

ENCLOSURE 4

NRC TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint
Methodology for LSSS Functions" Slide Presentation
Meeting Summary of September 30, 2008 Meeting
with NRC/TSTF

TSTF Meeting

TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions"



U.S. NRC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Protecting People and the Environment

September 30, 2008

- **CURRENT STRATEGY BASED ON AUGUST 2003 LT DIRECTIVE**
 - Develop TSTF-493 generic solution while processing LARs
 - TSTF would replace ones-sies and two-sies LAR reviews
 - TSTF should save Staff and Industry resources

- **OUTCOME**
 - TSTF Development Frozen
 - Disagreement on scope of SL-LSSS
 - » PWROGs include all RTS and ESFAS
 - » BWROGs some RTS and ESFAS + Rod Block
 - Action is needed
 - GGNS/Vogtle LARs are cases-in-point
 - Raises questions about intent of plants to adopt the TSTF
 - One'sies and Two'sies LAR approvals consume staff resources
 - De-standardizes Improved STS plants
 - Produces considerable mismatch of TS requirements within the industry
 - Operability will continue to be determined by procedures, not TS for protective devices without the LSSS TS Notes (compliance with 50.36)
 - TSTF-493 adoption is voluntary

Concern 1: The staff does not understand BWROG and PWROG positions as reflected in TSTF Rev 3 when compared to RIS 2006-17.

Observation: RIS position is that all RPS and ESFAS functions would apply. Implicit in this position is that instrument functions in these LCOs meet 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3

“Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.”

Concern 2: Agreement criteria for deciding operability of instrument functions during channel calibration is not contained in TS.

Observation: TS Allowable Values alone are not sufficient to establish instrument channel operability during surveillance testing

Problems

- TS Allowable Values alone are not sufficient to establish instrument channel operability during surveillance testing (i.e., compliance with 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) for Limiting Safety System Setting)
 - AVs are not instrument settings.
 - AVs are not limiting settings
 - AVs are the maximum as-found value of an instrument setting beyond which a channel must be declared inoperable.
 - Instrument settings can be found conservative to the AV and be inoperable if ...
 - The setting cannot be reset within the as-left tolerance band, or
 - The channel does not behaving as expected
- Outcome
 - Surveillance testing agreement criteria for declaring instrument functions operable are located in **procedures not in tech specs.** (channel setting tolerances, limiting channel trip setpoints, As-found and As-left setpoint tolerances) ,


Proposal #1

- Issue 493 Rev 3N (NRC) for public comment with two options
 - Specify SL-related LSSS instrument functions option
 - Setpoint Control Program option
- Prepare written problem statement and exchange 14 days prior to workshop
- Conduct a workshop; work thru problem statement

Proposal #2

- Develop list of instruments in question
- Industry provide a problem statement detailing the basis for excluding any instruments
- Conduct a workshop; work through problem statement

Discussion



Background Setpoint Methodology Terminology

TLU = Total Loop Uncertainty
 COT = Channel Operational Test
 NCOT = Non-COT
 AL = Analytical Limit
 AV = Allowable Value
 AV3 = AV Method 3
 NSP = Nominal Setpoint
 ST = Setting Tolerance
 DL = Deviation Limit

Figure 1: SRTS Parameter Relationship

