TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-007 アシュー - ラミリ

Category: 53

Confidentiality: \_YES \_NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BROWN'S FERRY: DIESEL GENERATOR MARGINS ARE INADEQUATE. HAS ADDED DGS TO BROWNS FERRY, SEQUOYAH AND WATTS BAR. EACH TIME A QUESTION IS RAISED, TVA MUST CONDUCT ANOTHER STUDY. TVA ADDS DIESEL GENERATORS WITHOUT UPGRADING LICENSING DOCUMENTS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

8=0\01256 Balteres

William Stehen	DEC 0 7 1985
MANAGER, ERT	DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_

NSRS \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 765

Electrical Design

Bune F. Singlan 12/13/85

TO: Director - NSRS

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-008

2-55- -530

Confidentiality: YES \_NO (I&H)

Category: 53

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SEQUOYAH: DIESEL GENERATORS HAVE RELIABILITY PROBLEMS. STATED THAT CORRECTION REQUIRES RELIABILITY PROGRAM, A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF STARTS, ATTENTION TO TESTING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE UPGRADING, AND MORE INTERACTION WITH INPO, OTHER UTILITIES AND VENDORS TO ESTABLISH RESOLUTION TO PROBLEMS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

TO TO PIETO LEDVONIMEN

17 Chair Shelle DEC 07 1985

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_

NSRS \_\_ / PCS

Bun F. Luffen 12/13/85

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-009

Confidentiality: \_YES \_NO (I&H)

Category: \_53

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

Concern: BELLEFONTE: DIESEL GENERATORS HAVE RELIABILITY PROBLEMS. STATED THAT CORRECTION REQUIRES RELIABILITY PROGRAM, A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF STARTS, ATTENTION TO TESTING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE UPGRADING, AND MORE INTERACTION WITH INPO, OTHER UTILITIES AND VENDORS TO ESTABLISH RESOLUTION TO PROBLEMS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

EKU/DIESE SELENIOR

Within it leden	DEC 0 7 1985
MANAGER, ERT	DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT

NSRS \_ / ZLS

Bund Sughn 17-43185

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-010

Category: 53.

Confidentiality: \_YES \_NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BROWN'S FERRY: DIESEL GENERATORS HAVE RELIABILITY PROBLEMS. CI STATED THAT CORRECTION REQUIRES RELIABILITY PROGRAM, A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF STARTS, ATTENTION TO TESTING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE UPGRADING, AND MORE INTERACTION WITH INPO, OTHER UTILITIES AND VENDORS TO ESTABLISH RESOLUTION TO PROBLEMS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

BELY DIESE J BELELLIORS

William Stekens

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT

NSRS \_\_\_\_ PCS

Bun J. Lufler 12/B/85

electrical operation.

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-011

I-85- -: an

Category: 52

Confidentiality:

YES NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SEQUOYAH: ELECTRICAL SEPARATION AND PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF REDUNDANT WIRING AND CABLING AND FOR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS ARE INADEQUATE AT ALL PLANTS. CI EXPRESSED THAT DETAILED REVIEWS NEED \* TO BE MADE, AND ARE SO EXTENSIVE THAT A CONSULTANT PROBABLY SHOULD BE USED. PROVIDING INDEPENDENCE FORM TVA. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

EUN/Teamant with 13

William Sheha DEC 0 7 1985

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_

NSRS \_\_\_\_\_ PCS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

Bruet. Lighen 12/13/89

TO: Director - NSRS TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214 ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority: Concern # XX-85-122-012 Priority: 1 I-22- - BM Confidentiality: \_YES \_NO (I&H) Category: 52 Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES Concern: BELLEFONTE: ELECTRICAL SEPARATION AND PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF REDUNDANT WIRING AND CABLING AND FOR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS ARE INADEQUATE AT ALL PLANTS. CI EXPRESSED THAT DETAILED REVIEWS NEED \* TO BE MADE, AND ARE SO EXTENSIVE THAT A CONSULTANT PROBABLY SHOULD BE USED. PROVIDING INDEPENDENCE FROM TVA. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER. PULLIBER THE WIRING William Stelen DEC 0 7 1985 MANAGER, ERT NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to: ERT \_\_\_ NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_ NSRS \_ V 7CS OTHERS (SPECIFY) Rung Suffer 12/13/05

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority:

\*Concern # XX-85-122-013

ユーザン・ - AFN LYES \_NO (IGH)

Category: 52

Confidentiality:

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BROWN'S FERRY: ELECTRICAL SEPARATION AND PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF REDUNDANT WIRING AND CABLING AND FOR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS ARE INADEQUATE AT ALL PLANTS. CI EXPRESSED THAT DETAILED REVIEWS NEED > TO BE MADE, AND ARE SO EXTENSIVE THAT A CONSULTANT PROBABLY SHOULD BE USED, PROVIDING INDEPENDENCE FROM TVA. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

TOFN/Reasonable win no

Walliam Stere DEC 0 7 1985

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

Bung Leafen 12/13/15

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indice ed category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-015

I-8= -12-1

Category: 13

Confidentiality: YES NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BELLEFONTE: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTRICAL AND I&C EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS IS INADEQUATE. QUALIFICATION WAS OFTEN NOT DONE, OR IF DONE, RECORDS DO NOT EXIST IN MANY CASES, WHICH RESULTS MODIFICATION OR REPLACEMENT. CURRENT UPGRADE PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS NEEDS SCRUTINY. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

क्तिरी/हाराह न्यानी

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_ NSRS/ERT NSRS / pcs

Qualification

Bung Life 14/3/25

TO: Director - NSRS TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214 ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority: Concern # XX-85-122-016 Priority: 1 Confidentiality: YES NO (I&H) Category: 13 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES Supervisor Not1fied: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO Concern: BROWN'S FERRY: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTRICAL AND I&C EQUIPMENT AND CUMPONENTS IS INADEQUATE. QUALIFICATION WAS OFTEN NOT DONE, OR IF DOTE, RECORDS DO NOT EXIST IN MANY CASES, WHICH RESULTS IN MODIFICATIONS OR REPLACEMENT. CURRENT UPGRADE PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS NEEDS SCRUTINY. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER. PILANC SICISTAGE MANAGER. ERT DEC 0 7 1985 NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to: ERT \_\_\_ NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_ NSRS \_ V TUS Equipment Quelification Bune & Sugles 12/13/18

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214
ERT has received the Employee of assigned the indicated category and	concern identified below, and has dipriority:
Priority: 1	Concern # XX-85-122-017
Category: 52 Cor	T-8/-274 3217 of identiality: YES NO (I&H)
Supervisor Notified:YESNO	NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES
Concern: SEQUOYAH: CLASS 1E UNACCEPTABLY SUPPORTS (NO BATTERY TUNACCEPTABLY USED. CI HAS NO FURTURE VIA LETTER.	AND NON-CLASS 1E BATTERIES ARE TIE DOWNS), AND UNISTRUT SUPPORTS ARE THER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN
500/09500	
	MANAGER, ERT DEC 0 7 1985
NSRS has assigned responsibility fo	or investigation of the above concern
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
NSRS PCS	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	7
Suppris	NSRS DATE

	EMPLO	TEE CONCERN AS	STONNEN! BEA	10521		
TO: Direct	or - NSRS		TRANSMITT	TAL NUMBE	R T50214	
		Employee con category and p		lfied be	low, and	has
Priority:	1		Concer	n # XX-8	5-122-018	
Category:	52	Confid	lentiality:			
Supervisor	Notified:	YESNO	NUCLEAR SA	FETY REL	ATED YES	
UNACCEPTAB	LY SUPPORTED EPTABLY USED	CLASS 1E (NO BATTERY T . CI HAS NO	'IE DCWNS),	AND UNIS	TRUT SUPP	ORTS
[a	ur/Ballerie	క				
			Walland MANAGER.	<b>—</b> — — — — — .	DEC 07	_
NSRS has as	ssigned respon	sibility for	investigatio	on of the	above con	cern
ERT		•				
NSRS/ERT _						
NSRS	-PCS					
OTHERS (SPI						-
Electrical			Dung. NSRS	Luften	72/13/19/ DAT	S E

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214 TO: Director - NSRS ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority: Concern # XX-85-122-019 Priority: 1 I-85- - PFO Confidentiality: YES \_NO (I&H) Category: 52 Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES Concern: BROWN'S FERRY: CLASS 1E AND NON-CLASS 1E BATTERIES ARE UNACCEPTABLY SUPPORTED (NO BATTERY TIE DOWNS), AND UNISTRUT SUPPORTS ARE UNACCEPTABLY USED. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER. BEN/EVERFEBIES NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to: ERT \_\_\_ NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_ NSRS \_\_\_V\_ PCS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-020

I-85- -5QN

Category: 13

Confidentiality: YES NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SEQUOYAH: HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING AND/OR REVIEWS HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED FOR CONTROL PANELS AND STATIONS. CI EXPRESSED THAT THIS IS A VIOLATION OF NUREG -0700. CI FURTHER STATED THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY POOR ENGINEERING PRACTICES IN THIS AREA. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

SQN/Parke: - Unco

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to: -

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT

NSRS VDCS

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214
ERT has received the Employee corassigned the indicated category and p	
Priority: 1	Concern # XX-85-122-021 I-55 b\∩
Category: 13 Confi	identiality: _YES _NO (I&H)
Supervisor Notified:YESNO	NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES
Concern: BELLEFONTE: HUMAN FACTORS E BEEN IMPLEMENTED FOR CONTROL PANELS THIS IS A VIOLATION OF NUREG -0700. TOO MANY POOR ENGINEERING PRACTICES INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA L	AND STATIONS. CI EXPRESSED THAT CI FURTHER STATED THAT THERE ARE IN THIS AREA. CI HAS NO FURTHER
15/11/NUBES - 2700	
	William Shelm DEC 0 7 1985 MANAGER, ERT DATE
NSRS has assigned responsibility for to:	investigation of the above concern
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
NSRSDCS	•
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	
Opera	Brund. Lufter 12/3/15 NSRS DATE

Openha

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50?14
ERT has received the Employee assigned the indicated category	e concern identified below, and has and priority:
Priority: 1	Concern # XX-85-122-022
Category: 13	Confidentiality: YES NO (ISH)
Supervisor Notified:YESNO	NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES
NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED FOR CONTRO THAT THIS IS A VIOLATION OF NUREO	G -0700. CI FURTHER STATED THAT THERE PRACTICES IN THIS AREA. CI HAS NO
5=1/nury - 27	<b>ර</b> ර
	MANAGER, ERT DEC 0 7 1985
NSRS has assigned responsibility to:	for investigation of the above concern
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
NSRSZS	
Descriptions of the property of the proof	NSRS DATE
00 1	

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-023

Category: 51

Confidentiality: YES NO (IGH)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BELLEFONTE: OUT OF SERVICE TAGS FOR VALVES, ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, ETC., HAVE BEEN VIOLATED EVERYWHERE. THIS PRESENTS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS PERSONNEL SAFETY PROBLEM. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. AMONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

Bun/out service tags

MANAGER, ERT DEC 07 1985

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT

NSRS \_\_\_ PCS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

Bun & Suffer 12/13/15

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214
ERT has received the Employe assigned the indicated category	ee concern identified below, and has and priority:
Priority: 1	Concern # XX-85-122-025 ⊥-85 6 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Category: 13	Confidentiality: _YES _NO (I&H)
Supervisor Notified:YESN	NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES
Concern: BELLEFONTE: THERMAL INVOLVING REG. GUIDE 1.97. CI CONCERN VIA LETTER.	OVERLOAD BYPASS AND INDICATION PROBLEMS HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS
Brid INSCUEL DO	မလ် <b>င်</b> လည်
	W Ilian A Jahren DEC 07 1985
	MANAGER, ERT DATE
NSRS has assigned responsibilit to:	y for investigation of the above concerr
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
NSRS PCS	

Bune P. Lughen 4

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214 TO: Director - NSRS ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority: Concern # XX-85-122-024 Priority: 1 1-35 - . 54n Category: 13 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO Concern: SEQUOYAH: THERMAL OVERLOAD BYPASS AND INDICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING REG. GUIDE 1.97. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONCERN VIA LETTER. Ean/Insernal suecload NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to: ERT \_\_\_ NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_ NSRS \_\_\_\_ POS

Bung Luft C/0/85

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50216
ERT has received the Emplassigned the indicated catego	oyee concern identified below, and has ry and priority:
Priority: 1	Concern# XX-85-122-048 I 85 SW
Category: 53	Confidentiality: Yes No(I&H)
Supervisor Notified: Yes_	No Nuclear Safety Related_YES
COMPLETION OF COMMITMENTS AND	OF GOOD STATUS SYSTEM (PUNCH. LISTS) FOR COMPLETION OF NRC ACTIONS, AND COMPLETION TRUCTION, PRE-OP ETC. STATUS IS POOR. CI ANONYMOUS CONCERN.
527	Status sustem
	$\sim$ 4 $\sim$ 2.
	Manager, ERT date
NSRS has assigned responsibil	ity for investigation of the above concern
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
nsrspS	
OTHERS (SFECIFY)	
Constitut	NSRS Leften 17/1/5 date

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50216
ERT has received the Employee assigned the indicated category and	concern identified below, and has d priority:
Priority: 1	Concern# XX-85-122-049
Category: 53	I-55B No(I&H)
Supervisor Notified:YesNo	Nuclear Safety Related_YES
Concern: BELLEFONTE - LACK OF GO COMPLETION OF COMMITMENTS AND COMPI OF WORK AT SITES. PLANT CONSTRUCT HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYM	LETION OF NRC ACTIONS, AND COMPLETION ON, PRE-OP ETC. STATUS IS POOR. CI
TO WIN SEAN	tus system
·	
	Manager, ERT date
NSRS has assigned responsibility fo	or investigation of the above concern
ERT	•
NSRS/ERT	
nsrspcs	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	
Construct	NSRS Leglin 12/17/85 NSRS date

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50221

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated dategory and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-125-006

Category: 15 ...

