

**QUALITY
TECHNOLOGY
COMPANY**

P.O. BOX 600
Sweetwater, TN
37874

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 3

CONCERN NO: IN-85-091-X02

CONCERN: QA engineer informed ENDES group engineer not to issue a nonconformance report regarding lost documentation, filed in the document control unit-vault. Therefore, an NCR was not documented and issued to evaluate the condition.

INVESTIGATION
PERFORMED BY: K. M. Vadlamani

DETAILS

Personnel Contacted:

Confidential

Documents Reviewed:

ERT File IN-85-091-001
QCI 1.08 Rev. 10 Addendum #2 QA Records
QCI 1.02 Rev. 14 Addendum #1 Control of Nonconforming Items

OBJECTIVE

The objectives of this investigation ^{are} is to determine:

- * Whether or not the cognizant QA/ENDES engineer(s) directed the CI not to issue a nonconformance report relative to lost documentation.
- * Why QA/ENDES engineers were reluctant to issue/approve the NCR in the area of the subject concern?

CONCERN NO: IN-85-091-X02

DETAILSDISCUSSION:

ERT investigation report IN-85-091-001 was reviewed, which indicated that the cognizant ENDES/QA engineers did not agree that a nonconformance report to document, evaluate and rectify the deficient condition relative to the lost cable splice inspection documentation needed to be issued.

The cognizant engineers that were interviewed, revealed that ENDES objected to the NCR being issued with the Use-As-Is disposition. This was because ENDES and QA engineers had a tough time in the past convincing auditors and NRC inspectors that the use-as-is disposition was correct. The cognizant ENDES engineers stated that they never objected to the issuance of NCRs with dispositions such as Use-As-Is or repair, as long as it was justifiable and it fell within the guidelines of Procedure QCI 1.02. However, ENDES stated that as far as the subject NCR is concerned, they were not in a position to approve the Use-As-Is disposition for the deficiency identified, because there was no evidence to indicate that ~~an~~ official documentation existed for the deficiency identified by the construction unit. The cognizant ENDES engineers stated that QA would not get involved in approving NCR dispositions because procedurally, they (QA) do not have such authority. It was stated that ENDES is not responsible for the issuance and control of NCRs generated by the construction groups at WBNP. This information was found to be in agreement with the Procedure QCI 1.02.

Discussions with the cognizant construction units revealed no indications that procedural requirements were intentionally violated when rectifying nonconforming conditions. However, there exists a lack of understanding by the cognizant construction units on how to implement the QA programmatic requirements. (See IN-85-091-001 for details). The Cognizant construction unit personnel stated that the supervisors never restricted them in identifying and generating nonconformance reports.

CONCERN NO: IN-85-091-XJ2

DETAILS, continued

The information obtained from ENDES, was discussed and confirmed by the CI. The CI was asked why his statements, given during the ERT's follow-up interview, differed from what was confirmed. The CI stated that if specific details were provided to ERT, it might lead the investigation to leak the personal identity and therefore CI opted not to provide the complete version of the subject concern.

SUMMARY FINDINGS:

1. The cognizant ENDES/QA engineers objected to the NCR being issued with a "Use-as-is" disposition .
2. The responsible unit for regenerating the lost documentation did not originate and issue a nonconformance report. However, a construction maintenance request A 505735 dated July 2, 1985 was issued to correct the situation.
3. There is no evidence that the cognizant supervisors prevented their employees from documenting and rectifying deficient conditions under the NCR system.
4. Cognizant construction units lack an understanding in the implementation of QA programmatic requirements and in the regeneration requirements of lost documentation in accordance with procedure QCI 1.08, when no official documentation exists.

CONCLUSION:

Based upon the discussions with the cognizant personnel and the review performed, the subject concern is substantiated. The NCR was not issued. ERT has no further plans to continue the subject investigation. The cognizant WBNP management should review the findings for necessary actions.

PREPARED BY Krishna Mohan Vadlamani 8/26/85
DATE

REVIEWED BY Oh. Shaw 8/26/85
DATE

Report reviewed & Accepted
[Signature] 10/3/85
[Signature] 10/6/85

No new recommendations issued - Refer to IN-85-091-001 for corrective actions recommendation.

REQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION

FINAL

1. Request No. IN-85-091-X02 (ERT Concern No.) (ID No., if reported)
2. Identification of Item Involved: Nonconformance Reports
(Nomenclature, system, manuf., SN, Model, etc.)
3. Description of Problem (Attach related documents, photos, sketches, etc.)
Concern: QA engineer informed ENDES group engineer not to issue a nonconformance report regarding lost documentation, filed in the document control unit vault. Therefore, an NCR was not documented and issued to evaluate the condition.
4. Reason for Reportability: (Use supplemental sheets if necessary)
- A. This design or construction deficiency, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant.
NO YES If Yes, Explain: _____

- AND
- B. This deficiency represents a significant breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance program conducted in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B.
No Yes If Yes, Explain: _____

- OR
- C. This deficiency represents a significant deficiency in final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does not conform to the criteria bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit.
No Yes If Yes, Explain: _____

- OR

REQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION

D. This deficiency represents a significant deficiency in construction of or significant damage to a structure, system or component which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function.

No Yes If Yes, Explain: _____

OR

E. This deficiency represents a significant deviation from performance specifications which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to establish the adequacy of the structure, system, or component to perform its intended safety function.

No Yes If Yes, Explain: _____

IF ITEM 4A, AND 4B OR 4C OR 4D OR 4E ARE MARKED "YES", IMMEDIATELY HAND-CARRY THIS REQUEST AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION TO NSRS.

