

Table R– Relocated Specifications

ITS/CTS No. and DOC No	CTS Requirement	Description of Relocated Requirement	Location	Change Control Process
3/4.1.2.1 R01	3/4.1.2.1	Current technical specification (CTS) 3/4.1.2.1 provides requirements on the Boration System flow paths during shutdown. CTS 3.1.2.1 requires a flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system via a boric acid pump and a makeup or decay heat removal (DHR) pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if only the boric acid storage is OPERABLE or a flow path from the borated water storage tank via a makeup or DHR pump to the RCS if only the borated water storage tank is OPERABLE. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM). The improved technical specification (ITS) does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).	TRM	10 CFR 50.59
3/4.1.2.2 R01	3/4.1.2.2	CTS 3/4.1.2.2 provides requirements on the flow paths during operation. CTS 3.1.2.2 requires the a flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system via a boric acid pump and a makeup or DHR pump to the RCS, and a flow path from the borated water storage tank via a makeup or DHR pump to the RCS to be OPERABLE. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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3/4.1.2.3 R01	3/4.1.2.3	CTS 3/4.1.2.3 provides requirements on the Boration System makeup pump during shutdown. CTS 3.1.2.3 requires at least one makeup pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 to be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bus. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59
3/4.1.2.4 R01	3/4.1.2.4	CTS 3/4.1.2.4 provides requirements on the flow paths during operation. CTS 3.1.2.4 requires two makeup pumps to be OPERABLE. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59
3/4.1.2.5 R01	3/4.1.2.5	CTS 3/4.1.2.5 provides requirements on the boration system DHR pump during shutdown. CTS 3.1.2.5 requires at least one DHR pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 or 3.1.2.2 to be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bus. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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3/4.1.2.6 R01	3/4.1.2.6	CTS 3/4.1.2.6 provides requirements on the Boration System boric acid pump during shutdown. CTS 3.1.2.6 requires at least one boric acid pump to be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bus if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.1a is OPERABLE. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59
3/4.1.2.7 R01	3/4.1.2.7	CTS 3/4.1.2.7 provides requirements on the boric acid pumps during operation. At least one boric acid pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bus. The boration subsystems of the Makeup and Purification System and Chemical Addition System provide the means to control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS and to help maintain the SDM. The ITS does not include this Specification. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.	TRM	10 CFR 50.59
3/4.1.3.7 R01	3/4.1.3.7	CTS 3.1.3.7 requires each control rod assembly (CRA) (safety, regulating, and axial power shaping rod) to be programmed to operate in the core location and rod group specified in the core operating limit report (COLR). CTS 4.1.3.7.a requires each CRA to be demonstrated to be programmed to operate in the specified core location and rod group. CTS 4.1.3.7.b requires verification that the control rod drive (CRD) patch panels are locked every 7	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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		<p>days. If any CRA is not programmed to operate as specified the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within 1 hour. The location of CRAs is provided in the reload report for each fuel cycle, and are reflected as core location and rod group assignments in the COLR. These constraints on CRA core locations and rod group assignments function to optimize core burnup and minimize local power peaking during operation. Programming (or "patching") of CRAs is also determined by the reload report for each fuel cycle to ensure that adequate SDM can be achieved when the CRs are tripped. Incorrect programming of CRAs in regulating groups would be revealed during measurement of group rod worth's performed during startup testing, and verification that CRAs in safety groups are fully withdrawn is performed using the control rod (CR) position indication system. Unlatched CRAs would be detected via core power tilt measurements during power escalation. When test, reprogramming, or maintenance of the CRD patch panel and associated cables and instrumentation is performed, control rod control "programming" is also validated. If rod assemblies are not programmed correctly at some point the applicable insertion, overlap, and alignment limit may not be met. The Technical Specifications (TSs) still include appropriate compensatory actions for insertion, overlap, and alignment limits not met. This will ensure the safety analysis is met or the plant will be required to be shut down within the specified time frame. Therefore, this Specification does not meet the criteria for retention in the ITS; therefore, it will be retained in the TRM.</p>		
3.3.17 R01	Table 3.3-10 Instruments 10,	CTS Table 3.3-10 provides requirements for Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation channels. Each individual post	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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	11, 12, 13, and 15	<p>accident monitoring parameter has a specific purpose; however, the general purpose for all accident monitoring instrumentation is to ensure sufficient information is available following an accident to allow an operator to verify the response of automatic safety systems, and to take preplanned manual actions to accomplish a safe shutdown of the plant.</p> <p>The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) position on application of the screening criteria to post-accident monitoring instrumentation is documented in a letter dated May 9, 1988 from TE Murley (NRC) to W.S. Wilgus (Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group). The screening criteria are now incorporated into Title 10 of the <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> (10 CFR) Part 50, Section 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The NRC position taken was that the post-accident monitoring instrumentation table list should contain, on a plant specific basis, all Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 Type A instruments specified in the plant's safety evaluation report on RG 1.97, and all RG 1.97 Category 1 instruments. Accordingly, this position has been applied to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (DBNPS) RG 1.97 instruments. Those instruments meeting these criteria have remained in TSs. The instruments not meeting these criteria will be relocated from the TSs to the TRM. A review of the DBNPS UFSAR and the NRC RG 1.97 Safety Evaluation for DBNPS shows that the following CTS Table 3.3-10 Instruments do not meet Category 1 or Type A requirements.</p> <p>Instrument 10 RC System Subcooling Margin Monitor Instrument 11 PORV Position Indicator</p>		

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ITS/CTS No. and DOC No	CTS Requirement	Description of Relocated Requirement	Location	Change Control Process
		Instrument 12 PORV Block Valve Position Indicator Instrument 13 Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator Instrument 15 Containment Normal Sump Level		
3/4.4.10.1 R01	3/4.4.10.1	<p>CTS 3/4.4.10.1 provides requirements for the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components to ensure their structural integrity. The inspection programs for American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained throughout the life of the components. ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components are monitored so that the possibility of component structural failure does not degrade the safety function of the system. The monitoring activity is of a preventive nature rather than a mitigative action. Other TSs require important systems to be OPERABLE (for example, Emergency Core Cooling Systems) and in a ready state for mitigative action. This TS is more directed toward prevention of component degradation and continued long term maintenance of acceptable structural conditions. Hence, it is not necessary to retain this Specification to ensure immediate OPERABILITY of safety systems. Further, this TS prescribes inspection requirements that are performed during plant shutdown. It is, therefore, not directly important for responding to design basis accidents. This limiting condition for operation does not meet the criteria for retention in the ITS; therefore, it will be retained in the TRM.</p>	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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3/4.7.2.1 R01	3/4.7.2.1	<p>CTS 3.7.2.1 states that the temperature of the secondary coolant in the steam generators (SGs) shall be > 110°F when the pressure of the secondary coolant in the SG is > 237 psig. The limitation on SG pressures and temperatures ensures that pressure-induced stresses on the SGs do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness limits. These pressure and temperature limits are based on maintaining a SG reference temperature nil ductility sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. As such, the Technical Specification places limits on variables consistent with structural analysis results. However, these limits are not initial condition assumptions of a design-basis accident or transient. These limits represent operating restrictions and Criterion 2 includes operating restrictions. However, it should be noted that in the Final Policy Statement the Criterion 2 discussion specified only those operating restrictions required to preclude unanalyzed accidents and transients be included in TSs. This Specification does not meet the criteria for retention in the ITS; therefore, it is not included in the ITS. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.</p>	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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3/4.7.8.1 R01	3/4.7.8.1	<p>CTS 3.7.8.1 states that each sealed source containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microcuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microcuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of ≥ 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination. The limitations on sealed source contamination are intended to ensure that the total body and individual organ irradiation doses do not exceed allowable limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation. This is done by imposing a maximum limitation of < 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination on each sealed source. This requirement and the associated surveillance requirements bear no relation to the conditions or limitations that are necessary to ensure safe reactor operation. This specification does not meet the criteria for retention in the ITS; therefore, it is not included in the ITS. This changes the CTS by relocating the Specification to the TRM.</p>	TRM	10 CFR 50.59

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3/4.9.6 R01	3/4.9.6	<p>CTS 3.9.6 states that the CR hoist and fuel assembly hoist of the fuel handling bridge shall be used for movement of CRs or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The CR hoist having: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and 2. An overload cutoff limits of ≤ 2650 pounds. b. The fuel assembly hoist having: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A maximum capacity of 3000 pounds, and 2. An overload cutoff limit of ≤ 2700 pounds. <p>OPERABILITY of the fuel handling bridge hoists ensures that the equipment used to handle fuel within the reactor pressure vessel functions as designed and that the equipment has sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and/or CRAs. Although the interlocks designed to provide the above capabilities can prevent damage to the refueling equipment and fuel assemblies, they are not assumed to function to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. This specification does not meet the criteria for retention in the ITS; therefore, it is not included in the ITS. This changes the CTS by relocating this Specification to the TRM.</p>	TRM	10 CFR 50.59