

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
SPECIAL PROGRAM

REPORT NUMBER: 91000

REPORT TYPE: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Subcategory

REVISION NUMBER: 2

TITLE: Unsafe Conditions as Related to
Industrial Safety

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REASON FOR REVISION:

Revised sections 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0 and incorporation of general editorial comments.

PREPARATION

PREPARED BY:

Charles R. Petty

SIGNATURE

1/29/87

DATE

REVIEWS

PEER:

E. J. Wiseman

SIGNATURE

1/29/87

DATE

TAS:

*RBY
1/30/87*

DW Skovick

SIGNATURE

2/2/87

DATE

CONCURRENCES

CEG-H:

Lonnor Ellis

1/29/87

SRP:

Jimmie W. Goye

SIGNATURE

2-387

DATE

SIGNATURE

DATE

APPROVED BY:

M. R. ...

ECSP MANAGER

2/23/87

DATE

N/A

MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

DATE

*SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

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8706050227 870522
PDR ADOCK 05000259
P PDR

Preface

This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1, 1986. Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).

The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns. Each of the concerns was a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate. The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the NRC, and the general public. The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports: element, subcategory, category, and final.

Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2. An element consists of one or more closely related issues. An issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns. For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself. Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.

Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements. However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations. The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level. This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.

To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report: a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms (terms formed from the first letters of a series of words).

Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report the reader will find at least two attachments. The first is a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the following information: the concern number, a brief statement of the concern, and a designation of nuclear safety-related concerns. The second attachment is a listing of the concerns included in each issue evaluated in the subcategory.

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The subcategories are themselves summarized in a series of eight category reports. Each category report reviews the major findings and collective significance of the subcategory reports in one of the following areas:

- management and personnel relations
- industrial safety
- construction
- material control
- operations
- quality assurance/quality control
- welding
- engineering

A separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contentions of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be released by the TVA Office of the Inspector General.

Just as the subcategory reports integrate the information collected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.

A final report will integrate and assess the information collected by all of the lower level reports prepared for the ECSP, including the Inspector General's report.

For more detail on the methods by which ECTG employee concerns were evaluated and reported, consult the Tennessee Valley Authority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Manual. The Manual spells out the program's objectives, scope, organization, and responsibilities. It also specifies the procedures that were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closeout of the issues raised by employee concerns.

ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS*

classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:

Class A: Issue cannot be verified as factual

Class B: Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)

Class C: Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken

Class D: Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation

Class E: A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee concern, but was revealed during the FCTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.

collective significance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.

concern (see "employee concern")

corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.

criterion (plural: criteria) a basis for defining a performance, behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement").

element or element report an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.

employee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.

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evaluator(s) the individual(s) assigned the responsibility to assess a specific grouping of employee concerns.

findings includes both statements of fact and the judgments made about those facts during the evaluation process; negative findings require corrective action.

issue a potential problem, as interpreted by the ECTG during the evaluation process, raised in one or more concerns.

K-form (see "employee concern")

requirement a standard of performance, behavior, or quality on which an evaluation judgment or decision may be based.

root cause the underlying reason for a problem.

*Terms essential to the program but which require detailed definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.g., generic, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).

Acronyms

AI	Administrative Instruction
AISC	American Institute of Steel Construction
ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ANS	American Nuclear Society
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
AWS	American Welding Society
BFN	Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
BLN	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant
CAQ	Condition Adverse to Quality
CAR	Corrective Action Report
CATD	Corrective Action Tracking Document
CCTS	Corporate Commitment Tracking System
CEG-H	Category Evaluation Group Head
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CI	Concerned Individual
CMTR	Certified Material Test Report
COC	Certificate of Conformance/Compliance
DCR	Design Change Request
DNC	Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)

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DNE Division of Nuclear Engineering
DNQA Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance
DNT Division of Nuclear Training
DOE Department of Energy
DPO Division Personnel Officer
DR Discrepancy Report or Deviation Report
ECN Engineering Change Notice
ECP Employee Concerns Program
ECP-SR Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative
ECSP Employee Concerns Special Program
ECTG Employee Concerns Task Group
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EQ Environmental Qualification
EMRT Emergency Medical Response Team
EN DES Engineering Design
ERT Employee Response Team or Emergency Response Team
FCR Field Change Request
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
FY Fiscal Year
GET General Employee Training
HCI Hazard Control Instruction
HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning
II Installation Instruction
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IRN Inspection Rejection Notice

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L/R	Labor Relations Staff
M&AI	Modifications and Additions Instruction
MI	Maintenance Instruction
MSPB	Merit Systems Protection Board
MT	Magnetic Particle Testing
NCR	Nonconforming Condition Report
NDE	Nondestructive Examination
NPP	Nuclear Performance Plan
NPS	Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System
NQAM	Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSB	Nuclear Services Branch
NSRS	Nuclear Safety Review Staff
NU CON	Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
NUMARC	Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or Act)
ONP	Office of Nuclear Power
OWCP	Office of Workers Compensation Program
PHR	Personal History Record
PT	Liquid Penetrant Testing
QA	Quality Assurance
QAP	Quality Assurance Procedures
QC	Quality Control
QCI	Quality Control Instruction

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QCP	Quality Control Procedure
QTC	Quality Technology Company
RIF	Reduction in Force
RT	Radiographic Testing
SQN	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
SI	Surveillance Instruction
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRP	Senior Review Panel
SWEC	Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
TAS	Technical Assistance Staff
T&L	Trades and Labor
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
TVTLC	Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council
UT	Ultrasonic Testing
VT	Visual Testing
WBECSP	Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program
WBN	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
WR	Work Request or Work Rules
WP	Workplans

1.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES

This subcategory report consists of 59 concerns and safety suggestions that have been grouped into 15 issues that address unsafe working conditions. These concerns and safety suggestions address those situations that have the potential to injure employees but are not otherwise specifically classified in other subcategories of the Industrial Safety Group. There are no nuclear safety-related concerns in this subcategory.