This Condition was Identified by: *OK These* 365-4464
KmV ERT Group Manager Phone Ext.
5.26.55

OK These for 365-4414
ERT Project Manager Phone Ext.

Acknowledgment of receipt by NSRS

[Signature]
Signed

Date *5/5/55* Time *1757*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : S. Schum, QTC-ERT Program Manager, WBN CONST

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : **OCT 16 1985**

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

The following investigation reports have been reviewed and accepted by NSRS and are transmitted to you for preparation of employee responses.

- IN-85-078-001 _____
- IN-85-196-004 _____
- IN-85-445-013 _____
- IN-85-845-004 _____
- IN-86-102-002 _____
- IN-86-122-001 _____
- PH-85-003-021 _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

[Handwritten Signature]
 K. W. Whitt

Please acknowledge receipt by signing below, copying and returning this form to J. T. Huffstetler, E3B37 C-K

 Name Date

Attachments
 cc: W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)
 H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K
 E. R. Ennis, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

REPO7:G3



TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-85-272-WBN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-078-001
MILESTONE 6

SUBJECT: UNIT OPERATOR/SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: August 12-22, 1985

INVESTIGATOR: W. D. Stevens
W. D. Stevens

10/11/85
Date

REVIEWED BY: G. G. Brantley
G. G. Brantley

10/4/85
Date

APPROVED BY: M. A. Harrison
M. A. Harrison

10/14/85
Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

The Nuclear Safety Review Staff investigated employee concern IN-85-078-001 which Quality Technology Company identified during the Watts Bar employee concern program. The concern was worded as follows:

Some unit operators, in WBNF unit 1, may not be as knowledgeable as they should be concerning safety related systems. CI would not provide names of individuals or any additional.

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined to be minimum unit operator qualifications regarding safety-related systems for individuals filling these positions. TVA training and experience requirements (which include safety-related systems' training) and NRC license requirements would be reviewed. The nonspecific nature of the concern and lack of any additional details available regarding the subject concern prevented a more narrowly scoped approach to the investigation.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. The document which prescribes the training requirements and methods used by TVA to provide its operations personnel with the knowledge and skill required for the safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants was found to be set forth in procedure 0202.05, "Nuclear Plant Operator Training Program." This document included the TVA licensed and nonlicensed training-programs which meet NRC regulation requirements. A review of this document resulted in the following information relating to the experience and training required of each individual performing licensed-reactor operator duties.
1. The Nuclear (Nonlicensed) Operator Training Program (NOPT) was a comprehensive 113-week training program designed to give the student operator fundamental background in all facets of nuclear power plant operation.
 2. Two years of power plant experience was required for promotion from Assistant Unit Operator (AUO) to Unit Operator (UO), including a minimum of six months at the site for which the license is sought and a minimum of twelve months in the AUO position before entering Reactor Operator (RO) license training.
- B. The individual must have completed the Cold or Hot License Program before being allowed to take an NRC RO license examination. The Cold License Program (the program that was presently used at WBN) consisted of several applicable subprograms.
1. Onsite Training (5 Weeks)

A combination of lectures and self-study designed to familiarize each candidate with design criteria, operating characteristics, license requirements, and plant equipment layout. Primary and secondary systems were discussed in depth.

2. Practical Work Assignments and Onsite Training

A combination work and training period which covers all systems, components, and administrative and operating procedures.

3. License Certification Training (12 Weeks)

Comprised of classroom lectures and simulator operation, including technical training in safety and emergency systems.

4. Small Reactor Training

A supervised program at a research or power reactor during which 10 reactor startups were performed.

5. Observation Training at a Comparable Operating Plant

This program stressed participation in the observation of operating evolutions. All safety-related systems were studied during this training.

6. Preliminary Training

Classroom training, simulator operations training, and plant walk-throughs which included safety-related systems.

After completion of the above training requirements, the license candidate was administered a cold-license examination by the NRC.

- C. It was stated by training and operations management personnel contacted that persons presently manning unit operator positions at WBNP held an NRC RO license, were in training to meet these requirements, or would be placed in required training before being allowed to operate the safety-related systems' controls after fuel loading.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This concern was not substantiated.

The training documents reviewed concerning the minimum qualifications for the position of unit operator at WBNP required extensive training and experience in safety-related systems. All individuals occupying these positions were qualified unit operators holding a Reactor Operators license from the NRC or were in training to meet TVA and NRC requirements.

Recommendations

None.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-384-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN FH-85-003-021

MILESTONE 1 - FUEL LOAD

SUBJECT: UNEVALUATED CUTTING OF REINFORCING STEEL

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 16-27, 1985

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

M. A. Koltowich

M. A. Koltowich

10/10/85

Date

INVESTIGATOR:

F. K. Howard

F. K. Howard

10/10/85

Date

REVIEWED BY:

P. R. Washer

P. R. Washer

10/10/85

Date

APPROVED BY:

M. A. Harrison

M. A. Harrison

10/10/85

Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated employee concern PH-85-003-021 which the Quality Technology Company (QTC) identified during the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern is worded:

"Management required personnel to drill holes in concrete and cut rebar without an engineering evaluation being conducted."

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined from the stated concern to be that: reinforcing steel was cut without Office of Engineering (OE) evaluation through an approved process; e.g., Field Change Requests (FCRs). The activities performed by NSRS during this investigation are listed below.

