

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

January 27, 2009

Mr. William R. Campbell, Jr. Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ISSUANCE OF CORRECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES FOR AMENDMENTS REGARDING CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY (TAC NOS. MD7198 AND MD7199)

Dear Mr. Campbell,

On October 28, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 321 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 313 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Agencywide Document and Management System Accession Number ML082840761). These amendments were issued in response to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) application dated October 26, 2007 (TS-07-02), which proposed to revise the technical specifications (TSs) to adopt the content of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) traveler, TSTF-448, Revision 3, "Control Room Habitability." TSTF-448, Revision 3, had been generically approved by the NRC and a notice of availability and model safety evaluation had been published in the *Federal Register* as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process.

On December 23, 2008, the TVA staff notified the NRC staff that during implementation of the amendments, they realized that one of the changes to the TSs, specifically, the action statement for TS 3.7.7.b, required the plant to be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN rather than HOT STANDBY, as specified in TSTF-448, Revision 3. The TVA staff determined that the October 28, 2008, submittal had incorrectly transcribed the requirements of TSTF-448, Revision 3. As stated in the submittal, the purpose of the amendment was to adopt the content of TSTF-448, Revision 3, thus, the use of the term HOT SHUTDOWN was an inadvertent typographical error.

The NRC staff review of the amendment request was based on the licensee adopting the TSTF, and the SE approving the amendments was consistent with the model SE for TSTF-448, Revision 3, as previously published in the *Federal Register*, i.e., it required placing the plant in HOT STANDBY consistent with the TSTF. Also, the notices of consideration and of issuance indicated that the amendment was for adoption of the content of the TSTF. Neither the staff review as documented in the SE nor the notices addressed a deviation from the TSTF to require HOT SHUTDOWN instead of HOT STANDBY.

W. Campbell, Jr.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the inclusion of the term HOT SHUTDOWN was an inadvertent typographical error and the TS pages should be corrected. The TS pages issued with the amendments should be replaced with the attached pages.

Sincerely,

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Brendan T. Moroney, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosure: Revised TS pages

cc w/enclosure: Distribution via Listserv

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7 Two independent control room emergency ventilation systems (CREVS) shall be OPERABLE.*

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

- a. With one CREVS inoperable for reasons other than Action b, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one or more CREVS trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope (CRE) boundary, immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions, and within 24 hours verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological and chemical hazards will not exceed limits, CRE occupants are protected from smoke hazards, and restore CRE boundary to OPERABLE status within 90 days. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With both CREVS inoperable due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, restore at least one train to operable status within 8 hours or be in a least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With both CREVS inoperable for reasons other than Action b. or Action c., be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours

MODES 5, 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies

a. With one CREVS inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the operable CREVS in the recirculation mode.

suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b. With both CREVS inoperable or one or more CREVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE bounday, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7.7 Each CREVS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
 - a. DELETED
 - b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.
- * The CRE boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

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- C. With both CREVS system inoperable due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, restore at least one train to operable status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
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SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2

October 28, 2008

W. Campbell, Jr.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the inclusion of the term HOT SHUTDOWN was an inadvertent typographical error and the TS pages should be corrected. The TS pages issued with the amendments should be replaced with the attached pages.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brendan T. Moroney, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 **Division of Operating Reactor Licensing** Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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