These concerns and safety suggestions deal with hazardous conditions that develop in day-to-day plant operations or in activities performed in the workplace.

TVA managers, supervisors, and foremen are responsible for reviewing jobs before the work is undertaken to identify those potential hazards associated with the work to be performed. Those potential hazards identified will be either eliminated or controlled in order for the work to be performed safely. The control measures involved are to be communicated to the employees who are to perform the work, and employees should be allowed to participate in this planning process. Supervisors and foremen are also responsible for conducting day-to-day inspections of their workplaces to identify and correct hazards and to integrate safety into their work activities.

The employees are responsible for reporting hazardous conditions to their supervisors and correcting those conditions within their scope of responsibilities. The employees have the following means of reporting hazardous conditions to supervisors or management.

- Day-to-day contact with foremen, supervisors, or managers
- Weekly safety meetings
- Safety staffs
- Health and safety committees
- Form TVA 18090, Hazard Identification Report
- Maintenance requests
- Grievance procedures

1.1 Housekeeping

This element consists of ten concerns which address general and specific housekeeping problems. Areas identified were the Auxiliary Building, the Turbine Building of unit 2, the power block, restrooms, and Containment Buildings of units 1 and 2. Materials identified as contributing to poor housekeeping conditions included metal shavings, "dirt, dust, and grime," excess material and tools, boards with nails, scrap metal, hangers, and trash. Some concerns identified neither location nor material.

The issue addressed in this element is poor housekeeping practices in the plant. This issue addresses only industrial safety housekeeping.

1.2 Material Storage

The three concerns in this element perceive materials, specifically, bricks and compressed gas bottles, are stored in an unsafe manner that endanger employees at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Division of Nuclear Construction's (DNC) warehouse facility.

1.3 Traffic Control

The three concerns in this element claim that the traffic control system for construction access roads and parking lots is not adequate: lane lines need repainting; there are too many egress points from other parking lots; and lighting is inadequate in the second shift parking lot.

The issue in this element is that employees are exposed to hazardous conditions when using access roads and parking lots.

1.4 Oxygen and Acetylene Gauges and Headers

Two concerns claimed improper use of oxygen and acetylene regulators and headers in the plant. They are being interchanged without regard to compatibility of gases, and protective caps are not provided for headers.

The issue is that these conditions are unsafe.

1.5 Airlock Doors

The five concerns that comprise this element allege the airlock doors at elevation 713 between the Service Building and the Auxiliary Building are not maintained in a safe operating condition: doors do not have safety switches or they are sometimes inoperable; they move too fast.

1.6 Control of Vehicle Speed

The one concern in this element alleges excessive speed by TVA vehicles on the project.

1.7 Flammable Liquid Storage

This element consists of one concern regarding the placement of flammable liquid storage cabinets near the access portal and workplan booth on elevation 708, Turbine Building. The concerned individual (CI) perceived this type of storage in the Turbine Building to be a fire hazard and recommended that the cabinets and material in them be moved "outside for fire prevention."

Flammable liquid storage cabinets are required to safely store and control limited quantities of flammable liquids which are used routinely in the plant. It is not known if the CI is aware of the special fire rating design of these cabinets as opposed to ordinary metal storage cabinets. The concern referred to "red lockers." Therefore, it is believed that the CI was questioning the rationale for storing flammable liquids in the plant and particularly in the location identified.

1.8 Crane Operation

This element consists of one concern alleging the crane operator was permitted to swing loads over crew shacks at the entrance to the Turbine Building exposing employees to the potential of falling materials.

1.9 Exterior Doors

This element consists of one concern about an exterior door in the Technical Services Office Building (TSOB) which would not stay closed. The CI believes this condition to be a safety hazard. The concern was evaluated on the broader issue that exterior doors at WBN are not maintained in a safe condition.

1.10 Scrap Metal Drop Chute

This element consists of one concern alleging inspection and maintenance of the scrap metal drop chute on unit 2 is inadequate. The CI alleges this condition allows debris to ricochet into personnel walkways.

1.11 Explosive Detectors

The one concern in this element alleges the metal bracket and control lights on the explosive detectors in the access portal are unsafe because they extend outward from the equipment 18 inches on the back.

1.12 Booby Traps

This element consists of one concern. The CI is aware of a booby trap being set in the plant in 1981 or 1982 to cause physical harm to an employee and is concerned similar conditions may still exist.

1.13 Miscellaneous - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)

This element consists of 15 safety suggestions that were reported through the WBN Employee Suggestions Program before February 1, 1986. These relate to various alleged unsafe conditions in the plant. These issues did not fit into other established elements; therefore, they were grouped into a miscellaneous element.

A list of these suggestions is as follows:

- A. WBN-85-001 - Individuals are attaching ear plugs to hard hats with wire. CI believes this is a health hazard.
- B. WBN-85-007 - Air filters in Jerry Collins' office door should be covered with expanded metal. If anyone were to strike the metal portion of the filter, they would receive a severe cut.
- C. WBN-0126 - The doorknob on C56 between the control room and hallway outside of the shift engineer's office is too close to the edge of the door.
- D. WBN-0132 - Install a curb around the neutralization tank (Turbine Building, elevation 685) to contain caustic acid spills.
- E. WBN-0183 - Safety racks for temporary storage of pressurized gas cylinder in transit at gate 126 could eliminate a hazard.
- F. WBN-0185 - Grease fittings on the lower bearing capsule is very close to the motor shaft. Greasing this lower bearing when the motor is running, an employee could get caught in the motor coupling. CI suggests having the fitting extended from coupling so that services are away from the turning shaft. (All Emergency Reactor Cooling Water (ERCW) motors.)
- G. WBN-0187 - All confined space areas should be visually marked at the entrances as "Confined Space Areas - Contact Safety . . . ," also; confined space monitors should have operating instructions laminated on each unit.

