

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF:

DOCKET NO:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

10CFR-50, APPENDIX B

The Investigative Interview under oath of: STEVEN A. WHITE

LOCATION: ATLANTA, GEORGIA

PAGES: 1 thru 251

DATE: Tuesday, July 14, 1987

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BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

In the matter of:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
10-CFR-50 APPENDIX B

VOLUME I

The investigative testimony under oath of STEVEN  
A. WHITE, Deponent, taken by the Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission, all formalities waived, before Delana K.  
Bruce, Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public  
in and for the State of Georgia at Large, B-798,  
commencing at approximately 9:10 a.m., July 14, 1987,  
on the 30th Floor, Executive Conference Room, 101  
Marietta Street, Atlanta, Georgia.

APPEARANCES:

For the TVA and Mr. White:

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE  
By: DEBORAH L. BAUSER, ATTORNEY AT LAW  
and  
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APPEARANCES: (Con't)

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

LEN WILLIAMSON, JR.

DANIEL MURPHY

LARRY ROBINSON

MARK REINHART

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 MR. WILLIAMSON: On the record. It is now 0910,  
3 July 14th, 1987. This is an interview with Mr. Steven A.  
4 White, who is employed by Tennessee Valley Authority. The  
5 location of this interview is Atlanta, Georgia. Present at  
6 this interview are Mr. White, Ms. Deborah Bauser, Mr. Gerald  
7 Charnoff, Mr. Dan Murphy, Mr. Larry Robinson, Mr. Mark  
8 Reinhart, and Len Williamson. As agreed, this is being  
9 transcribed by a Court Reporter.

10 The subject matter of this interview, Mr. White,  
11 concerns your knowledge of, and involvement in TVA's March  
12 20th, 1986, response to the NRC regarding TVA's compliance  
13 with 10-CFR Appendix B, at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Mr.  
14 White, would you please stand and raise your right hand.  
15 Whereupon,

16 STEVEN A. WHITE

17 having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein,  
18 was examined and testified as follows:

19 MR. WILLIAMSON: Mr. White, for the record, I would  
20 like to ask you, if you would, to please provide a  
21 biographical sketch of your education, your professional  
22 career, both in the military and also in the nuclear  
23 industry?

24 MR. WHITE: I received a Bachelor's Degree in  
25 Political Science from the University of Southern California.

1 through the Naval Reserve Officer's Training Corps Program.  
 2 I received a Masters Degree in International Relations from  
 3 that same University, Southern California, and I attended law  
 4 school there for two years. Subsequent to that, I was  
 5 commissioned an Ensign in the Navy. I ~~serviced~~<sup>served</sup> almost ~~two~~<sup>ONE</sup> *EA*  
 6 year~~s~~ on a conventional cruiser. Subsequent to that, I  
 7 served about two years on a diesel powered submarine.

8 Commencing in early 1956, I entered into the Navy's  
 9 Nuclear Power Program. Subsequent to that, I spent time in  
 10 various jobs in the Navy's Nuclear Power Program, starting  
 11 with the job as the Reactor Officer on our first nuclear  
 12 powered submarine, the Nautilus. Subsequent to that, I held  
 13 other jobs in the propulsion plant -- the nuclear propulsion  
 14 plant on Nautilus. I was on that ship for four years.

15 Subsequent to that, I became the Chief Engineer for  
 16 a new construction, new design submarine, with a new type of  
 17 reactor. Chief Engineer is, I would call, synonymous with a  
 18 Plant Manager in the commercial industry. Subsequent to that  
 19 tour as Chief Engineer, I became the Executive Officer ~~of~~<sup>or</sup> *ESW*  
 20 Number Two, on a nuclear powered submarine. Subsequent to  
 21 that, I became the nuclear power advisor to the Commander of  
 22 the Submarine Force, Atlanta<sup>ic</sup> Fleet, the person who is *ESW*  
 23 responsible for all of the submarines in the fleet; and the  
 24 Training Officer -- the Nuclear Power Training Officer for  
 25 the Commander of Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet.

1 I then became Commanding Officer of a new  
2 construction, new design, new class of submarine. And as  
3 Commanding Officer of that, perhaps, is about the same as  
4 being a Site Director, or a, perhaps, a -- at least in TVA,  
5 as a Site Director. I then, after that tour, became a  
6 Division Commander, responsible for -- that responsibility  
7 included four nuclear powered submarines. And, then, for a  
8 period of time, it included eight nuclear powered submarines,  
9 because there were some -- a number of submarines that had  
10 some problems that were transferred to me, to try to correct  
11 those problems. So, I ended up with eight instead of four  
12 submarines.

13 I then, from that job, went to work directly for  
14 Admiral Rickover, in Washington, D. C., as an assistant to  
15 him in training and personnel matters. I then, at that time,  
16 I was -- had just been promoted to Captain. I went as a  
17 Squadron Commander of a deployed squadron in Spain, where I  
18 had the responsibility -- it varied between ~~one~~ ten and as *Edw*  
19 many as sixteen submarines. And I had the responsibility for  
20 the operations and maintenance, and so forth, for those  
21 submarines, plus a submarine tender, and other, non-nuclear  
22 ships.

23 After two years there, I was promoted to two star  
24 Admiral, and I went to a job in London, Connecticut, a  
25 Submarine Group Commander. In that job, I had the

1 responsibility for about thirty-six submarines. I had the  
 2 responsibility for submarines being built in a new  
 3 construction <sup>shipment</sup> job -- a number of submarines there. And  
 4 submarines in overhaul, in yet a different shipyard; and  
 5 responsibility for a base, and other things not associated  
 6 directly with nuclear power.

7 From that job, I went to a job in Washington, still  
 8 as a two star Admiral, on the staff of the Chief of Navy  
 9 Materiel, where I had the responsibility for materiel  
 10 matters; overhauls, and that type of thing, maintenance for  
 11 all of the ships in the Navy. That was in a staff position.  
 12 All of the ships, <sup>both</sup> with nuclear and non-nuclear. I then, after  
 13 about two years in that job, went for a two years as the --  
 14 on the Chief of Naval Operations staff, as a Deputy for what  
 15 you might call the Submarine Directorate. In other words,  
 16 the people responsible for the Navy's submarine program.

17 I spent about two years in that job, and I was  
 18 promoted, then, to three star, and assumed the job as the  
 19 Commander of the Submarine Force of the Atlantic Fleet. In  
 20 that job I had the responsibility for about ninety-five  
 21 nuclear powered submarines, nine submarine tenders, or mother  
 22 ships, two bases, a submarine school, you know, and all of  
 23 the ancillary things. I had that job for three years, and  
 24 was promoted to four star Admiral, where I then went as Chief  
 25 of Navy Materiel.

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1 And you recall, I said I had previously been on the  
 2 staff of that. I then went as Chief of Navy Materiel,  
 3 responsible for all of the Navy's procurement, nuclear and  
 4 non-nuclear <sup>no procurement,</sup> <sup>and a lot of other things.</sup> ~~for~~ maintenance, overhauls, Navy-wide. I had that  
 5 job for about two years, and then I retired. And that would  
 6 have been the last day of April, of 1985.

7 I, then, retired to my farm for a number of months,  
 8 from about the first of May, I would say, until sometime in  
 9 September, I believe. I then started what I thought was  
 10 going to be a part-time consulting with Stone & Webster  
 11 Engineering Corporation, in the nuclear power business. And  
 12 commencing on -- in early January of 1986, I came to TVA as  
 13 the Manager of the <sup>Office</sup> ~~Office~~ -- what's now called the Office of <sup>the</sup>  
 14 Nuclear Power.

15 MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay. Let me add for the record,  
 16 with that-- ask a question of Mr. Charnoff and Ms. Bauser,  
 17 are you Mr. White's personal attorneys?

