

December 23, 2008

Mr. William R. Campbell, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
REGARDING REQUEST TO ADOPT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK
FORCE (TSTF) STANDARD TS CHANGE TRAVELER, TSTF-447,
“ELIMINATION OF HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS AND CHANGE TO
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN MONITORS” (TAC NO. MD9603)

Dear Mr. Campbell:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.72 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment is in response to your application dated September 4, 2008.

This amendment adopts the TSTF-447, *Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors*, which deletes the TS requirements related to containment hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen monitors and supports implementation of the revisions of 10 CFR 50.44, *Combustible Gas Control for Nuclear Power Reactors*, that became effective on October 16, 2003.

A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 72 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.72
License No. NPF-90

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated September 4, 2008, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 72, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented no later than 60 days from the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

L. Raghavan, Chief
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Division of operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License
And Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 23, 2008

ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO.72
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90
DOCKET NO. 50-390

Replace Page 3 of Operating License NPF-90 with the attached Page 3.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3.3-41
3.3-42
3.3-43
3.3-44
3.3-45
3.6-20
3.6-21

Insert Pages

3.3-41
3.3-42
3.3-43
3.3-44
3.3-45
3.6-20
3.6-21

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-390

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 4, 2008 (Agencywide Document Access Management System Accession No. ML082680184), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1, Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed changes would delete the TS requirements associated with hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen monitors.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has revised Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) Section 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors." The amended standards eliminated the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed the requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring. In letters dated December 17, 2002, and May 12, 2003, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) proposed to remove requirements for hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen and oxygen monitors from the standard technical specifications (STs) (NUREGs 1430 - 1434) on behalf of the industry to incorporate the amended standards. This proposed change is designated TSTF-447.

The NRC staff prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) for the elimination of requirements regarding containment hydrogen recombiners and the removal of requirements from TSs for containment hydrogen and oxygen monitors and solicited public comment (67 FR 50374, published August 2, 2002) in accordance with the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen and oxygen monitor requirements from TSs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this model applies were informed that they could request amendments conforming to the model, and, in such requests, should confirm the applicability of the SE to their reactors and provide the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY EVALUATION

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, "Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power Reactors," was issued on March 20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STs in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed changes to the STs following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The NRC staff evaluates any

comments received for a proposed change to the STSs and either reconsiders the change or proceeds with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TS are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.

The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. This regulation requires that the TSs include items in five specific categories. These categories include (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings, (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCO), (3) surveillance requirements, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular TSs to be included in a plant's license.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) sets forth four criteria to be used in determining whether an LCO is required to be included in the TSs. These criteria are as follows:

1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that assumes either the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
4. A structure, system, or component whose operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. Existing LCOs and related surveillances included as TS requirements that satisfy any of the criteria stated above must be retained in the TSs. Those TS requirements that do not satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.

As part of the rulemaking that revised 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission retained requirements for ensuring a mixed atmosphere, inerting Mark I and II containments, and providing hydrogen control systems capable of accommodating an amount of hydrogen generated from a metal-water reaction involving 75 percent of the fuel cladding surrounding the active fuel region in Mark III and ice condenser containments. The Commission eliminated the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) hydrogen release from 10 CFR 50.44 and consolidated the requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring to 10 CFR 50.44 while relaxing safety classifications and licensee commitments to certain design and qualification criteria. The Commission also relocated, without change, the hydrogen control requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) to 10 CFR 50.44 and the high point vent requirements from 10 CFR 50.44 to 10 CFR 50.46a

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for combustible gas control were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2 accident are likely to have been the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the combustible gas control functions described in NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," as obligations. The issuance of plant-specific amendments to adopt these changes, which would remove hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen and oxygen monitoring controls from TSs, supersede the combustible gas control specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.

3.1 Hydrogen Recombiners

The NRC staff reviewed Amendment No. 40, dated September 23, 2002 (ML022790004), to the WBN Unit 1 Operating License. Amendment No. 40 approved the irradiation of up to 2304 Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) in the reactor core. The TPBARs are an additional source of hydrogen that is unique to WBN Unit 1. The potential post-LOCA hydrogen contribution from this source was evaluated in the Amendment No. 40 SE. The Amendment No. 40 SE stated the following:

TVA used an NRC-approved code to calculate the total additional hydrogen contributed by the TPBARs following a LBLOCA [large break LOCA] and NRC staff reviewed the analysis inputs and assumptions and found them to be acceptable. The staff concludes that TPBARs will not be a significant contributor to the post-LOCA hydrogen inventory. Also, operating with TPBARs will not significantly impact the total hydrogen concentration within the containment when compared to the values associated with the non-TPBAR core. TVA has emergency operating procedures in place to maintain the maximum containment hydrogen concentration at less than the lower flammability limit of 4.0-volume percent, with one recombiner train started at a 3-volume percent hydrogen concentration approximately 24 hours after a LBLOCA.

Since the hydrogen concentration remains below 4-percent for more than 24 hours according to the SE for Amendment No. 40, the TSTF-447 conclusion that the design-basis LOCA does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release of hydrogen within 24 hours after the onset of core damage remains valid for WBN Unit 1. Therefore, the justifications presented in the TSTF-447 proposal and the SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to WBN Unit 1.

The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines a design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours after the onset of core damage. In addition, these systems were ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant beyond design-basis accidents. Therefore, the Commission eliminated the

hydrogen release associated with a design-basis LOCA from 10 CFR 50.44 and the associated requirements that necessitated the need for the hydrogen recombiners and the backup hydrogen vent and purge systems. As a result, the staff finds that requirements related to hydrogen recombiners no longer meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in TSs and may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents for all plants.

3.2 Hydrogen Monitoring Equipment

Section 50.44(b)(1), the STSs, and plant-specific TSs currently contain requirements for monitoring hydrogen. Licensees have also made commitments to design and qualification criteria for hydrogen monitors in Item II.F.1, Attachment 6 of NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident." The hydrogen monitors are required to assess the degree of core damage during a beyond design-basis accident and confirm that random or deliberate ignition has taken place. If an explosive mixture that could threaten containment integrity exists during a beyond design-basis accident, then other severe accident management strategies, such as purging and/or venting, would need to be considered. The hydrogen monitors are needed to implement these severe accident management strategies.

With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. RG 1.97 recommends classifying the hydrogen monitors as Category 1. RG 1.97 Category 1 is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events and, therefore, are items usually addressed within TSs. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that the hydrogen monitors no longer meet the definition of Category 1 in RG 1.97. The Commission concluded that Category 3, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the hydrogen monitors because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents. Hydrogen monitoring is not the primary means of indicating a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Section 4 of Attachment 2 to SECY-00-0198, "Status Report on Study of Risk-Informed Changes to the Technical Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 (Option 3) and Recommendations on Risk-Informed Changes to 10 CFR 50.44 (Combustible Gas Control)," found that the hydrogen monitors were not risk-significant. Therefore, the staff finds that hydrogen monitoring equipment requirements no longer meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in the TSs and, therefore, may be relocated to other licensee controlled documents.

The elimination of Post-Accident Sampling System requirements from some plant-specific TSs (and associated CLIP notices) indicated that during the early phases of an accident, safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. The staff has subsequently concluded that Category 3 hydrogen monitors also provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration during the early phases of an accident.

4.0 VERIFICATIONS AND COMMITMENTS

As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

1. Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain, a hydrogen monitoring system capable of diagnosing beyond design-basis accidents.

TVA has verified that a hydrogen monitoring system capable of diagnosing beyond design-basis accidents is installed at WBN and is making a regulatory commitment to maintain that capability. The hydrogen monitoring function will be included in the WBN Technical Requirements Manual. This regulatory commitment will be implemented in conjunction with the implementation of the proposed TS revision.

2. For plant designs with an inerted containment, each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain, an oxygen monitoring system capable of verifying the status of the inert containment.

WBN Unit 1 does not have an inerted containment.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program. Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements. The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements that would require prior NRC approval of subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes," provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff (see Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC Staff," dated September 21, 2000). The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (73 FR 62569, October 21, 2008). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to

10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: B. Lee

Date: December 23, 2008