- A. Review of Office of Construction (OC) WBN plant procedures including:
 - 1. WBN-QCI-1.07, R11, Work Release
 - 2. WBN-QCP-1.14, R10, Inspection and Testing of Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete and Control of Attachments to Embedded Features
- B. Review of TVA commitments and requirements, including:
 - 1. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) - WBN, Section 3.8, "Design of Category I Structures"
 - 2. TVA General Construction Specification G-32, Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete
- C. Interviews with Office of Engineering (OE) and site personnel associated with reinforcing steel engineering and inspection practices and
- D. Review of documentation including:
 - 1. 52 "Steel Drilling or Cutting Releases" (WBN-QCP-1.07)
 - 2. Nonconforming Condition Report (NCR) 2755 (RIMS WBN 801120 006)
 - 3. Memorandum from J. A. Raulston to L. M. Mills dated June 22, 1981, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Unauthorized Cutting of Reinforcing Steel in the Diesel Generator Building - NCR 2755R Report No. 4 (Revised Final)" (RIMS NEB 810622 262)
 - 4. "Rebar Cuts - Book I, Auxiliary and Associated Buildings" (RIMS WBP 830923 027)
 - 5. "Rebar Cuts - Book II, Reactor; Control; DG; and ADG Buildings" (RIMS WBP 830923 028)
 - 6. CONST Quality Assurance Audit WB-6-82-04, "Control and Installation of Bolt Anchors"

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Based upon review of the applicable documents and interviews with individuals associated with the subject, NSRS substantiated the identified concern. Described below are the results of the investigation and the basis for substantiation.

A. Review of TVA Commitments and Requirements

The FSAR for WBN in Section 3.8, "Design of Category I Structures," states the codes, standards, and specifications for which the design and construction of the applicable structures are based. Paragraphs 3.8.1 (concrete containment), 3.8.3 (concrete interior structure), and 3.8.4 (other Category I structures) state that TVA is committed to TVA General Construction Specification G-32, Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete. TVA G-32 subsequently states that unless specifically permitted, reinforcing steel shall not be cut or drilled to install anchors.

B. Review of OC WBN Plant Procedures

The requirements of TVA G-32 and OE design drawings are defined in WBN-QCP-1.14, Inspection and Testing of Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete and Control of Attachments to Embedded Features; and WBN-QCI-1.07, Work Release. These procedures require OE approval prior to starting work anytime rebar is to be cut. OE approval appeared in site Civil Engineering Unit (CEU) and OE logbooks prior to June 1982. Since June 1982, Field Change Requests (FCRs) have been required to obtain OE permission to cut rebar.

C. Interviews with WBN Site and OE Personnel

1. Employee A informed NSRS that unevaluated cutting had occurred in the Diesel Generator Building due to craft personnel being instructed to cut rebar. No cutting release was present prior to starting work. This was identified and dispositioned by means of NCR 2755R (initiated 11/20/80, closed 4/27/81). Employee A also indicated that due to past problems in the area, the craft is now fully aware of the requirements concerning rebar cutting. NSRS was made aware of the review undertaken by OE to evaluate and document all known possible cases of rebar cutting. OC used site logs, OE logs, site work releases, and NCRs to perform their evaluation. Employee A felt that the current program was providing adequate control, and no additional problems appeared to be occurring.
2. Employee B also informed NSRS of NCR 2755R. NSRS was informed that there was supposed to be a work release, but it could not be located. Employee B stated that a core drill was bought, and the craft were instructed to go ahead and cut rebar to install anchors. "B" was not aware of any other problems and stated that unit personnel were aware that approved cutting releases were required prior to starting work.
3. Employee C was not as familiar with NCR 2755R as were "A" and "B." "C" was, however, aware of OE's review and evaluation. "C's" information was similar to that supplied by Employee A.

4. Employee D discussed OE's role and the methods used for performing their evaluation. This evaluation was contained in "Rebar Cuts - Books I and II" which include design calculations and marked-up master prints showing cut rebar locations. Twenty (20) work releases obtained by NSRS were specifically reviewed with Employee D. OE's evaluation appeared to be comprehensive to the extent possible with the information available. "D" indicated that this evaluation is an accumulative one. New FCRs and NCRs are received and incorporated on subsequently issued drawings. Before approval to cut rebar is given, the latest issued drawings and the "Rebar Cuts - Books I and II" are used together to evaluate any cuts proposed.

D. Review of Documentation

1. NSRS reviewed 52 "Steel Drilling or Cutting Releases" (twenty in detail with OE) in conjunction with "Rebar Cuts - Books I and II." Several calculations justifying the adequacy of cut bars were reviewed and determined adequate. The master marked-up prints compared favorably to the twenty (20) work releases reviewed jointly by NSRS and OE. The master marked-up prints are considered part of "Rebar Cuts - Books I and II." The initial issue of these books occurred in September 1983.
2. NCR 2755R and a memorandum from J. A. Raulston to L. M. Mills dated June 22, 1981, Report No 4 (Revised Final) were reviewed by NSRS and considered adequate.
3. CONST Quality Assurance Audit WB-G-82-04, Deficiency No. 2 (initiated 3/19/82, closed 8/2/82) identified a problem that cutting releases contained no indication of OE approval. These approvals were found to be contained in CEU log books. Permission to cut rebar was subsequently required through the FCR process; therefore, this problem should not recur in the future.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The concern was substantiated since cutting of reinforcing steel did occur prior to engineering evaluation (approval of work release) as evidenced in section III of this report. However, the effects have been mitigated due to OE's past evaluation and the present FCR/NCR processes.

Recommendation

No further action is considered to be necessary as the NCR process, FCR process, and OE's evaluation for this particular concern appear adequate.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. T-85-481-WEN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-86-122-001
MILESTONE 2

SUBJECT: CRACKS IN WF3Z BEAM ON STEAM GENERATOR LOWER LATERAL
SUPPORTS (GROUP 4) UNIT 1

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 24-October 4, 1985

INVESTIGATOR:	<u>C. R. White</u> C. R. White	<u>10/10/85</u> Date
REVIEWED BY:	<u>Paul S. Borden</u> P. S. Borden	<u>10/10/85</u> Date
APPROVED BY:	<u>[Signature]</u> M. Harrison	<u>10/10/85</u> Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated employee concern IN-86-122-001 which was identified by Quality Technology Company. The concern was worded as follows.

