TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
5N 157B Lookout Place

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WBRD-50-390/86-60
WBRD-50-391/86-56

AUG 20 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOORS IN FIRE RATED BARRIERS NOT LISTED FIRE DOORS - WBRD-50-390/86-60, WBRD-50-391/86-56 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-Region II Inspector Morris Branch on July 23, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-422-P for unit 1. NCR WBN MEB 8680 was subsequently issued to document the deficiency for unit 2. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit our final report on or about December 29, 1986.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with J. A. McDonald at (615) 365-8527.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Domer
for R. L. Gridley, Director
Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
Mr. James Taylor, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DOORS IN FIRE-RATED BARRIERS NOT LISTED FIRE DOORS
WBRD-50-390/86-60, WBRD-50/391/86-56
NCR W-422-P AND SCR WBN MEB 8680
10CFR50.55(e)
INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The secondary containment shield walls at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) are designated three-hour fire barriers. The following penetrations through the walls are not installed in an approved fire-rated configuration, nor have they been evaluated for equivalency.

1. Personnel locks on elevations 713 and 757 that provide access into primary containment (this includes the supplemental door provided in the opening for the elevation 713 lock).

2. Double doors in the equipment hatch on elevation 757 that provide access into primary containment.

Heavy equipment doors located in designated fire barriers were addressed in a fire protection program evaluation documented in a letter to NRC from L. M. Mills to E. Adensam dated September 9, 1980. In a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated June 1982 for WBN, NRC accepted these doors as adequate fire barrier seals. However, the doors affected by this deficiency were not specifically addressed in the TVA letter. Subsequent fire door evaluations, including those conducted for the WBN compliance program for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, did not address heavy equipment doors. The cause of this deficiency is that responsible design personnel had incorrectly assumed that doors affected by this deficiency were heavy equipment doors, and as such were covered by the TVA letter and the SER approval.

Safety Implications

The subject condition could possibly result in the propagation of fire through a fire barrier. This could result in damage to redundant safe shutdown equipment. As such, the deficiency potentially could adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant.

Interim Progress

TVA is currently performing an engineering evaluation to determine whether use of existing doors "as-is" can be justified and to determine what corrective actions, if any, are required. TVA will provide a final report on this item to the NRC on or about December 29, 1986.