

4.8 Findings - Crane Operation

4.8.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Before beginning the work mentioned in the concern, a planning meeting was held by the responsible maintenance specialist, the crane operator, and the ONP WBN safety engineering staff. It was determined that the crane could not safely swing over the crew shacks. To prevent this, the crane and the truck used to handle material were located between the Turbine Building and the crew shacks. This eliminated the need to swing over the crew shacks.

Conclusion

Interviews with the crane operators and the ONP WBN safety engineering staff indicate that the crane did not swing over the crew shacks. Observations of the crane work revealed no operation over crew shacks. This issue is not substantiated.

4.9 Findings - Exterior Doors

4.9.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Exterior doors inspected in the Interim Office Building, Technical Services Office Building, Modification Building, Service Building, Turbine Building and Plant Office Building are non-CSSC (critical systems, structures, and components), nonfire-rated doors. Maintenance performed on these doors is conducted by the initiation of a MR. MRs for Non-CSSC door work are not retained as permanent records. Therefore, the MR describing the details of work performed on the TSOB door could not be reviewed. However, the CI stated in the concern that the door would not stay closed. This condition in itself does not constitute a safety hazard nor a violation of the Life Safety Code. The means of egress was not impeded by the condition of the door even though it was not functioning fully as intended.

Mechanical maintenance (MM) carpenters are responsible for repairs on exterior doors. An interview with the MM carpenter foreman revealed that a MR had been initiated

about August or September 1985 and the door was repaired. The component repaired was identified as the door closer mechanism. Although door repair is recognized as a continuous, on-going activity, no evidence was found which indicated neglect of exterior door maintenance.

Conclusion

The issue on the maintenance of exterior doors is not substantiated. This determination is based upon the results of inspections of exterior doors of buildings at WBN. All doors inspected, including the door in the concern, were determined to be in compliance with the standards regarding unobstruction of egress.

4.10 Findings - Scrap Metal Drop Chute

4.10.1 Site-Specific - WBN

Discussion

The chute met the requirements when it was constructed. Despite meeting requirements, scrap material could bounce out of the receptacle and strike a person using a nearby walkway. During the summer of 1985, after the concern was submitted, a wooden barrier and a deflector shield were added to the chute. This effectively controls the hazard.

Conclusion

This element is substantiated. Corrective action has been taken.

4.11 Findings - Explosive Detectors

4.11.1 Site-Specific - WBN

Discussion

The metal brackets that hold the control lights on the explosive detectors were designed and installed by the manufacturer. These units have been in service for four to five years and are the same type used at SQN. The ONP WBN PSS manager interviewed stated that he has no knowledge of any injuries or damage to equipment caused by someone striking the control lights and brackets, nor has he received any employee complaints on these units.

The control light brackets extend 14-1/2 inches from the rear of the units but only protrude about 2 inches into the employees' walkway. Brackets are not rigidly mounted but will move approximately 2-inches horizontally if struck. Employees going through the detectors must focus on the lights to know when to stop and proceed through the detectors, minimizing the possibility of striking the lights or brackets.

Conclusion

The control lights and brackets are located as the concern states. However, they create no more of a hazard to employees than desk corners, fire extinguishers hanging on a wall, chairs, pipes, valves and support hangers, etc. Therefore, the concern is not substantiated.

4.12 Findings - Booby traps

4.12.1 Site-specific - WBN

Discussion

Interviews with individuals having knowledge of the original incident revealed no other booby trap incidents have been reported or found in the plant since the 1981 or 1982 incident. The individuals interviewed did not know who set the trap or who the trap was intended. However, some believe it was intended for a general foreman.

Conclusion

Information obtained from interviews does not indicate any traps being reported or investigated since the 1981 or 1982 incident; therefore, this concern is not substantiated.

4.13 Findings - Miscellaneous - ONP WBN

The WBN Employee Suggestions Program (WB2.1.10) details the responsibilities and requirements for implementing this program. Once an employee submits the suggestion, it is tracked until the item is resolved.

The plant DCU has a tracking system for employee suggestions. The suggestions are assigned for resolution to the sections from which they were originated. At 30 days after original date of the suggestion, the DCU forwards any unresolved suggestions to the Planning and Scheduling Unit for addition to the responsible section's Outstanding Items Status Log (OISL).

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The DCU advises the Site Director monthly of any suggestions not answered within 30 days. This list and the OISL are discussed monthly at plant staff meetings. Once a suggestion is entered on the OISL it stays there until the suggestion is resolved.

The Safety Supervisor maintains a record of the suggestions submitted and provides the health and safety committee members, the Site Director, and Plant Manager a quarterly Safety Suggestion Status Report.

The safety staff conducts an annual audit of the safety program. The Employee Safety Suggestions Program is included in this audit. The program audit report for FY 1985 states that 52 of the 88 safety suggestions forwarded to the Safety Office did not have a response to the originator of the action taken. The recommendation states "implementation of the Employees Concerns Program (WB2.1.10) should adequately address the feedback problem." This program is being implemented.

The safety suggestions that were developed through the Employee Suggestions Program are listed below by number, description, and actions taken to address the suggestions.

- A. WBN-85-001 - Individuals are attaching ear plugs to hard hats with wire. CI believes this is a health hazard.

Based on field observations by the ONP WBN safety staff, this condition has not been observed. There is no criteria on how to attach ear plugs to hard hats.

- B. WBN-85-007 - Air filters in Jerry Collins' office door should be covered with expanded metal. If anyone were to strike the metal portion of the filter they would receive a severe cut.