18 MR. CHARNOFF: We are that, and we are also  
 19 representing TVA. But we are his personal attorneys.

20 MR. WILLIAMSON: And you are being retained by TVA,  
 21 or under contract with TVA?

22 MR. CHARNOFF: Yes.

23 MS. BAUSER: Yes.

24 MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay. And also for the record, as  
 25 in previous interviews, we agreed with Ms. Bauser, that upon

1 completion of our field work, we would provide a copy of the  
2 transcript to the interview.

3 MS. BAUSER: Specifically, within a week of your  
4 last interview.

5 MR. WILLIAMSON: Mr. White, let me explain  
6 something to you, that we would like to talk with you about  
7 today, for your benefit. We're going to be asking you  
8 questions in several different areas. One will be the  
9 initial Stone & Webster review, the management assessment at  
10 TVA. The systematic analysis of identified concerns, the  
11 Nace Report that was conducted in January. A review that was  
12 conducted by Mr. Craig Lundin at TVA. Line organization  
13 responses to the NSRS concerns, or perceptions that were  
14 raised by NSRS. The March 20th response to the Commission,  
15 regarding TVA's compliance with the industry at Watts Bar.  
16 The June 5th letter that you wrote to NRC, providing some  
17 clarification and amplification to that letter. As well as  
18 personal documentation you provided to us on July the 10th,  
19 1987, and other documentation that might be related to this  
20 issue.

21 We also -- we have assembled all of this  
22 documentation, and we will be referring to it during the  
23 course of this interview. And I want you to know that you  
24 have access to this. And we hope that we will be able to  
25 provide this to you. When we make reference to it, we'll

1 make reference to it on the record, and also make sure that  
2 you have time to review it, and see any documentation that we  
3 have here. Mr. Murphy?

4 MR. MURPHY: I'm going to just add a couple things.  
5 One, if you've got any documentation, you know, and you need  
6 time to look it up, just let us know.

7 MR. WHITE: Thank you.

8 MR. MURPHY: And, secondly, I'm the oldest person  
9 here, so I have the -- I have a --

10 MR. WHITE: I doubt that. I doubt that.

11 MR. MURPHY: Well, I'm not sure. But, anyway, I  
12 have the responsibility for insuring we take breaks every now  
13 and again. But, also, any time you want to take a break,  
14 feel free to say, you know --

15 MR. WHITE: Thank you, sir.

16 MR. MURPHY: -- call time out. And we'll get on,  
17 I guess. I'm going to tell you, if I need a break, I'm going  
18 to take one. But I have -- that's my responsibility.

19 MR. CHARNOFF: I hope the record is clear that I  
20 didn't participate in who was the oldest. (Laughter.)

21 MR. MURPHY: I'm going to try my best to kind of do  
22 it in the sequence that Mr. Williamson talked about. And  
23 first topic on my list is, according to testimony that we  
24 received from people like Mr. Kelley and Mr. Burns, Stone &  
25 Webster made an offer to TVA, to do a review of their

1 situation sometime, probably in the October and November time  
2 frame of 1985. Are you familiar with that review?

3 MR. WHITE: Yes, I am.

4 MR. MURPHY: Who made the decision to offer the  
5 Stone & Webster review to TVA? I'm told that this was,  
6 initially, at least, was going to be cost free. It wasn't  
7 going to cost TVA any money, is that correct?

8 MR. WHITE: Well, you've asked two questions.

9 MR. MURPHY: Okay, well --

10 MR. WHITE: The first one, I don't know the answer  
11 to. I do not know who, specifically, offered -- it was not  
12 me. So I don't know who, specifically, made that offer.  
13 With reference to the second question, of was it going to be  
14 cost free, I was present at the meeting with some of the TVA  
15 people, including Mr. Hugh Parris, at which that point was  
16 made by a Stone & Webster individual, one of the people  
17 present, and I don't recall which one. But someone mentioned  
18 that at the time.

19 MR. MURPHY: Okay. Are you familiar with the team  
20 members?

21 MR. WHITE: When you say familiar with?

22 MR. MURPHY: Or who were the team members?

23 MR. WHITE: I would recognize the names, I think,  
24 if given to me, I certainly would. For example, there were  
25 two Burns in that group.

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1 MR. MURPHY: Uh huh (affirmative).

2 MR. WHITE: Nace kind of was responsible for  
3 coordinating the technical kinds of information. And I think  
4 I would probably recognize the other names if given to me.  
5 But, of course, at the time, almost all of those people,  
6 except for Mr. Nace, they were new to me. I didn't know who  
7 they were, yes.

8 MR. MURPHY: Do you have any idea what their  
9 credentials were?

10 MR. WHITE: At the time, I reviewed it. If you ask  
11 me now to sit back and determine what the credentials of the  
12 individuals were, I would have trouble doing that. At the  
13 time, I certainly looked at what they were expert in, what  
14 fields. But I don't recall that as of now.

15 MR. MURPHY: And do they have, in your view, a  
16 broad range of expertise?

17 MR. WHITE: Let me answer that the best way I can.  
18 There was, for an example, an individual who had expertise in  
19 QA, you know, <sup>there was</sup> ~~it was~~ an individual who had expertise in edw  
20 documentation, a person who had expertise in design, one had  
21 some in construction and a couple of them had just kind of  
22 overall commercial nuclear experience.

23 MR. MURPHY: Did you all conduct an entrance  
24 briefing with TVA related to this? I mean did you appear as  
25 a group and give Mr. Hugh Parris or any members of his staff

1 an entrance briefing as to what you were going to do?

2 MR. WHITE: I think two things were done that might  
3 fall <sup>into that category</sup> and I want to make sure I present you everything I know. EKW

4 Two things which you might categorize as kind of entrance.

5 One, was the initial discussion that I mentioned  
6 with Mr. Parris and I believe Mr. Mason was there when the  
7 Stone & Webster people discussed what <sup>it</sup> was that they felt  
8 could be done for TVA. When the group arrived here and the  
9 group then was about ten people with me in charge of that  
10 group overall, we met with a number of TVA managers. I  
11 believe Mr. Parris was present, I'm not certain. But I would  
12 call that, in the normal sense, the entrance brief, where  
13 various people -- they showed <sup>me</sup> some organizational charts and EKW  
14 told what various people did -- in other words, before we  
15 started out into the field so to speak.

16 MS. BAUSER: Excuse me. I want to ask a clarifying  
17 question. When you said when we arrived here, where were you  
18 talking about?

19 MR. WHITE: I'm sorry. When we arrived in  
20 Chattanooga.

21 MR. MURPHY: I guess that you've answered the next  
22 question. But there has been some difference in testimony as  
23 to who was actually in charge and you can clarify this. Some  
24 of the folks we talked to said Mr. Nace was in charge, other  
25 folks have identified you as being in charge. Was there a

1 period of time when he initially was in charge and then you  
2 kind of took over?

3 MR. WHITE: No. And I can understand why some  
4 might hold that view. I had been assigned this job even  
5 though I was a consultant for Stone & Webster Engineering  
6 Corporation. Mr. Allen, who was the chairman, had said,  
7 "Look, Steve, I want you to go and take over all control of  
8 this group of people." He knew that I didn't have any  
9 experience, I had very, very little experience in commercial  
10 nuclear power. Nace, then, was the person who had some  
11 number of years of experience and so Nace was the person  
12 responsible for, you know, the coordination of the technical  
13 issues and the things that were being brought up.

14 And the best way that I can describe the thing  
15 perhaps is to say that that group would meet and discuss, I  
16 believe, on a daily basis the various things that people had  
17 done and talked to. And then they would do that in the  
18 evening, I would appear for some period of time in the  
19 evening to get really two things; one, an overall kind of  
20 management look at how things were going, was it progressing  
21 properly, and it also provided me a chance to educate myself  
22 on some of the lingo and some of the terms being used and  
23 that kind of thing.

24 No, I was in overall responsibility in direct  
25 answer to what you're asking and Mr. Nace, you know, served

1 for me, but was in charge then of the group in a technical  
2 sense.

