

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5B 157B Lookout Place

~~December 30, 1985~~
12/21/85

WBRD-50-390/85-64

WBRD-50-391/85-60

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region II

Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900

Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

**WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT DESIGN
INSTRUCTIONS - WBRD-50-390/85-64, WBRD-50-391/85-60 - INTERIM REPORT**

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Al Ignatonis on November 15, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-291-P. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about February 15, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Homer
J. A. Homer

W. W. Hufham
Manager of Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT DESIGN INSTRUCTIONS
WBRD-50-390/85-64, WBRD-50-391/85-60
NCR W-291-P
10 CFR 50.55(e)
INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During field inspections by TVA personnel, eight valves were identified as not being environmentally sealed where conduit connected with the valves. The valves are 1-FCV-63-39A, 1-FCV-63-40B, 1-FCV-63-152A, 1-FCV-26-241B, 1-FCV-26-242A, 2-FCV-67-146A, 1-FSV-70-85-B, and 1-FSV-77-128A. The sealing of the valve-conduit interface was called out in the notes of TVA drawings 45W824-4 and 45W826-10 but due to an oversight, the sealing requirements were met for junction boxes and conduit but not for the equipment interface.

Safety Implications

These devices were required to be sealed in order to prevent the intrusion of moisture in the event of a noncritical pipe rupture and the subsequent possibility of an electrical short which could disable the device. Failure of one or more of these devices could interfere with the respective safety-related system's ability to perform its design safety function during an accident.

Interim Progress

TVA has identified all equipment for unit 1 which must be sealed in accordance with the above requirements. This equipment will be inspected and those points not sealed in accordance with requirements will be repaired. Engineers and craftsmen are being trained on these requirements. The work on unit 1 will be completed before fuel load.

TVA is continuing to investigate the applicability of this deficiency to unit 2.