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- H. WBN-0188 - Bumping hazards are in lower containment at and around platforms to pressure relief tank, at elevation 716 and 724. Suggest padding and identifying (tape) these hazards.
 - I. WBN-0212 - Inadequate entrance into Medical Services to transport an injured person on a stretcher to an examination bed.
 - J. WBN-0243 - Weld some type of metal or steel hook on the liquid nitrogen Dewar cart to secure bottles from releasing.
 - K. WBN-0244 - Need Mechanical Maintenance fitters to remove or relocate piping (1-DRV-889 Drain) at elevation 708, TB-J line, on the steam generator blowdown system. It is a safety hazard at eye level.
 - L. WBN-700 - The CI believes the chain at the loading dock will not properly hold the empty cylinders.
 - M. WBN-0268 - Service air headers in Reactor Building, unit 1 have caps when not in use. If valve leaks, it needs repair. Problem is there is not a way to bleed this down to remove cap.
 - N. WBN-0271 - There is a need for reflectors along the access road to the plant and on the morning exit from the plant to help drivers during fog and heavy rain.
 - O. WBN-600 I.S. - The three phase bench grinders in the shops need lights installed on the starter to indicate when they are running.

1.14 Miscellaneous - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN)

This element consists of 14 concerns and safety suggestions relating to various alleged unsafe conditions at SQN. These issues did not fit into any of the established elements; therefore, they were grouped into a miscellaneous element.

A list of these concerns and safety suggestions is as follows:

- A. DLJ-85-001 - A tripping hazard exists due to the lip on the threshold of C-15 door to auxiliary room, unit 1.
- B. DLJ-85-002 - Tripping hazards are frequently created by hanging scaffolds or other supports from steel grate floors using pipe or other items to anchor the cables.
- C. DKJ-85-003 - The stairs accessing the Turbine Building from the outside are very slick when wet.

- D. DLJ-85-006 - Open plugs in upper containment cause tripping hazards. This issue originated from a crew safety meeting report.
- E. DHT-86-001 - The Public Safety Services (PSS) and Health Physics stations on the refueling floor are located such that loads pass over employees' heads.
- F. JAM-85-003 - No warnings are given that ignitors are being tested. If electrical maintenance is testing hydrogen ignitors, there is a risk of being burned. Request warnings when testing ignitors.
- G. EAC-85-001 - Tie-off cables are not provided above crane bridges for use during crane housekeeping or inspections.
- H. EAC-86-002 - Fittings for high pressure hose are improperly job-fabricated by unqualified personnel and are unsafe.
- I. EAC-85-006 - Vehicles parked along roadway curbs at entrance to No. 1 parking lot, obstructing vision and traffic, are a hazard.
- J. RMM-85-005 - Car parking along the curb of parking lot 1 were blocking the view of cars pulling out.
- K. EAC-85-008 - Some crane operators board and operate cranes while other operators are in the process of walking down and/or checking out the crane.
- L. EAC-85-009 - The concern expressed that heavy equipment operators lifting casts using Lorain hydraulic cranes without setting outriggers is not safe.
- M. I-86-240-SQN - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting a sheet metal platform be built on the side of the centrifuge.
- N. I-86-236-SQN - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting safety screens be installed to cover the caustic valves on the hot water tank at the makeup water treatment plant on elevation 685.

1.15 Miscellaneous - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

There is one concern in this element. The issue is that only slight improvement has been made on a winning safety award suggestion that involves installing lighting, handrails, and improved access road at the BFN Intake Forebay, Gate Structure 3.

The absence of adequate lighting and handrails allegedly creates an unsafe condition for employees working in this area.

2.0 SUMMARY

2.1 Summary of the Issue

This report addresses allegations by employees that unsafe conditions are allowed to exist at WBN, SQN, and BFN. These 59 concerns and safety suggestions relate to conditions that have developed through day-to-day plant operations and work activities.

2.2 Summary of the Evaluation Process

The evaluation process used to evaluate these concerns and safety suggestions involved the following:

- Research and review of applicable regulatory and industry safety standards to determine requirements
- Review of pertinent memorandums and documents
- Review of previously prepared investigation reports on individual concerns
- Conducted interviews with managers, supervisors, foremen, and employees
- Conducted inspections to determine physical conditions mentioned in the concerns

2.3 Summary of the Findings

2.3.1 Housekeeping

The issue is not substantiated. Findings of this evaluation revealed that the requirements for housekeeping as it relates to industrial safety are being met.

2.3.2 Material Storage

The issue is partially substantiated. Interviews with employees and a review of the previously prepared investigation report revealed repairs had been made on the compressed gas bottle shed. Repairs were made as a result of this concern.

Interviews with employees revealed the stack of bricks did not present a hazard to employees. Inspection of the area revealed the bricks have been removed.

2.3.3 Traffic Control

This issue is partially substantiated. The investigation revealed management has a system for controlling traffic, has provided for staggered work schedules for DNC and ONP WBN employees to minimize traffic congestion, has expedited traffic flow in the mornings and afternoons, and periodically paints road lane lines.

Burned out light bulbs did create an illumination deficiency on the second shift parking lot.

2.3.4 Oxygen and Acetylene Gauges and Headers

The part of this issue on protective caps for gas headers is substantiated. DNC management provided caps as a result of this concern.

The part of this issue on interchanging regulators and gauges on compressed gas systems is not substantiated. Inspections revealed fuel gas cylinders and headers have left-hand threads while oxygen and argon cylinders and manifolds have right-hand threads, thus preventing interchanging.

2.3.5 Airlock Doors

The issue is substantiated. The investigation of these concerns revealed (1) the doors had vertical safety strips, (2) management took actions to minimize or eliminate hazards and, subsequently, took the doors out of service. However, the investigation also revealed one of the doors was operating too fast at one time and that the doors did not have safety strips along the bottom edge of the doors. These two conditions created unsafe conditions.