Confidentiality:

7-85- - WBN \_YES \_NO (18H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_X\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED \_YES

Condenns KNOXVILLE - THE TVS SYSTEM PROCUREMENT MANUAL PROCUREMENT OF IE, SAFETY RELATED, NESS AND HOLD DEVICES EQUIPMENT TO BE SURCHASED COMMERCIALLY, NOT THROUGH QUALIFIED SUPPLIERS, BECAUSE ALLOWS , THEY ARE PART OF A LARGER COMPONENT. (NAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO GITD AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). NUDLEAR POWER DENDERN. DE MAS NO YORE INFORMATION.

equipment Prominent

35 bas assired money	DEC 1 19
RS has assigned nesponsibility for	investigation of the above concer
SVERT	
3 ×2	
RS (SPECIFY)	
two last	Bune J. Leffun 1417185 DATE

TO: Director - NSRS	TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50216
ERT has received the Employee assigned the indicated category an	concern identified below, and has d priority:
Priority: 1	Concern# XX-85-126-001
Category: 10	T-858FN Confidentiality: Yes No(I&H)
Supervisor Notified: Yes X No	Nuclear Safety Related_YES
Concern: BELLEFONTE - TVA CH OBTAINING GRINNELL'S (A&E) APPROVA HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.	
BIN DRAW	ins openéss
	•
	Manager, ERT date
NSRS has assigned responsibility f	or investigation of the above concern
ERT	
NSRS/ERT	
nsrs/125	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	<del></del>
Control	NSRS Lesten 12/17/15

					21011			
QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B	DATE RESPONSE	A C C ?	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD
** MILESTONE:								
IN-86-134-002	IRN POLICY	NSRS	12/03/85	.T.	11		11	QA
** Subtotal *	•							
					•			
** MILESTONE:								
					07/24/85		07/24/85	
	NO SECURITY BARRIER	NSRS			11/26/85			SECURITY
	WELDS UNDER WATER VIOLATION OF 050 NTS	ERT			09/23/85	T	09/23/85	
	TENSILE STRNG OF FIT	NSRS	11/22/85		/ /		/ /	HANGERS
	SUPV NOT FOLLOW PROC		08/05/85		//			MATERIAL.
	WELDER CERTIF FALSIF		11/14/85 10/24/85		//			ELECTRICAL
	DRWNS & 050 NOTES	NSRS	07/03/85		//		//	WELDING HANGERS
	ENBD PLTS NOT CORREC	ERT	08/20/85				//	DESIGN
	CONCRETE ANCHORS	ERT			09/11/85	P	11	CIVIL
	ANALYS OF LARGE PIPE				09/05/85		09/05/85	
	THML STRS ON PIPING	ERT			09/05/85		09/05/85	
	STRES&SUPPRT LD PROB	ERT	11/08/85		//		11/12/85	
	DRWNGS & 050 NOTES	NSRS			07/30/85	F	//	HANGERS
IN-85-088-001	VACUM TEST ON DOORS	ERT	07/09/85		11	70	07/09/85	
IN-85-091-X02	NO NCR FOR LOST DOCU	ERT	08/26/85		11			DOCUMENT
	FIRE SEALS BREACHED	ERT	07/05/85	.T.	09/13/85	T		CONSTRUCTI
	CRIT NOT MET/IDSS WL	ERT	11/22/85	.F.	11		11/22/85	WELDING
	UNREPORTED FIRE	NSRS	11/07/85		11		11/12/85	CONSTRUCTI
		NSRS	12/03/85		//		12/11/85	CONSTRUCTI
	SYS 62 VALVE CLASS	ERT			07/26/85	T		MATERIAL
	CRACK IN WELD	ERT	07/10/85		/ /		07/09/85	WELDING
	USE OF FISH TAPE	NSRS	11/22/85		//		//	ELECTRICAL
	MAINT WITHOUT NCR	NSRS			12/06/85		12/10/85	
	WELD DOCUMNTATION	ERT			11/29/85		12/10/85	
	CR ENTRANCE FIREDOOR VALV CONT/OPER TRAN				09/24/85	T		OPERATIONS
	FSAR REQ FOR SUPERV	NSRS NSRS	10/01/85			_		OPERATIONS
		ERT	07/03/03	·T·	11/25/85 07/24/85	T		OPERATIONS
IN-85-413-001		NSRS	08/09/85			T	07/24/85	
	INADEQ UPDT WELD CER		09/26/85		//		08/09/85 10/03/85	
	FALSIF WELDER CERTIF		10/24/85		11		10/03/63	WELDING
	INADEQ CRAFT SUPV	NSRS	10/30/85		11			CONSTRUCTI
	PROC DIFFICULT TO KN		10/23/85		11		10/30/85	
IN-85-445-010	EYE TEST INADEQUATE	NSRS	10/28/85		11		/ /	WELDING
IN-85-445-013	47-050 HARD TO USE	NSRS	10/10/85		11		10/16/85	
	INADQ REVIEW BY PORC	NSRS	10/17/85		11		//	OPERATIONS
IN-85-465-002		NSRS			11/14/85	T	11/20/85	
	NO NCRS ON ERCW LINS		10/03/85	.F.	11		11	QA
IN-85-527-001	CABLE PULL W/O PUSE	NSRS	11/27/85	·T·	//		11/29/85	ELECTRICAL

QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD
TN-85-534-005	FIRE PROTEC HYDRO TE	NSRS	10/02/85	. P.	//		, ,	TESTING
	WORK W/O WORKPLAN	ERT	10/22/85		11		11	QA
	VIOLATION OF PROCEDU		10/23/85		//		//	QA
	WLDRS NOT QUAL ELEC	NSRS	10/17/85		11		10/17/85	CONSTRUCTI
IN-85-612-X07	WELDER CERTIF FALSIF	ERT/OGC	10/24/85	.T.	1.1		11	WELDING
IN-85-671-002	NOT ISSUING IRN/WRN	NSRS	12/03/85	.T.	11		11	CIVIL
IN-85-676-001	DISAGREE W/TVA POLIC	NSRS	10/31/85	.T.	11		11	QA .
IN-85-682-005	MGT ALLOW INSP HARAS	NSRS	11/27/85	.F.	//		//	QA
IN-85-684-001	DEFECTIVE TUBE STEEO	NSRS	09/16/85	.F.	//		09/16/85	MATERIAL
	PREVENT OF CORRECTIV		12/09/85	.T.	/ /		//	QA
	PROC FOR CER NOT PER	ERT	10/24/85	·T·	/ /		//	WELDING
<del>-</del>	UNCERTIFIED WELDERS	ERT	09/26/85	·T·	/ /		10/03/85	WELDING
	WELDERS CERT FALSIFI		10/24/85		/ /		//	WELDING
	WELDER CERT CARD FAL	-	10/24/85		//		//	WELDING
	COMPRESS FITTING	ERT			10/07/85		/ /	INSTRUMENT
	COMPRESS FITTING	ERT			10/07/85	F	/ /	INSTRUMENT
	SYS43 UNIS NOT ACHD	NSRS	12/04/85		/ /		/ /	CIVIL
	CRFT SUP ALW UNAP PL		10/29/85		/ /		//	QA
	QUANTITY VS. QUALITY		11/07/85		/ /			QA
	VIOLAT TVA PROCEDURE		10/12/85		/ /			QA
	QUANTITY VS QUALITY	NSRS	12/09/85		/ /			QA
	INEXP CRAFTSMEN CONSTRUCT VIOLATIONS	NSRS		·T·	/ /			CRAFT
	DRAWING CONTROL		11/26/85		/ /		/ /	Qλ
	WELDOR CER BACKDATED	NSRS	10/22/85	·T·	/ /		/ /	DOCUMENT
	TAPE NOT REPL ON RCS		10/24/85 10/10/85		//		/ /	WELDING
	DOCUMENT OF TCS/SIS	NSRS	10/03/85		//		//	QX DOCUMENT
	HYDRAZINE SPILL	NSRS	10/17/85		//		//	DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
	RETUBIN OF HEAT EXCH		11/05/85		//		11	MAINTENANC
	INADEQ PLANT SYS STA		11/19/85		11		, ,	OPERATIONS
	DELAY IN CARS/DRS	NSRS	12/09/85		.,,		', ',	QA
	DIFFERENCE IN Q-LIST		10/04/85		11		1/	QA
	DIFFERENCE IN Q-LIST		10/04/85		11		11	QA
	DELAY IN CARS/DRS	NSRS			12/09/85	T	11	QA
TN-86-090-003	SIS APPROVAL W/O REV	-	10/17/85		/ /	•	11	<b>OPERATIONS</b>
	DELAY IN CAR/DR	NSRS	12/09/85				11	QA
	REQ FOR CONDUIT INSU		10/11/85		//		11	HANGERS
	NO ATTACH D/CONDUIT	NSRS	10/14/85		11			CONSTRUCTI
	NO ATTACH D/CONDUIT	NSRS	10/11/85		11		/ /	ELECTRICAL
	REMOVAL OF INSULATIO		11/13/85	.F.	11			CONSTRUCTI
	USE OF TOOLS NOT DOC		12/12/85		11		//	OPERATIONS
	LINES NOT INSPECTED	NSRS	12/09/85	.T.	11		11	HANGERS
	WELDER CERT BACKDATE		10/24/85	T.	11		11	WELDING
IN-86-155-004	WELDS MAY NOT INSPEC	NSRS		.F.	11		• •	WELDING
IN-86-167-005	WELDER REQUAL BACKDT	ERT	10/24/85		11		11	WELDING
IN-86-167-X08	WELDER CERT CARD FAL	ERT/OGC	10/24/85	.T.	11		11	WELDING

