2, and B.2.1 - Response to NRC Request for Information (RAI) (TAC Nos. MC1704, MC1705, and MC1706)," January 31, 2005 [ADAMS Accession No. ML050320145]
- [13] USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence," March 2001 [ADAMS Accession No. ML010890301]
- [14] S.A. Richards (USNRC) to J.F. Klapproth (GE), "Safety Evaluation for NEDC-32983P, 'General Electric Methodology for Reactor Pressure Vessel Fast Neutron Flux Evaluation' (TAC No. MA9891)," September 14, 2001 [ADAMS Accession No. ML012400381]

cc:

Tom Mulford, EPRI BWRVIP
Integration Manager
Raj Pathania, EPRI BWRVIP
Mitigation Manager
Ken Wolfe, EPRI BWRVIP
Repair Manager
Larry Steinert, EPRI BWRVIP
Electric Power Research Institute
P.O. Box 10412
3412 Hillview Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94303

George Inch, Technical Chairman
BWRVIP Assessment Committee
Constellation Nuclear
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (M/S ESB-1)
348 Lake Road
Lycoming, NY 13093

Jeff Goldstein, Technical Chairman
BWRVIP Mitigation Committee
Entergy Nuclear NE
440 Hamilton Ave. (M/S K-WPO-11c)
White Plains, NY 10601

Amir Shahkarami, BWRVIP Executive Oversight Committee
Exelon Corp.
Cornerstone II at Cantara
4300 Winfield Rd.
Warrenville, IL 60555-4012

Al Wrape, Executive Chairman
BWRVIP Assessment Committee
PPL Susquehanna, LLC
2 N. 9th St.
Allentown, PA 18101-1139

Rick Libra, BWRVIP Executive Oversight Committee
DTE Energy
Fermi Nuclear Plant (M/S 280 OBA)
6400 N. Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166-9726

Robin Dylé, Technical Chairman
BWRVIP Integration Committee
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
42 Inverness Center Parkway (M/S B234)
Birmingham, AL 35242-4809

Denver Atwood, Technical Chairman
BWRVIP Repair Focus Group
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
Post Office Box 1295
40 Inverness Center Parkway (M/S B031)
Birmingham, AL 35242-4809

Charles J. Wirtz, Chairman
BWRVIP Inspection Focus Group
FirstEnergy Corp.
Perry Nuclear Power Plant (M/S A250)
10 Center Road
Perry, OH 44081

Robert Carter, EPRI BWRVIP
Assessment Manager
Jeff Landrum, EPRI BWRVIP
Inspection Manager
EPRI NDE Center
P.O. Box 217097
1300 W. T. Harris Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28221

H. Lewis Sumner, Executive Chairman
BWRVIP Mitigation Committee
Vice President, Hatch Project
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
M/S BIN B051, P.O. BOX 1295
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35242-4809

D

NRC APPROVAL OF BWRVIP-86-A



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 16, 2002

Carl Terry, BWRVIP Chairman
Niagara Mohawk Power Company
Post Office Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NRC Staff Review of BWRVIP-86-A, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project,
Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan"

Dear Mr. Terry:

By letter dated November 12, 2002, the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) submitted Proprietary Report BWRVIP-86-A, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan," for information and NRC staff review. The BWRVIP-86-A report represents a compilation of information from several sources: Proprietary Report TR-114226, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Plan (BWRVIP-78)," Proprietary Report BWRVIP-86, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Integrated Surveillance Program Implementation Plan," BWRVIP responses (dated December 22, 2000, and May 30, 2001) to NRC staff requests for additional information (RAIs) regarding BWRVIP-78 and BWRVIP-86, and the NRC staff's safety evaluation (SE), issued on February 1, 2002, which approved the BWRVIP ISP.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information in BWRVIP-86-A and has found that it accurately incorporates all of the relevant information which was submitted by the BWRVIP in the documents noted above to support NRC staff approval of the BWRVIP ISP. Further, the staff finds that Appendix B to BWRVIP-86-A is a faithful reproduction of the NRC staff's February 1, 2002, SE, the inclusion of which is consistent with NRC staff expectations regarding an "A" topical report. BWR licensees who wish to reference in their facility's final safety assessment report (FSAR) or facility Technical Specifications the documentation which supports their adoption of the BWRVIP ISP may, therefore, reference BWRVIP-86-A in lieu of referencing the separate source documents noted in the paragraph above.