2.3.6 Control of Vehicle Speed

The issue is not substantiated. Speed limit signs are posted. DNC PSS periodically monitors traffic using a radar gun. Tickets are issued and disciplinary action can be taken for habitual violators. Interviews and personal observation of traffic for over five months indicate vehicle speeding on the project is not a problem.

2.3.7 Flammable Liquid Storage

The issue is not substantiated but a corrective action was taken. The evaluation revealed five flammable liquid storage cabinets in an area where the requirements permitted only three. However, the CI wanted all the cabinets to be moved from this area. Findings revealed that flammable liquid storage cabinets are permitted within limits as specified by requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). A review of the original response revealed the authorized limit had been exceeded at the identified location. Corrective action taken in September 1985 consisted of relocating the two cabinets in excess of the limit.

2.3.8 Crane Operation

The issue is not substantiated. The evaluation revealed that before the crane began working, a planning meeting was held and the crane and truck were positioned so loads would not be carried over crew shacks. Interviews with the crane operator and ONP WBN safety staff and personal observation indicate that the crane did not carry loads over crew shacks.

2.3.9 Exterior Doors

The issue is not substantiated. Findings revealed no violation or nonconformance with applicable standards, and the condition of door did not present an unsafe condition.

2.3.10 Scrap Metal Drop Chute

The issue is substantiated. The chute was constructed to meet requirements; however, materials falling into the container at the base of the chute could bounce out into personnel walkways. This condition was corrected before this investigation, but after the concern was submitted, by installation of wooden barriers.

2.3.11 Explosive Detectors

The issue is not substantiated. The brackets and control lights do extend out from the rear of the units, but they do not create an unsafe condition.

2.3.12 Booby Traps

The issue is not substantiated. Information obtained does not indicate any other traps being reported or investigated since the 1981 or 1982 incident.

2.3.13 Miscellaneous - ONP WBN

The issues that comprise this element were submitted as suggestions through the Employee Suggestions Program. The concerns in this element relate to various unsafe conditions in the plant that would not fit into other established elements.

A review of the quarterly reports prepared by the Safety Supervisor to provide a status of the suggestions, and a discussion of the suggestions with a representative in the safety staff revealed management has taken action to address the suggestions.

2.3.14 Miscellaneous - SQN

The issues that comprise this element were submitted as suggestions through the Employee Suggestions Program or as concerns that were submitted to the Nuclear Safety Review Staff. The concerns relate to various unsafe conditions in the plant that would not fit into other established elements.

The case files were reviewed; several telephone calls were made to the Safety Supervisor and managers at SQN; and an inspection was made to determine the status of one specific concern. Management has taken or proposed corrective action on all but one of the issues. A Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATD) was submitted to SQN on this issue.

2.3.15 Miscellaneous - BFN

The issue is substantiated. The investigation revealed the CI submitted the safety suggestion before August 28, 1985, and was concerned that more action has not been taken to implement the suggestion. The investigation further revealed the BFN safety staff investigated the status of the suggestions and provided the CI a reply on October 9, 1985.

A Design Change Request (DCR) D3251, has been written, but the work for providing additional handrails and lighting will not be done until the next outage. A CATD was submitted to BFN on this issue.

2.4 Summary of Collective Significance

Management has been effective in resolving unsafe conditions reported through the safety suggestion program at the sites. However, line management has not been totally effective in its support of the safety program. Because of this, unsafe conditions in the workplace are not always recognized and corrected. This results in an increased probability of accidents or injuries caused by such unsafe conditions.

2.5 Summary of Perceived Causes for the Findings

The cause of the findings could be either management's failure to understand its responsibility to implement the safety program or its failure to carry out this responsibility.

Some managers relied on the employees to identify unsafe conditions and report them. Then the managers would take action to get the conditions corrected, but they fail to fulfill their responsibility to conduct day-to-day inspections of their workplaces and preplan work activities to identify and correct unsafe conditions. This lack of initiative creates a perception by employees that management is not interested in the safety program.

2.6 Summary of Corrective Action and Results Achieved

The unsafe conditions mentioned in the concerns, except for the safety screens to cover caustic valves on the hot water tank at SQN, and the handrails and lighting at the BFN Intake Forebay Structure, Gate Structure No. 3, have been corrected or have had action proposed to make corrections.

3.0 EVALUATION PROCESS

The activities conducted in the evaluation of the issues in this subcategory include research and review of applicable standards, reports, memorandums and documents, inspections, and interviews. Each of these activities are discussed below.

3.1 Interviews

During the course of this evaluation, interviews were conducted with 16 managers, 41 employees, nine foremen and, on numerous occasions, the safety staffs. Interviews were conducted to determine procedures for reporting unsafe conditions, to determine inspection programs, to gain knowledge of conditions addressed in the concerns, and to learn management's attitude about getting conditions that are reported to them corrected.

3.2 Inspections

Inspections were conducted of the areas mentioned in the concerns to determine the physical conditions and evaluate the alleged unsafe conditions.

3.3 Standards and Documentation Review

Standards, procedures, and memorandums were researched and reviewed to determine applicable requirements or criteria for the unsafe conditions mentioned in the concerns. Listed below are either regulatory standards or requirements that have been adopted by TVA, ONP WBN, or DNC.

3.3.1 Housekeeping Requirements

3.3.1.1 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.22(a)(1)

This standard requires that all places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms shall be kept clean and orderly and in a sanitary condition.

3.3.1.2 29 CFR 1926.25 (a, b, and c)

This standard requires that construction debris shall be kept cleared from work areas, passageways, and stairs during the course of construction. Combustible scrap and debris shall be removed at regular intervals and appropriate waste collection and separation containers provided. Flammable, oily, or hazardous wastes must be disposed of in containers equipped with covers.