Cracks were noted in a WF 33 beam. CI is unsure if these cracks were ever fixed. Beam location is between 0 degrees and 337 degrees 30' at elevation 723', Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. (Approximately 37' radius). Standing at 0 degrees radial and looking toward Steam Generator #4, one would be looking at the WF in question.

II. SCOPE

The investigation of this concern entailed the inspection of the beam noted in the concern and the remaining beams that make up the lower lateral support from approximately the 270° to 35° position. Verification of supporting inspection and welding documentation were reviewed.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. An NCR (2257R) dated April 14, 1980, was issued to address cracks in outer flanges of W33X240 steam generator lower supports. Disposition was investigated, repairs made, and the NCR was released from nonconforming disposition on February 26, 1981.
- B. Through the investigation process generated by NCR 2257R, it was determined by Engineering Design (EN DES) that the maximum depth of the indication was 1/8" to 3/16" and found them to be acceptable to use as is (reference memo SWP 810107 060).
- C. Subsequently ECN 3255 was issued to require additional stiffener plates to be added to the beams. Magnetic particle inspection identified laps and seams in the weld area where the added stiffener plates were to be installed. The area extending two times (2x) the weld size in all directions from the edge of the stiffener plate weld was inspected, and all indications up to 1/16" were removed and rewelded. Indications found outside of the weld area required no remedial action and was dispositioned use as it.
- D. The NSRS investigator and the Construction Quality Control Manager observed the No. 4 steam generator lateral supports on Unit 1 and saw no obvious indication of cracking on the WF33 beam. Adjacent WF33 beams on the MK3A loop 4 supports were also observed with the same result. However, these observations were not considered conclusive because all of these beams were painted.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The employee concern was substantiated by evidence of cracking in the WF33 web areas as identified in NCR 2257R. However, verification was made that these cracks were removed, rewelded, and inspected by visual and NDE methods. EN DES was made aware of the problem and implemented corrective action through NCRs. The condition was considered use as is with the addition of stiffeners and removal of the cracks within the 2x weld envelope. No remedial action was required for cracks outside of the weld area since NCR 2257R provides a use-as-is disposition for them. The reason for the acceptance of the cracks is the nonrejectable lamellar-type indication with relatively shallow depths of 1/8"-3/8".

This condition is inherent to the rolling process used to make the beams at the mill.

Recommendations

None.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-513-WBN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-86-102-002
MILESTONE 1 - FUEL LOAD

SUBJECT: OPEN JUNCTION BOX

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 9-30, 1985

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

W.D. Stevens

W. D. Stevens

10/11/85

Date

REVIEWED BY:

G.G. Brantley

G. G. Brantley

10/11/85

Date

APPROVED BY:

M.A. Harrison

M. A. Harrison

10/10/85

Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

The employee concern as received from Quality Technology Company stated:

Conduit MC 846A is run into open J.B. 1220 and has no Physi-2. Attachment D form filled out. Location Elev. 737 between A14&R and A9&Q. CI has no additional information. Unit 1, Nuclear Power concern, time frame current.

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined to be that junction box (J.B.) 1220 had been opened in violation of plant fire barrier breaching requirements. The junction box and referenced conduit were physically inspected by NSRS, and applicable documentation relating to the concern was reviewed. Office of Engineering (OE) and WBN site personnel were contacted regarding specific fire barrier requirements for J.B. 1220 and conduit MC 846A.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. Junction box 1220 and conduit MC 846A were visually inspected by NSRS. The junction box metal cover was found to be installed with no fire barrier insulation covering. The conduit was fire wrapped along its entire length with the wrap terminating at the junction box.
- B. NSRS reviewed applicable conduit and grounding drawings (45W826 series), which were annotated with notes indicating where fire wrap was required. Review of these drawings identified that conduit MC 846A required fire wrap up to J.B. 1220. No requirements for J.B. 1220 to be fire wrapped were found.
- C. WBN site personnel contacted stated that no requirements to insulate J.B. 1220 with fire insulation were indicated from their examination of the conduit and grounding drawings.
- D. OE personnel contacted provided the following information.
 1. J.B. 1220 and associated conduits had been previously analyzed by OE for cable separation requirements.
 2. Conduits routed to J.B. 1220 either met the 20-foot separation criterion for interdivisional interactions or the redundant components had been fire wrapped to meet requirements.
 3. J.B. 1220 was not an interconnecting junction box which would have required 3-M fire barrier material to be installed over the box.

- E. NSRS reviewed WBN - Physical Security Instruction 2 (Physi-2). "Fire Protection Plan," section III, which specified the control of combustibles including breaching of fire barriers. This procedure applied to fire-rated assemblies consisting of cable-penetration barriers, fire doors, fire dampers, piping runs, and fire-resistant cable wraps. It did not address conduits which were not required to be fire wrapped. No provisions were found to exist which would have required a Physi-2, Attachment D, for J.B. 1220.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Employee concern IN-86-102-002 was not substantiated.

J.B. 1220 was closed and was not required to be fire wrapped; therefore, no Physi-2, Attachment D, was required to be in effect.