MR A-410615 was written to delete the filters. The 1985 fourth quarter safety suggestion status report indicates this work is complete.

- C. WBN-0126 - The doorknob on C56 between control room and the hallway outside of shift engineer's office is too close to the edge of the door.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates this doorknob has been replaced.

- D. WBN-0132 - Install a curb around the neutralization tank (Turbine Building, elevation 685) to contain caustic acid spills.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates DCR 630 was written to install a curb. This item was entered on the OISL February 4, 1986, and the August 4, 1986 OISL shows it is still an open item.

- E. WBN-0183 - Safety racks for temporary storage of pressurized gas cylinder in transit at gate 126 could eliminate a hazard.**

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates a DCR was written to install storage rack. This item was entered on the OISL February 4, 1986, and the August 4, 1986 OISL shows it is still an open item.

A conversation with a Modifications Section supervisor on August 25, 1986 revealed they have purchased bottle buggies to secure the bottles while in transit instead of installing racks.

- F. WBN-0185 - Grease fittings on the lower bearing capsule is very close to the motor shaft. Greasing this lower motor bearing when the motor is running, an employee could get caught in the motor coupling. CI suggests having the fitting extended from coupling so that services are away from the turning shaft. (All ERCW motors.)**

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates the procedure was rewritten to prohibit lower bearing lubrication while the motor is running.

- G. WBN-0187 - All confined space areas should be visually marked at the entrances as "Confined Space Areas - Contact Safety..."; also, confined space monitors should have operating instructions laminated on each unit.**

A conversation with a representative from the ONP WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, reveals that there is no requirement to mark all confined spaces and they do not intend to mark them. They have laminated instruction on confined space monitors.

- H. WBN-0198 - Bumping hazards in lower containment at and around platforms to pressure relief tank, at elevation 716 and 724. Suggest padding and identifying (tape) these hazards.**

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates specific bump hazards need to be identified for marking.

A conversation with the ONP WBN Safety Supervisors revealed there are too many bump hazards in the area to mark each one. Employees are to submit MRs on specific ones to be marked or padded.

- I. WBN-0212 - Inadequate entrance into Medical Services to transport an injured person on a stretcher to an examination bed.

A conversation with a representative from the ONP WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, revealed there is an adequate door and passageway to get a stretcher into the Medical Services examination room. This suggestion was submitted after an incident where a chair prevented the door from opening completely.

A 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report states that the furniture blocking the entrance was rearranged.

- J. WBN-0243 - Weld some type of metal or steel hook on the liquid nitrogen Dewar cart to secure bottles from releasing.

A conversation with a representative from the WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, revealed a chain has been installed on the cart as an interim measure to secure the bottles. A MR A568375 to weld hook on cart has been issued.

- K. WBN-0244 - Need Mechanical Maintenance fitters to remove or relocate piping (1-DRV-889 Drain) at elevation 708, TB-J line, on the steam generator blowdown system. It is a safety hazard at eye level.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates piping was marked to make it more obvious. No action will be taken to reroute piping.

- L. WBN-700 - The CI believes the chain at the loading dock will not properly hold the empty cylinders.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report states a MR was written to improve the securing system and the MR has been completed.

- M. WBN-0268 - Service air headers in Reactor Building, unit 1 have caps when not in use. If valve leaks, it needs repair. Problem is there is no way to bleed valve down to remove cap.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates response was sent to the CI January 8, 1986. No action will be taken.

A conversation with the ONP WBN safety staff revealed these caps are required to prevent contamination. These connections can be used for breathing air; therefore, caps cannot be removed. Caps do not hold enough pressure to be a hazard.

- N. WBN-0271 - There is a need for reflectors along the access road to the plant and on the morning exit from the plant to help drivers during fog and heavy rain.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates MR number A-524015 was written to implement this suggestion and action was completed.

- O. WBN-600 I.S. - The three phase bench grinders in the shops need lights installed on the starter to indicate when they are running.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates MR number A-581327 was submitted. The OISL dated August 8, 1986, indicates the field work is completed.

A review of status of the suggestions that were received, indicates ONP WBN management has taken positive action on 14 of the 15 suggestions that were brought to their attention. The open item is being tracked on the OISL.

4.14 Findings - Miscellaneous - SQN

The employee safety suggestion program is documented in Standard Practice - SQA3178, "Employee Concern Program." This document includes definitions, a policy statement, responsibilities, and requirements. Line management is responsible for tracking concerns.

The concerns and suggestions received from SQN are listed below by number, description and status.

- A. DLJ-85-001 - A tripping hazard exists due to the lip on the threshold of C-15 door to the auxiliary room, unit 1.

This issue originated from a crew safety meeting report. MR A541929 has been written for mechanical maintenance to feather the lip.

- B. DLJ-85-002 - Tripping hazards are frequently created by hanging scaffolds or other supports from steel grate floors, using pipe or other items to anchor the cables.

This issue came from a safety meeting report. New supports that fit into the grating were ordered to eliminate the trip hazards.

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- C. DKJ-85-003 - The stairs accessing the Turbine Building from the outside are very slick when wet.

The issue came from a crew safety meeting report. Abrasive paint was applied and sheet metal workers applied n'nskid strips.

- D. DLJ-85-006 - Open plugs in upper containment cause tripping hazards. This issue originated from a crew safety meeting report.

The issue was investigated by an acting safety planner and plant safety staff. Inspection of the upper containment showed proper handrails and lifelines installed. No real hazard existed.

