

SUBJECT: OE21421 - (Preliminary) Loss of condenser vacuum due to air in-leakage and a degraded steam jet air ejector train

~~\*\*\* RESTRICTED AND CONFIDENTIAL \*\*\*~~

Abstract: With Dresden Unit 3 at 100 percent power, a derate was required to maintain condenser vacuum after a step increase in air in-leakage to the condenser. The event was compounded by operation on a degraded steam jet air ejector train.

Reason for Message: When evaluating steam jet air ejector trains for operation during summer months consider the health of the trains. Summer months are the largest challenge for air ejectors when condensate temperatures reach their highest levels and degrade the steam jet air ejector inter condenser vacuum and, as a result, the efficiency of the steam jets. Had the 3A steam jet air ejector train been in service, Dresden Unit 3 would have been able to operate with the elevated in-leakage. Additionally, the most probable location of the in-leakage is from the vacuum pump piping that ties into the center waterbox. This was identified as a suspect location of leakage at Quad Cities in 2001.

Event date: 8/15/05.

Station/ Unit Name: Dresden /Unit 3  
NSSS/A-E: Westinghouse/ Sargent  
& Lundy  
Turbine Manufacturer: Westinghouse

Maintenance Rule Applicability: Yes

Component Information: Unit 3B Second Stage Air Ejector  
Manufacturer: Ingersoll Rand (now alstom power)  
Model Number: #1 4MF-24, #2 4MF-8  
Part Number:

Description:

The following chronology describes the course of this event and associated actions:

- April 2005 Dresden Unit 3 shifted to 3B offgas train for maintenance on the 3A train
- 8/15/05 Offgas flow increases to 196 SCFM
- 8/19/05 Reduced load to 860 Mwe due to SJAE "chugging"
- 8/20/05 Indication of leak in condenser from Helium testing
- 8/21/05 Attempted to increase load to 912 Mwe but had to abort due to condenser backpressure transient and onset of SJAE "chugging"
- 8/25/05 Reduced load to 500 Mwe and shifted to the 3A offgas train
- 8/26/05 Returned to full power (912 Mwe) on the 3A offgas train

Causes:

The most probable cause of air in-leakage (unconfirmed because outage has not been taken yet to confirm the leak) is from the circulating

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC

Docket No. 50-271 Official Exhibit No. E4-17-V4

OFFERED by Applicant/Licensee Intervenor \_\_\_\_\_

NRC Staff \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

IDENTIFIED on 7/23/08 Witness/Panel NEC 4

Action Taken: ADMITTED REJECTED WITHDRAWN

Reporter/Clerk MAC

water vacuum pump (water side of the condenser used for system start-up)

The most probable cause of the lost generation is degraded 2nd stage Steam Jet Air Ejector on the 3B train.

Corrective Actions:

Repair the condenser waterbox leak during next outage of sufficient duration

Repair the 3B steam jet air ejector during next refueling outage

Safety Significance:

None

Information Contact:

S. Miller, 815-416-3872, scott.miller2@exeloncorp.com

C. Bowser, 815-416-3808, charlie.bowser@exeloncorp.com

NOTICE:

Please note that access to Nuclear Network is restricted to organizations authorized by INPO. The information exchanged via this network is confidential and for the sole use of the authorized organization. Confidentiality is important to ensure the open and frank exchange of information among authorized organizations. Messages and other information on this web site should not be published, disclosed, abstracted, or otherwise transferred in any form to any third party, and their contents should not be made public without the prior written consent of INPO

DOCKETED  
USNRC

August 12, 2008 (11:00am)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY  
RULEMAKINGS AND  
ADJUDICATIONS STAFF