U.S.NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
REGULATORY CONFERENCE
September 18, 2008

Service Water Strainer Backwash System

Enclosure 2

AGENDA
OPEN REGULATORY CONFERENCE
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
September 18, 2008

I. OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENT
Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator

II. NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICY
Mr. J. Moorman, Acting Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVES
Mr. S. Rose, Acting Chief, Branch 1, DRP

IV. SUMMARY OF APPARENT VIOLATION
Mr. S. Rose, Acting Chief, Branch 1, DRP

V. LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION

VI. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO APPARENT VIOLATION

VII. BREAK/NRC CAUCUS
Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator

VIII. CLOSING REMARKS
Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator

DRAFT APPARENT VIOLATION

10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.

Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required ability for manual strainer backwash could be maintained even during accident conditions. More specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address the macro-fouling concern (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump's strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates (whether induced by fish or other potential sources) and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a safety injection or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fowling.

Note: The apparent violation discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and change prior to any resulting enforcement action.