Recommendations

None.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-504-WEN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-845-004
MILESTONE 3

SUBJECT: WELDING OF DISSIMILAR METALS

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 30-October 4, 1985

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

P. C. Mann

P. C. Mann

10-10-85
Date

REVIEWED BY:

P. R. Washer

P. R. Washer

10-10-85
Date

APPROVED BY:

M. A. Harrison

M. A. Harrison

10/10/85
Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated employee concern IN-85-645-004 which Quality Technology Company identified during the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern is worded:

Welding of dissimilar metals. Sampling system (43) contains stainless steel to aluminum welds. No di-electric teflon coated union installed. Unit 1. Location: Hot sample rooms. Elevation 713'-0" A&W line.

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined from the stated concern to be: In the Unit 1 hot sampling room, located on 713'-0" elevation at A&W line, certain tubing welds were made between stainless steel and aluminum without the use of a di-electric teflon-coated union. NSRS reviewed General Construction Specification G-29M, the Procedure Handbook of Arc Welding, TVA System Description NS-43-3001, and TVA Contract 83574 during this investigation.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Based upon review of the applicable documents, inspection of the subject system, and interviews with personnel knowledgeable of the requirements and processes relative to the concern, NSRS has not substantiated the identified concern. Following are the details that led to the investigation result.

- A. A visual inspection was performed on all tubing/piping of the sampling system (43) located in the hot sampling room. Essentially all connections were accomplished utilizing compression fittings in lieu of welding. The few welded connections were confirmed to be stainless steel to stainless steel by physical examination and through weld record review. The review of General Construction Specification G-29M revealed that no processes were identified which involved the use of di-electric couplings. A review of the Procedure Handbook of Arc Welding, in addition to interviews with personnel knowledgeable in metallurgical process, indicated that the thermal conductivity and melting point characteristics of the dissimilar metals would prevent the successful fusion of the metals to accomplish a weld that would remain intact.
- B. The review of the TVA Contract Specification 83574 indicated that all tubing supplied for use in vendor-supplied components located in the system (43) in the hot sample room would be ASME SA-213, Type 316, stainless steel. NSRS could find no indication that any aluminum material was utilized in the area.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

NSRS could find no evidence to support the concern that welding of dissimilar metals in system 43 in the hot sample room had occurred. The employee concern is not substantiated.

Recommendations

None.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-374-WBN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-445-013
MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT: DRAWING NOTES IN THE 47-A050 SERIES ARE HARD TO USE

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: October 3-8, 1985

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

D. K. Baker

D. K. Baker

10-10-85

Date

INVESTIGATOR:

M. A. Koltowich

M. A. Koltowich

10-10-85

Date

REVIEWED BY:

P. R. Washer

P. R. Washer

10-10-85

Date

APPROVED BY:

M. A. Harrison

M. A. Harrison

10/10/85

Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated employee concern IN-85-445-013 which Quality Technology Company identified during the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern is worded:

Drawing notes in the "47-A05" series are hard to use: They are hard to interpret, too numerous, and are still being revised (. . . EG FCR-I-2394 just changed notes to allow clear support length of 6'9" instead of previously allowed 5'6" on conduit supports). CI has no more information. Construction Department concern.

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined from the stated concern to be: "47-A05" series drawing notes are hard to use, hard to interpret, too numerous, and are still being revised. The 47-A050 notes have been the subject of the following previous investigations: I-85-110-WBN, I-85-124-WBN, I-85-148-WBN, I-85-160-WBN, and I-85-234-WBN. This investigation builds on the previous investigations.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Previous NSRS investigations concluded that 47-A050 notes are open to interpretation and are sometimes contradicting. The reviews also found that changes are estimated to be five (5) per week. The 47-A050 notes are quite extensive with 74 pages in the series as of the dates of this investigation.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The employee concern is substantiated in that the 47-A050 notes have in previous investigations been found to be open to interpretation, voluminous, and are continually being revised.

Recommendations

Corrective action for this concern should be completed concurrently with the corrective actions recommended in previous NSRS reports. No additional recommendations are offered.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

*NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-166-WBN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-196-004
MILESTONE 6

SUBJECT: ERCW SYSTEM DETERIORATION

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: October 3-9, 1985

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

Fredrick J. Slagle
F. J. Slagle

10/11/85
Date

REVIEWED BY:

Paul B. Border
P. B. Border

10/11/85
Date

APPROVED BY:

M. A. Harrison
M. A. Harrison

10/11/85
Date

FINAL

I. BACKGROUND

The Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigated employee concern IN-85-196-004 which Quality Technology Company (QTC) had identified during the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern was worded as follows:

Pipe (unidentified) improperly installed and leaks, repaired with spray on grout. Subsequent flaking of repaired areas has resulted in repeated failures of pumps associated with the piping system.

Prior to the initiation of this investigation, an attempt was made through QTC to obtain additional information from the concerned individual. The primary purpose of the request for additional information was to determine if this employee concern was directed at the ERCW system. The reply from QTC stated that no additional information was available and the collection of additional information was not possible. The assumption was then made that this employee concern was associated with the mortar lining of the ERCW system.

II. SCOPE

The scope of this investigation was previously addressed in NSRS Investigation Report Nos. I-85-166-WBN and I-85-118-WBN.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Refer to NSRS Investigation Report Nos. I-85-166-WBN and I-85-118-WBN.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Not substantiated. Refer to NSRS Investigation Report Nos. I-85-166-WBN and I-85-118-WBN.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
 FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K
 DATE : OCT 16 1985
 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-427-WBNSubject No PHYSI-2, Attachment D, For Conduit BreachesConcern No. IN-86-102-001 and IN-86-103-001

and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached recommendations by October 29, 1985. Should you have any questions, please contact W. D. Stevens at telephone 126-143-3779.

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes _____ No X

Original Signed By

M. A. Harrison

Director, NSRS/Designee

Attachment

cc (Attachment):

H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K
 QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
 W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

--Copy and Return--

To : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

From: _____

Date: _____

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-427-WBN
 Subject No PHYSI-2, Attachment D, For Conduit Breaches for
 action/disposition.