- E. DHT-86-001 - The PSS and Health Physics stations on the refueling floor are so located that loads pass over employees' heads.

A January 9, 1986, the Safety Supervisor replied in a memorandum that a meeting was being set up to develop an adequate resolution.

A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed the crane operators have been advised by their supervisors not to move loads over employees. They are to stop the load and have employees move before proceeding. Employees have been told in weekly safety meetings not to walk under loads and to move from the area if a load needs to be moved over their work areas.

Management is to relocate the work stations so that they will be out of the path of the crane. This work is on hold until the next outage.

- F. JAM-85-003 - No warning is given that ignitors are being tested. If electrical maintenance is testing hydrogen ignitors, there is a risk of being burned. Request warnings when testing ignitors.

A telephone conversation on August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed verbal instructions have been issued to provide better communications when testing ignitions. Signs are to be posted when ignitions are being tested.

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A telephone conversation on August 21, 1986, with the Electrical Maintenance supervisor revealed he has verbally instructed the electrician to "walkdown" areas before energizing ignitors. If there is a scaffold in the area that would permit employees to contact the ignitors, signs are to be posted that ignitors are being tested.

- G. EAC-85-001 - Tie-off cables are not provided above crane bridges for use during crane housekeeping or inspections.

A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed cables have been installed on some cranes but not all yet. However, cables will be installed on the other cranes as soon as practical.

- H. EAC-86-002 - Fittings for high pressure hose are improperly job-fabricated by unqualified personnel and are unsafe.

A note in the concern file dated February 3, 1986, from the Safety Supervisor states the concern is under investigation and remains open. A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed the following information:

1. Only green hoses would be used for inert gases and oxygen.
2. Only webbed double hose will be issued from the toolroom for gas welding and cutting.
3. Replacement or initial installation of hose fittings will be performed only by employees designated by the Mechanical Maintenance Group supervisor.
4. The toolroom will issue only welding hose with proper fittings.

These four actions have been included in a revision dated April 17, 1986, to the HCI-M7.

- I. EAC-85-006 - Vehicles parked along roadway curbs at the entrance to No. 1 parking lot, obstructing vision and traffic, are a hazard.
- J. RMM-85-005 - Car parking along the curb of parking lot 1 were blocking the view of cars pulling out.

Approximately 300 additional parking places have been provided in a new lot. PSS will mark the area of concern in both concerns as a no parking zone.

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- K. EAC-85-008 - Some crane operators board and operate cranes while other operators are in the process of walking down or checking out the crane.

Signs are provided for crane controls to advise operator that crane checkout is in progress. The problem has also been discussed between responsible groups and management.

- L. EAC-85-009 - The concern alleged that heavy equipment operators were lifting casts using Lorain hydraulic cranes without setting outriggers, an unsafe practice.

Investigation by SQM personnel determined lifts to be acceptable. Crane cab has charts for load limits for lifts made on rubber tires, outriggers, and walking the load.

- M. I-86-240-SQM - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting a sheet metal platform be built on the side of the centrifuge.

A telephone conversation with the Mechanical Maintenance Craft Section supervisor on August 11, 1986, revealed this work was completed week of August 4, 1986.

- N. I-86-236-SQM - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting safety screens be installed to cover the caustic valves on the hot water tank at the make up water treatment plant on elevation 685.

This concern was investigated at the SQM site on August 14, 1986. Investigation of the hot water tank revealed that shields have not been installed over the valves. A site safety engineer states that he recalls a MR being initiated over a year ago to do this work. He went to this location to discuss what type of shield would provide protection, but he did not know what happened to the MR after that.

The carpenter foreman was contacted. He stated that while planning the erection of the shields he contacted the Operations Section for advice. They advised him that shielding was not necessary. He relayed this information to his general foreman and the MR was cancelled.

The procedure in effect at that time (SQM-2) required industrial safety MRs to be reviewed by the safety engineering staff if not approved and for the cancelled MR to be returned to the originator. Review of the procedure SQM-2 revealed that the procedure for cancelling industrial safety MRs was in

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revision 17, but had been omitted in revision 18 dated August 5, 1986. The data processing staff was unable to locate a record of the cancelled MR. It is their policy to retain cancelled MRs for only six months.

This investigation developed that an assistant shift engineer had identified the valves on the hot water tank as needing shielding in a May 24, 1986 safety meeting. A Work Request 125-190 was initiated on August 15, 1986 to have this shielding installed.

The investigation into the status of these concerns and suggestions revealed management has taken action to resolve the issues on all except I-86-236-SQN. SQN management was sent a CATDs on this issue.

4.15 Findings - Miscellaneous - BFN

This concern was investigated by calling the BFN safety staff for a status report on this concern. Copies of the September 28, 1985, original concern; the October 9, 1985, Safety Supervisor memorandum advising the CI of the status of concern; the DCR-D3251; and the Hazard Assessment Worksheet were obtained.

The Safety Supervisor advised the CI in the memorandum that there were plans for repairing the road, and that a DCR would be initiated to erect handrails and install better lighting.

A telephone call to the BFN DCU revealed the DCR will not be done until the next outage Unit 3, Cycle 5.

The DCR-D3251 dated November 19, 1985, is for the addition of handrails and lighting on the intake gate structure No. 3. Priority 8/c has been assigned and the recommended schedule indicates March 5, 1986, U3/C5B for "timely disposition of safety concern."

Representatives of the safety staff and line management conducted a hazard assessment of the area in the concern. The Hazard Assessment Worksheet dated October 9, 1985, indicates there is an employee exposure to an unsafe condition that could produce a serious injury.