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	QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD	
	IN-86-210-001	HEAT EXCH TUBES INAD	ERT	11/05/85	.т.	//		//	DESIGN	
	IN-86-221-004	CLEANERS NOT APPVD	NSRS	10/10/85	·T·	12/06/85	T	12/12/85	MATERIAL	
	IN-86-226-001	HARAS FOR REP QC	NSRS	11/11/85	·T·	//		11	QA	
	IN-86-259-004	INADEQ CABLE PULL	NSRS	10/31/85	.T.	//		11/04/85	ELECTRICAL	
	NS-85-001-001	INACCUR WELD INSPECT	ERT	08/13/85	.T.	09/27/85	F	//	WELDING	
	PH-85-003-021	ENG EVAL NOT CONDUCT	NSRS	10/10/85	.T.	/ /		10/16/85	QA	
	PH-85-006-001	CHANGES TO 050 NOTES	NSRS	08/09/85	·F·	//		08/09/85	HANGERS	
	PH-85-012-001	INSPECT OF WELDS	ERT	07/19/85	.T.	//		07/19/85	WELDING	
	PH-85-018-001	AUDIT FINDS WITHHELD	ERT	07/10/85	.F.	//		07/10/85	QA	
		FALSE WELD CERTF CRD		10/24/85	.T.	/ /		//	WELDING	
		WELDER CERT CARD FAL	ERT/OGC	10/24/85	·T·	//		//	WELDING	
		INSPECT THRU PAINT	ERT	11/06/85	.T.	//		//	WELDING	
		PROCEDURE VIOLATIONS		11/01/85	.F.	//		11	CIVIL	
	WI-85-055-001	WELDER RECERTIFICATI	ERT	09/24/85	.T.	1 1		10/02/85	WELDING	
	WI-85-056-001	NOT FOLLOW CODE REQU	ERT	09/24/85	.T.	//		10/02/85	WELDING	
	** Subtotal **									
		2 CRITICALITY								
		TUBING NOT CLAMPED	NSRS	09/03/85				/ /	HANGERS	
		INCORE THERMO TEST	NSRS	07/03/85		/ /		//	TESTING	
		SHUTDN BDS TOP OPEN	NSRS			07/22/85		07/22/85	ELECTRICAL	
		INADEQUATE INSPECTS	ERT			10/10/85	F	//	HANGERS	
		MN STM LOADS SUPPORT	ERT	07/11/85		/ /		07/11/85	DESIGN	
		BOLTS REPLAC BY WELD		11/07/85		/ /		//	WELDING	•
		INSL ON CONDT & CABL				09/24/85		10/10/85	ELECTRICAL	
		WELDING SEQUENCE	ERT			08/05/85	F	//	WELDING	
		CONDENS POTS, \$1	ERT	07/15/85		//		07/14/85	DESIGN	
		INSUFFNT MOVEMT/NVR	NSRS	08/09/85		//		08/09/85	DESIGN	
		DIFFUSER FLOW	ERT			07/25/85		07/25/85		
		TRNSM NOT READ SAME	NSRS	08/15/85	·T·	12/04/85	T	12/10/85	DESIGN	
		CONCRETE ERCW LINES	NSRS.	07/11/85				07/11/85	MECHANICAL	
		SUBSTD WEAK CONCRETE		11/07/85		/ /		//	CIVIL	
		GOUGE IN LINE, 1#	ERT			09/24/85	T	10/17/85	MECHANICAL	
		EXCAV ARC STRK SYS72		10/21/85		//		//	WELDING	
	IN-85-485-X01		NSRS	11/07/85		/ /		//	CIVIL	
		FIRE PROTECT SYSTEM	NSRS	10/08/85		/ /		11	DESIGN	
		INADEQ SURVL INSTRUC		10/09/85		/ /		10/09/85		
٠		RO NOT AVAILABLE	NSRS			10/16/85	T		<b>OPERATIONS</b>	
		TARGET ROCK VALVES	NŠRS	10/25/85		/ /		1 1	DESIGN	
		SYS43 HANGER DESIGN	NSRS	11/20/85		/ /		11	HANGERS	
		CRACKS IN WF 33 BEAM		10/10/85		/ /		10/16/85		
		PVC CONDUITS BROKEN	NSRS	12/03/85		1 1			ELECTRICAL	
	XX-85-020-001	SQN/ECNS APPLICABILI	NSRS	11/19/85	.F.	//		11/19/85	<b>OPERATIONS</b>	

QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST	DATE	S	DATE	A	DATE	KEY
		ORG	REPORT	U	RESPONSE	С	INVEST	WORD
				В		C	CLOSED	
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\*\* Subtotal \*\*

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** MILESTONE:	3 5% POWER							
IN-85-001-002	WELD ROD CONTROL	ERT	07/10/85	.F.	1. 1		07/06/85	WELDING
IN-85-016-001	BROKN CONCRE AT PLAT	NSRS/ERT			11		08/04/85	
	BACKDATE CERTF CARDS		08/19/85		11		11	WELDING
IN-85-027-002	COMPUTER ANALYSIS	ERT	08/01/85	.T.	11/20/85	F	11	DESIGN
IN-85-052-008	PROCED FOR WELD RODS	ERT			12/16/85		11	WELDING
IN-85-064-001	SPRAY ON SHUTDN BDS	NSRS	06/28/85	.T.	11		06/28/85	ELECTRICAL
IN-85-086-001	STM GEN MATERIALS	ERT	07/10/85	.F.	11			MATERIAL
IN-85-108-001		ERT	07/12/85	.F.	11			MATERIAL
	WELDER CERTIFICATION	ERT	07/10/85	·T·	11/12/85	T	11/20/85	
	OPER WATCH VS PAPER	NSRS	08/30/85	·T·	10/16/85	T		<b>OPERATIONS</b>
	UNFOLLOWED WORK PLAN		12/03/85	·T.	//		11	CONSTRUCTI
	BOARDS IN ELEC PANEL	ERT	07/05/85	.F.	09/23/85	T	09/23/85	ELECTRICAL
	ERCW LINE LEAK	NSRS	06/27/85	·F·	//			MECHANICAL
	IMPROPER VALVE OPER	ERT	07/05/85	.T.	09/23/85	T	09/23/85	<b>OPERATIONS</b>
	WELD ROD CONTROL	ERT	11/27/85	.T.	11		11	WELDING
	WELD CERTIFICATIONS	ERT	09/26/85	.T.	11		10/03/85	WELDING
	UPDATE WELD CERTIFIC		09/26/85	.T.	11		10/03/85	
	HEAT CODE TRACEABILI		07/03/85	.T.	07/26/85	T		MATERIAL
	STMFIT PERFM WELDING		11/27/85		11		11	WELDING
	ACCOUNT OF WELD RODS		11/27/85	.T.	11		11	WELDING
	INADEQ CERTF OF WELD		08/19/85	.T.	11		11	WELDING
	DELAY IN DOCUMT DRWS		11/22/85	.F.	//		11/27/85	DOCUMENT
	LINES CLOSE TO HANGR		07/30/85	·T·	08/09/85	T	09/08/85	MECHANICAL
	INADEQ WELD CERTIFIC		09/26/85	.T.	//		10/03/85	
IN-85-501-001	UNUSED WLD RDS DISPO	ERT	09/03/85		//		11	WELDING
IN-85-532-004	WELDER RECERTIFICATE	ERT	09/26/85		. / /		10/03/85	
	RECERT W/O VERIFICAT	ERT	09/26/85		11		10/03/85	WELDING
	FIRE PROT LINES	NSRS	10/22/85	.F.	11		10/22/85	DESIGN
	INADE WELD CERTIFICA		09/26/85		11		10/03/85	WELDING
	INADEQ WELD CERTIFIC		09/26/85	.T.	//		10/03/85	WELDING
	INCOMP STAIN STEL LN	NSRS	09/03/85	.F.	11		09/03/85	CONSTRUCTI
	INCOMPLETE WELD	ERT	12/03/85	.T.	11		11	WELDING
IN-85-612-006	INADEQ WELD CERTIFIC	ERT		.T.	11		10/03/85	
IN-85-671-004	WELDS NOT PROP INSPE	NSRS	10/22/85		11		10/22/85	
IN-85-705-001	UNQUALIFIED PERSONNE	ERT	09/28/85		11			CONSTRUCTI
IN-85-725-X14	INADQ RECERT PROG	ERT	11/05/85		11		11	WELDING
IN-85-725-X15	TEST PLATES INADQ	ERT	11/05/85		11		11	WELDING
IN-85-778-001	WELDER CERTIFICATION	ERT	09/26/85		11		10/15/85	
	UNAPPROV BEND PROCED				10/18/85	T	10/30/85	
IN-85-845-004	IMPROPER WELDING	NSRS	10/10/85	.F.	/ /	•	10/16/85	
IN-86-055-002		NSRS	11/22/85		11			MAINTENANC
IN-86-083-003	PRODUCTION VS QUALIT	NSRS	12/05/85		11		/ /	TESTING

QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C ?	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD
IN-86-169-001 IN-86-173-001 IN-86-205-001 IN-86-259-006 IN-86-262-003 IN-86-268-003 IN-86-291-007 PH-85-001-002 WI-85-053-003	DESIGN CALCULATIONS ERCW UNSUITABLE INADQ SEPAR OF CABLE EXCEED MAX PULL TENS IMPROPER INSTAL CABL SECURITY CLEAR PERS INST LNS SLOPE PROB IMPORP WELDING DOCUM TEST DIR NOT QUAL DRAINS PLUGGED UP	NSRS NSRS NSRS NSRS ERT	10/09/85 11/26/85 10/28/85 12/03/85 11/01/85 10/31/85 11/01/85 12/03/85 07/06/85 11/14/85 10/25/85 11/22/85	.T. .F. .T. .T. .T.	/ / / / / / / / 09/20/85	T	/ / / / 12/11/85 / / 11/04/85 / / 09/23/85 / / 11/27/85	ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL OPERATIONS
IN-85-010-004 IN-85-021-002 IN-85-218-001 IN-85-407-001 IN-85-688-003 IN-85-945-001 IN-85-998-002	ELEC MANHOLES DISORG IRN PROG NEEDS IMPRO EFFECT OF QA DEPT	NSRS NSRS	09/16/85 08/23/85 07/29/85 10/04/85 10/04/85 10/22/85 12/03/85 11/19/85	.T. .T. .T.	/ / 08/22/85 : / / / / / /	T	09/24/85 08/30/85 08/22/85 / / / / / / 11/21/85	DESIGN INSTRUMENT DESIGN DESIGN ELECTRICAL QA
** MILESTONE: EX-85-012-001 IN-85-078-001 IN-85-196-003 IN-85-272-004 IN-85-352-002 IN-85-424-001 IN-85-453-009 IN-85-454-004 IN-85-496-002 IN-85-618-004 IN-85-825-002 IN-85-913-001	UNQUALIFIED PERSONNE UO/SAFTY RELATE SYST VALVE OPER INADEQ FIREPROOFING CABLES NO PORT WELD OVENS NO PORT OVENS PASS OF WELD ROD PASS OF WELD ROD LINER OF ERCW PIPING DAMAGED INST TUBING CLAIRTY IN PROCEDURE ELECT JUNCTION BOXES ELECT JUNCTION BOXES	NSRS ERT NSRS ERT ERT ERT ERT ERT NSRS NSRS NSRS NSRS	09/28/85 10/14/85 08/24/85 12/10/85 11/27/85 11/27/85 11/27/85 11/27/85 10/03/85 08/12/85 10/22/85 11/26/85	.F. .T. .T. .T. .F.	/ / 11/25/85 ' / / / / / / / / / / / /	T	12/10/85 12/12/85 / / / / / / / /	CONSTRUCTI OPERATIONS OPERATIONS DESIGN WELDING WELDING WELDING WELDING WELDING MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTI OPERATIONS ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL

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QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B		TE ONSE	A C C ?	IN	ATE /EST OSED	KEY WORD
** MILESTONE: 6 IN-85-020-001 IM ** Subtotal **	09/02/85 PROP INSTAL REDHDS	NSRS/ERT	08/15/85	.т.	/	/		/	1	CIVIL
	1ST REFUEL CW LINE NOT STAINL QUIRE FOR WELD ROD		10/03/85 11/27/85			/		//	//	MECHANICAL WELDING
** MILESTONE: 6 IN-86-145-002 CO ** Subtotal **	I85-166W>N NCRETE LINING APAR	NSRS	10/03/85	.F.	/	/		/	/	MECHANICAL
** MILESTONE: 6 EX-85-021-001 IN ** Subtotal **	IN85-052008 ADEQUAT ACCOUNTABI	ERT	11/27/85	.т.	/	/		/	/	WELDING
IN-85-426-002 IN IN-85-815-001 CE	IN85-113003 RIFI PROCESS/WELD ADEQ WELD CERTIFIC RTIFICATI OF WELDR LDING CERTIFICATIO	ERT ERT	09/26/85 09/26/85 09/26/85 09/26/85	.T.				10/0	3/85 3/85	WELDING WELDING WELDING WELDING
** MILESTONE: 6 IN-86-167-001 NO ** Subtotal **	IN85-150001 TRACEABIL OF RODS	ERT -	11/27/85	.т.	.,	/		/	/	WELDING
** MILESTONE: 6 IN-85-441-003 NO ** Subtotal **		- ERT	11/27/85	.т.	/	/		/	/	WELDING
	IN85-406001 AUT ACCS TO WLD SY NG OF WELD STATUS		08/27/85 08/27/85	.T.	//	/			-	Welding Welding

QTC NUMBER	SUBJECT	INVEST	DATE REPORT	S U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD	
	6 IN85-415002 INPROP INSTAL PIPING	NCDC	10/11/85	P	/ /		10/16/85	MATERIAL	
	LINING LOSS IN PIPE	NSRS	10/11/85		//		/ /	MECHANICAL	
	LINER ON ERCW LINE	NSRS	10/03/85		//		//	MECHANICAL	
	CONCRETE LIN IN PIPE		10/03/85		1.1		11	MECHANICAL	
	GOUT LINER/SAFTY HAZ		10/03/85		11		11	MECHANICAL	
** Subtotal *			20,03,00	•••	, ,		, ,		
** MILESTONE:	6 NO DATE								
	DESIGN DEFICIENCY	NSRS	11/07/85	.т.	//		//	WELDING	
	WELDERS REQUALIFICAT	ERT	10/23/85		//		10/30/85		
	"SHODDY WORKMANSHIP"	NSRS	12/10/85		11		12/12/85		
IN-85-007-003	VENDOR WELDS INSPECT	NSRS	12/10/85		11		12/12/85		
IN-85-103-001	IEB 79-02	NSRS	08/09/85	.T.	11		08/09/85	DESIGN	
IN-85-198-001	UNCOVERED CABLE TRAY	NSRS	12/04/85	·T·	11		12/09/85	CONSTRUCTI	
IN-85-279-005	NO TRACKING SYSTEM	NSRS	11/13/85	·T.	11		11/15/85		
IN-85-289-006	VERMASCO APPL PREMAT	NSRS	11/27/85	.T.	11		11/29/85	ELECTRICAL	
	ERCW LN W/CEMENT LIN	NSRS	10/03/85	.F.	11		11	MECHANICAL	
	DAMAGED CABLE	NSRS	06/28/85	·T·	07/25/85	T	07/25/85	ELECTRICAL	
	LACK OF WELD ROD CON	ERT	11/27/85	·T·	//		11	WELDING	
	UNREQ PORT OVENS	ERT	11/27/85	·T·	11		//	WELDING	
	OVERSIZED WELDS	NSRS	08/16/85	·T·	/ /		//	WELDING	
	DETERORIATE STEEL	NSRS	07/29/85	·F·	09/26/85	T	07/29/85	CONSTRUCTI	
	ERCW LINE IMPROP INS	NSRS	11/19/85		/ /		//	MECHANICAL	
	INADQ DOC FOR ERCW	NSRS	11/19/85		/ /		//	MECHANICAL	
	LIN ACPT WITH DEFAUL	NSRS	12/12/85		/ /		12/12/85	_	
	DRAWING CONTROL	NSRS	10/17/85		/ /			DOCUMENT	
	PWR LOST SYST INOPER		12/09/85		/ /		12/12/85		
	IMPROP MAT/EQIUP USE		12/10/85		./ /			MATERI AL	
	USE OF "SUPERGLUE"	NSRS	12/04/85		/ /			CONSTRUCTI	
		NSRS.	11/01/85		/ /			DOCUMENT	
	INADQ ICE LOADING TRACEABILITY NOT ATT	NSRS	10/25/85		/ /		10/30/85		
	ANCHOR NOT TEST INDI		11/27/85		/ /		/ /	WELDING	
	CAB PULL/REQ PER QCI		10/24/85		/ /		10/30/85		
	SUPPORT NOT SAFE	NSRS	10/31/85		/ /			ELECTRICAL	
	CAB PULL LIMIT EXCEE		12/11/85 10/31/85		/ /		12/12/85	ELECTRICAL	
IN-86-221-001	RED HEADS NOT REMOVE	NSRS	12/09/85		//		12/12/85		
	REPAIR EPCW VIOLAT	NSRS	10/03/85		//		/ /	MECHANICAL	
	FAILURF SE FUSE LIN		10/31/85		11			ELECTRICAL	
	OVERFILLED CABLE TRA		11/14/85		11		/ /	ELECTRICAL	
	TVA PROC NO IEEE STD		11/14/85		11		11	DESIGN	
	OVERCROWDING CABLES	NSRS	11/14/85		11		11	ELECTRICAL	
	LACK OF COVERAGE	NSRS	10/31/85		11			ELECTRICAL	
	IRNS NOT QUAL RECORD	NSRS	12/03/85		11		11	QA	

QTC NUMBER	Subject	INVEST ORG	DATE REPORT	S U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD
IN-86-314-004 WI-85-040-001 WI-85-040-002 WI-85-041-001	NO FIRE DAMPERS INADQ CABLE SEPARATI NCR FOR ERCW LINE INADQ PROC/INSP PLAN WELD MAT INADEQUATE WELDER CERTIFICATION	NSRS NSRS ERT	12/10/85 11/27/85 11/19/85 11/19/85 11/27/85 11/12/85	.T. .F. .T.	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /		12/10/85 11/29/85 / / / / / /	DESIGN ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL MECHANICAL WELDING WELDING
	6 PH85-001002 IMPROPER LINE INSTAL	ERT	09/18/85	.т.	10/22/85	T	10/30/85	INSTRUMENT
IN-85-189-002 IN-85-246-005 IN-85-250-001 IN-85-530-001 IN-85-615-001	LEAK IN SPRINK SYS ACCESS TO VALVES/#2 RUSTED WELDS/#2/RB INSP PERF W/O WK REL WLDS NOT ACCRD PROCD OBSTRUCTED ACCESS HANGER UNACCEP WELDS	NSRS NSRS	08/13/85 10/04/85 10/24/85 11/27/85 08/15/85 10/04/85 11/27/85	.F. .T. .F.	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /		08/13/85 10/04/85 // 11/29/85 08/15/85 10/04/85 11/29/85	WELDING HANGERS WELDING DESIGN
** MTLESTONE: EX-85-008-001	7 N/A UNQUAL SUBJOURNEYMEN	ERT	09/28/85	.т.	/ /		//	 CONSTRUCTI
EX-85-009-001	SUBSTN WK BY SUBJRMN	ERT	09/28/85		, ,		11	CONSTRUCTI
	UNQAUL SUBJOURNEYMEN		09/28/85	.T.	//		11	CONSTRUCTI
IN-85-021-001		ERT			10/22/85	r		CONSTRUCTI
	PIPING CALCULATIONS LOST DOCUMENTATION	ERT	11/26/85				11/29/85	
	UNQUILIFIED PERSONNE	ERT .	09/16/85		/ /		/ /	DOCUMENT
	INSTAL PIPE W/O DRWG		09/28/85 11/27/85		//		11/29/85	CONSTRUCTI CONSTRUCTI
	INADQ DOCUMENT CONTR		12/10/85				12/12/85	
	SAFTY HAZ ON PLATFRM				08/09/85	r	09/08/85	DOCUMENT
	CONTAM DURING CUTTIN		08/22/85		/ /	•	/ /	INSTRUMENT
	REQ WELD ON 2 SIDES	NSRS	08/15/85		//		08/15/85	
IN-85-556-001	SUBJ DOING JOUR WORK	ERT	09/28/85		, ,		//	WELDING
	SUBJ DOING JOURN WRK		09/28/85		, ,		11	WELDING
	TIE-IN OF SEAL DRAIN		08/16/85	·F·	//		08/16/85	DESIGN
	BFN/SUPTS ON RHR SYS		10/12/85		11		11	<b>OPERATIONS</b>
XX-85-001-001	SQN/D-G BATTERIES	NSRS	11/18/85		11			QA
/ XX-85-007-002	SQN/LEAK DUE TO MGMT		12/13/85		1 1			<b>OPERATIONS</b>
	SQN/WRONG WELD ROD	ERT	08/22/85		/ /		08/27/85	
VV-02-013-001	BLN/AUDIT FINDINGS	ERT	07/10/85	·F·	/ /		07/10/85	QA

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BJECT	I NVEST ORG	DATE S REPORT U B ?	DATE RESPONSE	A C C	DATE INVEST CLOSED	KEY WORD	#
TRAIN ENGI NE TRAIN ENGI NE 5-096-005 NE DR TUBE PRO NE	NSRS NSRS NSRS NSRS NSRS NSRS SSRS SSRS	12/09/85 .F. 11/26/85 .T. 11/26/85 .F. 11/26/85 .F. 12/09/85 .F. 12/09/85 .F. 12/13/05 .F. 12/12/85 .F. 11/29/85 .F. 11/29/85 .F. 11/26/85 .T. 11/26/85 .T. 12/09/85 .F. 2/09/85 .F. 2/09/85 .F.		11 11 11	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /	OPERATIONS DESIGN QA WELDING OA	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

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# Memorandum

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO :	E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	
FROM :	K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review S E3A8 C-K	
DATE :	DEC 1 2 1985	
SUBJECT:	NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL	, <del></del> <del>-</del>
	Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No	· •····
	SubjectQUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY IN INSTRUMENTATION	
	Concern No	_
	and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.	
	It is requested that you respond to this report and the attache	<b>d</b>
	recommendations by January 9, 1986. Should you have any quest	ions 3TH
	please contact D. K. Baker at telephone 3752-WBN	The second secon
	Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X No	
	Director, NSRS/Designee	TO BAR TO CONTROL
•	DKB:GDM	17.85
	Attachment	. 55
	cc (Attachment):	
	R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C	10 3 6
	D.R. Nichols, E10A14 C-K QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	2 3 6
	H. S. Sanger, EllB33 C-K	
	E. K. Sliger, LP6N48A-C	
	W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)	
	The state of the s	
	. U. A. District M. S.	
	Copy and Return	
?o :	K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K	landad
rom:	W. T. Cottle, Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P&E (Nuclean	ır)
ate:	December 18, 1985	
ı	I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. <u>I-85-523-WBN</u> Subject QUANTITY VS QUALITY/INSTRUMENTATION for action/disposit	ion.

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

# NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

# NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-85-523-WBN

# EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-858-001

# MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT:	QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY IN INSTRU	MENTATION
DATES OF INVESTIGATION:	October 18-November 4, 1985	
LEAD INVESTIGATOR:	D. K. Baker	/2-6-85
INVESTIGATOR:	F. Many	17-4-85 Date
REVIEWED BY:	PR Washer	12-9-85 Date
APPROVÉD BY:	M. A. Harrison	13 · 9 · 87

#### I. BACK GROUND

1.

NSAS has investigated Employee Concern IN-85-858-001 which Guality Technology Company identified during the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern is worded:

Instrumentation seems more concerned with quantity rather than quality workmanship. Example: Instrumentation line in south valve room had interference with 36" pipe. CI brought this to the attention of supervisor and was told not to be concerned. Per CI, supervisory staff wanted to buy-off the supports and could re-route the line afterwards. Location: Unit 2, time: March 1985. CI also stated this type of poor workmanship are constantly.

#### II. SCOPE

The issues of the investigation were determined from the stated concern to be:

- A. Instrument line had interference with process piping.
- B. Supervisor wanted to buy off supports and reroute line later.
- C. This type of poor workmanship occurs constantly.

Based on the description given in the concern, NSRS reviewed the program and procedures related to instrument-line routing and inspection. This history of instrument-line routing was examined to determine if poor workmanship would be rejected by inspection procedures. The procedures were examined to determine if they allowed activities described in the concern to occur. The rejection rate of inspections was examined to determine their frequency. Visual inspections were made in the south valve room of Units 1 and 2 to determine if such workmanship was apparent. Interviews were performed with QC inspection personnel to determine their understanding of the inspection process.

### III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The investigation of this concern included the following: datermination of what constitutes interference; review of procedures; review of procedure and criteria changes; fraquency of inspection rejection notices (IRN); and, quantity versus quality.

A. Instrument-line interference to process piping was datermined to be either physical interference which would make it physically impossible to actually install instrument lines or interference with the process pipe's clearance envelope which could result in inadequate insulation clearance, violate train separation, or separation from high-energy pipe breaches. All of these were considered in the investigation.

### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECEMBENDATIONS

### A. Conclusions

The concern of duantity versus quality was substantiated to the degree that it showed that the mechanism exists for accepting instrument—line hanger supports knowing that the instrument line would have to be remoted and the supports possibly reworked. In addition, the current system of separate tests (No. 57) for each support rewards poor quality work by giving production credit for installing a support that would have to be reworked and subsequent additional credit given for the reworking of the support. Final acceptance of the subassemply is dependent on the successful completion of test No. 52. This portion of the concern would not be a safety issue since the line routing and the supports must be correct prior to final acceptance. This is an issue of efficiency and dood work practices.

The line for a pressure transmitter (PT 2-2A) on steam generator loss I was run 2.5 inches from the steam line. Although it does not meet the intent of note to on Drawing 47%600-0-4 £16, "... and where cractical by a minimum of 10 inches ...", where practical is so vague that no criteria was violated. Drawing notes 6A, B, C, D, F. S. and H adequately cover train and protection-set separation. A review of the drawing notes and procedures showed that the other criteria adequately cover safety considerations. Running of instrument lines to common trains and protection sets should meet the 10-inch-minimum distance criteria except when physically impossible or truly impractical. Although no safety considerations are violated, notching of insulation to provide clearance is not good engineering practice.

Based on the frequency rate of IRN generation of less than 10 percent, there was no indication that this type of work occurs frequently.

### B. Recommendations

# I-85-5232WBN-01 - Support Cradit when Subassembly Approxed

WBN should investigate methods of tying QCP-3.11-1 and QCP-3.11-2 closer together to eliminate the mechanism which allows supports to be bought off prior to inspection of line routing. An alternative to this would be not allowing credit for each support (individual tests No. 59 of QCP-3.11-1) until test No. 52 of QCP-3.11-2 for the entire subassembly is approved.

# I=85-523-WBN-90 - Specific Criteria for Separation

WBN should investigate methods to allow deviation to the 10-inch minimum separation to process lines given in Routing and Separation Instruction Note &e on Drawing 47W600-0-4. This should be performed with specific criteria and not subjective wording as is currently being used.

# Memorandum

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO :	E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar M	uclear Plant		
FROM :	K. W. Whitt, Director of Muclear Safety	Review Staff,	E3A8 C-K	
DATE :	DEC 16 1985		WI	B-
SUBJECT:	NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATI	ON REPORT TRANS	SMITTAL	
		-1.	WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT	
	~		SITE OUTSCIOUS OF	FICE
	Transmitted herein is MSRS Report No	I-85-727	-MBMin. I A .O	5
	SubjectACCOUNTABILIT	Y OF METE USE		
	Concern No IN-86-11	2 001	اء ا	6 4
	18-56-11	2-001	The X're	र ह
	and associated recommendations for your	action/disposi	t-lon.	
	It is requested that you respond to thi	s report and th	attached	
		<u>-</u>	- which	#
	recommendations by <u>January 16, 1986</u> .	Should you have	any question	DS.
	please contact T. O. Frizzellat	telephone3	651-WBM	##
	Recommend Reportability Determination:	Yes X No	•	
		Misk .		· <del></del>
		Director, NSRS	S/Designee	-
	San. anu			
•	TOF:GDM Attachment			
	cc (Attachment):		•	•
	R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C			•
	D. R. Nichols, ElOAl4 C-K			
	QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	•		
	H. S. Sanger, EllB33 C-K		• •	
**	E. K. Sliger, LP6N48A-C		·	•
	W. F. Willis, El2Bl6 C-K (4)		•	
		- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-	STH Ale
×.	Copy and Retur	rn		
To :	K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safet	y Review Staff,	E3A8 C-K	
From:	W. T. Cottle Site Director Warrs Bay	r Nuclear Plant	P&E (Nuclea	r)
Date:	December 18, 1985		W <sub>a</sub>	
		~		
	I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS R Subject ACCOUNTABILITY OF METE USE for			<del>-</del>
<b>.</b>	The state of the s			g 3000

### TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

## NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

## NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-85-727-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-86-112-001

MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT:

ACCOUNTABILITY OF M&TE USE

DATES OF INVESTIGATION:

November 19-December 5, 1965

INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

#### . BACKGROUND :

Э

NSKS has investigated Employee Concern IN-S6-112-001 which was communicated to the Guality Technology Company (GTC) in response to the Watts Bar Employee Concern Program. The specific concern reviewed and discussed in this report was expressed by GTC to NSKS as follows.

The use of calibrated instruments and tools is not properly documented. The personnel responsible for this activity receive inadequate procedural training.

Further information was requested from QTC regarding the specific nature of the measuring and test equipment (M&TE) documentation problem discussed in the submitted NUC PR concern. In an effort to focus the direction of the investigation, inquiries were made as to whether a particular WBN plant section was identified, the types of M&TE involved, and the timeframe of concern occurrences. GTC related that the concerned individual (CI) identified documentation of NUC PR n&TE issuance as the area needing investigation and that known problems existed as late as September 1985. Also, to support the determination of the plant section where activities of concern were occurring, QTC provided the name of the CI's immediate supervisor. From this information, and based on an example of the M&TE issuance documentation problem which the CI had discussed with GTC, it was assessed that the concern investigation should be directed at the M&TE issued by the WBN Support Services Materials Unit.

#### II. SCOPE

- A. The scope of this NSRS investigation was defined by the concern of record which entails verification of compliance with established NUC FR requirements for the documentation of MaTE issuance and determining the adequacy of program training provided to M&TE issue and user personnel.
- B. As a basis for investigation conclusions, reviews were made of the most recent NRC and Quality Assurance audit or survey reports which address the topic of control of M&TE to determine if the elements of concern had been previously identified. NUC PR corporate—level M&TE program criteria were compared against WBN procedures and instructions to assure compatibility with the requirements for training of program—implementing personnel and documentation of M&TE issuance. Records reviews and interviews with cognizant WBN Materials Unit, Training Section, and Instrument Maintenance Section employees were conducted to assess the adequacy of program training provided to M&TE issue and user personnel. Also, an examination was made of the program processes for the actual issuance of onsite NUC PR M&TE.

#### III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#### A. Requirements and Commitments

- 1. Topical Report TVA-TR75-1A, "Quality Assurance Program Description for Design, Construction, and Oberation, "Revision 8. Sections 17.2.2.3 and 17.2.12
- ANSI N18.7-1976, "Administrative Control and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants," Paragraphs 3.3 and 5.2.16
- 3. NOAM Part IH, Section 3.1, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision dated 8/21/84, Paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.7, and 3.8
- 4. NOAM, Part III, Section 4.1, "Guality Assurance Récords," Revision dated 5/15/85
- 5. NGAM, Fart III, Section 5.1. "Selection and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision dated 10/12/84
- 6. WBN Administrative Instruction AI-5.9. "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment." Revision 26 dated 9/13/85
- 7. WBN Administrative Instruction AI-10.1, "Plant Training Program," Revision 14 dated 7/6/85

#### B. Findings

The results of the most recent audit conducted by the NUC PR Division of Quality Assurance (DQA) on the WBN control of M&TE 1. program was presented in report GWB-A-85-0014 which was issued 6/27/85. During the audit performance the audit team identified and reported that there was no consistency between plant sections on the various section-level control programs for M&TE and therefore recommended that WBN develop and implement a plant-level program. It was stated that a central point of control along with a consistent program for all plant sections would enhance the WBN M&TE control activities. It was also identified that an item of M&TE was checked out of the tool room and logged as being used on one activity but actually was being used on multiple activities, thereby circumventing the log system for traceability of M&TE utilization. In addition to these adverse conditions, the audit team occumented two quality program deviations dealing with inadequacies in the M&TE controlling procedure and the failure of some plant sections to fully implement the established requirements for the control of In responding to this audit report (memorandum from E. R. Ennis to G. W. Killian dated 7/29/85), WBN plant management committed that by 9715/85 a new plant-level instruction covering the M&TE program would be developed and implemented to resolve the identified deviations. With reward to the accountability of M&TE utilization, the response stated that the new plant instruction (AI-5.9, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment") would require each user of M&TE to be responsible for listing all CSSC usages on an issue log sheet and that employees would be instructed on the proper

implementation of AI-5.9.

- 2. The team leader for DGA Audit GW8-A-85-0014 was contacted on 11/25/85 to determine the implementation status of the corrective actions committed to resolve the reported inacequacies with the W8N M&TD program. It was related that Instruction AI-5.9, issued on 9/13/85, had been reviewed and found acceptable in defining a plant-level M&TE control program which meets the intent of the established quality standards and requirements. Also, it was indicated that implementation of the new M&TE control program, including training of issue and user personnel, had not been reviewed for adequacy. However, the DGA representative clearly stated that acceptable resolution of the identified deviations would be based in part on the verification that adequate and documented training on AI-5.9 has been provided to all appropriate M&TE issue/user personnel.
- On 7/15/85 the Plant Quality Assurance (PGA) Staff issued Report WBN-AS-85-51 which cocumented the results of a survey conducted? to ensure traceability/accountability of M&TE used to perform maintenance on CSSC equipment. This report documented numerous observations to support the report's concluding adverse condition that plant instructions in effect at the time did not preclude the utilization of M&TE on work not specified in the accountability log. The POA report indicated that due to this adverse condition. M&TE utilization traceability was lost and the tool room M&TE accountability log was rendered an incomplete quality assurance record. As a result of the survey findings. PQA issued Corrective Action Report (CAR) WB-CAR-85-28 to the Site Services and Instrument Maintenance Sections for resolution of the program inadequacies. As with the response to DQA Audit Report GWB-A-85-0014, the response to the CAR stated that the WBN M&TE program was being revised and placed under the procedural control of an administrative instruction (AI-5.9). It also stated that AI-5.9 would contain new language which specified that each person using M&TE was to list all CSSC applications and usages on the applicable M&TE checkout logs and that all CSSC tool room attendants would be properly trained in all aspects of the new instruction.
- 4. Cognizant PQA personnel were interviewed regarding the status of corrective actions for WB-CAR-85-28. In addition to their verbal confirmation, documentary evidence was provided which verified that PQA had examined the issued AI-5.9 M&TE program description and found it acceptable. The documentation also conveyed that as of 9/30/85 all CSSC tool room attendants were "informally" trained on the criteria of AI-5.9. However, PQA had not considered or pursued having all WBN M&TE user personnel trained to the new AI-5.9 M&TE program.

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Report Numbers 50-370/85-53 and 50-371/85-43 were transmitted to TVA on 10/25/85 to formally present the results of an inspection conducted at WBN between 8/20/85 and 9/20/85. Included within the NRC inspection scope was a review of the WBN m&TE program implementation. The inspectors identified and respirted that a consistend M&TE procram did not exist among the various plant sections and that the lack of consistency presented problems in records retrievals and verification of proces program implementation. It was also reported that accountability of the M&TE utilization, which is necessary for evaluating the effect of an as-found out-sf-tolerance condition affecting previously completed worker did not appear to be adequately controlled. The inspectors noted, however, that on 9/13/85 a new administrative instruction (AI-5.9) was issued as the plant-level controlling document for M&TE. This AI was reviewed by the inspector and found to contain three significant changes to the previously delineated MWTE program. These noted changes were as follow.
  - a. The records for all M&TE at WBN will be maintained in one central file.
  - b. All CSSC applications and usages of each piece of M&TE will be listed in that equipment's file.
  - c. The responsibilities to establish and supervise the M&TE program have been consolidated from five onsite organizations into three (Division of Power System Operations, NUC PR WBN Support Services, and NUC PR WBN Instrument Maintenance).

In concluding the discussion on the WBN M&TE program, NRC indicated that the effectiveness of the AI-5.7 program implementation would be reviewed in the future as an inspector followup item.

- 6. WBN AI-5.9 was independently reviewed by NSRS and compared against the M&TE program criteria referenced in Section III.A of this report. As with DGA, it was assessed that the program description was adequate in defining a plant-level M&TE control program. It was also noted, however, that certain program changes were described in AI-5.9 which emphasized the need for additional training or retraining of M&TE issue/user personnel. Specifically, the newly defined WBN program provides criteria for handling radioactivity-contaminated M&TE, crimping tools, and go/no-go gauges. Also, AI-5.9 establishes several program requirements, the implementation of which is highly dependent upon the procedural knowledge of the individual M&TE user. Examples of these current M&TE program responsibilities assigned to the user include the following.
  - a. Verification that the utilized M&TE calibration date is current.
  - b. Documenting all CSSC applications and usages of the M&TE.

- c. Reporting to defined personnel any M&TE that is suspected of not meeting any requirement set forth in AI-S.9.
- d. Methods for handling out-of-calibration, damaged, or lost M&TE.
- 7. An interview was held on 11/22/95 with the cognizant unit supervisor of the WBN Engineering and Technical Training Section (E&TTS). It was related that the plant training organization had no knowledge of the WBN response to the DBA Audit Report GWB-A-85-0014 which committed to instructing plant employees in the proper implementation of AI-5.7. It was also related that no records of this training have been received from the other plant sections for maintenance by E&TTS.
- 8. Discussions were held with appropriate management and instructor personnel of the WBN Instrument Maintenance Section to determine if AI-E.9 training had been provided to M&TE user personnel as committed. As indicated by the WBN training organization, the instrument maintenance contacts stated that they were unaware of the AI-E.9 training committment and, therefore, the training had not been accomplished. However, the actual need for the training was readily acknowledged, and it was stated that efforts would be expended to schedule and conduct the training in the near future.
- The overall scope and implementation of the WBN M&TE issuance program was reviewed with the supervisor of the WBN Support Services Materials Unit. It was verified that actual issuance of WBN NUC FR M&TE is performed by Materials' Unit personnel, including the M&TE issued from the WBN Instrument Maintenance Section's tool room. This arrangement basically places the issuance control of all the onsite NUC FR M&TE under the responsibility of the Materials Unit. Upon questioning, the unit supervisor indicated that M&TE issue personnel had been "informally" instructed in the new AI-5.9 procedure by on-the-job training and that no formal training documentation had been generated. He also indicated that, to his knowledge, M&TE user personnel had not been trained on AI-5.9 but agreed with the need to do so.
- 10. WBN Administrative Instruction AI-10.1, "Plant Training Program." was referenced to determine if documentation requirements existed for the "informal" AI-5.9 training which was provided to the M&TE issue personnel. It was noted that "informal training" is addressed in AI-10.1 as a specific form of instruction with established documentation criteria. Informal training is defined as that which is initiated within the various plant sections due to procedure/instruction revisions or in response to inspections, audits, or surveys by NRC, NSRS, OGAB, or the Plant QA Staff. AI-10.1 indicates that the defined documentation for informal training will be filed in the initiating section's files, because these documents are not considered QA records. NSRS considers the initiation, conduct, and documentation of training within the various plant sections

to the an acceptable method for maintaining the knowledge and proficiency of section employees. However, the AI-10.1 position that training documentation is not quality assurance records does not appear appropriate. This is particularly true when the training is conducted as a method of corrective action for identified program deficiencies.

#### IV. COMELUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

- A. Each of the latest reviews conducted by NRC, the Division of Quality Assurance, and Plant Quality Assurance Staff on the WBN M&TE control program has identified and reported that problems exist with the accountability of M&TE utilization. Based on this, the submitted concern regarding the use of M&TE not being properly documented was substantiated. However, subsequent to the concern submittal and in response to the noted regulatory and quality M&TE program reviews. several significant WBN M&TE control program changes have occurred to resolve the accountability of M&TE use problem. Specifically. the M&TE control program description has been elevated to a plant-level administrative instruction which is applicable to all onsite organizations. Also, control of all NUC FR M&TE issuance at WBN has been administratively placed under the cognizance of the Support Services Materials Unit to assure consistent implementation of the issuance documentation requirements. Additionally, the newly developed administrative instruction clearly establishes responsibilities for each person using M&TE to list all CSSC applications and usages of the N&TE on the appropriate checkout sheet.
- B. The additional submitted concern that M&TE issue/user personnel have not received adequate training on the documentation requirements related to M&TE utilization was also substantiated. Investigation results identified that even though WBN management committed to the Division of Quality Assurance to instruct employees on the proper implementation of the new M&TE administrative instruction (AI-5.9), only the Materials Unit issue personnel were trained, and that training was conducted informally. The AI-5.9 places responsibility for documenting M&TE utilization with the individual-being issued the equipment. However, it appears that none of the WBN NUC PR M&TE user personnel were trained on the AI-5.9 assigned responsibilities or other newly established M&TE control program aspects.

#### Recommendations

### I-85-727-WEN-01 - Training for AI-5.9 Implementing Serappost

A formal training program which fully addresses all alements of the newly developed WEN control program for NUC PR M&TE should be provided to all appropriate onsite personnel. This training should emphasize the individual M&TE user's responsibilities for implementation of the control program, and adequate documentation demonstrating completion of the training should be maintained. Also, consideration should be given to having the WBN Training Section develop and present the training material to assure that consistent instruction is provided to all affected plant sections. Additionally, this program of instruction should be presented to M&TE issue personnel as well.

# I-ES-727-WBU-02 - Training Documentation Chitatia of AI-10.1

WBN Administrative Instruction AI-10.1 should be reviewed and revised to stipulate that records of training provided in response to NRC inspections. GA audits. or GA/GC surveys should be processed and maintained as quality assurance records. The table for this recommendation is that both the NGAM, Part III. Section 4.1, and WBN Administrative Instruction Al-4.1 identify records of personnel training as typical operational-phase quality assurance records which must be maintained for six years past employee work termination or transfer. Both procedures also define GA records as those which furnish documentary evidence of the quality of items or <u>activities</u> which affect the quality of the CSSJ. Besides training of plant personnel, another activity which can affect CSSC quality is implementation and completion of corrective actions for identified adverse conditions. As such, those records which demonstrate the adequacy of measures taken to correct deficiencies identified by inspections, audīts, or surveys should be maintained as quality assurance documents.

TWA 64 (OS-9-65) (OP-WP-5-85)

#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : S. Schum, QTC/ERT Program Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DEC 1 6 1985

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF ACCEPTED FINAL REPORTS

The following final reports have been reviewed and accepted by MSRS and are transmitted to you for preparation of employee responses.

I-85-361-WBN (IN-85-877-001) I-85-693-WBN (IN-86-305-002)

Please acknowledge receipt by signing below, copying and returning this form to J. T. Huffstetler, E3B37 C-K.

NAME

DATE

GDM Attachments

cc (Attachments):

R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C

E. R. Ennis, WBN -

D. R. Nichols, BlOA14C-K

Eric Sliger, LP6N48A-C

W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)



#### TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

NERS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-85-361-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-85-877-Q01

. MILESTONE 6

SUBJECT:

EROW EYSTEM DETERIORATION

DAFES OF INVESTIGATION: December 2-11, 1985

INVESTISATOR:

Fredux D. Slagle

7=+0

REVIEWED BY:

3 0 5m th

Date

PERMUED BY.

Harri Ean

Date

#### I BACKGROUND

The Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigated Employee Concerning the Matte Bar Employee Concern Program. (QTC) had identified during the Matte Bar Employee Concern Program. The concern was worded as follows:

The SECW line was accepted by Knoxville Engineering even though Watts Bar OA found and documented the following non-conformances: (1781/1782)

- 1. Did not meet min thickness (liner).
- 2. Liner did not bond to pipe.
- Enough was not maintained at 100% humidity (ends of pice were improperly covered during during).
- 4. Liner has crecks.
- 5. Screens going into 881 and 2 are currently being cloques with chipped grout.

No accitional information available.

Friends the initiation of this investigation, an attempt was made through QTC to obtain additional information about the clogging of the screens in the ERCW identified in No. 5 in the above concern. The concerned individual stated that this information was hearsay, and no firsthand knowledge of any system clogging was available.

## II. ECOFE

Bea NSRS Investigation Report No. 1-65-166-NSN.

#### II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

See NSRS Idvestigation Recort No. I-85-166-WBN.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Refer to NERS Investigation Report No. I-55-166-WBN. No additional response is decessary. This item is closed: corrective action is tracked by I-65-166-WBN.

#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

## TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : DEC 1 6 1985

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted	herein is NSRS Report No.	I-85-372-SQN				
Subject	LEAK DUE TO MANAGEMENT					
Concern No.	xx-85-007-002					

No response or corrective action is required for this report. It is being transmitted to you for information purposes only. Should you have any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone 2277.

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_X

Director, NSRS/Designee

RCS: JTH

Attachment

cc (Attachment):

R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C

R. J. Griffin, SQN E-18

G. B. Kirk, SQN

D. R. Nichols, ElOA14 C-K

QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Eric Sliger, LP6N48A-C

J. H. Sullivan, SQN

W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

0182U

### TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

#### NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

#### INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-372-SON

EMPLOYEE CONCERN: XX-85-007-002

SUBJECT:

LEAK DUE TO MANAGEMENT

DATES OF

INVESTIGATION:

SEPTEMBER 19-23, 1985

LEAD

INVESTIGATOR:

\_\_\_\_\_

12/6 /85 OKTE

INVESTIGATOR:

KIRBY LAWLESS

12/11/85 DATE /

REVIEWED BY:

D C CAUPD

12/13/8

DATE

APPROVED BY:

A. Harrison

DATE

#### I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted to determine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received by Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). The concern of record, as summarized on the Employee Concern Assignment Request Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-007-002, stated:

"Leak in April 1983 in Unit 2 reactor was due to management's (name unknown) desire to break time records (179 days on line). Result was contamination of 500-600 gallons."

Further information was requested from the ERT followup group regarding where the leak had occurred. QTC relayed that the CI identified the leak as a steam generator leak.

#### II. SCOPE

- A. The scope of the investigation is defined by the concern of record which entails investigating the following issues:
  - 1. Leak in unit 2 reactor resulted in contamination leakage of 500-600 gallons per day.
  - 2. Leak was caused by management's desire to break record time on line.
- B. The Monthly Operation Reports to NRC and Shift Engineer, Unit Operator, and Assistant Shift Engineer daily logs were reviewed for the months of April through July 1983. In addition, reviewed the plant daily operational event report and surveillance instruction leakage data records for the months of May, June, and July 1983. Interviews were also conducted with a plant compliance engineer and plant manager who were familiar with plant operations during this time period.

#### ◆ III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. Requirements and Commitments
  - 1: Sequoyah Unit 2 Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.4.6.2.C Limits primary to secondary leakage to 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator. If this leakage rate is exceeded, the unit must be shut down and be in cold shutdown condition within 36 hours.

#### B. Findings

1. The records reviewed in this investigation revealed that in early May 1983 (not April as stated), the unit 2 No. 3 steam generator experienced a through wall tube leak. This resulted in leakage of reactor coolant into the secondary side of the steam generator. The unit continued to operate until the

reactor tripped as the result of the loss of a feed pump on July 18, 1983. The leakage at that time was approximately 311 gallons per day (ref. 6).

- 2. The plant operational event report issued the day following detection of the tube leak (ref. 2) stated "current plans are to continue normal operation until scheduled refueling outage." Since the technical specification primary to secondary tube leakage limit of 500 gallons per day was never exceeded, continued operation did not present a safety concern. Economic considerations dictated that the unit continue to operate until the scheduled August 5, 1983, refueling outage if possible.
- 3. The leakage rate was monitored frequently during this time and did not exceed the NRC approved technical specification limit. The leakage was calculated to be 553 gallons per day on July 19. 1983, after the unit had tripped (ref. 6); however, this was later determined to be an erroneous calculation because the unit was in a transient condition. For calculations of this nature to provide accurate results, the data must be taken when the unit is operating in a stable condition for several days, which was not the case after the trip. However, Potential Reportable Occurrence (PRO) Report No. 2-83-71 (ref. 7) was initiated. During discussions between plant management, Westinghouse, and NRC, they agreed that the leakage calculation was not valid and that the more accurate determination of leakage was that made just prior to the trip. Therefore, technical specification limits had not been exceeded and it was determined that the event did not require a formal report to the NRC.
- 4. During subsequent inspections of the steam generator to determine the location and cause of the leakage, it was determined that the leakage resulted from a piece of loose metal rubbing against the tubes and subsequently wearing a hole through the tube wall. This metal piece had inadvertently been left in the steam generator after a modification had been made on the secondary side. This prompted a thorough examination of all generators and retrieval of any loose or foreign material.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The employee concern appears to be unsubstantiated for the following reasons:

- The leak was not caused by management actions or lack of, but by movement of a loose metal piece rubbing against the tubes.
- The leakage never exceeded 500 gallons per day.

 No objective evidence was found during the investigation that indicated that a record run time was the main consideration for continued operation.

## Recommendations

None

#### Unit 2 SG #3 Tube Leak Chronology

- 5/9/83 Indication on condenser vacuum exhaust and steam generator (SG) blowdown radiation monitor indicate tube leak in U-2 #3 SG. (Operation explanation in ref. 7)
  - Significant Operational Event portion of the Monthly Operation Report to NRC (ref. 1) reported primary to secondary tube leak in #3 SG.
- 5/10/83 ASE/SRO Journal U-2 SG #3 leakage approximately 15 gallons per day (gpd) (approximation).
- 7/16/83 SRO Daily Journal entry shows U-2 #3 SG leak rate at 234 gpd.
- 7/17/83 Unit 2 operating at 98% thermal power. Shift Engineer log shows chemical lab analysis indicates #3 SG tube leak approximately 234 gpd.
- 7/18/83 Per Larry Nobles July 28, 1983 note to Compliance Section, chemical lab analysis of SG tube leak yields approximately 311 gpd.
  - Reactor tripped at 1233 hours on feed pump turbine trip and SG low water level - leak terminated.
- 7/19/83 0215 hours chemical lab analysis yields approximately 553 gpd tube leakage (ref. 6). NRC notified on red phone. Plant Superintendent (C. C. Mason) notified.
  - Significant Operational Event section of Monthly Operation Report to NRC reports 553 gpd leakage.
- 7/28/83 Larry Nobles consulted by Westinghouse and NRC determined that chemical lab analysis (553 gpd) was not accurate because it was performed while unit was in an unstable condition. Last analysis during stable unit condition was on 7/18 and yielded 311 gpd. Determined that event was not reportable as technical specifications had not been violated.
- 8/2/83 ---- PRO documented determination that event was not reportable.

# DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION I-85-372-SQN AND REFERENCES

- 1. Sequoyah Monthly Operation Report to NRC, April-September 1983
- 2. Plant New and Escalated Operation Event Report for May, June, and July 1983
- 3. Sequoyah Unit 2 Tech Spec Section 3/4.4.6 Reactor Coolant System Leakage
- 4. FSAR Section 5.2 Integrity of Reactor Coolant System Boundary
  15.4.3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture
  15.5.5 Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Steam
  Generator Tube Rupture
- 5. Shift Engineer, Unit Operator, and Assistant Shift Engineer daily log April-September 1983
- 6. Surveillance Instruction SI-137.2 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Data Packages for May, June, and July 1983
- 7. Potential Reportable Occurrence Report PRO 2-83-71 originated on July 19, 1983
- 8. Larry Nobles July 28, 1983 note to Compliance Section.

....

#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE : DEC 13 1985

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmi	tted here	in is 1	NSRS I	Report	No.		I-8	5-65	2-SQN			
Subject	SEQUOYAH	WELD	INSPE	CTIONS	NOT	AS	STRICT	AS	WATTS	BAI	R	
Concern	No		XX-85	5-083-0	001_							
No ros	nongo on .				: a		inad E	4			-1 74	• -
	ponse or o					•				-		
	estions, j								-			
Recomm	end Report	tabili	ty Det	termina	ation	ı:	Yes		1	No	x	

Director, NSRS/Designee

RCS: JTH
Attachment
cc (Attachment):

R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C

R. J. Griffin, SQN E-10

G. B. Kirk, SQN

D. R. Nichols, ElOA14 C-K

QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Eric Sliger, LP6N48A-C

J. H. Sullivan, SQN

W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)



## TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

#### NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

## INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-652-SQN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN: XX-85-083-001

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH WELD INSPECTIONS NOT AS STRICT AS WATTS BAR

DATES OF

INVESTIGATION:

October 1-17 1985

INVESTIGATOR:

5 7 //-

12/6/

IN A ESTIGNION .

E./F. Harwell

Date /

REVIEWED BY:

P C Salier

Date

APPROVED BY:

M. A. Harrison

Date

#### T. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted to determine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received by Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). The concern of record as summarized on the Employee Concern Assignment Request Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-083-001, stated:

"Sequoyah: Individual expressed that during previous employment at Sequoyah, welding inspection was not as strict as it is at WBNP. The concern is that either Sequoyah was not properly inspected, or that WBNP is excessively inspected, and unduly increases the cost of welding."

Further information was requested from the ERT followup group regarding whether the concern was related to particular type welds, type inspections, or location within the plant. QTC/ERT was unsuccessful in contacting the Concerned Individual (CI) to obtain any more specific information. Because the nature of the expressed concern could not be narrowed in scope, it was addressed in a broad generic manner.

#### II. SCOPE

- A. The scope of the investigation is defined by the concern of record which entails determining two specific issues.
  - 1. Were Sequoyah welds properly inspected?
  - 2. Were Watts Bar welds excessively inspected resulting in unjustified welding cost?
- B. Construction Specifications, Design Criteria, FSAR, and construction installation procedures which govern the design, classification, and installation requirements for Sequoyah and Watts Bar were reviewed. A comparison was made between the two plants with regard to code requirements and installation commitments. Interviewed several people that had been associated with either welding requirements or actual inspections for both plants.

#### III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. Requirements and Commitments
  - 1. ANSI Standard B31.7 (1969) and 1970 Addendum Nuclear Power Piping Governed installation and inspection requirements for Sequoyah Safety Class A, B, C, and D piping systems.
  - 2. ASME Section III, 1971 Edition through Summer 73 Addenda Nuclear Power Plant Components Governed Installation and Inspection Requirements for Watts Bar Safety Class A, B, C, and D Piping Systems.

- 3. ANSI Standard B31.1.0 (1967) Power Piping Governed installation and inspection requirements for Sequoyah Safety Class G and H piping systems.
- ANSI Standard B31.1, 1973 Edition, Summer 1973 Addendum Power Piping Governed the installation and inspection requirements for Watts Bar Safety Class G and H piping systems.
- 5. 10CFR50 Appendix B Basis for Quality Assurance (QA) program at Sequoyah.
- 6. ASME Section III, Subsection NA-4000 Basis for NCM (Nuclear Components Manual) code manual QA requirements for Watts Bar.

#### B. Findings

- 1. Although different construction codes were in effect at each site, the installation requirements and level of inspections was essentially the same for both plants with the exception that portions of the Watts Bar plant are ASME Code stamped which requires verification by a third party inspector (Authorized Nuclear Inspector, ANI).
- 2. Although the inspection requirements are essentially the same for both plants, the QA requirements at each specific location required the inspections to be implemented and documented differently. For example, at Watts Bar the inspection of each safety-related pipe weld for "fitup" and "release for welding" requires verification by an inspector of certain parameters (i.e., cleanliness, weld prep, gap, purge, preheat, etc.), and the inspection for fitup is broken down into several Quality Control (QC) holdpoints which may require multiple inspections and completion of more than one weld inspection data card for a given weld. Conversely, at Sequoyah all these parameters were accomplished under one QC holdpoint and documented on one weld data card.
- 3. Up to 1984 many of the welds at Watts Bar have undergone additional or supplemental reinspections to address various safety concerns such as integrity of welded supports, fillet welds potentially undersized, and inspectability of painted welds.
  - 4. Some structural supports at Watts Bar required QC fitup verification; whereas, similar supports at Sequoyah required fitup verification by the welder foremen and QC inspection of the finished weld.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

1. The employee concern is not substantiated for the following reasons:

- a. The allegation that Sequoyah welds may not have been properly inspected could not be substantiated because these welds were inspected under an inspection and QC program which met the QA and Code requirements applicable to construction activities at Sequoyah.
- b. The allegation that Watts Bar welds were excessively inspected could not be substantiated because these welds were inspected under an inspection and QC program which met the ASME Code requirements applicable to Watts Bar. Since Watts Bar is an ASME Code stamped plant, the independent third party (ANI) verification of inspections performed by TVA personnel could be construed as a more strict inspection program. In addition, Watts Bar has been subjected to many reinspections to resolve possible safety concerns and to satisfy NRC inquiries. These, also, could be construed as a more strict inspection program.
- 2. A comparison of the overall welding inspection and documentation requirements between two nuclear plants of different ages, different codes of record, and code plant versus noncode plant cannot be described succinctly and if done differences will be observed. These differences would not necessarily indicate that one inspection program is better than the other or that the weld integrity of one plant is better than the other.

#### Recommendations

None

# DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION I-85-652-SQN AND REFERENCES

- 1. SNP Construction Procedure W-3, Revision 3, dated December 4, 1978, "Weld Procedure Assignment and Welding Surveillance"
- SNP Construction Specification No. N2M-865, Revision 3, dated April 12, 1977, "Field Fabrication, Assembly Examination, and Tests For Pipe and Duct Systems"
- 3. SNP General Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-3.0, Revision 1, dated June 28, 1985, "The Classification of Piping, Pumps, Valves, and Vessels"
- 4. WBNP Quality Control Instruction QCI-4.03, Revision 6, dated August 25, 1984, "Process Control, Welding Surveillance, and Weld Procedure Assignment"
- 5. WBNP Construction Specification No. N3M-868, Revision 2, dated February 4, 1985, "Field Fabrication, Assembly, Examination, and Tests For Piping Systems"
- 6. WBNP General Design Criteria No. WB-DC-40-36, Revision 1, dated March 15, 1984, "The Classification of Piping, Pumps, Valves and Vessels"
- 7. TVA General Construction Specification G-29, sections P.S.3.C.5.2(R2) dated March 7, 1983 and P.S.3.C.5.4(R2) dated January 28, 1985, "Process Specifications for Welding, Heat Treat, Nondestructive Examination, and Allied Field Fabrication Operations"
- 8. SNP FSAR Section 3.2 Classification of Systems, Structures, and Components

NOTE: Revision history of some documents were also reviewed.

FROM

# Memorandum

TO : E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, WBN

(Please copy entire page for return)

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

FROM:	K. W. White, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, ESRO C-R							
DATE :	September 3, 1985							
SUBJECT:	NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL							
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
	Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-211-WBN							
	SubjectExcessive Paperwork Affects Operations							
	Concern No. IN-85-140-001 and IN-85-616-001  and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.  It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached recommen-							
	dations by September 16, 1985 . Should you have any questions,							
	please contact W. D. Stevens at telephone 6970-K; 222-WBN							
	Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No _X							
	MHA -							
	Director, NSRS/Designee							
•	CC: W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4) Guenter Wadewitz, WBN J. W. Coan, P-104 SB-K QTC/ERT, CONST-WBN H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K							
	Copy and Return							
	To : 1K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K							
	From:							
	Date: •							
•	I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No.							
	Subject							
	for action/disposition.							
	Signature Date							

#### I. BACKGROUND

The employee concerns as received from the ERT stated:

#### Concern IN-85-616-001

"Excessive paperwork causes reactor operators to be unavailable for running the plant for two hours. Much of this paperwork could be delegated to other groups with the operators having oversight."

#### Concern IN-85-140-001

"The amount of paperwork processed through the Control Room and Shift Engineer's office--especially surveillance inspections--focuses the attention of the licensed operators away from a vigilant watch of plant conditions into making sure everything is properly filled out on all the many pages of data.

#### II. SCOPE

Documentation that related to both licensed and unlicensed control room operator duties was reviewed and unit operators and operations management were interviewed regarding required paperwork performed and its effect on "operator vigilance" during plant operations.

#### III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Based upon a review of applicable documents and interviews with Unit Operators and Operations Management, the specific findings listed below were identified:

- A. Routine paperwork as described by interviewees consisted of the following:
  - Daily journal entries.
  - 2. System status file/configuration log updates.
  - -- 3. Review of daily, weekly, and other periodic surveillance instructions performed by lower grade operators.
    - 4. Review of Assistant Unit Operator routine log sheets.
    - 5. Actual performance and documentation of Unit Operator performed surveillance instruction procedures.

This paperwork appeared consistent with Unit Operator (Nuclear) duties as described in the job description for the position and as required by the following plant procedures:

1. AI-2.1, "Authorities and Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown," sections 3.5, 3.15, and 3.17.

- Operating Section Letter 2, "Maintaining Cognizance of perational Status."
- 3. Operating Section Letter 41, "Operations Narrative Log Books."
- 4. Surveillance Instruction 2, "Shift and Daily Surveillance Log" (requirements for operator signoff reviews).
- B. Interviews with licensed and unlicensed unit operators resulted in the following information:
  - o Estimates of the time required for performance of routine paperwork varied from 30 minutes to 8 hours and was dependent on the shift worked and the plant conditions.
  - o No meaningful amount of paperwork could be delegated to any group other than Operations. An extra (third) Unit Operator was needed only during sporadic heavy workload periods.
  - The paperwork load which consisted of surveillance instruction performance for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment and valve stroke timing tests on safety-related equipment appeared to be the major items that diverted the unit operator's attention from the rest of the main control room boards. It was stated, however, that no one other than another qualified operator could perform this function on a control room panel.
- C. Interviews with Operation Management resulted in the following information:
  - o A third Unit Operator would normally be used on the control room functions during unit startup conditions up to approximately 20 percent power.
  - o The Shift Engineer had the authority to call in and use operations personnel as necessary for shift manning requirements.
  - o Surveillance tests which were performed on unit equipment in the control room but outside the "horseshoe" area of the control boards involving long-term testing (e.g., Diesel Generator Load Testing) were normally performed by a third Unit Operator if the workload was heavy or test performance was scheduled on the day shift.
  - o Surveillance testing performed in the control room by the Unit Operator helped him in maintaining an awareness of unit conditions.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Concern No. IN-85-616-001

#### Conclusion

Concern IN-85-616-001 was not substantiated due to the following considerations.

- 1. The interviews conducted indicated that although the paperwork load was at times heavy due to present work conditions (testing prior to fuel loading) and that to some degree this paperwork might detract from normal duties, it did not appear to be of the magnitude that the operators were "unavailable for running the plant for two hours."
  - 2. The majority of paperwork causing the greatest concern to Unit Operators interviewed (e.g., performing and reviewing Surveillance Instructions) could not be performed by "other groups" due to the nature of the work performed and NRC licensing requirements.

#### Recommendation

None

B. Concern No. IN-85-140-001

I-85-211-WBN-01, "Additional Operator Manning Authority"

#### Conclusions

Concern IN-85-140-001 was partially substantiated due to the following considerations.

As indicated in conclusion A.1 (above), the surveillance 1. paperwork load was felt to detract from "operational vigilance" to some extent by most operators interviewed. This surveillance workload, however, was a normal function of the position at all TVA nuclear plants and could be partially attributed to the varied workload requirements and preoperational testing performed in the unit control room prior to This would appear to be primarily a loading. scheduling and shift management function. It was stated by Operations Management interviewed that the Shift Engineer had the authority to man the shift with operations personnel as necessary for the workload and to meet WBN Technical Specifications requirements (requirements beginning at fuel Documentation reviewed indicated that this was correct for NRC required licensed and support positions, however, documented authority allowing the Shift Engineer to man the unit with a third Unit Operator position as he deemed necessary for workload requirements was not found in the Operation Section Letters and other documentation reviewed relating to shift manning.

# NSRS Recommendation

Document the authority of the Shift Engineer to provide additional operator support above the minimum staffing requirements as necessary to meet the changing workloads both prior to and after fuel loading.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO :	E. R. Ennis, Acting Site Director, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
FROM :	K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K
DATE :	OCT 16 1985
SUBJECT:	NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL  WATTS BAR MUCLEAR PLANT SITE DIRECTOR'S DEFICE
	Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-427-WBN
	Subject No PHYSI-2, Attachment D, For Conduit Breaches
	Concern No
	and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.
	It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached recommendation
	dations by October 29, 1985 . Should you have any questions, please
	contact W. D. Stevens at telephone 126-143-3779
	Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No _x WB
	Director, NSRS/Designee
•	Attachment cc (Attachment):
	H. N. Culver, W12A19 C-K QTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)
	Copy and Return
	To : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K
	From: E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P&E (Nuclear)
	Date: October 31, 1985
	I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. <u>I-85-427-WBN</u> Subject <u>No PHYSI-2, Attachment D. For Conduit Breaches</u> for action/disposition.

Signature

Date

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

# NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

# NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-427-WBN

# EMPLOYEE CONCERNS IN-86-102-001 AND IN-86-103-001

## MILESTONE 1

SUBJECT:

NO PHYSI-2, ATTACHMENT D, FOR CONDUIT BREACHES

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: September 9-30, 1985

INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

#### I. BACKGROUND

The employee concerns as received from Quality Technology Company stated:

## Concern IN-86-102-001

The requirement for conduit insulation deleted and insulation removed from MC 8478. At the hanger attachment conduit A is on the same hanger. Requirements for hanger fireproofing for conduit A includes 12". This constitutes a breach in A. A Physi-2 Attachment D is required for each breach and Attachment D is not filled out. CI has no more info. Unit 1, 737' Elev. on Q, wall from A-14 to A-12 on Elev. 752'. Nuclear Power concern, time frame - current.

### Concern IN-86-103-001

No Attachment D from Physi-2 issued for breach to insulation on cable conduit. Conduit 847B on Q Wall, elevation 737 about 15° above the floor A10 to A8. Also 945B (same location) over cooling tank #2. CI has no additional information. Nuclear Power Concern. Unit 1. Ongoing.

#### II. SCOPE

The scope of the investigation was determined from the stated concerns to be that: conduit fire wrap insulation was removed from conduit MC 8478 which exposed a heat-transfer surface to conduit MC 846A located on the same hangers on Q wall, elevation 737, of the auxiliary building. This resulted in an unauthorized breach to MC 846A when insulation was removed from MC 847B after its fire wrap requirements were deleted. Conduit 945B in the same location was also breached without the proper authorization.

Documentation regarding 3-M fire wrap was reviewed, and the specific conduits referenced by the concern were examined for compliance with requirements.

#### III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- A. Further information was requested from Quality Technology Company (QTC) for the concerns expressed. Both concerns were found to be identical in nature regarding conduits MC 8478 and MC 8468 although the concern forms as received from QTC had different wording.
- B. Electrical conduits MC 847B and MC 846A located on elevation 737, Q wall from A9 to A14, were physically examined by NSRS including the hanger supports and 3-M fire wrap. Both conduits were approximately 6 inches apart and supported by common unistrut hangers. Conduit MC 846A was wrapped with 3-M fire wrap along its entire length. Insulation had been removed from part of MC 847B (from A14 to A12Q) with a maintenance request during July 1985 after fire wrap was no longer required for the entire conduit length. This removal resulted in requirements on conduit MC 846A being violated since conduits within the 12-inch heat-transfer path to a protected item are required to be wrapped.

C. Conduit MC 945B located on elevation 737 was physically examined from Q wall, junction box 830 (between A8 and A9), to A10S. One unauthorized fire breach was discovered approximately 8 feet east of A8-S over the component cooling water heat exchanges. This consisted of the fire wrap and one condulet cover removed on the conduit. No Physi-2, Attachment D, was posted in the area for this breach as required by plant procedures.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

- A. Concern IN-86-102-001 was substantiated for the following reasons.
  - The fire wrap on conduit MC 846A was found to be breached in violation of 3-M fire wrap specifications requirements.
  - 2. No Physi-2, Attachment D, authorization was in effect as required by plant procedures.
  - 3. The fire breach was the result of the fire wrap removal from MC 847B which inadvertently exposed conduit MC 846A.

#### Recommendations

#### I-85-427-WBN-01 - Conduit MC 646A Fire Wrap Breach

Inspect and rewrap conduit MC 846A as required to comply with 3-M fire wrap specifications.

### Conclusions

- B. Concern IN-86-103-001 was substantiated for the following reasons.
  - Conclusions and recommendations regarding conduit MC 846A/MC 847B fire wrap breach are similar to IV.A.1.,2.,and 3.
  - 2. Conduit MC 945B was found to be breached in an unauthorized manner with no Physi-2, Attachment D, in effect at the time of inspection by NSRS.

#### Recommendations

# I-85-427-WBN-02 - Conduit MC\_945B\_Conduit\_Breach

Inspect and restore conduit MC 945B as required to comply with 3-M fire wrap specifications and plant procedures.

#### EMPLOYEE CONCERN ASSIGNMENT REQUEST

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50211

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # WI-85-100-002

I-85- - WEIL

Category: 53

Confidentiality:

YES NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: DIESEL GENERATOR MARGINS ARE INADEQUATE. TVA HAS ADDED DGS TO BROWNS FERRY, SEQUOYAH AND WATTS BAR. EACH TIME A QUESTION IS RAISED. TVA MUST CONDUCT ANOTHER STUDY. TVA ADDS DIESEL GENERATORS WITHOUT CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. UPGRADING LICENSING DOCUMENTS. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

Day 40 10005

William Stefan	071985
MANAGER, ERT	DATE
investigation of the above	concern

NSRS has assigned responsibility for to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

Bun f. Luglan 12/13/85

#### EMPLOYEE CONCERN ASSIGNMENT REQUEST

TO: Director - MBRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50212

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # WI-85-100-032

I-85. - WBN

Category: 73

Confidentiality:

\_YES \_NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: YES NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: CONSTRUCTION PROCESS DOES NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW ENDES REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS, OR VENDOR REQUIREMENTS/INSTRUCTIONS. THESE DEVIATIONS DO NOT ALWAYS GET INCLUDED ON AS-BUILT DOCUMENTS, AND THERE IS TOO MUCH "AFTER THE FACT" APPROVAL. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

DARKU KOUKE GAMESE

··-			MANAGER, ERT					
NSRS has assigned to:	responsibility	for	investigation	of	the	above	concern	
ERT	•							
NSRS/ERT								

William 1 LAREC 0 7 1985

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS

Bune 7. Suffin 12/13

#### EMPLOYEE CONCERN ASSIGNMENT REQUEST

TO: Director - NSRS

TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50214

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and has assigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority: 1

Concern # XX-85-122-014

I-35- - 5an

Category: 13

Confidentiality: \_YES \_NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: \_\_YES \_\_\_NO

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SEQUOYAH: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTRICAL AND I&C EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS IS INADEQUATE. QUALIFICATION WAS OFTEN NOT DONE, OR IF DONE, RECORDS DO NOT EXIST IN MAN' CASES, WHICH RESULTS IN MODIFICATION OR REPLACEMENT. CURRENT UPGRADE PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS NEEDS SCRUTINY. CI HAS NO FURTHER ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER.

sign/enuir aualif

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern to:

ERT \_\_\_

NSRS/ERT \_\_\_\_

NSRS \_\_\_ L\_ RWS

Equipment Qualification,

Bun P. Lagler 12/13/85

B. Quality Control Instructions, Quality Control Procedures, and instrument-line installation drawing notes were reviewed to determine their adequacy as related to this investigation. All procedures adequately covered the process except for two identified problems.

The first was related to the inspection process. GCF-3.:1-1 R6, "Inspection and Documentation of Instrumentation Supports," provides the media (test No. 59) for the inspection of supports and inspection of instrument lines between adjacent supports for line slope and cleanliness. Each support and its adjacent line are. individually tested in accordance with test No. 59. QCP-3.11-2  $R5_{\gamma}$ "Inspection and Documentation of Instrument Lines," provides the media (test No. 52) for inspection of the instrument-line subassembly. This test verifies correct instrument-line routing. correct material. and inspects bends. One test is performed for the entire subassembly. The separation of these inspections allows supports to be accepted knowing the instrument-line routing will not pass the test No. 52. Should this occur, production credit is given for the support installation, and additional credit is given following the reworking of the supports. This allows coucle production credit to be given to support installations.

The second problem related to procedures was on the drawing notes on Drawing 47W600-0-4 R15. Note 6e on Routing and Separation Instructions stated: "Instrument lines must be physically separated from larger pipes as far as practicable and where practical by a minimum of 10 inches, except at a support where both pipes are constrained against movement in the direction of contact. Final acceptability to be determined by the pipe rupture team." This note was changed by FCR I-1370 which was approved 9/2/83 and incorporated in Revision 9 of the drawing on 1/9/84. Frior to this time the note stated: "... and at all times by a minimum of 10 inches ...."
"Final acceptability to be determined by the pipe rupture team" was not included prior to Revision 9.

This change does not affect plant safety because the train separation criteria is covered in other notes. This change removes minimum separation requirements to larger process piping. An inspection of the Unit 2 south valve room revealed that instrument lines were run as close as 2.5 inches to process piping that require mirror insulation. Although such practices did not violate procedures or criteria, the process-line insulation will require notating when installed. There were times when the old requirement of a minimum of 10 inches at all times could not be met. The revision eliminated the requirement that an NCR be generated each time the 10-inch criteria could not be met. By replacing it with the "whenever practical" revision, any minimum criteria was essentially eliminated.

C. The frequency of IRN generation was reviewed and shown to run less than 10 percent and typically less than 7 percent. Although the IRN is not the only mechanism for identifying potential problems, it should be an indication of the quality of the work being performed.

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

## NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

# INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-211-WBN

## Milestone 2

SUBJECT: ERT CONCERN NO. IN-85-616-001 IN-85-140-001

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

INVESTIGATOR:

APPROVED BY: