

R 6

MEMO ROUTE SLIP Form AEC-98 (Rev. May 14, 1947)		See me about this. Note and return.	For concurrent For signature.	For action. For information.
TO (Name and unit) Gerry Page Enforcement Branch DLR	INITIALS	REMARKS <i>Note: This matter brought to attention of Co on 2-14-63 (Chitwood) No enforcement action appropriate at this time as set forth in memo to files dtd 7-30-62.</i>		
	DATE			
TO (Name and unit) <i>Dochel</i> Chitwood <i>Siler</i>	INITIALS	REMARKS <i>70-90</i>		
	DATE			
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS		
	DATE			
FROM (Name and unit) L. R. Rogers DLR	REMARKS <i>See attached note.</i>			
PHONE NO. 5200	DATE 1/30/63			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

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D/5

January 30, 1963

Gerry:

Attached is an old inspection report which Charlie Luke had in his possession to review the criticality aspects. You may wish to review Charlie's comments and pass them on to Compliance. I don't believe any action is indicated at this point since Engelhard will be submitting a new application.

Item 3 of Charlie's notes indicates some suggestions regarding the radiation monitoring system. We have now included more detailed requirements on radiation monitoring equipment in the new Part 70-71 that has been approved by the Commission and will be published for comment shortly. The suggestions by Charlie and the 70-71 criteria may not necessarily be consistent and we should be following 70-71 where there may be inconsistencies.

L. R. Rogers

To RE Cunningham

Feb. 9, Draft
'62

Fr. Ed Case

Sub Engelhard Inspection Report

We have reviewed the inspection report on Engelhard Industries which was forwarded to the Criticality Evaluation Branch on January 8, 1962.

While the inspector concluded that no criticality hazard exists, we have noted three problem areas discussed on the attachment to this memorandum. We believe these problems represent noncompliance, especially items 1 and 2. It is hardly possible for the licensee to comply with his license unless he knows how much U and U-235 he is working with.

We suggest that closer liaison be maintained between the inspectors and our criticality evaluation personnel. Perhaps a joint meeting should be arranged after each inspection, ^{where criticality hazard is involved,} in order to discuss the situation in more detail. In some cases the CAB should be able to point out some problem areas in advance of the inspection.

Comments

Inspection Report on Engelhard Industries

1. Improper Labeling. The report mentions that containers in process and storage areas are not labeled with uranium content and isotopic assay. This is a dangerous omission and indicates poor administrative control.

2. Unknown SVM Content. Scrap received from others for reprocessing is not analyzed - the word of the customer is taken for U and U-235 content prior to dissolution. While this is a difficult problem, nevertheless, we believe that each container of scrap should be carefully analyzed as it is received, before storage and processing. The alternative is to transfer the scrap on receipt to safe geometry containers, and to carry out the initial dissolution in a safe geometry vessel, with analyses for U and U-235 after dissolution. The Engelhard dissolver is not safe in diameter for fully enriched uranium.

3. Radiation Monitoring. It is stated that tests of the horns are made weekly. It is not clear as to whether the entire monitor-alarm

system is fail safe. Such systems should be tested daily with a small source, or they should be designed to give immediate warning in case of failure of any component.

C.D. Luke

Charlie - this is
sort of old news -

please re check

1) 1st TP of
comments re/ minister

2) Should this be
dropped in view of
request for new
application?

ML