The NRC staff's only comment regarding the BWRVIP-86-A report is to suggest that you consider, when a future revision of the report becomes necessary, adding a statement to Section 5.4, "Plan for Ongoing Vessel Dosimetry," which notes that future BWR RPV fluence calculations should be performed using a fluence methodology which is acceptable to the NRC staff and consistent with the guidance found in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence." In the current revision of BWRVIP-86-A, the NRC staff finds that the topic of what is expected regarding future BWR RPV fluence calculations is adequately addressed in Appendix B (the reproduction of the NRC staff's SE). Our comment regarding Section 5.4 is only intended to support overall consistency between the body of the report and the NRC staff's SE.

Carl Terry

-2-

Please contact Matthew A. Mitchell of my staff at (301) 415-3303 if you have any further questions regarding this subject.

Sincerely,



William H. Bateman, Chief
Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch
Division of Engineering
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: As stated

cc: See next page

cc:

George Vanderheyden, Executive Chair
BWRVIP Assessment Committee
Exelon Corp.
200 Exelon Way (KSA 3-N)
Kennett Square, PA 19348

Robin Dyle, Technical Chairman
BWRVIP Assessment Committee
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35242

Bill Eaton, Executive Chair,
BWRVIP Inspection Focus Group
Grand Gulf Gen. Mgr., Plant Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
PO BOX 756, Waterloo Rd
Port Gibson, MS 39150-0756

Gary Park, Chairman
BWRVIP Inspection Focus Group
Nuclear Management Co.
3313 DAEC Road
Palo, IA 52324-9646

H. Lewis Sumner, Executive Chair
BWRVIP Mitigation Committee
Vice President, Hatch Project
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
MS BIN B051, PO BOX 1295
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35242-4809

John Wilson, Technical Chair
BWRVIP Mitigation Committee
AmerGen Energy Co.
Clinton Power Station, M/C T-31C
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

George T. Jones, Executive Chair
BWRVIP Repair Focus Group
Vice President, Nuclear Engrg. & Support
PP&L, Inc.
M/S GENA61
2 N 9th St
Allentown, PA 18101-1139

Vaughn Wagoner, Technical Chair
BWRVIP Integration Committee
Carolina Power & Light Company
One Hannover Square 9C1
P.O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27612

Robert Carter, EPRI BWRVIP
Assessment Manager
Greg Selby, EPRI BWRVIP
Inspection Manager
EPRI NDE Center
P. O. Box 217097
1300 W. T. Harris Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28221

Bruce McLeod, Technical Chair
BWRVIP Repair Focus Group
Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
Post Office Box 1295
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35201

Richard Ciomiewicz, Technical Vice Chair
BWRVIP Assessment Committee
Exelon Corp.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
M/S SMB3-6
1848 Lay Road
Delta, PA 17314-9032

Tom Mulford, EPRI BWRVIP
Integration Manager
Raj Pathania, EPRI BWRVIP
Mitigation Manager
Ken Wolfe, EPRI BWRVIP
Repair Manager
Larry Steinert, EPRI BWRVIP
Electric Power Research Institute
P. O. Box 10412 3412 Hillview Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94303

E

REVISION DETAILS TO BWRVIP-86-A (EPRI REPORT 1003346)

NOTE: Changes made to BWRVIP-86 in developing BWRVIP-86-A are NOT marked with revision bars in the current version of this report (BWRVIP-86, Revision 1).

**Entire Appendix Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

F

REVISION DETAILS TO BWRVIP-86, REVISION 1

**Entire Appendix Deleted -
EPRI Proprietary Information**

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), with major locations in Palo Alto, California; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Knoxville, Tennessee, was established in 1973 as an independent, nonprofit center for public interest energy and environmental research. EPRI brings together members, participants, the Institute's scientists and engineers, and other leading experts to work collaboratively on solutions to the challenges of electric power. These solutions span nearly every area of electricity generation, delivery, and use, including health, safety, and environment. EPRI's members represent over 90% of the electricity generated in the United States. International participation represents nearly 15% of EPRI's total research, development, and demonstration program.

Together...Shaping the Future of Electricity

Program:

Nuclear Power

© 2007 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Inc. All rights reserved. Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER...SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

 Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America

1016575NP

Electric Power Research Institute

3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304-1338 • PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303-0813 USA
800.313.3774 • 650.855.2121 • askepri@epri.com • www.epri.com