3.3.1.3 ONP WBN Administrative Instruction (AI) - 1.8, Revision 8, "Plant Housekeeping"

This instruction encompasses activities for control of cleanliness in facilities, cleanliness in material and equipment, fire prevention, fire protection, control of access, protection of equipment, and radioactive material control. The instruction assigns to plant individuals the responsibility for housekeeping checks of plant areas. Additionally, this instruction provides for a housekeeping check list, specifies frequency of inspections, requires training for special housekeeping practices, and specifies documentation.

**3.3.1.4 DNC, Quality Control Instruction (QCI)-1.36,
Revision 13, April 1, 1986, "Storage and
Housekeeping"**

This instruction describes storage and housekeeping requirements for work activities, conditions, and environments that can affect the quality of safety-related and nonsafety-related structures, equipment, and components. This reference, though implemented primarily for the protection of hardware, is included as a part of this report due to its impact on housekeeping as it relates to personnel safety.

**3.3.1.5 DNC Manual of Safe Practice and Information,
"Housekeeping," pages 10 and 11. There is not a
revision number or date on this manual.**

This manual requires DNC employees to maintain cleanliness and orderliness at all times both inside and outside of buildings. Material is to be stored to prevent falling or spreading and eliminate tripping and stumbling hazards. Clean up after each work assignment is required. Additionally, welding cables, hoses, electrical cords, etc., shall be routed overhead to eliminate tripping hazards. Housekeeping is briefly described as the orderly arrangement of tools, equipment, supplies, storage facilities, and work areas.

3.3.1.6 Review of Other Pertinent Documents or Reports

Reviewed of the periodic "Property Loss Prevention Report," generated by M&M Protection Consultants. Units one and two at WBN were inspected and reported on by Mr. T. V. Clark. The inspection was conducted on August 26-28, 1985.

Responses to employee concerns regarding housekeeping that were prepared before the formation of the WBN Employee Concerns Special Program were reviewed and incorporated within this report.

Housekeeping inspections performed according to AI-1.8 were reviewed for the period January 1985 through July 1986. The inspection reports were reviewed for each section having housekeeping responsibilities.

3.3.2 Material Storage Requirements

3.3.2.1 CFR 1926.250 - "General Requirements for Storage"

"General" - 1926.250 (a)(1)

All materials stored in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or otherwise secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapse.

1926.250 (a)(3)

Aisles and passageways shall be kept clear to provide for the free and safe movement of material handling equipment or employees. Such areas shall be kept in good repair.

1926.250 (a)(6)

Brick stacks shall not be more than 7-feet in height. When a loose brick stack reaches a height of 4-feet, it shall be tapered back 2-inches in every foot of height above the 4-foot level.

3.3.2.2 29 CFR 1910.176 - "Handling Materials - General"

"Secure Storage" - 1910.176(b)

Storage of materials shall not create a hazard. Bags, containers, bundles, etc., stored in tiers shall be stacked, blocked, interlocked and limited in height so that they are stable and secure against sliding or collapse.

"Housekeeping" - 1910.176(c)

Storage areas shall be kept free from accumulation of materials that constitute hazards from tripping, fire, explosion, or pest harborage. Vegetation control will be exercised when necessary.

3.3.2.3 29 CFR 1910.22 - "General Requirements"

"Housekeeping" - 1910.22(a)(1)

All places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms shall be kept clean and in a sanitary condition.

3.3.2.4 DNC Manual of Safe Practices and Information -
"Housekeeping"

Premises both inside and outside of buildings shall be kept clean and orderly at all times.

1. Housekeeping means much more than a "pushbroom" effort. It is the orderly arrangement of tools, equipment, supplies, storage facilities, and work areas.
2. Store materials and supplies in an orderly manner so as to prevent their falling or spreading and to eliminate tripping and stumbling hazards.

3.3.3 Traffic Control Requirements

American National Standard Institute (ANSI) Practice for Industrial Lighting, All.1-1973 and Illuminating Engineering Society Handbook, 1981 application volume requires a minimum of one foot candle of light for self-parking lots.

3.3.4 Oxygen and Acetylene Requirements

29 CFR 1926.350(e)(3)

Manifold hose connections, including both ends of the supply hose that lead to the manifold, shall be such that the hose cannot be interchanged between fuel gas and oxygen manifolds and supply header connections. Adapters shall not be used to permit the interchange of hose. Hose connections shall be kept free of grease and oil.

29 CFR 1926.350(e)(4)

When not in use, manifold and header hose connections shall be capped.

29 CFR 1926.350(f)(1)

Fuel gas hose and oxygen hose shall be easily distinguishable from each other. The contrast may be made by different colors or by surface characteristics readily distinguishable by the sense of touch. Oxygen and fuel gas hoses shall not be interchangeable. A single hose having more than one gas passage shall not be used.

3.3.5 Airlock Doors Requirements

No specific requirements.

3.3.6 Control of Vehicle Speed Requirements

Speed limit signs are posted along access roads and project roads.

3.3.7 Flammable Liquids Storage Requirements

3.3.7.1 ONP WBH Hazard Control Instruction (HCI)-HM1, "Flammable Liquids Storage, Transfer, and Handling." This instruction permits no more than three flammable liquid storage cabinets to be located in a single storage area. It further states that the supervisor is responsible for ensuring that employees are thoroughly familiar with the appropriate hazard control measures associated with the handling of flammable liquids.

3.3.7.2 NFPA, 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 4-3.1.

This section permits no more than three storage cabinets in a single fire area. Additional cabinets are permitted if separated by at least 100 feet.

3.3.8 Crane Operation Requirements

29 CFR 1926.180(h)(3)(vi)

The operator should avoid carrying loads over people.

3.3.8.1 ANSI B30.5a - 1984, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes, Sections 5-3, 1.4 (e)

The operator should avoid carrying loads over people.

3.3.8.2 DNC Manual of Safe Practices and Informations, page 17

Do not swing loads over other workmen if at all possible.

3.3.9 Exterior Door Requirements

29 CFR 1910.36(b)(1), "Means of Egress, General Requirements, Fundamental Requirements"

This standard requires that buildings for human occupancy be provided with exits sufficient to permit the prompt escape of occupants in case of fire or other emergency.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code

Section 5-1.2.1, "Means of Egress"

Defines a means of egress as a continuous and unobstructed way of exit travel from any point in a building.

Section 5-1.7, "Workmanship, Impediments to Egress"

Requires doors and all other components of means of egress to be of substantial, reliable construction and built or installed in a workmanlike manner. Means of egress shall be free of obstructions which would prevent its use.

3.3.10 Scrap Metal Drop Chute Requirements

29 CFR 1926.252(a) - "Disposal of Waste Materials"

Whenever materials are dropped more than 20 feet to any point outside the exterior walls of the building, an enclosed chute of wood, or equivalent material, shall be used. For the purpose of this paragraph, an enclosed chute is a slide, closed in on all sides, through which material is moved from a high place to a lower one.

3.3.11 Explosive Detector Requirements

None

3.3.12 Booby trap Requirements

None

3.3.13 Miscellaneous - ONP WBN Requirements

No specific requirements on to these safety suggestions.

3.3.14 Miscellaneous - SQN Requirements

There are various requirements applicable to issues raised on the safety suggestions and concerns.

3.3.15 Miscellaneous - BFN Requirements

29 CFR 1910.22(c) - "Covers and Guardrails"

Covers and/or guardrails should be provided to protect personnel from the hazards of open pits, tanks, vats, ditches, etc.

4.0 FINDINGS

The majority of the issues addressed by this subcategory are site-specific in nature. They may, however, have general implications at other ONP sites or Divisions. Therefore, this is being addressed through the development of ONP Standards (which are generic documents for all ONP) and through the development of site procedures (which deal with one site's specific circumstances.)

The findings and conclusions of this subcategory report are not in conflict with any findings and conclusions generated as a result of previous investigations of the employee concerns addressed by this report.

4.1 Housekeeping

4.1.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Inspections of both DNC and ONP WBN areas revealed a high level of compliance with applicable standards. Although some instances were noted where housekeeping was less than adequate, the overall view is that these are limited areas and are considered to be isolated instances when compared with the plant condition in general. Also, the few areas where some minor housekeeping discrepancies were observed were areas involving construction and contractor work activities. The discrepancies primarily involved welding leads on the floor in unit one, Containment Building and in the Turbine Building at a single work site. These instances are exceptions to the generally good housekeeping practices being employed in the plant.

Inspections revealed that passageways and aisles are clear of material; combustible material is not allowed to accumulate; routing of hoses and electrical cords overhead is being practiced; scaffolding materials are being well managed; and floors are being maintained. Further evidence of this finding is provided in the comments included in the referenced property loss report of M&M Protection Consultants, that housekeeping was good throughout the plant.

A review of inspection reports prepared by ONP WBN and DNC health and safety committees, WBN quarterly inspection teams, and DNC safety staff weekly activity reports indicates 97 housekeeping deficiencies were noted for the period February 1984 to March 1986. This number is not excessive given the size of this project and the type of work involved during this time frame.

A review of the monthly housekeeping inspection reports indicated that housekeeping items are being identified, documented and corrective action taken. ONP WBN Section Supervisors are responsible for monthly inspections of their assigned areas per WBN AI-1.8, "Plant Housekeeping." Compliance with this requirement is considered to be at a high level, judging from the number of reports submitted each month and the number of items identified. Items identified are being corrected by initiation of Maintenance Requests (MR).

Housekeeping, being an ongoing daily process, is no doubt a problem at specific times. The concerns were submitted over a year ago and housekeeping conditions could have been less than adequate at times. However, the procedures implemented for dealing with these problems are effective in meeting the plants industrial safety needs and in meeting requirements.

Conclusion

This issue regarding the perception that poor housekeeping practices exist at WBN is not substantiated. Inspections and observations conducted during this evaluation provided evidence that housekeeping procedures are being followed.

4.2 Findings - Material Storage

4.2.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

The DNC warehouse facility covers several acres of land and consists of metal buildings, plastic clad storage sheds, storage sheds for compressed gas bottles and an open yard storage.

There are 15 warehouse employees on the day shift and nine on the night shift.

The warehouse clerks conduct a weekly inspection of the warehouses and document results. A monthly housekeeping inspection is conducted by a representative from the Materials Quality Control Unit and either the warehouse supervisor or warehouse quality assurance supervisor.

Interviews with two managers and five employees revealed weekly employee involvement meetings and weekly safety meetings are held. Employees are given an opportunity to bring any concern or safety issue to management's attention in these meetings and on a daily basis. A review of the employee involvement meeting minutes for the period of January 29, 1986, to June 2, 1986, revealed considerable discussion from employees on occupational safety issues, i.e., hardhats, safety glasses, seat belts, fork lifts, and conditions in the buildings and yard areas.

Interviews with employees revealed (1) employees are comfortable in reporting conditions needing attention either to their foreman or to the warehouse supervisor; (2) warehouse management is receptive to getting reported conditions corrected, but "sometimes it takes too long"; (3) employees are not required to work in conditions they believe are unsafe; and (4) management is more interested in employee concerns now than they were a year or two ago.

The bricks mentioned in Concern IN-85-118-003 were stacked at the backside of yard 2 in an area with very little, if any, work activity. The condition of the stack of bricks was brought up in a safety meeting before becoming an employee concern. Some of the bricks were restacked and management thought this resolved the problem. Once the employee concern dated August 8, 1985, was issued, management roped off the area since the bricks were not to be used but were to be sold in the October 17, 1985, auction. Inspection of the area revealed the bricks have been removed.

Interviews with four warehousemen that were aware of the stack of bricks revealed: (1) the bricks were two pallets high and estimates of height ranged from 3 to 8-feet; (2) no one was required to work near the bricks; and (3) bricks did not present a threat to anyone.

The shed mentioned in Concern IN-85-001-001 is used to store compressed gas bottles. Two sheds are constructed of heavy timber flooring and supports with skeleton-iron-clad siding. An observation of the sheds did not reveal any deteriorated structural members or sagging floors. Interviews with employees revealed the sheds have been repaired at different times in the past. The previous investigation of this concern indicates repairs had been needed and had been made at the time of that investigation. The repairs were made as a result of the employee concern.

Shed "E" mentioned in Concern IN-85-118-002 is used for miscellaneous storage and is of skeleton-plastic-clad construction. The previous investigation report stated that an inspection conducted August 6, 1985, revealed no safety hazards, but "apparently some work had been done in this area." The report also stated DNC was in the process of moving materials out of the sheds into warehouse buildings. A large portion of shed E has been torn down since the previous investigation was conducted; therefore, physical condition could not be determined during this evaluation.

A review of inspection reports prepared by ONP WBN and DNC Health and Safety Committees, ONP WBN Quarterly Inspection Team, and DNC Safety Staff Weekly Activity Reports, revealed three material storage deficiencies were noted on the reports for the period February 1984 to March 1986. The specific locations were not determined when the information was gathered.

Conclusion

The conclusion is that materials at the DNC warehouse facility are stored in a safe manner. This determination is based on the following findings:

1. Only three storage deficiencies were noted through inspection activities for a two year period.
2. Two meetings are held weekly that provide employees an opportunity to bring unsafe conditions to management's attention.
3. Employee interviews indicate management is receptive to getting conditions corrected.

4. Employee interviews indicate they are not required to work in conditions they believe are unsafe.
5. Observation of the outside storage area and bottle shed reveal materials are being stored in compliance with requirements.

4.3 Findings - Traffic Control

4.3.1 Site Specific - WBN

4.3.1.1 Second Shift Parking Lot

Discussion

The previous investigation report on concern IN-85-684-002 indicated light readings in the second shift parking lot ranged from 0.15 to .2-foot candles. Since this is significantly below the 1-foot candle requirement in ANSI A11.1, the report concluded the second shift parking lot lighting should be improved. Therefore, the burned out light bulbs were replaced.

Only a few employees are presently on the second shift; therefore, this parking lot is currently used for overflow and visitor parking during the day.

Personnel walkways in the second shift parking lot and in the main construction parking lot are designated by railroad rails approximately 7 feet apart and protrude above ground level 4 to 5 inches to inhibit vehicles from crossing walkways. Employees that parked in the second shift parking lot crossed the main construction parking lot road enroute to and from the brass alley at shift change. Yellow signs caution vehicle drivers of pedestrian crossings, and DNC management provided the employees using this lot a bus to transport them between the parking lot and the brass alley to minimize traffic exposure.

Conclusions

This portion of the element is partially substantiated in that lighting was below ANSI standards. However, replacement of burned out bulbs has improved illumination in the lot.

The personnel walkway concern is not substantiated because walkways are marked by rails and signs, and a bus was provided for transportation when the second shift was fully staffed.

4.3.1.2 Painting Traffic Lane Lines

Discussion

The main access road traffic lane lines were painted in June 1985 and the lane lines on the road to the Construction Service Branch (CSB) maintenance garage were painted in November 1985. The concern IN-85-743-002 is dated July 19, 1985. The ONP WBN employees' parking lot, located adjacent to the main DNC parking lot, had its lines painted in March or April 1986. A cognizant general foreman stated there is not a specific schedule for painting lane lines; painting is done when requested either by ONP WBN or DNC management. The DNC parking lots are limestone rock and painting lines is not feasible.

Conclusion

This portion of the element is not substantiated. Main access road lines were painted before the concern was submitted, and all lines are painted periodically. Inspection revealed lines are readily visible.

4.3.1.3 Third Shift Parking Lot

Discussion

The road from ONP WBN employees parking lot to the CSB maintenance garage road is approximately 21-feet wide and makes a 90-degree right hand turn about half way between the parking lot and the junction with the CSB maintenance garage road. At the time the concern was issued, traffic entered the CSB maintenance garage road from the ONP WBN employees parking lot, DNC parking lot, and third shift parking lot. Traffic in this area at shift change would be congested due to the amount of cars leaving the project, but this does not mean this condition would be dangerous because of the safety measures listed in the following paragraph.

Speed limit signs are posted on all access roads and DNC PSS monitors traffic speed using a radar gun on a random basis. PSS officers direct traffic at each DNC shift change, observe for traffic bottlenecks that cause unusual problems, and check roads and parking lots during daily routine patrols. Any unusual conditions noted are reported to their supervisor.

The third shift has now been discontinued and traffic patterns have now been changed to require both DNC and ONP WBN employees parking in these lots to enter and exit through the access road by the DNC gate 2.

Shift changes for ONP WBN and DNC employees are staggered 30 minutes apart; however, both were on the same schedule for about two weeks during the summer of 1985, and this caused some additional traffic congestion. Normally, because of the half hour stagger, employees reporting to work park in the appropriate lot before the employees getting off leave the parking lot; therefore, traffic is primarily one way, either coming in or going out. Between 6 a.m. and 8 a.m. when employees are coming to work, there are two lanes for in-bound traffic and one lane for outbound and vice versa the remainder of the day. Traffic lane restriction signs are posted along the roadway.

Conclusion

This portion of the element is not substantiated for the following findings:

1. Speed limit signs are posted and DNC PSS uses a radar gun to periodically monitor vehicle speeds.
2. ONP WBN and DNC employees' work schedules are staggered 30 minutes apart to minimize traffic congestion at shift changes.
3. DNC PSS monitors and directs traffic between 6:15 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., and 3:15 p.m. and 3:45 p.m. when traffic is the heaviest.

4. The three lane road to the project uses two lanes for in-bound traffic between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. and two lanes for outbound traffic the remainder of the day.