This issue is substantiated. The concern is a year old and still has not been resolved. From the nature of the work it could be done at anytime and not held until the next outage. A CATD was sent to BFN describing this problem.

5.0 COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

5.1 Management Effectiveness

Management has been effective in resolving unsafe conditions reported through the safety suggestion program at the sites. However, line management has not been totally effective in its support of the safety program. Because of this, unsafe conditions in the workplace are not always recognized and corrected. This results in an increased probability of accidents or injuries caused by such unsafe conditions.

6.0 CAUSES

The majority of the problems identified by the concerns within this subcategory are minor in nature and have been resolved through normal channels. The common cause for these problems is management's failure to recognize and correct unsafe conditions however minor in nature.

The major problems identified by this evaluation and their associated causes are as follows:

- A. The flammable liquid storage limitations contained within HCI-HM1 were not effectively communicated to line management, supervisors, and foremen.
- B. An MR written at SQN to install safety screens to cover certain caustic valves in the water treatment plant was cancelled improperly due to an inadequate cancellation procedure.
- C. Work to add lighting and handrails on the intake gate structure number 3 at BFN was unnecessarily delayed because of management's lack of recognition that the situation could produce a serious injury.

7.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

No immediate corrective actions or stop work orders were initiated as a result of this subcategory evaluation. No outstanding corrective actions exist as a result of any prior investigation of the employee concerns addressed by this report.

Actions previously taken through normal channels to correct deficiencies identified by concerns within this subcategory are listed below.

- A. Repairs were made on the compressed gas bottle sheds at the DNC warehouse.
- B. Illumination in the DNC second shift parking lot was improved by replacing burned out bulbs.

- C. Protective caps for gas heders in the plant were provided and are in use.
- D. The airlock doors at elevation 713 between the Service Building and the Auxiliary Building were adjusted, a safety strip was installed along the bottom edge, and they were subsequently taken out of service.
- E. A wooden barrier and deflector were installed on the scrap metal drop chute to keep materials from bouncing into personnel walkways.
- F. Two flammable liquid storage cabinets were removed from the Turbine Building in order to comply with storage limit requirements.

Inadequate communication between line management and employees concerning industrial safety issues and mangements failure to support the safety program are addressed by Corrective Action Tracking Documents (CATDs) within the Industrial Safety Category as follows:

A. Subcategory Report 90100, Management of Safety.

CATD 90100-1, 5, 9, and 13 establish a Central Safety Committee (CSC) comprised of line management. CATD 90100-2, 6, 10, and 14 establish various line management subcommittees to the CSC. CATD 90100-3, 7, 11, and 15 establish a safety audit program. One of the principal purposes of the CSC will be to communicate and to improve the enforcement of the industrial safety program by all line managers to their employees.

The following is a list of CATDs issued on problems identified by this evaluation.

7.1 Site Specific - ONP WBN

- a. Problem Description: Interviews with craft foremen revealed a lack of knowledge on the HCY-HMT Requirements, specifically a limit of three flammable liquid storage cabinets in a single area.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-5: A safety Bulletin that addresses this problem will be issued by January 1, 1987 to the appropriate personnel.

7.2 Site Specific - SQN

- a. Problem Description: Valves for the caustic dilution station hot water tank on elevation 685 at T6 and D lines do not have shields to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-3: Valves for the caustic dilution stations hot water tank at elevation 603 will be shielded to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel. Work Request 125-190 dated August 15, 1986 has been submitted to shield these valves prior to restart of the system.

- b. Problem Description: Revision 18 of Standard Practice SQM-2 does not contain procedures for cancelling Industrial Safety related NRS or WRs.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-4: Standard Practice SQM-2 will be revised to include procedures for cancelling Industrial Safety related work requests (WRs). This revision will provide feedback to the work request originals as to why the request was canceled. Revision will be completed by January 1, 1987.

7.3 Site Specific - BFN

- a. Problem Description: Additional lighting and handrails have not been installed on the intake gate structure number 3 to resolve an employee safety concern and complete DCR D3251. This work should not be delayed until the next outage, unit 3, cycle 5.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-2: The addition of hand rails and lighting will not be delayed until the unit 3, cycle 5 outage. The work is not outage related and can be done during operation. A new design support group is being formed at BFN which will handle priority, plant-support type changes. Completion of this ECN will be assigned to this group and given priority. Installation may be completed before unit 2 startup but its completion will not be a constraint to unit 2 restart.

8.0 LIST OF EVALUATORS

Gray, D. K.
Petty, C. R.
Rogers, J. T.

9.0 ATTACHMENTS

Subcategory Summary Table

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
SEQUENCY - REQUEST
IP - ISSS - RHM

REGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

AT IMEN

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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RUN DATE - 01/28/87

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 0 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
TH-85-002-00301	SF	910	N	BFN	1 Y N N N 2 NO NA NA NA 3 D NA NA NA		NSRS	DURING THE EXIT INTERVIEW THE CI EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT ONLY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON A WINNING SAFETY AWARD--INSTALL LIGHTING, HANDRAILS, AND IMPROVE ACCESS ROAD AT THE INTAKE FOREBAY, GATE STRUCTUR	1.15, 2.3.15, 3.3.15, 4.15
IT-86-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	PUBLIC SAFETY AND HEALTH PHYSICS STATIONS ON REFUELING FLOOR ARE LOCATED SUCH THAT LOADS PASS OVER EMPLOYEES' HEADS.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
LJ-85-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - TRIP HAZARD EXIST DUE TO THE LIP ON THRESHOLD OF C-15 DOOR TO AUX. INSTR. RM (U-1).	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 IP - ISSS - RWH

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
 EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
 EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
 SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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 RUN DATE - 01/28/87

CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
1J-85-002	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO HA 3 NA NA C HA		OECF	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - TRIP HAZARDS ARE FREQUENTLY CREATED BY INSTALLING SC AFFOLDS OR OTHER SUPPORTS BY HANGING THEM FROM STEEL GRATE FLOOR - USING PIPE OR OTHER ITEM TO ANCHOR THE CABLE.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
1J-85-003	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO HA 3 NA NA C HA		OECF	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - THE STAIRS ACCESSING TURBINE BUILDING FROM OUTSIDE ARE VERY SLICK WHEN WET.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
1J-85-006	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO HA 3 NA HA A HA		OECF	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - OPEN PLUGS UPPER CONTAINMENT TRIP HAZARD.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
IP - ISSS - RHH

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 0 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
AC-85-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	WIE OFF CABLES ARE NOT PROVIDED ABOVE E CRANE BRIDGES FOR USE DURING CRANE INSPECTIONS OR HOUSEKEEPING.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
AC-85-006	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	VEHICLES PARKED ALONG ROADWAY CURBS AT ENTRANCE TO NO. 1 PARKING LOT OBS TRUCT VISION AND TRAFFIC AND ARE A H AZARD.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
AC-85-008	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	SOME CRANE OPERATORS BOARD AND OPERA TE CRANES WHILE OTHER CRANE OPERATOR S ARE IN PROCESS OF HALTING DOWN AND /OR CHECKING OUT CRANE.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
IP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

PAGE - 4
RUN TIME - 16:50:14
RUN DATE - 01/28/87

CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
EC-85-009	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y H 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA A NA		DECP	CONCERN EXPRESSED THAT HEAVY EQUIPMENT OPERATORS LIFTING CASKS USING LORAIN HYDRAULIC CRANE W/O SETTING OUTRIGGERS IS NOT SAFE.	1.1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
EC-86-002	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		DECP	EMPLOYEE HAS CONCERN THAT HOSE AND FITTINGS FOR HIGH PRESSURE HOSES ARE IMPROPERLY JOB FABRICATED BY UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL AND ARE UNSAFE.	1.1.4, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
EX-85-001-00101 T50032	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	EX-85-001-001	QTC	BOTTLE SHED-(BEHIND MAIN WAREHOUSE) POST (SUPPORT) HAS FALLEN 2 TO 3 INCHES AND APPEARS TO BE A PERSONAL SAFETY HAZARD. IF THE SHED COLLAPSES, BOTTLES (OXYGEN, NITROGEN ETC...) MIGHT EXPLODE.	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2, 7.0

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 IP - ISSS - RHM

REGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 2 3	REPORT SAF RELATED FIND CLASS	APPL BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
EX-85-033-00301 T50138	SF	909	S	HBN	1 2 3	N NA NA	N NA NA	N NA B	Y NO B	UNIT 02 IS LACKING IN GOOD HOUSEKEEP ING PRACTICES, IE EXCESS MATERIAL AN D TOOLS ARE LYING AROUND POSING AN I NDUSTRY SAFETY "TRIPPING" HAZARD. C I HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NUCLEAR PHR. DEPT. CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP RE	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 1.9, 2.3.1, 3.3.9, 4.1
02	SF	910	S	HBN	1 2 3	N NA NA	N NA HA	N NA NA	Y NO A		
EX-85-038-00101 T50144	SF	910	N	HBN	1 2 3	N NA HA	N NA NA	N NA HA	Y NO C	THE DOOR IN THE BUILDING NEXT TO THE SITE SERVICES BUILDING IS BROKEN (H ILL NOT STAY CLOSED.) THE DOOR IS AN OUTSIDE DOOR NEAR THE SAFETY SECTIO N. C/I FEELS THIS IS A SAFETY HAZAR D. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. C/I HAS P REQUIRED.	1.9, 2.3.9, 3.3.9, 4.9
EX-85-048-00901 T50168	SF	910	N	HBN	1 2 3	N NA NA	N HA NA	N HA NA	Y NO A	THE BIG ELECTRIC DOORS IN THE AUX BU ILDING ARE DANGEROUS WHEN CLOSING. A PERSON CAN BE CAUGHT IN BETWEEN TH EM DURING CLOSURE BECAUSE THE SAFETY PAD DOESN'T ALWAYS WORK. CONSTRUCT ION CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL I	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
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LEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
-85-064-00301 T50183	SF	906	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA D	EX-85-064-003	QTC	AT TIMES THERE IS UNSAFE EQUIPMENT I N THE FIELD SUCH AS LIGHT CORDS WITH BROKEN LIGHTS, BOARDS WITH NAILS IN THEM.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1
02	SF	910	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A				
-86-236-SQN 01	SF	910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA D NA		NSRS	AN ANONYMOUS INDIVIDUAL MAILED IN A SAFETY CONCERN TO NSRS REQUESTING TH AT SAFETY SCREENS BE INSTALLED TO CO VER THE CAUSTIC VALVES ON THE HOT HA TER TANK AT THE MAKEUP WATER TREATME NT PLANT ON EL 685. SEVERAL MAINTEN R THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF.	1.1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14, 7.0
-86-240-SQN 01	SF	910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		NSRS	AN ANONYMOUS INDIVIDUAL MAILED IN A SAFETY CONCERN TO NSRS REQUESTING TH AT A SHEET METAL PLATFORM SIMILAR TO THE ONE AT HATTS BAR BE BUILT ON TH E SIDE OF THE CENTRIFUGE AT SQ. TH E PLATFORM WOULD ALLOW THE LIFTING O LLESEN THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK INJUR IES TO PERSONNEL.	1.1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
1 -85-037-00201 T50002	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA HA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-037-002	QTC	"BOOBY TRAPS" IN PLANT CAUSED PERSON NEL HAZARDS IN 1931 AND 1982 AT WATT S BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. CONDITIONS MAY STILL EXIST	1.12, 2.3.12, 3.3.12, 4.12
1 -85-118-00201 T50014	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-118-002	QTC	SOME STORAGE SHEDS (EG SHED "E") HAV E MATERIAL UNSAFELY AND HAPHAZARDLY STORED CREATING SAFETY HAZARDS	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2
1 -85-118-00301 T50108	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA HA C	IN-85-118-003	QTC	HEAVY MATERIAL (IE: PALLETS OF BRICK S) IS BEING STORED ON WOODEN PLATFORM M IN F SECTION OF YARD 2 OF WAREHOU E OUTSIDE STORAGE AREA. BOTH THE W ODEN PLATFORM AND PALLETS ARE EXCESS IVELY ROTTED. CI IS CONCERNED THAT R PLATFORM GIVE WAY, INJURING PERSON NEL/WORKERS BELOW NO FOLLOW UP REQUI RED	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-205-00101 T50007A	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	EXIT ROAD FOR THIRD SHIFT WORKERS IS EXCESSIVELY DANGEROUS DUE TO TOO MANY EGRESS POINTS FROM OTHER PARKING LOTS AND A NARROW ROAD	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3
IN-85-311-00501 T50021	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B	IN-85-311-005	QTC	METAL BRACKETS AND CONTROL LIGHTS AS SOCATED WITH EXPLOSIVE DETECTORS PRE SENT A SAFETY HAZARD TO OFFICERS AND PERSONNEL BECAUSE THEY EXTEND OUTH ARD FROM THE UNIT -18". IT HAS EXPR ESSED THAT THESE BRACKETS COULD BE R TED WITHOUT COMPROMISING FUNCTION OF THE UNIT.	1.11, 2.3.11, 3.3.11, 4.11
IN-85-338-00201 T50039	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	STEAMFITTERS/HELDER INTERCHANGING G AS BOTTLE AND HEADER AIR GAUGES WITH OUT ANY REGARD TO COMPATIBILITY. TH IS OCCURS IN BOTH UNITS #1&2.	1.4, 2.3.4, 3.3.4, 4.4

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-338-00301 T50039	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-338-003	QTC	EXCESSIVE SPEEDING BY TVA VEHICLES ON THE PROJECT.	1.6, 2.3.6, 3.3.6, 4.6
IN-85-350-00101 T50026	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	HOUSEKEEPING IN THE POWER BLOCK AND THE RESTROOMS IS VERY POOR. TRASH IS ALLOWED TO ACCUMULATE IN THE WORK AREAS. THIS CAUSES DEGRADATION OF THE EQUIPMENT AND REPRESENTS A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1
IN-85-480-00501 T50028	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-480-005	QTC	HAZARDOUS SAFETY CONDITION EXISTS THROUGHOUT TURBINE BLDG. (UNIT # 2) DUE TO VERY POOR HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1

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REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-512-00101 T50046	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	IN-85-512-001	QTC	SCRAP METAL DROP CHUTE, UNIT 2 SIDE, NEAR ELECTRICAL SHACK, IS UNSAFE IN THAT IT OFTEN ALLOWS DEBRIS TO RICOCHET NEAR PERSONNEL WALKWAYS. CI EXPRESSED A CONCERN THAT APPROPRIATE SHIELDING SHOULD BE INSTALLED TO REDUCE DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE.	1.10, 2.3.10, 3.3.10, 4.10, 7.0
IN-85-546-00101 T50047	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	PERSONNEL AIR LOCK ON UNIT 2 (IN OPERATION) CAUSED TWO PERSONNEL TO BE INJURED. BELIEVE AIR LOCK DOES NOT NEED TO BE UNDER PRESSURE AT THIS TIME. (DETAILS KNOWN)	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0
IN-85-579-00301 T50052	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-579-003	QTC	POOR HOUSECLEANING THROUGHOUT THE PLANT.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1

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TEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-583-00201 T50055	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	IN-85-583-002	QTC	OXYGEN & ACETYLENE HEADERS THROUGHTO UT UNIT 82 ARE NOT CAPPED OFF WHEN N OT IN USE.	1.4, 2.3.4, 3.3.4, 4.4, 7.0
IN-85-615-00201 T50058	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-615-002	QTC	NO SAFETY LIMIT SWITCH ON AIR LOCK D OOR (713' FROM PORTAL TO ELEVATOR) C OULD RESULT IN DOOR CLOSING ON A PER SON AND INJURING HIM/HER.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0
IN-85-684-00201 T50063	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		QTC	INADEQUATE LIGHTING IN 2ND SHIFT PAR KING LOT. VEHICLES MUST PASS THROUG H PERSONNEL HALKWAYS. CI HAS NO MOR E INFORMATION.	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3, 7.0

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-743-00201 T50077	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B	IN-85-743-002	QTC	TRAFFIC CONTROL/LANE LINES NEED REPA INTING ON ACCESS ROADS AND IN PARKIN G LOTS. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABL E.	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3
IN-85-758-00201 T50073	OP	313	S	HBN	1 2 3	IN-85-758-002	QTC	CLEANLINESS IN THE AUX. BUILDING IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. THERE IS DUS T, DIRT AND GRIME EVERYWHERE. (UNIT 1) NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILA BLE. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED.	1.3, 2.3.1, 3.3.3, 4.1
	02 SF	910	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A				
IN-85-803-00101 T50083	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-803-001	QTC	CRANE PARKED BY THE SHACKS AT THE EN TRANCE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING OFTEN SHINGS HEAVY LOADS OVER THE SHACKS WHILE EMPLOYEES ARE INSIDE. A SUB-C ONTRACTOR DOING ROOFING WORK IS OPER ATING THE CRANE AND MAKES NO ATTEMPT KS. THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT HAS NOTIF IED BUT NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN NOTED. (NOTIFIED 2 WEEKS AGO.) NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE.	1.8, 2.3.8, 3.3.8, 4.8

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TEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 0 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-85-934-00101 T50096	SF	910	N WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	METAL FILINGS/SHAVINGS/SLIVERS RESULTING FROM CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN REACTOR BUILDINGS OF BOTH UNITS ARE NOT CLEANED UP OFTEN ENOUGH, WHICH RESULTS IN A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD, PARTICULARLY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1
IN-85-991-00101 T50100	OP	301	S WBN	1 2 3	IN-85-991-001	QTC	DOOR SYSTEM ENTERING AIRLOCK, ELEV. 713 BETWEEN AUXILIARY AND SERVICE BUILDING (DOUBLE DOORS BY CHEMISTRY LAB), CAN BE HAZARDOUS DUE TO SYSTEM OF OPERATION. DOORS ARE AIR OPERATED, AND ONE DOOR SHINGS HARD AND FAST. NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0
	02 SF	910	S WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B				
IN-86-008-00201 T50108	SF	910	N WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-86-008-002	QTC	A LACK OF GOOD HOUSE KEEPING PROCEDURES. SCRAP METAL, HANGERS, AND EXCESS MATERIAL CLUTTER THE WORK AREA IN TURBINE BLDG CAUSING A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
IN-86-059-00101 T50111	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA D	IN-86-059-001	QTC	IN THE TURBINE BUILDING (EL. 708') NEAR THE WORK PLAN BOOTH AND ACCESS PORTAL ARE SOME RED LOCKERS WHICH CONTAIN FLAMMABLE MATERIAL. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE MOVED OUTSIDE FOR FIRE PREVENTION. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL I	1.7, 2.3.7, 3.3.7, 4.7, 7.0
IN-86-246-01401 T50142	OP	301	S	WBN	1 2 3	IN-86-246-014	QTC	TWO LARGE METAL DOORS ARE INOPERABLE AND ARE DANGEROUS. ELEV. 713' (THROUGH PORTALS-INSIDE SECURITY). THEY ARE CURRENTLY BEING KICKED OPEN. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0
	02	910	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A				
IN-85-003	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - IF ELECTRICAL MAINT. IS TESTING H2 IGNITORS, AND YOU MUST WORK IN #4 ACCUMULATOR ROOM, ONE MUST GET VERY CLOSE TO IGNITOR AND RISK BEING BURNED.	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 8 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
71-85-005	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		DECP	CARS PARKING ALONG THE CURB OF PARKING LOT #1 WERE BLOCKING THE VIEW OF CARS PULLING OUT.	1.1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14,
71-0126	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		DECP	DOOR KNOB ON C56 BETWEEN CONTROL ROOM AND HALLWAY OUTSIDE OF SE OFFICE 1 IS TOO CLOSE TO EDGE OF DOOR. FRIDAY 11/23, AND EMPLOYEE'S HAND GOT CAUGHT AND WAS INJURED.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
71-0132	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		DECP	INSTALL A CURB AROUND THE NEUTRALIZATION TANK (T.B.EL685) TO CONTAIN CAUSTIC ACID SPILLS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
WH-0182	01	SF	910	N WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		OECF	BOXES ON PALLETS IN FRONT OF CARPENTER SHOP NEED TO BE MOVED. CAN STOP DOOR SWINGING OUT HITTING PEOPLE COMING UP THE HALL.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
WH-0183	01	SF	910	N WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECF	SAFETY RACKS FOR TEMPORARY STORAGE ONLY ON BOTH SIDES OF GATE 126 AND ANYWHERE ELSE WHERE PRESSURIZED GAS CYLINDERS ARE TEMPORARILY LEFT WHILE IN TRANSIT, WOULD ELIMINATE A HAZARD THAT PRESENTLY EXISTS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
WH-0185	01	SF	910	N WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECF	GREASE FITTINGS ON LOWER BEARING CAPSULE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE MOTOR SHAFT. WHEN GREASING THIS LOWER MOTOR BEARING WHEN MOTOR IS RUNNING, EMPLOYEE COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE MOTOR COUPLING. CI SUGGESTS HAVING THE FITTINGS AT SERVICES ARE AWAY FROM THE TURNING SHAFT. (ALL OTHER MOTORS)	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
SEQUENCY - REQUEST
IP - ISSS - RHH

REGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECP)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION 0 CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
WH-0187	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B		OEC	ALL CONFINED SPACE AREAS SHOULD BE VISUALLY MARKED AT THE ENTRANCE AS "CONFINED SPACE AREAS - CONTACT SAFETY ...". ALSO CONFINED SPACE MONITORS SHOULD HAVE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS LAMINATED ON EACH UNIT.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
WH-0188	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B		OEC	BUMPING HAZARDS IN LOWER CONTAINMENT AT AND AROUND PLATFORMS TO PZR RELIEF TANK @ 716' & 724' ELEC. SUGGEST PADDING AND IDENTIFYING (TAPE) THESE HAZARDS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
WH-0212	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 K N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OEC	INADEQUATE ENTRANCE INTO MEDICAL TO TRANSPORT INJURED PERSON ON STRETCHER TO EXAMINATION BED.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
P - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910	
01-0243	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	WELD SOME TYPE OF METAL OR STEEL HOOK ON LIQUID NITROGEN DRAIN CART, TO SECURE BOTTLE FROM RELEASING.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
01-0244	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	NEED MECH. MAINT. FITTERS TO REMOVE OR RELOCATE PIPING. (1-DRV-889 DRAIN) IT IS A SAFETY HAZARD AT EYE LEVEL ELV.708.T.D. TB-J LINE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
01-0268	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		OECP	SERVICE AIR HEADERS IN RB1 HAVE CAPS WHEN NOT IN USE. IF VALVE LEAKS, IT NEEDS REPAIR. PROBLEM IS THERE IS NO WAY TO BLEED THIS DOWN TO REMOVE CAP.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
IP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS DF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910	
WH-0271	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		DECP	THERE IS A NEED FOR REFLECTORS ALONG THE ROAD ENTERING AND THE MORNING EXIT OF THE PLANT TO HELP DRIVERS DURING FOG AND HEAVY RAIN.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
WH-6001S	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		DECP	THE THREE PHASE BENCH GRINDERS IN THE SHOPS NEED LIGHTS INSTALLED ON THE STARTER TO INDICATE WHEN THEY ARE RUNNING CAUSING A SAFETY HAZARD.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
WH-700	01	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		DECP	CI BELIEVES THAT THE LONG CHAIN AT THE LOADING DOCK WILL NOT PROPERLY SECURE THE EMPTY CYLINDERS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
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IP - ISSS - RHM

CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION # CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
85-001	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		OECP	A CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT IN DIVIDUALS ARE ATTACHING EAR PLUGS TO HARD HATS USING HIRE. CI BELIEVES THIS IS A HEALTH HAZARD.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
85-007	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	AIR FILTERS IN THE DOOR TO JERRY COL LINS OFFICE SHOULD BE COVERED WITH E XPANDED METAL. IF ANYONE WERE TO ST RIKE THE METAL PORTION OF THE FILTER S THEY WOULD RECEIVE A SEVER CUT.	1.13, 2.3.13 3.3.13, 4.13

59 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY SF SUBCATEGORY 910

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

**ECSP Corrective
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)**

INITIATION

Applicable ECSP Report NO:

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Stop Work Recommended: ☐ Yes ☒ No
3. CATD No. 91000-2
4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: ☐ QR ☒ NQR Additional lighting and handrails have not been installed on the intake gate structure No. 3 to resolve an employee safety concern and complete DCR D3251. This work should not be delayed until the next outage, unit 3, cycle 5.
7. PREPARED BY: NAME C. R. Petty DATE: 8/12/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86

☐ ATTACHMENTS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: See attached sheet
11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/25/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

☒ ATTACHMENTS

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

**ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)**

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Stop Work Recommended: ☐ Yes ☒ No
3. CATD No. 91000 - 3
4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: ☐ QR ☒ NQR Valves for the caustic dilution station hot water tank on elevation 685 at T6 and D lines do not have shields to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel.
7. PREPARED BY: NAME J. T. Rogers - JTR DATE: 8/13/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H Tom E. [Signature] DATE: 8/18/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 2/2/87

☐ ATTACHMENTS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: Valves for the caustic dilution stations hot water tank on elevation 685 will be shielded to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel. Work Request 125-190 dated August 15, 1986 has been submitted to shield these valves prior to restart of the system.

11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

☐ ATTACHMENTS

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Stop Work Recommended: ☐ Yes ☒ No
3. CATD No. 91000 - 4
4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: ☐ QR ☒ NQR Revision 18 of Standard Practice SQM-2 does not contain procedures for canceling Industrial Safety related NRS or WRs.

7. PREPARED BY: NAME J. T. Rogers J. T. Rogers ☐ ATTACHMENTS DATE: 8/13/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H Don E. [Signature] DATE: 8/14/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 2/2/87

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION: Standard Practice SQM-2 will be revised to include procedures for canceling Industrial Safety related work requests (WRs). This revision will provide feedback to the work request originator as to why the request was canceled. Revision will be completed by January 1, 1987.

11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] ☐ ATTACHMENTS DATE: 8/21/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Stop Work Recommended: ☐ Yes ☒ No
3. CATD No. 91000-5
4. INITIATION DATE 08-22-86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: ☐ QR ☒ NQR Interviews with craft foremen revealed a lack of knowledge on the HCI-HMI requirements, specifically a limit of three flammable liquid storage cabinets in a single area.
7. PREPARED BY: NAME C. K. PETERSON DATE: 8-22-86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H San C. Peterson DATE: 8-22-86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 3/2/87

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: All applicable plant supervision will be issued a reminder covering the flammable liquids handling requirements contained in Hazard Control Instruction 4001. The reminder will be included in a "Hazardline" (safety bulletin) issued by the Safety Section prior to January 1, 1987.

11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/25/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE