

To Hugh Thompson
 From Henry Myers

This memorandum supplements my June 3 memorandum concerning the B&V review of the Watts Bar Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW).

QUESTIONS

1. Did NSRS review the June 5, 1985 response to the NRC letter dated May 16? Did NSRS concur in the June 5 response?
2. Did the B&V assessment include review of NCR's, NRC inspection reports etc?
3. Does TVA have a list of specific corrective actions (e.g. hardware modification, drawing revisions, etc.) resulting from the B&V review?
4. Will B&V certify that the AFW was designed and constructed in substantial compliance with the FSAR and other commitments?
5. Will NSRS certify that the AFW was designed and constructed in substantial compliance with the FSAR and other commitments?
6. Who among TVA managers having detailed knowledge of implementation of QA/QC programs will certify that commitments in WB FSAR were fulfilled?
7. Will NSRS staff involved in B&V review certify that, with respect to areas they investigated, problems revealed by B&V findings were ultimately resolved in accord with FSAR commitments?

TVA B&V TASK FORCE CATEGORY 13

One B&V finding, F-142, fell into Category 13 as defined by the TVA B&V Task Force established to evaluate the results of the B&V AFW review. F-142 involved erroneous termination documentation that had not been "updated to reflect the actual configuration." The NSRS assessment of the B&V review supported the Task Force conclusion that "based on a sampling of 40 additional AFW termination records with no discrepancies that this finding was an isolated case and no further action is required." (NSRS R-84-19-WBN, p. 10.) The Task Force conclusion that F-142 was an isolated case appears to have been based on a review of records, not a determination that records were consistent with the actual configuration.

Contrary to the Task Force Category conclusion and NSRS concurrence therein, a Quality Management Staff (QMS) staff surveillance concluded that F-142 "was, and is, not an isolated case." The Surveillance Report recommended an "inspection of all

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medium (6.9 KV) cable terminations be performed to verify that tagging and identification of individual conductors are in accordance with standard electrical drawings and the applicable connection drawings." (Category 13 QMS Surveillance Report, 11/29/84.)

A subsequent QMS Surveillance Report [QMS 841210 203(?)] on the same subject dated December 6, 1984 summarized the findings concerning F-142/Category 13. Noting again that F-142 was and is not an isolated case, it said:

A sample of 11 out of 56 cables were reviewed and all cables were properly terminated and grounded. However, 10 of the cables exhibited tagging deficiencies and all 11 cable termination records exhibited deficiencies. ... It is essential that these deficiencies be addressed by the appropriate office and corrective action taken. This Black and Veatch category cannot be closed until this deficiency is documented and the appropriate corrective actions taken.

The F-142/Category 13 type deficiencies are the subject of 2 Non-Conformance reports WBNQMS8401 and WBNP 5889 which apparently resulted from QMS 841210 203 and which remained unresolved as of December 31, 1984 (and which may be unresolved as of this date).

How does the existence of WBNQMS8401 and WBNP 5889 jibe with the Task Force finding on Category 13 and NSRS support therefore?

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