Signature_____
Date

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. T-85-427-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERNS IN-86-102-001 AND IN-86-103-001

MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT: NO PHYSI-2, ATTACHMENT D, FOR CONDUIT BREACHES

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 9-30, 1985

INVESTIGATOR: W. D. Stevens
W. D. Stevens

10/11/85
Date

REVIEWED BY: G. G. Brantley
G. G. Brantley

10/11/85
Date

APPROVED BY: M. A. Harrison
M. A. Harrison

10/11/85
Date

I. BACKGROUND

The employee concerns as received from Quality Technology Company stated:

Concern IN-86-102-001

The requirement for conduit insulation deleted and insulation removed from MC 847B. At the hanger attachment conduit A is on the same hanger. Requirements for hanger fireproofing for conduit A includes 12". This constitutes a breach in A. A Physi-2 Attachment D is required for each breach and Attachment D is not filled out. CI has no more info. Unit 1, 737' Elev. on Q wall from A-14 to A-12 on Elev. 750'. Nuclear Power concern, time frame - current.

Concern IN-86-103-001

No Attachment D from Physi-2 issued for breach to insulation on cable conduit. Conduit 847B on Q Wall, elevation 737 about 15' above the floor A10 to A8. Also 945B (same location) over cooling tank #2. CI has no additional information. Nuclear Power Concern. Unit 1. Ongoing.

II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined from the stated concerns to be that: conduit fire wrap insulation was removed from conduit MC 847B which exposed a heat-transfer surface to conduit MC 846A located on the same hangers on Q wall, elevation 737, of the auxiliary building. This resulted in an unauthorized breach to MC 846A when insulation was removed from MC 847B after its fire wrap requirements were deleted. Conduit 945B in the same location was also breached without the proper authorization.

Documentation regarding 3-M fire wrap was reviewed, and the specific conduits referenced by the concern were examined for compliance with requirements.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. Further information was requested from Quality Technology Company (QTC) for the concerns expressed. Both concerns were found to be identical in nature regarding conduits MC 847B and MC 846A although the concern forms received from QTC had different wording.
- B. Electrical conduits MC 847B and MC 846A located on elevation 737, Q wall from A9 to A14, were physically examined by NSRS including the hanger supports and 3-M fire wrap. Both conduits were approximately 6 inches apart and supported by common unistrut hangers. Conduit MC 846A was wrapped with 3-M fire wrap along its entire length. Insulation had been removed from part of MC 847B (from A14 to A12Q) with a maintenance request during July 1985 after fire wrap was no longer required for the entire conduit length. This removal resulted in requirements on conduit MC 846A being violated since conduits within the 12-inch heat-transfer path to a protected item are required to be wrapped.

- C. Conduit MC 945B located on elevation 737 was physically examined from Q wall, junction box 830 (between A8 and A9), to A10S. One unauthorized fire breach was discovered approximately 8 feet east of A8-S over the component cooling water heat exchanges. This consisted of the fire wrap and one conduit cover removed on the conduit. No Physi-2, Attachment D, was posted in the area for this breach as required by plant procedures.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

- A. Concern IN-86-102-001 was substantiated for the following reasons.
1. The fire wrap on conduit MC 846A was found to be breached in violation of 3-M fire wrap specifications requirements.
 2. No Physi-2, Attachment D, authorization was in effect as required by plant procedures.
 3. The fire breach was the result of the fire wrap removal from MC 847B which inadvertently exposed conduit MC 846A.

Recommendations

I-85-427-WBN-01 - Conduit MC 846A Fire Wrap Breach

Inspect and rewrap conduit MC 846A as required to comply with 3-M fire wrap specifications.

Conclusions

- B. Concern IN-86-103-001 was substantiated for the following reasons.
1. Conclusions and recommendations regarding conduit MC 846A/MC 847B fire wrap breach are similar to IV.A.1., 2., and 3.
 2. Conduit MC 945B was found to be breached in an unauthorized manner with no Physi-2, Attachment D, in effect at the time of inspection by NSRS.

Recommendations

I-85-427-WBN-02 - Conduit MC 945B Conduit Breach

Inspect and restore conduit MC 945B as required to comply with 3-M fire wrap specifications and plant procedures.

NRC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : OCT 16 1985

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-484-WBN

Subject Cleaning Fluids

Concern No. IN-86-221-004

and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached recommendations by October 29, 1985. Should you have any questions, please contact G. R. Owens at telephone 126-143-3825.

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No

Original Signed By
M. A. Harrison
 Director, NSRS/Designee

Attachment
 cc (Attachment):
 H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K
 QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
 W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

--Copy and Return--

To : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

From: _____

Date: _____

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-484-WBN
 Subject Cleaning Fluids for action/disposition.

Signature

Date



TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-484-WEN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-86-221-004
MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT: CLEANING FLUIDS

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 24-30, 1985


LEAD INVESTIGATOR:



C. R. Owens

10/10/85
Date


INVESTIGATOR:



P. R. Revil

10/10/85
Date


REVIEWED BY:



P. B. Border

10/10/85
Date

APPROVED BY:



M. A. Harrison

10/10/85
Date

I. BACKGROUND

A concern was received by the Quality Technology Company Employee Response Team that stated: "Unit #1 containment - crafts using cleaning fluids that are not labeled 'CSSC approved'."

Note: Further information obtained from QTC established that it was laborers and not crafts observed using the cleaning fluids.

II. SCOPE

Documentation was reviewed, and cognizant personnel were interviewed concerning the use of "CSSC approved" cleaning fluids. Based on this evaluation, determinations were made on the use of cleaners without CSSC approved labels and on the adequacy of management controls to control the use of cleaning fluids.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. The controlling procedure for the use of cleaning fluids on CSSC is Watts Bar TI-35, "Specification Standards of Material Commonly Associated With Maintenance Which May Come in Contact With Reactor Coolant." This TI addresses material (including cleaning fluids) which is approved to be used on or in reactor coolant components and which may come in contact with reactor coolant and/or related components. A list of approved material is included in TI-35.
- B. TI-35 states that each plant supervisor responsible for performing any maintenance or other work on the reactor system or any components or systems related to that system shall ensure that the material used conforms to the type specified in TI-35.
- C. A plant memo from C. C. Mason (Plant Manager) to all section supervisors dated 2/19/80 recognized the need to improve control of material not listed in TI-35 as well as the materials listed in TI-35. This memo required that each section supervisor evaluate all materials not in TI-35 and prepare appropriate instructions regarding the proper use of any cleaners, solvents, waxes, etc., that he/she was using and was not listed.

They were to further evaluate all items they were using and take steps to get all that qualified placed in TI-35.

Those products which were approved by the supervisor but not listed in TI-35 were to be labeled by Power Stores. This was the only labeling requirement dictated by the C. C. Mason memo.
- D. Management Services Section Instruction Letter No. 63 dated 4/3/80 identified such material as cleaners and solvents with their specific use. The Instruction Letter stated that section supervisors would ensure the items listed and not approved by TI-35 would be labeled to indicate the cleaners, solvents, etc., were not approved for CSSC use. C. C. Mason's 2/19/80 memo indicated Power Stores would do this.

- E. Building Services Section Instruction Letter BSSL5 states that each foreman was responsible for having all products in his/her work area properly labeled and segregated. It also stated that all unapproved products shall not be used on CSSC equipment or taken into the Reactor, Auxiliary, or Control Building without prior approval by the Building Section Supervisor or foreman.
- F. According to interviews with cognizant personnel, Power Stores commenced a labeling program based on the directive of the 2/19/80 memo. Three categories were established:

1. Category 1 - "Approved per TI-35, Use Unrestricted"
2. Category 2 - "Approved per TI-35, Use is limited, See TI-35 for Limits"
3. Category 3 - "Not Approved per TI-35, Use Controlled"

Recently the Category 3 labels have been discontinued (only labeling requirement of the Mason memo). Based on the interviews, this change was not realized by most users.

These labels were observed on various cleaning fluid containers within the plant by the investigator. In one case, an approved cleaning fluid container was observed not labeled.

- G. There was not an approved plant instruction or SIL which controlled the labeling process.
- H. When a section is in need of cleaning fluid, the respective section supervisor signs the request, form TVA 575, that indicates the cleaner is or is not for CSSC use.
- I. The personnel interviewed indicated they use a very limited number of cleaning fluids for CSSC. Because of day-to-day familiarity with these cleaners and management reminders, they normally did not depend on the labels to determine the cleaners to use on CSSC.
- J. Based on interviews, the cleaning personnel have been instructed to not take the manufacturer containers inside containment. The cleaning fluid is transferred to working containers. There is no requirement to tag the working containers.
- K. The electrical maintenance section does not have an SIL on this subject but depends on standard practice WB6.1.5 entitled "Approved Cleaning Solvents for Both Plastics and Electrical Equipment Containing no Plastic Parts."
- L. Based on a review of documentation and personnel discussions, there does not appear to be any CARs, DRs, audit findings, or NRC violations related to the subject of approved cleaning fluids for CSSC.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

1. The concern of record regarding the use of cleaning fluids inside Unit 1 containment without "CSSC approved" labels was substantiated. However, it appears that no procedural requirement existed to require labels for approved cleaners. Only cleaners not listed in TI-35 and approved by section supervisors require labels per the initial directive from C. C. Mason on 2/19/80.
2. Due to the limited number of approved cleaners and personnel familiarity with TI-35, the evidence indicates that cleaning personnel were well instructed and informed to the proper cleaners to use. Thus they do not depend on the TVA labels to determine the approved cleaners to use on CSSC.
3. There appeared to be inadequate controls for identification of cleaning fluid containers. TI-35 clearly states control is the responsibility of the section supervisors, and those interviewed were cognizant of this and the requirements of TI-35. However, as presented in Mason's 2/19/80 memo, there have been plant concerns on improving control of materials not listed in TI-35. The memo required that products not listed in TI-35 and approved by the section supervisor were to be labeled by Power Stores. This was to be done in order to indicate the material shall not be used in areas where it might come in contact with the reactor coolant systems. This identification and labeling process as required by the memo is not being done. Power Stores commenced a labeling process after the 2/19/80 Mason memo that exceeded the requirements of the memo. They are now, however, marking only approved cleaners which is contrary to the 2/19/80 memo.
4. The labeling process of cleaning solvents has never been documented and procedurally controlled.
5. Although some sections that use cleaning fluids (including the Building Services Section) have Section Instruction Letters that comply with Mason's 2/19/80 memo; others appear to not have Section Instruction Letters which meet these requirements.

B. Recommendations

I-85-484-WBN-01 - Reevaluate Present Method of Cleaning Solvent Control

The WBN plant staff should reevaluate the present method in place to control cleaning solvents based on the experience of the past five years (since the C. C. Mason 2/19/80 memo) and consider the need for a plant instruction which would require positive identification of containers which hold approved CSSC cleaning solvents and would tie together the TI-35 and the SILs.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : OCT 16 1985

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-383-WBN

Subject Control of Use of Teflon Tape on Stainless Steel

Concern No. IN-85-977-001

and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached recommendations by October 29, 1985. Should you have any questions, please contact P. R. Bevil at telephone 126-143-3813.

