

1 within the framework of addressing only the programmatic  
2 aspects of Appendix B as far as the implementation of this?

3 A No.

4 Q Your answer is no?

5 A I want to make sure I have got the right  
6 question. What was the question?

7 Q Was there an effort on your part, anyone else's  
8 part, whether they be an advisor to Mr. White, a contract  
9 employee to respond to the NRC with regards to the January  
10 3rd, 1986 letter to answer the question only as it addressed  
11 the programmatic aspects of Appendix B?

12 A Can I ask you to define what you mean by  
13 "programmatic"?

14 Q I mean the program, the 18 criteria as we see it  
15 in Appendix B, where it says, you must have a program and you  
16 say, yes, we have a program. And it doesn't address the  
17 implementation or as someone said "execution" of the  
18 program.

19 A No. There was no attempt to limit it to the  
20 program, absolutely not.

21 Q Thank you.

22 BY MR. MURPHY:

23 Q I just want to clarify that. There was no attempt  
24 to limit it, but did this letter address implementation as  
25 opposed to we are not limited to it, but do we address

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1 implementation in that letter?

2 MS. BAUSER: Just the letter? You are just  
3 talking about the letter?

4 BY MR. MURPHY:

5 Q And the enclosures.

6 A The letter, as far as I was concerned, addressed  
7 the entire issue of QA, programmatic and implementation.  
8 Whether it specifically came out and talked about  
9 implementation, I don't believe it did, but it certainly was  
10 part of the thought process that that is what it included.  
11 Not just --

12 Q In your view, then, it did answer that?

13 A Yes.

14 MS. BAUSER: To make the record clear, when you  
15 said "the entire issue of QA," was that in any particular  
16 context? This is the same point again, I want to -- in what  
17 context was the issue? Is my question not clear?

18 MR. MURPHY: I object to that. Because I don't  
19 understand that.

20 MR. WILLIAMSON: I don't understand that either.

21 MS. BAUSER: Was the question in the context of  
22 the NSRS perceptions when you say you addressed QA? The  
23 entire program?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes.

25 MS. BAUSER: I just don't want a statement on the

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1 record.

2 MR. MURPHY: I didn't get what you said, so I am  
3 objecting to it. What did you say again?

4 MS. BAUSER: He said yes. My question was  
5 whether, when he said that it was to address all of QA, it  
6 was still in the context of the NSRS perceptions.

7 THE WITNESS: As the letters states, on the basis  
8 of the review of the issues identified in the NSRS  
9 perceptions. But certainly implementation.

10 BY MR. ROBINSON:

11 Q If there was a question in your mind upon receipt  
12 of the NRC's January 3rd letter as to just exactly what NRC  
13 was asking in that letter, why did you choose to make the  
14 internal judgment on that as opposed to immediately asking  
15 NRC what they meant by that question?

16 A I can't answer that. I don't know why, you know,  
17 what caused the phone calls to be made at what point. I  
18 don't know that.

19 Q What I am saying is, at the point in time the  
20 phone calls were made, the letter and the enclosures were  
21 pretty well finalized. I am saying that if there was a  
22 question in your mind early in the game, when you first  
23 received the January 3rd letter, at that point why was the  
24 decision made to internally decide what the question meant  
25 rather than contacting NRC and asking what the question

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1 meant?

2 A Well, there are two parts, I think, to the  
3 question of the meaning of the letter. The first one was,  
4 did they really mean the words --

5 Q I understand the difference between meeting the  
6 requirements of Appendix B and when you are --

7 A Appendix B requirements are being met at the Watts  
8 Bar facility. There was discussion, but I think very -- a  
9 lot of discussion, but I think it was very quickly arrived at  
10 that that couldn't be what the NRC was asking for literally.  
11 So we were going to proceed down what appeared to be the  
12 logical path as to what they were trying to ask. That, and  
13 again going back to the second paragraph, in the context of  
14 those 11 perceptions, to go find out whether that indicated  
15 that Appendix B had been breached in a significant manner.  
16 And that is where we went.

17 Q My question was, at that early point in the game,  
18 and if you know, you may not know the answer to this  
19 question, why was the decision made to go down that path  
20 based on your own internal decision of what the question  
21 meant?

22 A Not mine.

23 Q Well, absolutely. TVA's internal decision. As  
24 opposed to contacting the NRC immediately and saying, hey,  
25 what do you mean by this? Do you mean every single

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1 requirement or do you mean overall compliance?

2 A I just --

3 Q You don't know why?

4 A No, I don't know why.

5 Q Do you know if that was a conscious decision, to  
6 not contact the NRC?

7 A No. No. I don't. I think when the first time  
8 that the idea or thought of calling, making -- for White to  
9 make the phone call, that is when it happened. Maybe that is  
10 when it was first thought of. I am not aware.

11 BY MR. REINHART:

12 Q Who was it that gave, according to Mr. White, the  
13 agreement with what he felt the NRC really wanted?

14 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me. What was the question,  
15 who was it that gave what?

16 BY MR. REINHART:

17 Q Did you not say that Mr. White called the NRC to  
18 get clarification on the question that the NRC wanted?

19 A No, he did not say that. What I said was that  
20 White talked to several people at the <sup>NAC</sup> NRC, along the lines of  
21 him telling them his approach to answering the 3 January  
22 letter, to find out whether they felt that that was a logical  
23 approach to take. He didn't call up and ask the question, to  
24 the best of my knowledge, how do you want me to answer the  
25 letter, or how do you -- I don't understand the letter, tell

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1 me what it means. I don't think White did that.

2 White, by the time he made the calls, as best as I  
3 can tell, had a fairly good idea of the approach he was going  
4 to take. He was calling the NRC people to find out whether  
5 there was something that he was missing or that he was way  
6 off base, waiting for the reaction, to find out, gee, wait a  
7 minute, you are not answering the right questions, like that.

8 That is what he did.

9 Q Okay.

10 BY MR. MURPHY:

11 Q In your view, I guess -- in your view, in your  
12 discussion with Mr. White, did he feel that that was some  
13 form of approval of the manner in which he approached this  
14 problem? Or at least his understanding of what the NRC  
15 wanted him to respond to?

16 A I don't want to use the word "approval." I don't  
17 want to use the word "concurrence" or anything anything else  
18 like that. It was a -- fishing for the right word -- they  
19 certainly did not have any objections except in the one  
20 particular case. As I say, there was -- I was not privy to  
21 the conversations, okay? So I don't know. But I gather from  
22 the discussions after White had had the discussions with  
23 these people that this is the way we were going to go.

24 Q And your only firsthand knowledge is what White  
25 has told you as opposed to what Mr. White actually had done;

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1 right?

2 A I reiterate. I made no phone calls. I was not  
3 present when he made the phone calls. I am telling you what  
4 he told me at some time later.

5 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

6 Q Did you encourage him to make any phone calls?

7 A Yes. The only one I encouraged him to make was  
8 the phone call to Stello.

9 BY MR. MURPHY:

10 Q At what point in time was that? Was this letter  
11 already --

12 A No. No. This was -- well, the letter was in  
13 preparation, but not, I don't know which version. My advice  
14 to White on the Stello case, that was the only one where I  
15 said I think somewhere along the line you ought to call  
16 Stello, just to make sure that you are heading down the right  
17 path. So that there is nothing there that is hidden, because  
18 this was, you know -- again, if I go back to the all the  
19 other plants that I have been operating with, this is a  
20 standard way of doing it. The NRC asks a question, you set  
21 your people to writing the answer, before you send the answer  
22 in, you at least call up and say, look, am I going down the  
23 right path, what you would like to do, and I know that it is,  
24 you know, looked upon with some disfavor, but you would say,  
25 hey, this is what I am presenting to give you, will this

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1 answer your question.

2 Q Why did you suggest Mr. Stello as opposed to  
3 Mr. Denton, who, or say Mr. Eisenhut, but preferably Mr.  
4 Denton, who had sent the letter out? I mean, I am just  
5 curious.

6 A I think the only reason that I would have used  
7 Stello was that there had already been, as I recall, some  
8 discussion between White and Stello, somewhere along the  
9 line. And I am not sure that White had ever met Denton or  
10 Eisenhut. I just don't know.

11 No specific reason.

12 Q I am just curious, because usually I would go to  
13 the source and find out what the source was thinking about,  
14 as opposed to --

15 MR. ROBINSON: Who was the source of this letter?

16 MR. MURPHY: Eisenhut, but it had come out of  
17 Mr. Denton's office, so I mean, you could clearly contact  
18 Mr. Denton or have somebody contact Mr. Denton and ask him  
19 what was meant.

20 BY MR. ROBINSON:

21 Q Mr. Wegner, were you involved in any discussions  
22 with Mr. White or any of his other advisors regarding the  
23 ramifications of saying to NRC that we are not in compliance  
24 with Appendix B in that letter?

25 A Oh, yes. Yes. You mean what would have happened

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1 if --

2 Q Yes.

3 A White, certainly, yes. He asked me the question,  
4 why don't I just go back and say I am not in compliance and  
5 so what. What is the big deal?

6 Q What was your response?

7 ✓ A Well, my response was that <sup>clw</sup> ~~if~~ he could do that, if  
8 the facts supported it. But that he had to recognize that if  
9 he did that, then there was probably a long path to -- much  
10 along the lines of the Zimmer case where you then, instead of  
11 proving that what you have -- in other words, you can go in,  
12 I am getting off the track here a little bit, but if you have  
13 a problem in QA, it is one thing to go in and do sampling and  
14 you can say that I have sampled X amount and, therefore, I  
15 can conclude based on the sample that it is all right. In  
16 the case of Zimmer, you had the reverse of that. You had the  
17 situation where essentially because of the problems, you had  
18 to assume that whatever was there was probably not right.

19 And now you had to go prove that everything that  
20 was in there was right. The latter is a lot more complicated  
21 to do, can be done, but it is a lot more complicated. A lot  
22 more costly, a lot more -- takes a lot more time.

23 I am not saying that I tried to tell him, don't do  
24 it. He asked the question, what is the difference if I say  
25 this versus if I say this? And I explained it to him.

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1 Q Did he have any comment once you explained that to  
2 him?

3 A I think he asked a lot of questions. There again,  
4 just for, I think, to educate himself. He asked a lot of  
5 questions with respect to Zimmer, what was -- what did they  
6 have at Zimmer, what was going on, and, for example, we were  
7 battling this at Zimmer when the decision was made to stop.  
8 But if you take a situation of a weld. If a weld has been  
9 made and you don't have any records, how do you prove that  
10 the weld was made to meet code? All that you have got at  
11 your disposal is you can radiograph, you can dye penetrant,  
12 you can use sonics, but how do you ever prove -- no record,  
13 you have no record -- how do you ever prove that the welder  
14 was qualified?

15 How do you ever prove that the weld rod was the  
16 proper weld rod? How do you prove all of the things as you  
17 tick down the QA points that you have to have in order to say  
18 that is a code weld. One way -- another way to attempt to  
19 prove it is to destructively test the well. Well, you do  
20 that, great. Now you go in and you tear out every single  
21 weld in the plant and redo it.

22 That was one of the dilemmas that we faced at  
23 Zimmer. That is the kind of the dilemma that you might face  
24 if you proclaim that you now no longer have compliance with  
25 Appendix B.

1           The question is, how deep, how far does it go? I  
2 am not saying that that could not be the case, although there  
3 is no indication of that being the case as of right now.

4           BY MR. MURPHY:

5           Q     Did you feel at the time that there was a  
6 comparison between the condition at TVA and the condition at  
7 Zimmer during the last days you were there?

8           A     No. No. I didn't. I don't think -- I think at  
9 the time the feeling was that we had an unknown, but there  
10 was nothing there that you could see that indicated that we  
11 had a problem as serious as they had at Zimmer.

12          BY MR. ROBINSON:

13          Q     Did you feel or did you know that you would have  
14 had difficulty proving by records the integrity of the welds  
15 at TVA at that time?

16          A     Again, based on the -- looking at those  
17 perceptions and what that particular item looked at, and if  
18 you looked at what they came up with, you could not conclude  
19 that there was a major problem.

20          Q     No. That was not my question. I am not asking  
21 this question within that framework.

22          A     Okay.

23          Q     I am asking this question just with regard to your  
24 knowledge of the status of QA records and the adequacy of  
25 being able to prove that things were okay at TVA at the time

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1 when we were getting ready to present this letter.

2 A Uh-huh.

3 Q And I recognize that the answer to NRC's question  
4 was in a more limited framework than that.

5 At that time did you feel that you could prove the  
6 adequacy of welds at Watts Bar through TVA QA records?

7 A I would have had no way of knowing the answer to  
8 that question. I was not in a position to know the answer to  
9 that. Again, recall that when I was at Watts Bar, in the  
10 November time frame, and queried the people that I talked to  
11 with respect to weld records or weld qualification records,  
12 that I could not get a firm, hard, yes, we have problems. I  
13 knew they did say that, we have <sup>problems</sup> ~~approximate~~. So I knew there  
14 were problems.

15 Whether those problems were so severe that they  
16 would have precluded the necessary data requirements to prove  
17 that the welders are qualified, I was not in a position to  
18 say.

19 They had problems. How severe they were, I don't  
20 know.

21 Q Was there --

22 A I think that is why EG&G was in there, to tell you  
23 the truth, to look over those records, look over the welds,  
24 look over the radiographs, things like that.

25 Q Was there a conscious thought in your mind or, to

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1 your knowledge, in any of the other advisors minds that it  
2 was very convenient for you to answer the NCR question in  
3 that very limited scope, as opposed to the overall --

4 A No. That really never crossed -- it certainly  
5 didn't cross my mind. And I am not going to say it didn't  
6 cross anybody else's. It was never discussed. It was not  
7 the context.

8 BY MR. MURPHY:

9 Q Was the issue of material false statement ever  
10 discussed?

11 A No.

12 Q At no meeting you attended?

13 A No.

14 Q Did Mr. White ever indicate to you that this was a  
15 concern to him?

16 A No.

17 Q Do you have any idea what instructions were given  
18 to the line organization to prepare their responses to the  
19 NSRS's perception at all?

20 A No.

21 Q Do you know if that was done prior to your  
22 arrival?

23 A No.

24 BY MR. ROBINSON:

25 Q Is it your opinion or did any of the other

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1 advisors ever express the opinion to you that as long as a  
2 nonconformance or a deviation is in the corrective action  
3 system, we are in compliance with Appendix B?

4 A No. I don't believe that.

5 BY MR. REINHART:

6 Q Was there ever a thought to look, based on  
7 everything that was on the plate at the time, beyond the 11  
8 perceptions?

9 A Of course. Not, though, in anticipation of  
10 responding to the January 3rd letter. This is exactly what  
11 White said he was going to do. He was going to look at  
12 everything that needed to be looked at, as a result of --  
13 with the exception that, you know, he made it very clear that  
14 he was not going to go back and review everything that had  
15 been done at TVA over the last 20 years. It was not his  
16 intent. If you talk about Watts Bar, it was, I am not going  
17 to go back to day one and review every single thing that was  
18 done at Watts Bar, or at least that wasn't his intent.

19 Q What about reasonable history, the last year, the  
20 last two years as opposed to the last 20 years?

21 A At the time?

22 Q Yes.

23 A No. Again, the plan, the program which we  
24 discussed here was clearly, we thought, laid out in volume 1  
25 and volume 2 and volume 3 and volume 4.

1 It tells you exactly what we were going to do,  
2 what we were going to do from a corporate point of view,  
3 which includes the corrective action program; it includes --  
4 you know, the document is that thick.

5 Then there is volume 2, what are we going to do  
6 with Sequoyah, that thick. What are we going to do at Browns  
7 Ferry, that thick.

8 We haven't finished volume 4 yet and it is getting  
9 thicker by the day. I don't know where it is going to end  
10 up. That will specify -- now we are talking in 1987. We  
11 thought in all honesty, and we were wrong, that we could get  
12 volumes 1, 2, 3 and 4 out and have them on the street within  
13 six months.

14 We could not do it. Okay?

15 But if you want the plan, that is where the plan  
16 is. That is exactly what we intend to do. Now it turns out  
17 that there are developing things at all of these plants that  
18 we didn't predict were going to come up.

19 MS. BAUSER: And those volumes were volumes  
20 designed to inform the NRC what it was that was going on at  
21 TVA; is that right?

22 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. Those volumes were sent  
23 just like they were done in the case of all the other plants,  
24 particularly in region 3, and which -- from our point of  
25 view, this was, we were doing this before we even knew that

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1     Keppler was going to come down and take over control of the  
2     TVA program. But the whole idea of coming up with a "course  
3     of action document," which lays out exactly -- and this  
4     serves two purposes: One, it clearly defines for your own  
5     purposes, your own people, what it is you are going to do.  
6     But also it is a definitive program that you lay before the  
7     NRC. Because what you don't want is the NRC or to have the  
8     utility or TVA keep adding on and adding on and then the NRC  
9     keeps adding on and you never know where you are going.

10             So this was an agreement, we were hoping to get an  
11     agreement that if you do this, say at Sequoyah, <sup>what</sup> ~~that~~ you say  
12     in volume 2, if that is what you do and it comes out all  
13     right, that <sup>that</sup> ~~what~~ is all you have to do. We don't have any  
14     more issues with you.

15             Let me tell you, it is working with a few little  
16     wrinkles here and there, at Sequoyah, just beautifully.  
17     Everybody understands what is going on. Everybody  
18     understands what they are going to do. This is going to be  
19     investigated. This doesn't have every particular solution in  
20     it because a lot of the things -- the item that shows up in  
21     volume 2 is go investigate. And then you have got to go  
22     investigate, depends on what you find, then you go fix it.

23             This is what we intend to do at Watts Bar. We had  
24     not had an opportunity to do that.

25             BY MR. REINHART:

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1 Q Was there ever a thought or a plan in addressing  
2 the perceptions, the NSRS perceptions, to go look at the TVA  
3 QA audits that had performed, been performed in either the  
4 criteria addressed by those perceptions or the functional  
5 areas addressed by those perceptions?

6 A Are you referring to the efforts that went into --  
7 by this independent team?

8 Q Yes, sir.

9 A I have indicated before, I don't know what  
10 instructions they were given.

11 Q Okay.

12 A <sup>From</sup> He may have been given, may not. I don't know.  
13 But I have also said that in my discussions with the people,  
14 it was in my opinion, from my feeling, that they did not  
15 confine themselves only to the very narrow band of the  
16 specific item that maybe somebody in the NSRS came up with.  
17 The reason was because they had a much broader knowledge in  
18 given areas that they were looking into. So if I could  
19 expect the NSRS to say, well, our problem is we saw these  
20 four welds, look at those four weld records, I would expect  
21 that the team would have looked at those four.

22 But with their knowledge and their experience,  
23 that they would have gone, if they needed to, beyond that.  
24 And they would have gone and looked at other areas and  
25 wherever that led them.

1 Q And who were these discussions with?

2 A These are discussions with, as I say, as we talk  
3 back in the back room with the advisors. Okay?

4 Q Was it with -- you are saying it wasn't with the  
5 people on Kelly's team?

6 A No. I never talked to them.

7 Q Okay. Okay.

8 BY MR. MURPHY:

9 Q I just have a couple of little questions. One is,  
10 this is a copy of the draft memo of Mr. Lundin on his study.  
11 You should have it. If you don't, look at this one.

12 MS. BAUSER: You had it before.

13 BY MR. MURPHY:

14 Q It is a simple question; go ahead, look at it. I  
15 think it is the second paragraph has the time frame of 31  
16 January to 5 February. Is that in your view an adequate time  
17 frame to do a whole lot of work? Assuming that that is, you  
18 know --

19 A I don't know whether, this says these people were  
20 on the Watts Bar site from January 31st, '86 to February 5th;  
21 is that enough time to do what?

22 Q To really take a hard look at the perceptions?

23 A Are you saying that that is the only time they  
24 spent looking at perceptions?

25 Q That is what I am saying.

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1 A It may not be.

2 Q The individual that wrote the report seems to  
3 think that that was the time frame, so I am not disputing it,  
4 I am not saying that one way or another.

5 Is that four- or five-day period adequate in your  
6 mind to address the multiple issues?

7 A I would have expected more time to have been  
8 spent, but I don't want to say that it was inadequate because  
9 maybe it was adequate. But that seems a relatively short  
10 period of time as far as I am concerned.

11 Q Earlier on you said that you looked at the  
12 enclosures, the technical responses, and you said in your  
13 mind what you felt needed to be was they have to stand on  
14 their own. This was as I wrote --

15 A Yes.

16 Q That is your actual words, I think.

17 A Right. That is what I was looking for, the  
18 ability to be understandable on their own account so that you  
19 wouldn't have to go back and pull 15 other documents.

20 Q Should that letter there have been the same way, I  
21 mean, absent of any call? I mean, why would a call be  
22 required? Would you expect the same type of, that the letter  
23 just stood on its own?

24 A I think the letter does -- you are talking about  
25 the March 20th.

1 Q Yes, sir.

2 A I think the March 20 letter does stand on its  
3 own.

4 Q Then no calls should have been necessary to  
5 explain to anybody what you are getting at there?

6 A That was not the purpose of the call, to explain.  
7 The purpose of the call was to, again, to find out whether  
8 there was something there that ~~may~~ maybe White didn't see,  
9 maybe he didn't understand where the NRC was coming from.

10 Q Let me ask you one, there -- do you know of any  
11 changes that were made in the final draft of that letter  
12 between the time -- we are told, I will tell you what we have  
13 been told. The letter was taken by Mr. Kirkebo, it had been  
14 drafted, taken by Mr. Kirkebo to Bethesda; right?

15 A Right.

16 Q The next morning Mr. Kelly heads for NRC. En  
17 route Mr. Kelly is stopped and took a phone call at the  
18 airport and said there is a change in the letter and that a  
19 sentence was changed. Do you have any idea about that  
20 general scenario?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Why don't you tell us what, in your, as you --

23 A I recall that I was at home and I got a call from  
24 White. And I can't give you the date. I don't know when it  
25 was. But it must have been either the night of the 20th,

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1     okay, somewhere, or something, or the night of the 19th,  
2     whatever it was. The letter, as far as I was concerned --  
3     when we signed it on the 20th, then I think I left after  
4     that.

5             Anyway, I am not trying to put the time in, but I  
6     got a call from White. White said that he had had a  
7     telephone conversation with Denton and in effect had read him  
8     the letter. And as far as what White told me was that he was  
9     satisfied with the letter but he thought that something  
10    should be added. And White asked him what. And he told him.

11            And White asked me, what can we do about that?  
12    And that is when I said, well, where are they, is there some  
13    way we can get a sentence added, and he said, sure. I think  
14    we can do that. So we worked on the sentence, which wasn't  
15    very hard because it was almost Denton's words. And the  
16    change was sent in to, I think, the offices in Washington to  
17    replace the letter.

18            Q     You are absolutely sure that you are talking about  
19    Mr. Denton and not Mr. Stello?

20            A     I didn't talk to him. I am just going on my  
21    memory.

22            Q     Someone related something to you. As you recall  
23    we are talking about Mr. Denton?

24            A     Yes, right. That is my memory. It was  
25    Mr. Denton.

1 Q And you said these were almost exactly Denton's  
2 words. By that you mean they are almost the words that White  
3 related that Denton said, as opposed, you said --

4 A Again, in retrospect, you asked me before what  
5 were the words, I couldn't remember the words. I know that  
6 there was a change made and that I do recall that it was not  
7 a very difficult thing. It was a question of where do you  
8 put it?

9 Q Let me ask you, you said here that it is almost as  
10 Denton related it.

11 A Yes, that is correct.

12 Q You didn't talk with Denton directly?

13 A No.

14 Q So what you are saying, that is almost what White  
15 told you Denton said?

16 A White told me what Denton said; right.

17 Q Okay. You weren't present during that phone  
18 call?

19 A No. No.

20 Q And do you know, I guess I am trying to give you a  
21 clue -- Ms. Bauser went through the letter and highlighted  
22 all the changes -- does that sentence that is highlighted in  
23 the paragraph, I guess 3 of that letter, does that seem like  
24 the change that --

25 A I think that was the change. That was the only

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1 thing that I am aware of. I don't know about the other  
2 things. It is the only change that I can -- it was a  
3 concern, as I recall White telling me, it was a concern that  
4 Denton had that that was not made clear in the letter. And  
5 you ought to make that clear.

6 So we noted that, which didn't seem to be, it was  
7 something that we were going to do anyway.

8 Q That sentence?

9 A That sentence. And it did not certainly, as far  
10 as I was concerned, change the thrust of the letter in any  
11 manner, shape or form.

12 Q Okay.

13 BY MR. ROBINSON:

14 Q I just have two final questions as far as I am  
15 concerned right now.

16 To your knowledge, did Mr. Brodsky, Bass, Siskin,  
17 Sullivan, Stone, or Miles conduct any kind of a systematic  
18 review of Mr. Lundin's efforts?

19 A Say the names again?

20 Q Brody, Bass, Siskin, Sullivan, Stone or Miles?

21 A No.

22 Q All right.

23 BY MR. MURPHY:

24 Q When you say no, do you mean to your knowledge  
25 they didn't; or no, they didn't?

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1 A I answered the question, I have no knowledge of  
2 them doing it.

3 BY MR. ROBINSON:

4 Q Did you yourself do any kind of a --

5 A No.

6 Q Second area and totally different area, what I  
7 would like to do is to obtain some type of a threshold in  
8 your opinion of a QA program that is in borderline  
9 noncompliance with Appendix B. Now, the way I am going to  
10 try to do that is to paint the picture of the 18 criteria, as  
11 you did earlier, and you talked about breadth and depth --  
12 and you correct me if I am wrong -- but I think I got from  
13 your earlier comment that even if one of the criteria was in  
14 depth broken down, that would not be an overall QA breakdown.

15 And I am talking about borderline QA breakdown  
16 now, okay?

17 A You are just shifting.

18 Q Kind of use that framework and give me your  
19 description of when a borderline overall QA breakdown would  
20 take place? How deep and how broad?

21 A I will do that, but you recognize that there are  
22 probably an infinite number of these, okay? Even I could  
23 give you an infinite number. I will just pick one, okay?

24 MS. BAUSER: Please.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Only pick one.

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1 THE WITNESS: If I went in to an organization,  
2 which I have done on many occasions, and if I found, starting  
3 at the top, which I have found on a number of occasions,  
4 where I can talk to the president of the company, the CEO,  
5 first of all, I will always hear the right words. They are  
6 all believers in QA. Like they are all believers in safety.  
7 They all believe in that, okay?

8 I have never walked into any CEO or board of  
9 directors or president of a company that says, I don't  
10 believe in QA. Those days are gone. All right?

11 BY MR. ROBINSON:

12 Q Right.

13 A Now what you start to do is you start to move down  
14 the path. Those are nice words. In fact, you will probably  
15 find a policy statement signed by the chairman of the board  
16 that says, by God, we are going to have quality at this  
17 plant.

18 Now the question is, is the policy permeating down  
19 into the system? So if I go at the other end, and I get into  
20 the plant and I now start to just listen to workers -- and  
21 that is easy to do -- and you find that they have nothing but  
22 contempt for inspectors, all they do is stop work, they screw  
23 up the thing, they don't, they are -- they are just overhead  
24 around here. That is why we can't get this plant on the  
25 line.

1           If you see that, now obviously you have got a  
2 breakdown somewhere between Mr. President and lower level  
3 Louie down here, okay? There is a breakdown that has  
4 occurred.

5           So now you are going to say, if I see that at the  
6 lower levels, if the worker himself has nothing but contempt  
7 for QC, he obviously has nothing but contempt for QA because  
8 he doesn't believe in it. So now you walk yourself up one  
9 level and you start poking in on the first line supervision.

10           Chances are the same thing that you got from ~~from~~  
11 the lower level guy is going to start to reflect at the first  
12 level of supervision. If it does, and chances are it does,  
13 you now know that the problem is getting deeper. Because if  
14 that is the case, I am now, if I really poke hard enough, I  
15 am going to find where the workers will completely disregard  
16 hold points, where their procedure says, you cannot proceed  
17 unless you have got a QA or a QC inspector. Chances are that  
18 if there is nothing but contempt, they are going to do it.  
19 They won't do it all the time but there will be enough times  
20 so that now your QA system is starting to break down.

21           So now you start talking to the QA people. Okay?  
22 You talk to the inspectors, what do they tell you? If they  
23 tell you that they are afraid to go in the plant for fear of  
24 physical damage to themselves, you are now starting to see,  
25 okay, it is now getting, it is now getting binding, you are

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1 now getting close to what you are defining as what I would  
2 consider, I don't care about the 18 criteria, it is not  
3 working. There is something wrong. Maybe that is the first  
4 criteria. The first one.

5 Now, I can continue going down many different  
6 paths. I can see the same thing if I start -- is there a --  
7 for example, if I detect this fear of the inspectors, do I  
8 also see some form of system whereby you can handle  
9 intimidation and harassment, or does management cast that to  
10 the winds, say, no, we don't have a program. They have a  
11 program, they have got to have a program. It will look nice,  
12 but there will never be anything in there. Why? Because the  
13 people are afraid to use it.

14 So on the surface you have an intimidation and  
15 harassment program. We haven't had an intimidation and  
16 harassment case in six months. You bet you start to worry.  
17 All of these indications -- it is the depth at which you go  
18 through, now you start to leaf in, now you start to pull some  
19 records. And now you start to find maybe, probably, you  
20 start to see some of the physical problems. You still  
21 haven't proved, it still doesn't say that the hardware itself  
22 is bad, because that is not an element of QA compliance. The  
23 hardware may be perfect. It is the QA program that is part  
24 of Appendix B.

25 Q Using the example that you are giving, if the

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1 lower level workers have nothing but contempt for QA and  
2 their supervision, their first line supervision have nothing  
3 but contempt for QA and then you go over to the QA  
4 organization and the QA inspectors don't have any fear at all  
5 of going out and inspecting and writing in NCRs, is that  
6 program in compliance with Appendix B?

7 A You haven't asked me, you said something that is  
8 getting close. Again, you go by degrees now. All right.  
9 Any one of those items, if I only find one or if I do this, I  
10 have got to look at the thing and I have got to see, am I  
11 looking at merely a single isolated case. Because what I am  
12 saying is that if you see it in one place, it is not likely  
13 that it is, I will use the word, pervasive, you know, okay?  
14 That if it is only in one little place, that is not a big  
15 issue. We will fix it. Maybe it is just one person that is  
16 not doing what he should be doing. Maybe one first-line  
17 supervisor. You can correct that.

18 But if it permeates all the way through the  
19 organization, for example, when I mentioned Zimmer, where the  
20 philosophy was flowing down from the top, get the plant  
21 built, don't worry about the records, we will worry about  
22 those later, that permeates down. That gets you very close,  
23 if not there.

24 Q Keep in mind I am not asking you to define what  
25 you think is a pervasive breakdown.

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1 A I understand that. You asked me --

2 Q I am asking you to give an example of what would  
3 be borderline noncompliance with Appendix B in a QA program?  
4 And in the use of your example, I guess I am saying, if you  
5 interviewed all, of all the lower level employees that you  
6 interviewed, 100 percent of them had contempt for QA, and all  
7 the first line supervisors you interviewed had -- 100 percent  
8 of them had contempt for QA, and you went over to the QA  
9 organization and none of the QA inspectors were afraid to go  
10 out and inspect and write NCRs, would that be borderline  
11 compliance or noncompliance or what status would that be?

12 A That would be somewhere getting close. I would  
13 need more, I would need more than that. I would be worried  
14 that there has been a breakdown in the management chain  
15 through, all the way down through the first-line  
16 supervisors. Okay? Because there has got to be a reason why  
17 there is contempt. And maybe it is because management is  
18 pushing them so hard on scheduling performance, get the plant  
19 on the line, we have got an outage, we have only got 30 days,  
20 by God, we have 10 times as much work to do and we don't need  
21 QA around here to slow us down, or the people being feared --  
22 the people fearing that their job is in jeopardy if they  
23 don't meet a schedule.

24 Q If I take it one step further and say that when  
25 you do go to the QA organization, you do find that the

1 inspectors are afraid to go out for fear of physical attack,  
2 at that point are we in borderline noncompliance?

3 A I think so, yes.

4 Q Okay. That is what I wanted to know.

5 A Because now it says to me, QA isn't working.

6 MR. ROBINSON: I have no other questions.

7 MR. MURPHY: Why don't we take a quick break.

8 (Recess.)

9 MR. WILLIAMSON: Let me continue on. It is 4:40.

10 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

11 Q Mr. Wegner, let me direct your attention toward a  
12 letter we have here dated April 11, 1986; I will provide a  
13 copy to you. It is to U.S. NRC region 2 from S.A. White,  
14 manager, nuclear power. And it regards the, a rescission of  
15 two letters regarding certification for readiness for fuel  
16 load at Watts Bar. Are you familiar with this issue?

17 A Yes.

18 Q The letter?

19 A Yes, I am.

20 Q Did you advise Mr. White to take this action to  
21 rescind a letter in February, on February 20 and April 5,  
22 1985, Mr. White of -- Mr. Parris of office of power of TVA  
23 certified that Watts Bar was ready for fuel load and,  
24 therefore, would be ready for licensing process.

25 This letter was rescinded on April 11th, 1986 by

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1 Mr. White. Did you have any input into this letter?

2 A Yes, I did.

3 Q Would you explain that to me, please, sir?

4 A I was preparing some responses to questions that  
5 had come in from somebody. I don't know where they had come,  
6 where they had come from. There were some questions relative  
7 to either testimony that White was going to give or maybe  
8 there were some -- as I say, I don't know the source of the  
9 question. One of the questions it was determined to answer  
10 that had to do again with the March 20 letter, one of the  
11 positions that White wanted to take, which was true, that he  
12 was not pushing to load the core at Watts Bar. <sup>So</sup> ~~That is why~~ <sup>is</sup>  
13 everybody ~~is~~ so concerned, I am not ready to go with that  
14 plan. I am not even asking permission to go.

15 And I was attempting to write those words for him  
16 to use. And the thought crossed my mind as more of a  
17 question, I wonder if somewhere in the records there already  
18 is an outstanding request or statement by the TVA to the NRC  
19 with respect to Watts Bar. And my office was right next to  
20 Mr. Cottle's and I asked, I went across and asked him if he  
21 knew if there was such a letter in existence from TVA to the  
22 NRC stating readiness for loading the fuel. He said, yes,  
23 there was. And immediately his reaction was the same as my  
24 reaction, oh, my goodness.

25 And I went in to see White and told him that there

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1 was such a letter in existence and that it was very difficult  
2 for him to be saying I am not asking for permission to load  
3 the core because it was already an outstanding letter out  
4 there and he said, well, why don't we just retract the  
5 letter. So the answer is, "fine, let's retract the letter."

6 And as best I can remember, he called, I think it  
7 was Gridley, up and said write me a letter and I -- I did not  
8 know at the time, or at least Cottle didn't say to me that  
9 there were two letters. But there was a request later on, as  
10 I can see here, that there were two letters. And that was  
11 the sole -- nothing more behind it than that, simple.

12 BY MR. MURPHY:

13 Q Let me ask a question. Have you ever heard  
14 Mr. Edgar make the comment that --

15 A Mr. who?

16 Q Edgar make the comment that White had at some  
17 point in time, around the March 20 letter, had to make a  
18 positive movement and the only type positive movement he  
19 could describe to the NRC was personnel changes he had made  
20 at the time?

21 A No.

22 Q Did you meet with a Mr. Keppler on May 13, 1987?

23 MR. ROBINSON: 1987? This year?

24 BY MR. MURPHY:

25 Q Most recently?

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1 A Yes.

2 Q What was it, do you recall the content of your  
3 conversation with Mr. Keppler -- let me simplify that. Let  
4 me raise a couple comments and you tell me whether you made  
5 these comments to Mr. Keppler or not. Is that satisfactory?

6 A Sure.

7 Q Did you tell Mr. Keppler that Mr. White was  
8 thought by industry and others to save TVA and that he  
9 originally did not want the position?

10 A That is a true statement.

11 Q Wait a minute, did you tell that to Mr. Keppler?

12 A It is a true statement. I do not recall saying  
13 that to Mr. Keppler but I agree with it. I am not saying I  
14 didn't.

15 Q Okay. That might be better.

16 Did you stress, did you tell Mr. Keppler that  
17 White was and still is in many ways naive in dealing with  
18 regulatory agencies?

19 A No, I did not. Can I ask you where these are  
20 coming from.

21 MR. ROBINSON: You can ask.

22 MR. MURPHY: No, but I can't tell you.

23 MR. ROBINSON: But he sure can ask.

24 BY MR. MURPHY:

25 Q If it is a misstatement, you can say yes or no.

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1 Did you tell Mr. Keppler that TVA board and  
2 general manager view Mr. White as a necessary evil and that  
3 they really were neither helpful nor supportive with regard  
4 to Mr. White's efforts?

5 MS. BAUSER: And they were really neither --

6 BY MR. MURPHY:

7 Q Neither helpful nor supportive regarding  
8 Mr. White's efforts?

9 A No, I did not say that. I don't know where you  
10 are getting that from.

11 Q Did you tell Mr. Keppler that Mr. White was  
12 committed to solving TVA's nuclear problems and that he most  
13 likely will stay on until both Sequoyah units are back in  
14 operation?

15 A No.

16 Q Browns Ferry number 2 is back in operation and the  
17 plan for dealing with Watts Bar has been developed and  
18 approved?

19 A Close. Close. But not exactly what you said.

20 Q How close?

21 A I told him that it was my opinion -- the question  
22 came up, how long is White's contract? The contract is for  
23 January something, 17 or something, 1988. The question to me  
24 was, did I think that White would leave at the termination of  
25 that contract. My answer to him was, White keeps saying that

1 he is going to leave and in my opinion he will not leave  
2 because he is not that kind of a person. He will stay. The  
3 question was, how long will he stay. I said, I don't know,  
4 but I am sure that he will stay at least through the restart  
5 of Sequoyah and a clear path to the restart of one of the  
6 Browns Ferry plants, and some kind of understanding, whatever  
7 that may be, of Watts Bar. But the last one was very  
8 questionable.

9 MR. MURPHY: That is all I have.

10 BY MR. MURPHY:

11 Q Did you request this meeting with Mr. Keppler?

12 A Yes. I did.

13 Q Why did you ask for the meeting, what was your  
14 motive for doing that?

15 A I could sense -- well, first of all, I had dealt  
16 with Mr. Keppler on a number of occasions in the past, on the  
17 Zimmer case, on the Braidwood, Davis-Besse and Clinton. And  
18 that the word had gotten to me, not directly from Mr. Keppler  
19 but through some other sources, that before he took the job,  
20 the one that he has now, that he would like to sit down and  
21 chat with me with respect to what I sensed the problems were  
22 at TVA, more along the lines of giving him some background in  
23 terms of what we had been working with and the plants that he  
24 was familiar with.

25 That meeting never took place.

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1           As Mr. Keppler came into the situation and took  
2 over the job, then it appeared to me that it might be  
3 worthwhile to have that meeting. And there was an occasion  
4 when I saw him in Chattanooga, I think it was Chattanooga,  
5 and he indicated to me that, hey, we ought to get together  
6 sometime. So sometime I called up and said, how can we get  
7 together. And that is when we did. So we got together here,  
8 in one of these buildings right over here.

9           I would like to clarify, there was no effort to  
10 convince him to do anything. It was more of a, to give him  
11 some of the background, some of the background, incidentally,  
12 which I have discussed here that he was not privy to as to  
13 how we arrived at coming to TVA in the first place and what  
14 we were trying to do.

15           Q     Let me assure you that we didn't, if we left that  
16 thought, we did not intend to and that -- nor was that the  
17 basis for our information. I would never have brought it  
18 up.

19           BY MR. REINHART:

20           Q     Mr. Wegner, we would like to ask you about a  
21 letter that Mr. White sent to Mr. Denton on June 5, 1986.

22                     (Letter handed to the witness.)

23           BY MR. REINHART:

24           Q     Were you involved in this letter?

25           A     Yes.

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1 Q Did you draft it?

2 A Yes, I did.

3 Q Okay. Earlier you said that when the question of  
4 the rescission of -- never mind. Forget that for a minute.  
5 Let's go to paragraph 4 of this letter.

6 A Yes.

7 Q And in it it says, in the second sentence there,  
8 we are talking about the March 20th response to the January  
9 3rd letter?

10 A Yes. In order to respond to that request, I  
11 assembled a group of outside individuals, et cetera.

12 Q Who was the group of outside individuals?

13 A Kelly, Huston and whoever else came up under that  
14 system.

15 Q So the Lundin group under Kelly, Huston?

16 A I am not going to say that because I just --

17 Q But Kelly, Huston and whoever they got?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Okay. Then he says, "in addition, I had a group  
20 of highly experienced non-TVA experts review this group's  
21 findings."

22 Who was involved in that group?

23 A That would have been all of the advisors that we  
24 had, that we talked about before, which would have included  
25 Kelly, okay? And would have included Huston, too. Okay?

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1 Q What did that second group do with respect to  
2 Kelly, Huston and all their effort? Anything other than what  
3 you have described?

4 A They reviewed what they did to see, again, under  
5 the, under whatever direction White had given them. And I  
6 was not privy to the direction that he had given them other  
7 than what direction White gave me, which -- I was one of the  
8 advisors. And he never tasked me to look at the enclosures.

9 Q Do you know if he had anybody -- we are talking  
10 about two groups. We take Kelly and Huston, they have got to  
11 be in one group or another. And most people put them in the  
12 first group. So I am wondering who is in the second group?

13 A No, I think that my memory would say that it was  
14 Kelly that was asked to go form the first group, which he  
15 did. He never -- he kind of spans the two groups.

16 MR. ROBINSON: As I recall it, didn't Mr. White  
17 put Kelly in the second group?

18 BY MR. REINHART:

19 Q I am asking Mr. Wegner what his viewpoint was.

20 MS. BAUSER: He just testified three minutes ago  
21 that he was in both groups and that he was in the second  
22 group.

23 MR. WILLIAMSON: Which is the first group?

24 MR. REINHART: The first group is the group of  
25 outside individuals that is Kelly, Huston and the group they

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1 developed.

2 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to explain it?

3 MR. WILLIAMSON: Please do. I am a little  
4 confused.

5 MR. REINHART: That would help, please.

6 THE WITNESS: I go back to that meeting in  
7 January.

8 MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay.

9 THE WITNESS: Go in and see what -- At that time,  
10 I don't go through all the details of the meeting. Kelly is  
11 an advisor, works for Stone & Webster. He has got Siskin.  
12 Who can I talk to from Stone & Webster that is great on QA.  
13 It is Kelly. Okay?

14 Kelly get in here. Kelly, I want you to get some  
15 teams together to do this. This is the first team. Kelly  
16 was not necessarily on any of the teams. Okay?

17 MR. WILLIAMSON: I understand.

18 THE WITNESS: And that is probably where the name  
19 Lundin comes up. Now you have got Lundin. He has got a  
20 bunch of people out there.

21 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

22 Q The Lundin group?

23 A Call it the Lundin group.

24 MS. BAUSER: The reason he doesn't call it the  
25 Lundin group is because he doesn't know exactly what Lundin

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1 did because he has a reticence to call it that.

2 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

3 Q Call it what would you like to call it. Tell me  
4 if I am associating the right people because I want to be --

5 A It is that group of people, of which Lundin is  
6 part of? Whether he led the thing, I don't know. But  
7 obviously the letter you showed me would indicate that he is  
8 leading that group. But I didn't know that.

9 Q All right.

10 A All right?

11 Q That is --

12 A Now, their efforts are done. Now, White says, now  
13 I want my senior advisors to look this thing over. Who is  
14 that?

15 Q Is this the outside group of --

16 A This is the second group.

17 Q Non-TVA experts?

18 A In addition, I had a group of highly experienced  
19 non-TVA experts review this group's findings.

20 Q Who is that?

21 A All the advisors that were --

22 Q That is BETA, BETA people?

23 A To whatever extent they were used. It could have  
24 been zero for all I know, because I was not privy to who was  
25 asked to do what.



1 Q That would include, would that include, though,

2 BETA --

3 A Henry Stone, Siskin, Sullivan, Kelly, Huston.

4 Q Brodsky -- well, that is BETA?

5 A Yes.

6 Q That would be the non-TVA experts?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Is that what the word is?

9 A Yes.

10 MS. BAUSER: What about Drotleff and Kirkebo?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, they also would have been  
12 included within that.

13 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

14 Q These are advisors?

15 A Yes, except somewhere throughout that some of them  
16 get shifted over, but White continues to use them in this  
17 respect here to get this thing done.

18 Q But in this letter we are talking about two  
19 different groups?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Talking about the first group, which I say is the  
22 Lundin group, who did the on-site review of the NSRS  
23 perceptions of Watts Bar.

24 A Yes.

25 Q That was the effort that took place between

1 January 31st and February the 5th.

2 A Right.

3 Q And then another group, the non-TVA experts, this  
4 is the other group which is --

5 A They are all outside experts.

6 Q But we are talking two different groups?

7 A Yes. Yes.

8 Q Thank you.

9 BY MR. REINHART:

10 Q Now, three things were said here. I am not trying  
11 to put words in anybody's mouth, but I heard Kelly was in the  
12 first group. Kelly was in the second group?

13 A No. No.

14 Q Or Kelly was in neither group.

15 A No. Kelly was called in to form up the first  
16 group.

17 Q Okay.

18 A Okay?

19 Q But was not part of it?

20 A He was not part of it, no.

21 Q Okay. So therefore, Kelly was in the second  
22 group?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Okay.

25 A But to the extent that he formed the first group,

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1 he was -- I guess you could say he was part of it. I don't  
2 know. But certainly not in my definition. I am not saying  
3 that he didn't look over what they were doing.

4 Q Do you know if the second group had any specific  
5 direction from anyone as to what they should do?

6 A Other than what I read in the letter. That is  
7 all.

8 Q Was anybody designated to be in charge of the  
9 second group?

10 A Not that I know of.

11 Q Did the second group ever document their results?

12 A Not that I know of.

13 MR. REINHART: Okay.

14 MR. ROBINSON: Are you through?

15 MR. REINHART: Yes.

16 BY MR. ROBINSON:

17 Q What, to your knowledge, Mr. Wegner, were the  
18 findings of the first group? And let me clarify as to what I  
19 think two different types of findings are.

20 What I think the findings are of the first group  
21 is that what the TVA, line and QA people responded to, and  
22 NSRS, was, in fact, valid. That is what I interpret up to  
23 this point the findings of the first group. I don't  
24 interpret the findings of the first group to actually be the  
25 technical responses. Is that in consonance with your opinion

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1 of the first group's findings?

2 A I have to answer that in the context of what I  
3 knew at the time.

4 Q Okay.

5 A And what I knew at the time is what I testified to  
6 earlier, which was, the only thing that I saw was the first  
7 draft or an early draft of the 11 perceptions. I did not  
8 know who the author of those 11 were. Okay? But it was  
9 reported to me that they had been worked over -- I am not  
10 going to say prepared -- by the first group, so therefore, I  
11 interpreted that to be their work.

12 Q Their own.

13 A That may have been a bad assumption but I assumed  
14 that was their effort.

15 Q So at the time, you thought that was the Lundin  
16 group's or groups' findings?

17 A Yes. When I read that, I assumed that was work  
18 coming out of the, what we have been describing as the Lundin  
19 group.

20 Q Now you know different.

21 A Yes. Well, I know, again based on discussions of  
22 yesterday, that those are not that different than the ones  
23 that were prepared by the in-house TVA people.

24 Q Based on your discussions up to this moment with  
25 your attorneys or anyone, what do you think the Lundin group

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1 did?

2 MS. BAUSER: Today, now.

3 THE WITNESS: As of now?

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

5 THE WITNESS: What I think they did, based again  
6 on what I know right now, is that they took the responses  
7 that had been prepared by TVA, the line management. I also  
8 think that they went and they took whatever it was that the  
9 NSRS prepared in their specifics, because I am under the  
10 impression that the NSRS went back, and as I have heard words  
11 about the fact they spent all night and they complained about  
12 that, but they came up with a more definitive list, that they  
13 went and looked at that definitive list and somehow made a  
14 judgment on here is the NSRS perception. This is what QA  
15 went and did, and either blessed it or changed it in very  
16 minor form.

17 Q Okay.

18 BY MR. ROBINSON:

19 Q Okay. So now, going back to what you thought were  
20 that group's findings back in the early 1986 time frame, when  
21 you say, when you are drafting this letter and you indicate  
22 that the second group of highly experienced non-TVA experts  
23 reviewed these findings, you were talking about the technical  
24 responses themselves?

25 A Yes.

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1 Q Earlier in the questioning this afternoon, I asked  
2 you if you knew whether Mr. Brodsky, Bass, Siskin, Sullivan,  
3 Stone and Miles did any review of Lundin's findings, and you  
4 said, to your knowledge, none.

5 Was that answer based on what you know right up to  
6 this point about what Lundin's findings were? In other  
7 words, are you saying that Brodsky, Bass, Siskin, Sullivan,  
8 Stone and Miles did not review what Lundin did to validate  
9 the technical responses?

10 MS. BAUSER: Do you understand the question?

11 MR. ROBINSON: You can go ahead and explain it to  
12 him.

13 MS. BAUSER: I understood it.

14 THE WITNESS: I am not sure I understood the  
15 question. Are we talking did these people review the Lundin  
16 responses or did they review the TVA responses?

17 MR. ROBINSON: Right.

18 THE WITNESS: I would say that if they reviewed  
19 anything, they would have reviewed the Lundin, okay?

20 BY MR. ROBINSON:

21 Q The Lundin effort?

22 A The Lundin effort, because that was all that was  
23 available, as far as I could see. Whatever those were, here  
24 they sat, 11 --

25 MR. ROBINSON: Can I -- I think that there are

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1 groups of documents that he is referring to. One group of  
2 documents is what might be called the attachments to the  
3 letter as originally prepared by the TVA Staff. That may or  
4 may not have been changed by the Lundin group.

5 The other is there is a Lundin work product which  
6 is reflected in a memorandum shown to you before as to what  
7 they did.

8 When you are saying that people did or did not  
9 review the Lundin papers, are you referring to the Lundin  
10 memorandum or are you referring to possible Lundin changes in  
11 the underlying answers, or don't you know?

12 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I don't know. I  
13 never got it pinned down to that degree.

14 MS. BAUSER: Let me ask a clarifying question. Is  
15 it your impression that there were other people in this  
16 senior advisor group who looked at the attachments, whoever  
17 wrote them, who looked at those attachments?

18 THE WITNESS: Other than whom?

19 MS. BAUSER: Other than, let's say, Kelly and  
20 Huston?

21 MR. ROBINSON: Kelly and Drotleff and --

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was going to say they had  
23 Kelly, they had Huston, they had Drotleff, I am sure looked  
24 at them, Kirkebo, and, again, I won't swear to this, but it  
25 was my impression that there were some other people that may

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1 have looked at individual parts of these things, maybe not  
2 all of them in a collective sense. Here are all 11, let's go  
3 take a look at them.

4 Again, I am not -- I am not in a position to know  
5 what White told these people to do when he told them, who he  
6 told, and how he told them.

7 I was trying to answer your earlier question, do I  
8 have personal knowledge that, and you listed a bunch of  
9 people, that they reviewed. And the answer is, I don't have  
10 any personal knowledge, no. I am not saying they didn't.  
11 Okay?

12 BY MR. ROBINSON:

13 Q Correct me if I am wrong, I thought I understood  
14 that you didn't think they did or that you --

15 A I don't think they did.

16 Q You didn't have any knowledge that they did?

17 A That is right. That is what I am saying. But if  
18 someone came back and said, oh, yes, I did, I looked at that,  
19 I didn't know it. I was not present when White got these  
20 people in and said, I want you to review these documents.

21 Q So when you were -- back in the March or the June,  
22 excuse me, the June time frame, when you were drafting that  
23 letter, what findings were, in your mind, were produced by  
24 the first group and were reviewed by the second group?

25 A I don't think that -- where is the letter? I

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1 don't think that -- again, when I say I drafted the letter, I  
2 would have to go back and find out what did I say when I  
3 drafted a letter. For all I know, that particular part may  
4 not have been in there. That may have been added. This  
5 probably went through several drafts before it went out.

6 Q Do you recall thinking about that aspect of the  
7 letter?

8 A No. Again, I can't. I am not saying I didn't put  
9 it in there or I did put it in there, but I am saying that as  
10 I look at this now, it would have not -- it would not have  
11 been out of the question that I would have put it in there,  
12 because of my discussions with White where he has said these  
13 words so many times that I had two groups of people, I heard  
14 him use those words. I could have very easily put those  
15 words in based on what I had heard White say. It could also  
16 have been that when he saw my first draft, he said, hey, I  
17 want to add some things in here. I don't know. Or I could  
18 have just put them in myself. I don't know.

19 But if you are asking me to support what I meant  
20 when I put those words in there, I can't do that. Because I  
21 was not privy to the actions that were taken there.

22 Q All I was asking was what, in your mind, were the  
23 findings that were produced by the first group and reviewed  
24 by the second group?

25 A I can tell you what I thought --

1 Q Okay.

2 A -- or what I would think it would be. And that  
3 was that they looked at the 11 enclosures to the letter.

4 Q Okay.

5 A And I have also heard -- again, let me comment,  
6 for example, where White has indicated to me, for example, we  
7 take Henry Stone. Henry Stone, GE, probably was not involved  
8 in any of the drafting of anything, but yet he is an advisor  
9 -- many, many years of experience.

10 White was using Henry Stone as a tutor. He would  
11 come in and would spend several hours giving him, you know,  
12 there aren't many boiling water reactors in the Navy. So let  
13 me tell you how a boiling water reactor works.

14 He said to me that there were many occasions where  
15 Stone didn't even know, where I would be asking him a  
16 question that had surfaced out of the 11 perceptions. So  
17 unbeknownst to Henry, Henry is really providing some input  
18 into the review process. And again, White depended very  
19 heavily on the engineering judgment of Ed Siskin. And I am  
20 sure that there were many cases where he would have Siskin  
21 come in and say, I don't understand this, explain this to  
22 me. And Siskin would go through the explanation.

23 So, therefore, there again, Siskin would be  
24 involved in that process.

25 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

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1 Q So this doesn't, this response in this fifth  
2 letter doesn't necessarily mean, is that what you are saying,  
3 it doesn't necessarily mean that each and every one of these  
4 reviewed each and every finding?

5 A Yes, but it is my interpretation that White did  
6 direct several people, namely Kelly, namely Huston and  
7 possibly others, that he wanted a full total review of those  
8 enclosures.

9 Q Did Mr. Kelly object to the drafting and sending  
10 of this June 5 letter?

11 A Not to me.

12 Q Not to you.

13 BY MR. MURPHY:

14 Q Do you know if he objected to Mr. White?

15 A No.

16 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

17 Q On the question --

18 MS. BAUSER: No, you don't know, or no, he  
19 didn't.

20 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know.

21 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

22 Q This group, Mr. Bass, Brodsky, Miles, Nace,  
23 Siskin, Sullivan, Kelly, Huston and Mr. Wegner --

24 MR. ROBINSON: Are you going to do the batting  
25 order tonight?

- 1 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:
- 2 Q Are any of these people considered to have a  
3 particular expertise in QA?
- 4 A Read them again?
- 5 Q Bass?
- 6 A No.
- 7 Q Brodsky?
- 8 A No.
- 9 Q Miles?
- 10 A No.
- 11 Q Nace?
- 12 A No.
- 13 Q Siskin?
- 14 A Close.
- 15 Q Engineering, right.  
16 Stone?
- 17 A Very close.
- 18 Q Sullivan?
- 19 A No.
- 20 Q Kelly?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q Huston?
- 23 A Yes.
- 24 Q Wegner?
- 25 A No.

1 MR. ROBINSON: That was easy.

2 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

3 Q So these other people didn't have, as you  
4 mentioned, the ones that you wanted out didn't have that  
5 expertise in QA.

6 A The two people in there that clearly carried a QA  
7 banner ~~and~~ were Kelly and Huston. The other people, again, I  
8 have got to go back to my experience in the naval nuclear  
9 program. You understand, for example, that in naval  
10 reactors, Admiral Rickover's organization, there was never a  
11 QA organization. Okay? It would never pass<sup>S</sup> today's muster,  
12 because his philosophy was, everyone is responsible for the  
13 quality assurance of his product.

14 That didn't mean that there weren't QA  
15 organizations out in the shipyards and in the plants and  
16 everything else like that, but not in headquarters.

17 MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay.

18 BY MR. ROBINSON:

19 Q Referring to the June 5 letter again, the fourth  
20 paragraph in the middle.

21 A Uh-huh.

22 Q Regarding the sentence that pertains to the first  
23 group.

24 A Uh-huh.

25 Q Directed them to conduct a review of each one of  
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1 the perceptions?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Would you agree, based on what you know today,  
4 that perhaps a clearer explanation of what that first group  
5 did was to conduct a review of the TVA investigation of the  
6 perceptions?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Okay.

9 MR. ROBINSON: That is all I have.

10 MR. MURPHY: I don't have anything else.

11 MR. REINHART: Neither do I.

12 MR. MURPHY: We have to wait for our leader. He  
13 has got some questions to ask you, closing questions.

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 MR. WILLIAMSON: We don't have any more  
16 questions. I am going to read my closing remarks and give  
17 you an opportunity to make -- back on the record.

18 Mr. Wegner, in closing, I would like to ask you  
19 for the record have I or any other NRC representative here  
20 threatened you in any manner or offered you any reward in  
21 return for this testimony given today?

22 THE WITNESS: No.

23 BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

24 Q Have you given this testimony freely and  
25 voluntarily?

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1 A Yes.

2 Q Is there any additional information that you would  
3 like to add to the record?

4 A No.

5 Q Is there anything that anyone else would like to  
6 say at this time?

7 A I would like to say a couple words in closing,  
8 that I hope that I have been helpful and that I have tried to  
9 give you the answers as I saw them, and recognizing that this  
10 is a very complex issue and that we certainly would like to  
11 get it behind us. And, therefore, I am saying that if you  
12 have any further questions at any time, I would be most happy  
13 to come back and provide any information I can to help you.  
14 Because it has been my practice in the past, remember, I was  
15 around when the NRC was first formed. Many of the  
16 procedures, many of them, a lot of the people that formed the  
17 NRC came from our program. It has always been certainly  
18 Admiral Rickover's policy to help the NRC as much as he  
19 could, without getting his plants licensed, I might add. But  
20 I grew up in that atmosphere and I have tried to carry that  
21 out. And I hope we are doing that right now.

22 MR. WILLIAMSON: We want to express our  
23 appreciation for your time and your cooperation and we  
24 certainly trust that if additional questions arise that we  
25 will feel free to get back in touch with you and to pursue

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1 additional issues as necessary.

2 MR. ROBINSON: Through his counsel; is that  
3 right?

4 MR. WILLIAMSON: Period.

5 THE WITNESS: Period.

6 MR. WILLIAMSON: This interview is concluded at  
7 5:30 p.m. on July 22nd, 1987, through your counsel.

8 (Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the interview was  
9 concluded.)

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*William H. H. H.*



TRANSCRIPT CORRECTIONS TO OI  
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF  
WILLIAM WEGNER  
July 22, 1987

- ✓ p. 5, l. 7      Change "foreign ports into" to "foreign ships into"
- ✓ p. 6, l. 3      Change "you of all" to "you have all"
- ✓ p. 6, l. 4      Change "inter-viewed" to "interviewed"
- ✓ p. 12, l. 24     Change "part part" to "part"
- ✓ p. 15, l. 25     Change "and the" to "and"
- ✓ p. 17, l. 23     Change "chief of Naval materiel" to "Chief of Naval Materiel"
- ✓ p. 17, l. 24     Change "from" to "and with"
- ✓ p. 18, l. 4      Change "this" to "his"
- ✓ p. 18, l. 16     Change "it is not" to "it is, is not"
- ✓ p. 18, l. 19     Change "at more" to "as more"
- ✓ p. 20, l. 13     Change "with" to "as"
- ✓ p. 21, l. 18     Change "miles" to "Miles"
- ✓ p. 22, l. 25     Change "minute" to "mint"
- ✓ p. 23, l. 5      Change "president" to "President"
- ✓ p. 23, l. 6      Change "Webster, engineering corporation." to "Webster Engineering Corporation."
- ✓ p. 23, l. 16     Change "write" to "right"
- ✓ p. 25, l. 25     Change "trace built" to "traceability"
- ✓ p. 26, l. 7      Change "were" to "went"
- ✓ p. 26, l. 10     Insert "did" between "Nace" and "about"
- ✓ p. 36, l. 9      Change "not" to "got"
- ✓ p. 55, l. 10     Change "corrective action" to "Corrective Action"
- ✓ p. 55, l. 11     Change "program" to "Program"

- ✓p. 56, l. 5 Change "years" to "years;"
- ✓p. 58, l. 25 Change "person" to "purpose"
- ✓p. 60, l. 5 Delete "that"
- ✓p. 64, l. 10 Change "probably" to "probably,"
- ✓p. 64, l. 11 Change "so. There" to "so -- there"
- ✓p. 66, l. 6 Change "get getting" to "getting"
- ✓p. 66, l. 13 Change "does is" to "is"
- ✓p. 82, l. 1 Insert "were" between "requirements" and "not"
- ✓p. 82, l. 17 Insert "been" between "side" and "given"
- ✓p. 87, l. 5 Change "somebody's's" to "somebody's"
- ✓p. 87, l. 12 Change "call" to "cull"
- ✓p. 133, l. 8 Change "Commissioner" to "Victor"
- ✓p. 137, l. 7 Change "a" to "know"
- ✓p. 140, l. 25 Insert "door" between "locked" and "so"
- ✓p. 149, l. 5 Delete "We did not find that."
- ✓p. 178, l. 20 Change "NCR" to "NRC"
- ✓p. 182, l. 7 Change "that if he" to "that he"
- ✓p. 185, l. 13 Change "approximate." to "problems."
- ✓p. 189, l. 11 Change "Sequoyah, that" to "Sequoyah, what"
- ✓p. 189, l. 13 Change "that what" to "that that"
- ✓p. 190, l. 12 Change "He" to "They"
- ✓p. 193, l. 8 Delete "may"
- ✓p. 199, l. 10 Delete "from" [once]
- ✓p. 200, l. 16 Change "your" to "you"
- ✓p. 204, l. 12 Change "That is why" to "So why is"

✓ p. 204, l. 13 Delete "is"

✓ p. 226, l. 7 Delete "and"

✓ p. 226, l. 11 Change "past" to "pass"