3 MR. MURPHY: I appreciate that. Did anyone other  
4 than Stone & Webster, did any member of Beta take part in  
5 that assessment?

6 MR. WHITE: Yes. Mr. Bill Wegner and Mr. Murray  
7 Miles from <sup>ETA</sup> Beta Corporation were also members of that group. EJW

8 MR. MURPHY: How did they interface? Can you  
9 explain that?

10 Let me explain the question first. Because again  
11 there's been a little conflict as to whether they were  
12 working in unison or whether they were two separate groups  
13 and we'd kind of like to get that straight. Whether, you  
14 know, it was just one group or whether we had two groups  
15 going.

16 MR. WHITE: I understand the thrust of your  
17 question. It was one group. To know the precise mechanism  
18 under which the <sup>ETA</sup> Beta people were working for Stone & Webster EJW  
19 in a contractual sense, I don't know, but they were under  
20 some type of contract with Stone & Webster and in that, that  
21 was the vehicle in which they became part of this group.

22 MR. MURPHY: And you talked about these evening  
23 meetings were held. Were you briefed regularly as to the  
24 results of the daily activities of these various groups?

25 MR. WHITE: Not daily. In other words, the group

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1 was here for essentially two weeks and I wouldn't with any  
2 degree of accuracy say daily, but frequently during the  
3 period. And in terms of brief, if I could say in the  
4 management sense of brief. I was, because of my own  
5 background, familiar with management of things, but not at  
6 all familiar with the details of the commercial industry nor  
7 the design of the plants and that kind of thing. So  
8 sometimes rather than a brief, it was a listening session. I  
9 would just kind of listen and say, "What does that phrase  
10 mean?" and that type of thing.

11 So when you say brief, that would be a very loose  
12 term to indicate that I was really briefed. I'm trying to  
13 explain what went on to answer your question.

14 MR. MURPHY: It's not the formal type briefings you  
15 might have received in a military environment.

16 MR. WHITE: No, no, no, definitely not.

17 MR. MURPHY: You said that this took about two  
18 weeks. Could you explain the mechanism? I mean in reviewing  
19 the documents, it looks like they went from place to place  
20 and over a period of time. Can you explain all that work?

21 MR. WHITE: I'll do the best I can. The group  
22 didn't stay together. While the <sup>ETA</sup> Beta people, Mr. Wegner and *Edw*  
23 Mr. Miles were present, I spent most or all of my time with  
24 those two individuals rather than the remainder of the group.  
25 As I recall, Mr. Wegner and Mr. Miles were not here the

1 entire time. And after they left, then, perhaps in the  
2 second week, I spent more time listening to the other  
3 individuals.

4 After that first meeting which you characterized as  
5 the entrance meeting and if we can call <sup>IT</sup> that for clarity, Edu  
6 various people went in various directions to talk to  
7 different people at TVA. As I say, I stayed pretty much  
8 solely with Mr. Wegner and Mr. Miles during that period of  
9 time.

10 MR. MURPHY: We have testimony to lead us to  
11 believe that, at one point in time, they kind of said we've  
12 seen enough and let's not pursue to one of the plant sites.  
13 Are you familiar with that?

14 MR. WHITE: I'm sorry, I didn't catch that.

15 MR. MURPHY: At some point in time during the  
16 study, they kind of said we've seen enough of TVA and  
17 therefore, we were not going to go to Brown's Ferry, I  
18 believe.

19 MR. WHITE: That who said this? I'm not sure what  
20 you're saying.

21 MR. MURPHY: I'm talking of individuals that we  
22 talked to from the team that was assembled have indicated to  
23 us, you know, in their notes that they kind of had seen  
24 enough and that they were not going to pursue one of the  
25 plants.

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1 MR. WHITE: Well, I'm not familiar, specifically,  
2 with what you're talking about. But it's strange to me  
3 because we did go to Brown's Ferry.

4 MR. MURPHY: Did you go to all the plants?

5 MR. WHITE: No.

6 MR. MURPHY: What plant did you not go to?

7 MR. WHITE: Bellefonte. ELW

8 MR. MURPHY: Was there any particular reason why  
9 you didn't?

10 MR. CHARNOFF: When you ask "did you," do you mean  
11 Steve or do you mean the team?

12 MR. MURPHY: The team. He's the team leader.

13 MR. WHITE: Okay. Oops, I have to stop for a  
14 second because I don't believe they went to Bellefonte but I ELW  
15 wasn't with them the entire time and someone might have said  
16 well, one of the people went to Bellefont or something. I  
17 thought you meant me.

18 I did not go to Bellefonte. I do not believe the ELW  
19 other team members did, but some...

20 MR. MURPHY: I might add there's no comments in  
21 there or briefs related to Bellefont.

22 MR. WHITE: I don't recall any specific discussion  
23 about Bellefonte. ELW

24 MR. MURPHY: Are you familiar with the findings of  
25 that particular review?

1 MR. WHITE: In general, yes.

2 MR. MURPHY: Could you relate them to us?

3 MR. WHITE: I have to first say when I say in  
4 general, I'm viewing it from my vantage point. Which was  
5 really looking at management, leadership, morale, the types  
6 of things that you might expect from my previous command  
7 positions in the Navy that I would be familiar with the  
8 observation of people in that regard.

9 So I would say that certainly one of the primary  
10 impressions that I formed was that there was a lack of what I  
11 would call leadership at the top, a lack of adequate  
12 direction. There seemed to be very poor morale in a number  
13 of locations. I'd say those are the primary impressions that  
14 I formed. <sup>The</sup> ~~Those~~ other problems, to me, seemed to stem from *ELW*  
15 those overall issues.

16 MR. MURPHY: Could you explain what some of them  
17 other problems are that stem from the management problems?

18 MR. WHITE: Well, they were technical issues.  
19 Perhaps things that hadn't been solved on a prompt enough  
20 basis. I have publicly testified a number of times that  
21 there were individual fiefdoms at war with one another.  
22 That's one of the things that became very evident. It was  
23 evident to me that there was an organization called the  
24 Nuclear Safety Review Staff which was perhaps in disagreement *ELW*  
25 with <sup>line</sup> ~~my~~ management. That kind of thing.

1 MR. MURPHY: Did they have any problems in quality  
2 assurance areas?

3 MR. WHITE: I'm sure there were. In terms of  
4 management, there were. You know, management being the  
5 overall thing, there were problems as I say that stem from  
6 that. I'm sure quality assurance would have been one of  
7 them. I didn't focus, frankly, that much on those technical  
8 issues much <sup>due</sup> to lack of knowledge of what the standards in  
9 industry were.

10 It was clear to me -- don't let me mislead you in  
11 anyway -- It was clear to me that other members had concerns  
12 in particular areas about the way things were being managed  
13 and therefore, the problems that were arising from that.

14 MR. MURPHY: But you didn't get involved in the  
15 technical issues. Is that what you're leading up to?

16 MR. WHITE: Oh, no, I wouldn't say not involved.  
17 Perhaps I can be of most help if I talk about -- Well, first  
18 let me talk about quality assurance, but let me also talk --  
19 When you say technical issues, let me give you a couple of  
20 examples because maybe that's the best way.

21 We're visiting <sup>Sequoiah</sup> ~~Sequoia~~ and discussions were taking  
22 place between Mr. Wegner, myself, Mr. Miles and the site  
23 director, Mr. Abercrombie. I, frankly, wasn't asking many  
24 questions at that point, but for example, Mr. Wegner would  
25 look at Mr. Abercrombie and start talking about the 7902's

1 and 7914's. And frankly, I'd pull out a 3x5 card and write  
 2 7902 and 7914. So afterwards, I would say, "What were you  
 3 guys talking about?" Those were technical issues in which  
 4 they responded and I forget the overall sense of the issue.  
 5 That's the kind of thing when I say technical issues.

6 In quality assurance, as an example, I recall at  
 7 ~~Sequola~~<sup>Sequoyah</sup> meeting with -- I don't recall the individual's name EXW  
 8 -- but it was kind of a site Q/A manager and listening to the  
 9 questioning by both Mr. Miles and Mr. Wegner of that  
 10 individual about QA. I don't know because I can't climb into  
 11 Mr. Wegner's mind to know, you know, what real QA issues were  
 12 coming out. I formed judgment of management issues as a  
 13 result of that. I formed judgment that this was an  
 14 individual that had been put in the position at ~~Sequola~~<sup>Sequoyah</sup> that EXW  
 15 I viewed based on my knowledge at the time as being  
 16 responsible for quality assurance at ~~Sequola~~<sup>Sequoyah</sup> and that I felt EXW  
 17 that if I were to put him in the place, I would have trained  
 18 him, I would have sent him to school, I would have done  
 19 something to put him in the place. Nothing against the  
 20 individual. He seemed a competent individual, but I just  
 21 would have done it differently.

22 So those are the kind of impressions that I formed  
 23 when I thought of QA.

24 MR. MURPHY: Is there any other technical issues  
 25 that raised their heads?

1 MR. WHITE: Oh, I'm sure there were. I'm sure  
2 there were because I sat and listened and I remember for  
3 essentially two weeks. And I learned a lot during that  
4 period of time. So I'm sure there were technical issues that  
5 arose particularly I would say at Brown's Ferry, secondarily  
6 perhaps at ~~Sequoyia~~<sup>Sequoyah</sup> and third at Watts Bar. Edw

7 MR. MURPHY: Did you participate in a briefing of  
8 the Manager of Nuclear Power, Hugh Parris? Although I  
9 understand that wasn't his position at the time. I think he  
10 was a Manager of Power Engineering or something. Regarding  
11 the results of that team effort.

12 MR. WHITE: Yes. But let me define what  
13 "participate" means to me in this regard. Edw

14 Mr. Nace who knew the technical issues and ~~were~~<sup>was</sup>  
15 familiar with them really made the presentation. There were  
16 several of us there at the time and if you want to call us  
17 participants, I wasn't a direct participant in those  
18 technical things that went on. Did I say anything in that  
19 meeting? I'm sure I did. Edw

20 MR. MURPHY: Did you address the technical issues?

21 MR. WHITE: No, no.

22 MR. MURPHY: Only Mr. Nace addressed them?

23 MR. WHITE: Yes. I learned long ago you shouldn't  
24 talk if you don't know what you're talking about.

25 MR. MURPHY: Did he brief you at all about what he

1 was going to tell Mr. Parris and his staff?

2 MR. WHITE: Oh, yes. Did he brief me?

3 MR. MURPHY: Yes.

4 MR. WHITE: No. As I recall, there was a meeting  
5 in Boston at the Stone & Webster headquarters and in that  
6 meeting, there was a lot of discussion about how this thing  
7 would be presented to Mr. Parris and so forth. I still was  
8 in a position of not being knowledgeable enough, very  
9 frankly, and I wouldn't say I was an active participant in,  
10 for example, saying, "Well, we should say this, we shouldn't  
11 say this or we ought to say this this way" or anything else.  
12 I wasn't that knowledgeable.

13 MR. MURPHY: How about the briefing of the TVA  
14 Board of Directors? What was your role in that meeting?

15 MR. WHITE: The TVA Board of Directors had asked me  
16 to come down and talk to them. They apparently had learned  
17 of the briefing in Chattanooga which had taken place earlier  
18 and asked, really not me, but us to come down and talk to the  
19 Board about what had been found. My preparation for that was  
20 a very general one. As I recall, I spoke primarily of again  
21 management issues. I think I had, as I recall, a page of  
22 bullets of things to talk about. Because of some information  
23 Mr. Parris had provided me before that briefing, I had  
24 prepared what I viewed as maybe the options that TVA had in  
25 front of them because I expected they would ask for that. So

1 I kind of had a pocket paper for that.

2 MR. MURPHY: What were those options?

3 MR. WHITE: I'll answer that, but first let me  
4 explain what lead into that. I had received a call from  
5 either Mr. Parris or Mr. Mason saying the Board of Directors  
6 would like you to come down and talk to them about all this.  
7 At any rate, I talked to Mr. Parris and that discussion was  
8 kind of what is all this about and he indicated to me, "Look,  
9 this briefing the Board of Directors on this thing is really  
10 kind of a "subterfuge." They want you to come down here and *Edw*  
11 be the nuclear advisor to the Board of Directors. And that's  
12 the real reason you're "coming." *Edw*

13 I try never to depend on one source of information.  
14 So I called Mr. Dean at that point in time and said, "Mr.  
15 Dean, what is it that you want?" And it was a very general,  
16 "We'd like you to just come down and chat with us and explore  
17 things." It was a very general conversation. So with that  
18 background that I've just given you, I went to Knoxville.  
19 And I think these are important things for you to understand  
20 to kind of set the stage as to what the briefing was and was  
21 not.

22 When I arrived, as I walked in, Mr. Dean walked up  
23 and said, "You must be Admiral White?" I said, "Yes." And  
24 we shook hands. He said, "Come in my office." I said, "All  
25 right." And we went in his office. When I say we, I was

1 there and I think Mr. Matson from Stone & Webster, there were  
2 a couple of people that walked in. The Stone & Webster  
3 people started into a discussion of Stone & Webster's  
4 capability in various areas. And at that point, I, as a  
5 consultant to Stone & Webster, decided it was time to say,  
6 "Lock" -- to the Stone & Webster people -- "Please leave.  
7 Mr. Dean wants to talk to me." And they left the room.

8 Mr. Dean then was very up front with me. He said  
9 the real reason and he confirmed what Mr. Parris had said.  
10 The real reason you're here isn't to hear necessarily this,  
11 but the primary reason is we'd like you to be the nuclear  
12 advisor to the Board. And I said, "No, I won't." I wasn't  
13 rude to him, but I made it clear that if that was the reason,  
14 then I probably should get back on the airplane and leave.

15 So that kind of sets the background, then, of the  
16 brief.

17 Now, your basic, the alternatives. And I'm going  
18 from memory now, so these may not be precise. As I recall,  
19 the format was what you might expect from my Navy background,  
20 although I'm not saying it's only Navy, but to list here's an  
21 alternative and here are the major pros and cons to that  
22 alternative.

23 One alternative was just keep the way you're going.  
24 ~~one~~ <sup>ONE</sup> alternative was hire a nuclear advisor as they intended to *do*  
25 do. An individual, bring in one person. One alternative was

1 to hire a nuclear advisor, but bring in a group of people to  
2 help him. And each of these, as I say, listed good points  
3 and bad points. And the fourth alternative was to hire  
4 someone from outside in a line management position. So there  
5 were really four alternatives.

6 MR. MURPHY: Was a technical briefing given to the  
7 TVA Board of Directors at that time?

8 MR. WHITE: I frankly don't remember whether Mr.  
9 Nace was there or not, to give what I would call a technical  
10 briefing. I certainly told them what I felt the problems  
11 were in terms of major problems. And of course, they  
12 centered around management issues. They centered around  
13 management issues.

14 The Stone & Webster people <sup>may have been there.</sup> ~~were there~~ If they edw  
15 were, they were technically competent and discussed the  
16 technical issues. I frankly don't remember or in what  
17 detail. If they did, it wouldn't have been in a great amount  
18 of detail, if it was done. And I don't remember.

19 MR. MURPHY: According to several sources on Mr.  
20 Parris' staff to include Mr. Parris, he said during his  
21 briefing that was given by Stone & Webster that a picture of  
22 gloom and doom was painted of the situation at TVA. Is that  
23 a fair characterization in your view?

24 MR. WHITE: I'd have to see precisely what he was  
25 asked. I have no idea in that regard. I certainly never

1 heard that from Mr. Parris. In fact, a little different than  
2 that. My recollection is Mr. Parris said you haven't told us  
3 -- you being Stone & Webster people -- You haven't told us  
4 anything that we've not heard before. That's my recollection  
5 of what he said.

6 Because, you see, I remember that in a management  
7 sense. I thought, my God, here's the man in charge and he's  
8 saying I've been told all those things. So I looked at it  
9 again from a management sense of leadership.

10 MR. MURPHY: Was the situation at TVA, in your  
11 view, critical? I mean, were they in trouble?

12 MR. WHITE: When you say critical, I really have to  
13 define that term. Let me answer the best way I can. Were  
14 there problems at TVA? Certainly, there were problems at  
15 TVA. There wasn't any question. What you're, I think,  
16 really asking me is -- maybe you're asking me -- how did they  
17 compare with other places in the country with problems? I  
18 don't know. I wasn't the judge of that at that time. I just  
19 didn't know. But certainly there were problems.

20 MR. MURPHY: How about the suggestion made that  
21 they replace Mr. Parris? I mean, would that have been an  
22 indication, in your view, of a serious situation at TVA?

23 MS. BAUSER: Excuse me. Who's suggestion?

24 MR. MURPHY: Oh, I think that's the number one  
25 thing on the list of problems identified by Stone & Webster.

1 One of their recommendations was that.

2 MR. WHITE: I don't recall that as a recommendation  
3 of Stone & Webster to get rid of Mr. Parris.

4 MR. MURPHY: It was one of them, wasn't it? This  
5 is one of the notes furnished by Stone & Webster.

6 MR. WHITE: Do you mind if I see what <sup>you are</sup> ~~is~~ looking  
7 at? EXC

8 MR. MURPHY: Not at all.

9 MR. WHITE: What am I looking at? I don't even  
10 know what I'm looking at?

11 MR. MURPHY: No. Please, sir.

12 (Pause.)

13 MR. WHITE: Without, you know, getting into a lot  
14 of detail, what it looks like is Mr. Nace's briefing notes.  
15 Can you tell me if that's what I'm looking at?

16 MR. MURPHY: That's the briefing notes. An  
17 accumulation of notes by the group of Stone & Webster people.

18 MR. WHITE: Now, I come to a paper that is not part  
19 of that briefing. Now, I come to something that I don't  
20 remember being in this format. I think I'm looking at a  
21 different document now.

22 MR. MURPHY: What I'm suggesting is that a  
23 replacement of Mr. Parris --

24 MR. WHITE: No. This looks like what I talked to  
25 the Board of Directors by, but it's not part of this

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1 document.

2 MR. MURPHY: That may well be. This is --

3 MR. WHITE: And this is not part of the -- This one  
4 says notes four pages, but it isn't part of this  
5 (indicating.) I don't know what I'm looking at.

6 Exercise Number One, changes in TVA -- I've never  
7 seen this particular document before.

8 MR. MURPHY: May I suggest that we ask Stone &  
9 Webster to furnish us with all the notes that they have?

10 MR. WHITE: Okay. This things says Mr. Burns'  
11 Personal Notes. I've never seen this document. The one  
12 labeled Mr. Burns' Personal Notes is the one I've just said  
13 I've never seen before.

14 MR. MURPHY: Okay.

15 MR. WHITE: The prior one, this looks like an  
16 accumulation of documents rather than one document that I'm  
17 looking at.

18 MR. MURPHY: That's exactly what we have been told  
19 it is. It's an accumulation of different ideas of different  
20 people on the team.

21 MR. WHITE: Now, this one, I've never seen before.  
22 It says "Replace Parris, move to Knoxville." You know,  
23 without talking to Mr. Burns, I don't know what he had in  
24 mind. I don't know whether he means replace him with someone  
25 else, move him to Knoxville and put him in charge up there.

1 You know, I'd really have to ask a lot of questions of Mr.  
2 Burns.

3 MR. MURPHY: I will answer the questions.

4 MR. WHITE: Okay.

5 MR. MURPHY: Mr. Burns said that even prior to  
6 going to TVA, that he would have no heartburn in determining  
7 with five reactors down that there had to be a change in  
8 management. But he said this was a result of after -- the  
9 object of his note there was that he felt Mr. Parris should  
10 be replaced.

11 MR. WHITE: He may have said that. First of all,  
12 there were two Burns in the group. I don't know which one  
13 we're talking about or whether they spell their names the  
14 same way or not. But all I can say is I don't know.

15 MR. MURPHY: You have no idea?

16 MR. WHITE: I have no idea. I've never seen this.  
17 It was never mentioned to me by Mr. Burns or the other people  
18 on that team.

19 MR. MURPHY: Was it ever suggested to the Board of  
20 Directors that Mr. Parris be replaced?

21 MR. WHITE: By this team, you mean?

22 MR. MURPHY: Or by yourself.

23 MR. WHITE: Not directly. Let me explain.

24 MR. MURPHY: Please.

25 MR. WHITE: After the Board of Directors had talked

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1 to me in Knoxville, I went back to Virginia. There ensued a  
 2 number of telephone calls from Mr. Willis, I believe Mr.  
 3 Waters, and I believe Mr. Dean, wanting me to come as nuclear  
 4 advisor and I just kept saying no. They then said we'd like  
 5 you to come as the line manager responsible for this and I  
 6 again, indicated I wasn't interested. There followed a  
 7 meeting, at their request, I think in late December, at  
 8 ~~Sequoyah~~ <sup>Sequoyah</sup> ~~Sequoyah~~. At which point, they told me they wanted me to come  
 9 to run this thing.

10 Let me go back a step. <sup>5</sup> To say in Knoxville, after  
 11 frankly much pressure from them before I left that day, I  
 12 said I would go back and consider what they had said. That's  
 13 the only thing I promised them. I'll go back and consider  
 14 what you've said. Then at the subsequent ~~Sequoyah~~ <sup>Sequoyah</sup>, they said,  
 15 you know, we've decided, we want you to be in charge of this  
 16 thing.

17 As part of that discussion, we discussed any role  
 18 Mr. Parris might play. For example, should I be brought in  
 19 to work for Mr. Parris if I were willing to come? And I  
 20 said, no, I would not come in to work for Mr. Parris and went  
 21 through the reasons why, I'm sure.

22 Then the question was would you come in and have  
 23 Mr. Parris work for you? And I said, no, I thought that  
 24 would be wrong for an entirely different set of reasons. And  
 25 that is I thought it would be a consummate embarrassment to

1 Mr. Parris to be placed in that position. And I told them  
2 that. And Mr. Parris was present in the room when I said  
3 that.

4 I did not know until later that the Board of  
5 Directors had never told Mr. Parris. I was later informed by  
6 members of the Board that they had not told him, but they had  
7 decided to replace him. They had made that decision, but  
8 they had not told him. And the first time that he even heard  
9 of this thing was in that meeting.

10 That's the only recommendation that I ever made  
11 with regard to Mr. Parris.

12 MR. MURPHY: And you don't have any idea whether  
13 any of the other Stone & Webster individuals recommended  
14 that?

15 MR. WHITE: I have no idea whether or not anyone  
16 else entered into such a discussion with the Board of General  
17 Managers.

18 MR. MURPHY: I have just one final question. And  
19 that is in these meetings that were held in the evenings with  
20 these various Stone & Webster people, did they talk  
21 management or did they talk technical issues?

22 MR. WHITE: Oh, there was some management, but they  
23 really very much focused on their little areas of expertise.  
24 But obviously, my questions -- I didn't remain mute in those  
25 meetings -- My questions were well, now is this "indicative --" *Edw*

1 and I would ask some question about management problems.

2 MR. MURPHY: How did you view the information that  
3 was given at these meetings? Did it appear to you that there  
4 was some serious technical problems? I mean, did they  
5 express this to you?

6 MR. WHITE: I almost first have to define serious  
7 because as I remember in those meetings, a couple of things  
8 came across to me. One was there didn't seem to be anything  
9 new. In other words, I don't ever recall in any of those  
10 meetings, one of the persons saying, "Look, we've never seen  
11 this problem before. This is unique to TVA." It was rather  
12 like in the discussions, it would be, "Well, let me tell you  
13 what they're doing." And then they would mention some plant  
14 that they had seen before or plants and they'd said, "That's  
15 what they were doing." And sometimes they would say, "Look,  
16 there's a better way to do that. That's an acceptable way,  
17 but there's a better way." So it was that kind of thing.

18 I didn't come away with the impression that there  
19 was anything fatal in anything that had been found. Serious  
20 means to me, you know, something fatal is about to happen. I  
21 never came away with that impression. I came away with quite  
22 the contrary, that these problems that they found existed here, *etc.*  
23 existed at other places and had been solved at other places.

24 MR. MURPHY: Did any member of that group ever  
25 suggest to you or the group as a whole suggest to you that

1 these problems existed at other plants, but they have never  
2 seen all these problems together in one location?

3 MS. BAUSER: Would you repeat that question? I'm  
4 sorry, I missed it.

5 MR. MURPHY: Did you get the question?

6 MR. WHITE: I got the first part.

7 MR. MURPHY: Let me try one more time.

8 MR. WHITE: I'm trying to answer the thrust.

9 MR. MURPHY: Let me try one more time. Did anyone  
10 in the group or the group as a whole suggest to you that, yes,  
11 these problems have existed at other locations, but for all  
12 these problems that exist in one location, the accumulation  
13 of these problems, they had not seen that?

14 MR. WHITE: I would best answer that -- I don't  
15 recall that specifically. What I do recall is their saying  
16 that because of the number of plants at TVA -- this is common  
17 sense recollection. <sup>is</sup> ~~to~~ another utility's in trouble and it  
18 has two reactors and it has a management problem or it has  
19 this technical problem. At TVA, you have the same problem,  
20 but you don't have two reactors, you know, there are like  
21 nine. In that respect, the magnitude of the problem was  
22 clearly, I felt, larger than at other utilities.

23 I don't specifically recall someone saying, at that  
24 point, "Look, there are more problems here." It was more of  
25 a question of more reactors.

1 MR. MURPHY: And I use this term "serious" because  
2 have you ever, in any of your presentations to the Board or  
3 the press or publicly, said that there are some very serious  
4 problems?

5 MR. WHITE: Oh, I'm sure I have. I've never  
6 diminished the magnitude, the enormous magnitude of the  
7 problems faced by TVA. I've used that phrase. They are of  
8 enormous magnitude. If that's what you mean, there are many  
9 problems at TVA or I wouldn't have been brought in.

10 MR. MURPHY: Are any of these problems near fatal?

11 MR. WHITE: I haven't seen, as yet, any problems I  
12 consider fatal.

13 MR. MURPHY: I don't have any further questions.

14 MR. ROBINSON: I've got one question in the area of  
15 the initial assessment that was done in the November, '85  
16 time frame.

17 Did you, Mr. White, or any of your team, to your  
18 knowledge, come to any conclusions regarding the management  
19 abilities, the competency, or the organizational structure of  
20 NSRS at that time?

21 MR. WHITE: Run through that again because there  
22 was conversation going here.

23 MR. ROBINSON: Did you or any of the members of  
24 your task force from Stone & Webster reach any conclusion  
25 regarding the management abilities, the competency, or the

1 organizational structure with regard to the Nuclear Safety  
2 Review Staff at that time?

3 MR. WHITE: There's several questions. Let me make  
4 sure I got them all. One is management.

5 MR. ROBINSON: Management capabilities.

6 MR. WHITE: Capability. One was organizational --

7 MR. ROBINSON: The organizational structure.

8 MR. WHITE: -- structure. And the other was the  
9 competence --

10 MR. ROBINSON: Competency of the NSRS itself.

11 MR. WHITE: It's really three questions and really  
12 it's hinged around anything -- I want to make sure I  
13 understand what you're saying -- any opinions I formed or any  
14 opinions formed by others which were given to me.

15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.

16 MR. WHITE: People may not have been privy to what  
17 everybody may have been thinking. Let me approach it this  
18 way and do the best I can to answer the thrust of what you're  
19 asking.

20 It may include, at least two of these, the  
21 organization and management capability. The overall  
22 impression I formed was that TVA had a problem in that I  
23 wasn't given any evidence which would indicate to me that the  
24 Nuclear Safety Review Staff weren't competent. I had no  
25 evidence to indicate incompetency. What it appeared was that

1 for some reason, the Nuclear Safety Review Staff was coming  
2 up with items and with issues which festered. It was clear  
3 from a number of little things perhaps that happened when I  
4 was present during interviews that there might be some  
5 friction between that organization and what I've called the  
6 line management in TVA. But it was one of these things where  
7 in organization, they were doing a certain job, and things  
8 weren't coming out right. That's the overall impression that  
9 I formed.

10 I'm trying to do the best I can to answer you and I  
11 think I've answered those three, at least.

12 MR. ROBINSON: At that point in time, did you have  
13 any idea as to how to solve that friction?

14 MR. WHITE: No. I'm trying to think back. I don't  
15 think so and I don't think the subject came up with the  
16 Board. I don't recall discussing it with them. If you say  
17 did I have some ideas? I don't recall if I did or didn't. I  
18 might have because it was a management issue. For example,  
19 it would be normal at that point for me to have asked myself  
20 questions about "Gee, I wonder if they've done A, B, or C."  
21 But I didn't frankly focus on it because at that point, I had  
22 no idea I would ever be here. I didn't focus on here's how  
23 they ought to go through this.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. That's all I have.

25 MR. REINHART: Mr. White --

1 MR. WHITE: Yes.

2 MR. REINHART: -- you mentioned that during this  
3 management assessment you mentioned one meeting at <sup>Sequoyah</sup>~~Sequoia~~ E2-  
4 where you talked to people, you going around with people like  
5 Mr. Wegner and Mr. Miles. Do you remember any other meetings  
6 at any other sites you were on? Give us just a list of sites  
7 you maybe had meetings on.

8 MR. WHITE: Yes, I'll do the best I can from  
9 memory. We first met in Chattanooga. I want to be thorough  
10 in what I'm saying, so you may not consider Chattanooga and  
11 Knoxville a site.

12 We met in Chattanooga for one or maybe two days and  
13 talked to various members of what I call the headquarters or  
14 corporate organization. We being Mr. Miles, Mr. Wegner and  
15 myself.

16 We then, I believe the following day, visited  
17 <sup>Sequoyah</sup>~~Sequoia~~ and talked to a number of people at Sequoia. Edu

18 And the following morning and I remember because it  
19 was foggy, it took a long time to get to Watts Bar. We went  
20 to Watts Bar and unfortunately there, the preparations  
21 weren't in place. We found that we couldn't talk to what I  
22 would call the upper tiers of management, they were tied up  
23 with the Board of Directors. So on kind of a spur of the  
24 moment manner, someone, I don't recall who, in the  
25 organization brought some people in for us to talk to and we

1 talked to them for perhaps an hour or two.

2 That pretty much ended that week. That may have  
3 been Thursday or Friday. I may have come in either Friday or  
4 Saturday. I may have come in to Chattanooga and talked to  
5 Mr. Cottle or Mr. Parris, I don't remember, because Mr.  
6 Wegner and Mr. Miles left at that point.

7 The following week, we went to Brown's Ferry. We  
8 now being not with Mr. Miles and Mr. Wegner. We went to  
9 Brown's Ferry and, I think, spent a couple of days there.  
10 And these times may be off because I'm going by memory.

11 And then I left the group and on my own, then, went  
12 back and talked to Mr. Cottle and Mr. Parris and I think that  
13 was later that week and that was kind of the end of it.  
14 That's the best I can recall of the overall.

15 MR. REINHART: During the meeting at Sequoia, you  
16 mentioned that you would have given training to the QA  
17 manager.

18 MR. WHITE: Yes, I said that in the context that as  
19 a management thing, I wasn't comfortable with the individual.  
20 Not his capability. In fact, he impressed me as probably  
21 being a smart capable guy. But I perhaps would have given  
22 him some quality assurance training before putting him in the  
23 job.

24 MR. REINHART: What gave you that impression that  
25 you wanted to give him this training?

1 MR. WHITE: I think it was an answer to a question  
2 Mr. Wegner asked about, you know, how were you appointed to  
3 this job and the answer to that question which indicated that  
4 he came from a job not associated with quality assurance and  
5 was put in charge of that organization.

6 MR. REINHART: So what kind of training did you  
7 have in mind?

8 MR. WHITE: Well, you know, again, I was non-  
9 specific. If I put a person -- First, understand that that  
10 was just kind of a subjective judgment made by me. In a  
11 management sense, when I take an individual on <sup>to</sup> move-into a new ex  
12 position -- and this may have occurred, I have no way of  
13 knowing -- I certainly would talk to the individual and  
14 assure myself that he understood the standards and that he  
15 understood thoroughly his responsibilities in QA. And if he  
16 didn't have a Q/A background, then I would want to expose him  
17 to individuals that did. And that's what I mean in a general  
18 sense of training.

19 MR. REINHART: Do you know what kind of training he  
20 did have before he took the job?

21 MR. WHITE: I got the impression that there wasn't  
22 anything specific.

23 MR. REINHART: I see. When you went to Watts Bar  
24 and you had this group that you characterized as quickly  
25 assembled, do you remember any of that discussion?

1 MR. WHITE: In specifics, no. In specifics, no.  
2 Mr. Wegner did most of the questioning and it was very much a  
3 learning process for me. I would have trouble going back and  
4 saying specifics. I believe that the subject of QTC came up,  
5 but obviously QTC would have meant no more to me at that  
6 point, than a 7914.

7 MR. REINHART: I see.

8 MR. WHITE: It may have come up.

9 MR. REINHART: Do you remember any of the people  
10 that were there besides you, Mr. Wegner and Mr. Miles?

11 MR. WHITE: Yes. Because I've seen them since.  
12 Mr. Doug Wilson was one of the people present. And I  
13 remember him because of his stature. If you meet Mr. Wilson,  
14 you always remember Mr. Wilson.

15 MR. REINHART: Right.

16 MR. WHITE: I'm at a loss because I do remember the  
17 second individual who is now at Watts Bar working for Mr.  
18 Toto and the name slips me. Yes, I remember at least those  
19 two and I can't remember them right now. If given his name,  
20 I would have it.

21 MR. REINHART: Does the name McDonald ring a bell?

22 MR. WHITE: With respect to going?

23 MR. REINHART: That meeting?

24 MR. WHITE: No. No. If you're asking me if Mr.  
25 McDonald was there or not, I couldn't tell you.

1 MR. REINHART: Do you remember a discussion on  
2 correction action at that meeting or a comment on corrective  
3 action?

4 MR. WHITE: A comment of --

5 MR. REINHART: Comment on or discussion of  
6 corrective action during that meeting.

7 MR. WHITE: No. No, I do not.

8 I'm sorry. Wes Byrd is the name I was trying to  
9 think of. Wes Byrd was there at that meeting.

10 MR. REINHART: During your discussion and your  
11 presentation to the Board, to Mr. Parris, and your  
12 characterization of your feelings from the management  
13 assessment, the specifics that I inferred from your  
14 discussion was that you said there was poor leadership and  
15 low morale. I was wondering if you could be a little more  
16 specific on what you presented in the way of management  
17 problems?

18 MS. BAUSER: I'd like to ask you a question. Are  
19 you asking Mr. White what he presented to the Board of  
20 Directors or to who?

21 MR. REINHART: I'm asking if he can amplify a  
22 little more than poor leadership or low morale.

23 MR. WHITE: Well, no. It was, you know, examples,  
24 I think, of things like fiefdoms at war. I don't recall  
25 specifically right now any amplification. I'm sure there

1 was. I'm sure I gave them examples of management leadership  
2 problems that existed. But if you ask me now can you tell us  
3 exactly what ~~you~~<sup>I</sup> said, I can't. I don't recall.

4 MR. REINHART: Was there any document produced as a  
5 result of that effort?

6 MR. WHITE: Of that effort, being?

7 MR. REINHART: The management assessment?

8 MR. WHITE: To the best of my recollection, I had  
9 this page that I mentioned earlier, one with options on it,  
10 and I had the page then -- which I don't have a copy of it,  
11 but it looked familiar to the page in there that you showed  
12 me earlier that I said, "This one's out of sequence, this  
13 does look familiar." I think that that looks very much -- as  
14 I say the typing doesn't look the same -- but the one that's  
15 labeled conclusions looks like the thing that I used.  
16 Although some of the items even right now don't look familiar  
17 to me for having said at the time. But it looks like the  
18 document that I used.

19 And I think in answer to your question, I think at  
20 some point in this thing, Mr. Willis or one of the Board  
21 members said can we have a copy. I just know they did that  
22 on the options paper. They asked can we copy the thing and I  
23 said sure, it's just a bulletized thing.

24 So papers prepared, the only papers that I recall  
25 being prepared are the ones, you know, that I kind of sat

1 down and fatted down and had typed into something that I  
2 could use.

3 The reason this doesn't look familiar to me is, as  
4 I recall, on the papers that I had, I had actually made some  
5 changes, I'd lined some things and scribbled in some notes  
6 because I was going to use them.

7 MR. WILLIAMSON: Can we take a break at this time?  
8 It's 10:15. We'll go off the record.

9 (Whereupon there was a pause in the proceedings.)

10 MR. WILLIAMSON: Back on the record at 10:37.  
11 During the break, Mr. White and Ms. Bauser and Mr. Charnoff  
12 and have had an opportunity to review documents regarding the  
13 Stone & Webster management assessment conducted at TVA in the  
14 fall of 1985. And I believe Ms. Bauser has a question or  
15 comment to make regarding that meeting.

16 MS. BAUSER: Yes. I'd like to put on the record  
17 what it is that Mr. White was shown. Which appears to be a  
18 compilation of documents on the cover of which is a statement  
19 that says "November 11 to 22, 1985 SWEC Task Force Study of  
20 TVA." And the first page says, "TVA Study Findings." It has  
21 an introduction and then Roman Numeral II says, "The  
22 Purpose." There's no date on the document. It says  
23 preliminary and confidential.

24 What appears to be the second page of the same  
25 document has a heading at the top that says, "Generic TVA

1 Welding Control Concerns" and it has Roman Numeral III of  
2 "Findings."

3 And then there's a page three which appears to be  
4 of the same document continues on.

5 Now, then behind those pages is a document which,  
6 we believe, is a separate document that says, "Conclusions"  
7 and has Roman I through IV. Roman Number I is "Credibility  
8 is Very Poor." Roman Numeral II is "Magnitude." Roman III  
9 is "Management Capability within TVA." And Roman IV is  
10 "General" which has it's sub-bullets, "Nothing Fatal" as A, B  
11 is "More Difficult to Solve as Time Passes", e. g. Watts Bar  
12 spillover to ~~Sequoyia~~ <sup>Sequoyah</sup>, C is "Similar to problems experienced  
13 and solved elsewhere, symptoms there although each is  
14 different", D is "No magic simple solution. Needs hard work,  
15 strong leadership", and E is "No sense of urgency."

16 Behind that document is another document which says  
17 in handwriting at the top, "Received 3/26" no year, "R.  
18 Burns", B-u-r-n-s, "Personal Notes, four pages." And this  
19 page is entitled "Exercise Number 1, Changes at TVA." It has  
20 a list of fourteen items. The next page which may be page  
21 two of the same document, but I can't tell, is entitled "31  
22 Weaknesses." And there are a list of comments that go on for  
23 two pages.

24 And then the last page of this November 11 to 22,  
25 1985 compilation is entitled "Strengths" which has eighteen

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1 strengths, the last of which says, "No apparent fatal  
2 technical problems."

3 MR. CHARNOFF: That's probably the fourth page of  
4 the Burns.

5 MS. BAUSER: It appears to be the fourth page of  
6 the Burns pages. I don't believe -- correct me if I'm wrong,  
7 Mr. White -- he has seen any of these four pages which appear  
8 to be Mr. Burns' notes.

9 MR. WHITE: That's correct.

10 MR. MURPHY: Let me add something to the record.  
11 For the record, these notes are a compilation according to  
12 Stone & Webster of not only Mr. Burns' notes, but of all  
13 those who participated in the meeting of the review during  
14 that time frame.

15 MS. BAUSER: If I understand what you're saying,  
16 you're saying that they reflect not only Mr. Burns' thoughts,  
17 but other people's thoughts.

18 MR. MURPHY: Other people's thoughts.

19 MS. BAUSER: Okay.

20 MR. CHARNOFF: Are you talking about the four  
21 Burns' pages or the pages preceding Burns?

22 MR. MURPHY: The entire series of documents.

23 MR. CHARNOFF: Okay.

24 MR. MURPHY: To include the documents to which we  
25 will address soon. These have all been identified to us as

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1 notes, compilation of notes, taken as a result of the study  
2 inasmuch as they've said that no written report was rendered.

3 MR. CHARNOFF: Fine.

4 MR. WILLIAMSON: Do you want to continue, Mark?

5 MR. REINHART: Mr. White, to kind of refres your  
6 memory, I was asking you about the documentation. Was there  
7 any document produced as a result of the management  
8 assessment? You mentioned a handwritten options paper. And  
9 the question is was there anything that you're aware of that  
10 was issued formally as a result of that effort?

11 MR. WHITE: First, let me make sure that we're on  
12 the same frequency.

13 MR. REINHART: Sure.

14 MR. WHITE: I referred to a couple of documents,  
15 handwritten, but later typed, that I was responsible for  
16 preparing. I have no direct knowledge of who else prepared  
17 documents. I know that Mr. Nace had a talking paper that he  
18 used during the debrief. Does that answer what you're  
19 asking?

20 MR. REINHART: Not completely.

21 MS. BAUSER: Could I clarify? Because I think I  
22 understood the question. I think that he's asking whether  
23 after the presentation, there was any report prepared, that  
24 you're aware of?

25 MR. WHITE: Oh, is that what you're asking?

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MR. REINHART: Yes, sir.

MR. WHITE: No, I am not aware of any specific report. I'm sorry I didn't understand your question.

MR. REINHART: From your position of overall responsibility, why was there not a report issued?

MR. WHITE: As I recall, in the first meeting with Mr. Parris -- As I recall, it was at his request that a verbal report be made to him and that's what was done.

MR. REINHART: When you say verbal, you mean oral?

MR. WHITE: Oral. I'm sorry, oral report.

MR. REINHART: On another comment, you mentioned that there was an enormous magnitude of problems at TVA. When did you first become aware of that enormity?

MR. WHITE: To be frank with you, there wasn't a specific time. It was certainly after I arrived at TVA and not immediately after I arrived. As the months wore on into 1986 and it wasn't any specific time, I just continued to be impressed with the more and more things on my plate that had to be done, more and more problems and not necessarily problems specifically with the nuclear plant. There were problems with organizations outside of the nuclear power organization and so on.

As months wore on, the magnitude of these various things became apparent. But after I arrived, clearly, and some months after I arrived.

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MR. REINHART: Len, that's all I have.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay.

MR. MURPHY: As stated for the record, during the break, Mr. White had the opportunity to review some documents which we have received from Stone & Webster in which we went through to determine which of these documents pertained to Watts Bar because basically Watts Bar is what we're talking about here.

And first off, you had a chance to review these documents, Mr. White.

MR. CHARNOFF: Can we get clarified "the documents" we're talking about?

MR. MURPHY: Sure. This is headed "Observations at Watts Bar." Which we are again told is a compilation of notes of the team and it lists some twenty-three observations at Watts Bar.

MR. CHARNOFF: And as I recall, they're not dated.

MR. MURPHY: Not dated, that's correct.

MS. BAUSER: Can I make a suggestion which may be what you're planning on doing anyway? Which is that we deal with each document at a time.

MR. MURPHY: That's what we're doing. That's what we're going to do.

Have you seen that document?

MR. WHITE: Let me look at it. The documents that

1 we just looked at, I hadn't seen any of those documents, but  
2 as we go through, I'd like to look again.

3 MR. MURPHY: Sure.

4 MR. WHITE: The first one, the answer is no, I have  
5 not seen it until a few minutes ago.

6 MR. MURPHY: The observations themselves, were they  
7 ever presented to you by any member of that team or the team  
8 as a whole?

9 MS. BAUSER: Are you asking him whether he ever had  
10 a formal presentation of this list or whether he had ever  
11 seen these thoughts before?

12 MR. MURPHY: I'm asking him if them particular  
13 ideas expressed as observations at Watts Bar by that team as  
14 we are told, were ever expressed to Mr. White?

15 MS. BAUSER: All of them?

16 MR. MURPHY: Any of them.

17 MS. BAUSER: Any of them. Okay.

18 MR. WHITE: The only way I can do that is really go  
19 sentence by sentence, so you're going to have to give me some  
20 time as I do this.

21 (Pause.)

22 MR. WHITE: In Number 5, not specifically for Watts  
23 Bar, but I recall that some time during the review, someone  
24 mentioning a pamphlet called "Getting Your Signals Straight."  
25 I don't recall in what context or what that pamphlet was or

1 whether it came from Watts Bar or some other place, but it's  
2 mentioned here and I did know there was such a document.

3 MR. MURPHY: Would you read that comment for the  
4 record, please?

5 MR. WHITE: It says, "We discovered 'Getting Your  
6 Signals Straight' pamphlet, the word quality does not appear  
7 anywhere." The last part, I don't know. I'm just saying  
8 that the extent of my knowledge is someone, at one time,  
9 mentioned there was a document called "Getting Your Signals  
10 Straight." I don't remember in what context or anything  
11 else. But I'm trying to tell you everything that I know.

12 MR. MURPHY: Surely.

13 MR. WHITE: It was not specifically associated, as  
14 my recollection, with anything that was quality assurance.  
15 And I never saw the document to my recollection.

16 MS. BAUSER: When you say the document, you mean  
17 the pamphlet.

18 MR. WHITE: The pamphlet, "Getting Your Signals  
19 Straight", yes.

20 Some of these things don't even make any sense to  
21 me now as I read them. I had been, as I mentioned earlier,  
22 to some exposure, limited exposure, to the Nuclear Safety  
23 Review Staff, I recognize the title and as I mentioned  
24 earlier, the management type information. I don't recognize  
25 the things listed here under Item 13 which is NSRS.

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1           There's nothing else on page two. Huffum is a name  
2 that I recognize. He's an individual that I let go shortly  
3 after -- by let go, I mean relieved from his TVA duties  
4 shortly after I arrived. That name is familiar, but nothing  
5 else.

6           There's nothing that I recognize as being ever  
7 discussed on the third page.

8           MR. MURPHY: Let me cover a couple...

9           MR. CHARNOFF: Excuse me. Does that three page  
10 exhibit have an exhibit number?

11          MR. MURPHY: No.

12          MR. CHARNOFF: Aren't there numbers up there on the  
13 right-hand side?

14          MR. MURPHY: No, these are sequential numbers  
15 placed on this thing by Stone & Webster. As they went  
16 through, they just numbered the pages.

17          MR. CHARNOFF: I see. What are the page numbers?

18          MR. MURPHY: The page numbers are 103, 104 and 105.

19          MS. BAUSER: Do they have page numbers at the  
20 bottom?

21          MR. MURPHY: No.

22           Let me go over a couple of specifics just to insure  
23 in my mind that this has never brought up. Most  
24 underestimated it will take to evaluate the NRC concerns, and  
25 then in parentheses "material traceability." That's number