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X No

Original Signed By
M. A. Harrison

Director, NSRS/Designee

Attachment

cc (Attachment):

- H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K
- QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
- W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

--Copy and Return--

To : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

From: _____

Date: _____

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-383-WBN
Subject Control of Use of Teflon Tape on Stainless Steel for
action/disposition.

Signature

Date



TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF
NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-383-WBN
EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-977-001
MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF USE OF TEFLON TAPE ON STAINLESS STEEL

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 18-24, 1985

INVESTIGATOR: P. R. Bevil 10/10/85
P. R. Bevil Date

REVIEWED BY: F. B. Border 10/10/85
F. B. Border Date

APPROVED BY: M. A. Harrison 10/10/85
M. A. Harrison Date

I. BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated a Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) employee concern which was identified to the Quality Technology Company (QTC) as follows:

Concern_IN-85-977-001

"TVA management has stated that teflon tape which was used on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) must be identified and replaced with another type of tape; however, no program to accomplish this task has started."

II. SCOPE

Reviews and interviews were conducted to determine if, in fact, TVA/WBN management had required that teflon tape used on the RCS be identified and removed and this removal documented. A determination was also made as to whether recurrence control had been established to control the use of teflon tape in the future.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Applicable Requirements and Commitments

Construction Specification G-29M, section 4.M.1.1 (R8), and NUC PR WBN TI-35, section 2.8.1, rev. 21, stated that "Fluorocarbon base tapes (TFE type) are acceptable on joints only when temperatures are below 300°F and radiation levels are below 10^4 rads and are not for use on lines that reenter the reactor system."

B. Findings

1. Teflon tape was on lines that reenter the reactor system at WBN on Units 1 and 2. This problem was subsequently identified on 4/26/85 in Nonconformance Report (NCR) W-231-P. This issue was also raised in NRC Inspection Report 390/85-32-01 dated 5/24/85.
2. As part of the NCR corrective action measures, OE was requested to evaluate the use of teflon tape at WBN and specify those areas where its use is unacceptable. OE made their reply in a J. C. Standifer to G. Wadewitz memorandum dated 5/9/85 (RIMS B45 B50509 254). This memorandum recommended immediate removal of teflon tape from specific areas of the plant and also justified use as is in the remainder of the plant until all tape can be replaced on a no-delay-to-operations basis. It also stated that teflon tape located outside the applicable RCS boundary did not pose a safety concern.
3. The memorandum further stated that teflon tape would no longer be used at Watts Bar after 5/1/85. NSRS verified removal of teflon tape from Power storeroom and Construction warehouse stock. All of this type of sealant was either transferred to a TVA fossil or hydro plant, or auctioned off. This decision virtually eliminates any use of teflon tape and possible future problems in this area.

4. Subsequent to this memorandum, NUC FR removed all teflon tape applied on the referenced applicable stainless-steel lines in Unit 1 (reference 9/27/85 memorandum from E. R. Ennis to G. Wadewitz, RIMS T07 850827 960). The Unit 2 portion of the NCR remains open until similar action can be accomplished on the applicable Unit 2 lines.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The concern was not substantiated. A program has been established by NUC FR to remove all applied teflon tape from the applicable RCS instrument and sample lines. As stated above, Unit 1 corrective actions have already been completed, and Unit 2 correction action is forthcoming.

All teflon tape has also been removed from stock at Power Stores and OC; therefore, no future problems in this area are anticipated.

There is a program to remove all teflon tape already applied in other areas of the plant as well, but this program is informal. The 5/9/85 memorandum from OE, however, justifies that this situation is not a safety concern.

Note: WBN NCR W-231-F is listed as a nongeneric problem; however, NSRS believes this could be a potential problem at BFN, SQN, and BLN as G29 specification is applicable to all TVA nuclear plants.

Recommendations

No action is required at WBN.

I-85-383-WBN-01 - Applicability of NCR W-231-F to Other Plants

Reevaluate WBN NCR W-231-F for generic applicability to BFN, SQN, and BLN; or provide justification for the determination of "not generic."

NRC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P&E (Nuclear)

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : OCT 16 1985

SUBJECT: CORRECTIVE ACTION RESPONSE EVALUATION

REPORT NO. : I-85-211-WBN

SUBJECT : Excessive Paperwork Affects Operations

CONCERN NO.: IN-85-140-001

(X) ACCEPT () REJECT

() ACCEPT WITH COMMENT

Original Signed By
M. A. Harrison

K. W. Whitt

Attachments

cc (Attachments):

- J. W. Coan, P-104 SB-K
- H. N. Culver, W.2A19 C-K
- QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant For response to employee.
- G. Wadewitz, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
- W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

0027U



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

KWW

TO : ~~William H. Thompson, Manager, Employee Relations, E12B15 C-K~~

FROM : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P&E (Nuclear)

DATE : OCT 02 1985

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION/EVALUATION

Reference: QTC concern number IN-85-140-001

The above referenced employee concern investigation report transmitted by your memorandum for investigation and/or evaluation has been reviewed by the Watts Bar P&E (Nuclear) staff. Our response is outlined in the attached employee concern report.

Should you have any further questions please contact Roger Goode at Watts Bar extension 8833.

Total pages transmitted: 2

[Signature]

 E. R. Ennis

JEG:JPM:RWG:LB
Attachment

To: Roger Goode, Project Engineer, Technical Services, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

From: _____

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the response to employee concern number IN 85 140 001 and associated documents. Total number of pages received 2.

[Signature] 10/5/85
 Signature Date

(Please return copy of entire page.)