4.4 Findings - Oxygen and Acetylene Gauges and Headers

4.4.1 Site-Specific - WBN

Discussion

Plant inspections verified that fuel gas cylinders and headers have left hand threads while oxygen and argon cylinders and manifolds have right hand threads. This effectively prevents them from being interchanged.

Oxygen and argon cylinders have the same type of threads, but both are clearly marked as to their contents. Regulators for both oxygen and argon are rated at 3500 psi. A welding supply vendor and a TVA welding engineer concur that interchanging the regulators for these gases would not present a hazard.

Conclusion

This concern is not substantiated.

Discussion

As a result of the second employee concern in this element, construction management was informed during September 1985 that gas headers in the plant were not equipped with protective caps. By October 3, 1985, the caps were installed. An inspection during April 1986 verified the caps were still in place.

Conclusion

This concern is substantiated; corrective action has been taken.

4.5 Findings - Airlock Doors

4.5.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

The airlock system at elevation 713 between the Service Building and Auxiliary Building consists of two sets of side-hinged, air operated, double doors. The doors are controlled by an interlock system that incorporates both

card reader and manual opening, and manual and automatic closing activities. Each door is equipped with a vertical safety strip along the leading edge on the inside and outside of the door. This safety strip (switch) is interconnected with the door air operators. If the strip strikes something, the door automatically stops. This safety strip operates in a similar manner as the leading edge on a public elevator door.

The previous investigation report on concern IN-85-546-001 indicates "neither the safety staff nor Construction Medical Services had any records of injuries directly associated with elevation 713 airlock."

The previous investigation report on concern IN-85-615-002 indicates "an inspection of the airlock door (elevation 713, portal to elevator) was conducted on August 21, 1985.

The door does have a limit switch. The limit switch is inside the gray vinyl material which runs down the inside and outside edges of the door." The cognizant mechanical engineers interviewed stated the safety strips were on the doors when they were placed in operation in July 1985.

The previous investigation report on concern EX-85-048-009 indicates "the investigation included repeated use of the safety pad, talks with the cognizant engineer about the subject, and talks with members of the plant and construction safety staffs. None of the above individuals knew of any failure or witnessed any failures of the safety pad." This investigation did not develop any information that safety strips had failed to operate.

The previous investigation report on concern IN-86-246-014 indicates "the doors were most recently adjusted on or about August 21, 1985." The report states that "one of the doors was too fast and was adjusted back to the proper speed." One of the cognizant mechanical engineers interviewed stated one of the doors was operating a little too fast at one time, so adjustments were made to slow it down.

The doors did not have a safety strip along the bottom edge when they were put into operation. If someone is struck by one of the doors and the vertical safety strip is not contacted, the door would not stop, and the person could be pushed into the door threshold or knocked down, causing an injury.

After employees reported the potential hazard to the WBN safety staff, a representative of the safety staff met with the manager in charge to discuss ways to improve safe operations. The following precautions were taken to improve safe operations:

- A PSS officer was stationed at the door to show employees how to operate the doors.
- The swing radius of doors was painted on floor.
- A memorandum on how to operate the doors was sent to employees.
- A safety strip was installed along the bottom edge of the doors.
- An alarm was installed that operates when doors are in motion.

Because of operational unreliability, the manager in charge decided to take the doors out of service in March 1986 and keep them open. The manufacturer, in conjunction with Division of Nuclear Engineering, is now redesigning these doors.

Conclusion

Even though the investigations of these concerns revealed (1) the doors had vertical safety strips; (2) management took actions to minimize or eliminate the hazards and subsequently took the doors out of service, this element is substantiated. The investigations revealed one of the doors was operating too fast at one time, and the doors did not have safety strips along the bottom edge. These two conditions created unsafe conditions.

4.6 Findings - Control of Vehicle Speed

4.6.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Speed limit signs have been posted on all access and project roads. DNC PSS patrols all access roads and parking lots daily and periodically monitors traffic using a radar gun. First-time speeding violators are issued a warning ticket and second-time violators, within a six-month period, receive a ticket. A copy of the ticket is sent to the employee's supervisor with instructions for the supervisor to discuss the ticket with the employee.

PSS officers are permitted to exceed the posted speed limit only if they have been dispatched for an emergency. The PSS managers stated they have not received any complaints of officers speeding while on duty on the project.

DNC managers interviewed were aware of the policy on traffic violations and the sequence for progressive discipline as stated in DNC Conduct Guidelines for Salary Policy Employees and in Asa C. Kelley's memorandum dated April 5, 1984, "Working Rules for Trades and Labor Employees," contained in the DNC Policy Manual.

Interviews with two DNC managers who would be notified of tickets for the employees in their area revealed that their employees have not received a speeding ticket in over a year.

Conclusion

This element is not substantiated for the following reasons:

Management has developed and implemented measures to control violations of traffic rules on the project. These controls will not prevent speeding on the project, but do establish an effective mechanism to deal with those who habitually violate the requirements.

Interviews and personal observation of vehicles on the project and access roads by this evaluator for over five months indicates speeding is not a problem and that DNC ISS does monitor vehicle speed.

4.7 Findings - Flammable Liquid Storage

4.7.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Investigation of this concern was initially conducted on September 26, 1985. Five flammable liquid storage cabinets (two above the specified limit) were found at the coordinates T-3, J-Line, elevation 708, Turbine Building. Two cabinets were subsequently relocated in order to comply with the requirements.

NFPA-30 and HCI-HMI permit no more than three flammable liquid storage cabinets in a single location. However, the CI recommends that these cabinets "be moved outside for fire prevention." The use and placement of these cabinets is not prohibited in the plant by the standards except in quantity as mentioned and for critical areas. Critical areas contain safety-related wiring or equipment necessary for safe shutdown and all other areas so designated by the plant manager.

During the course of this evaluation, the Turbine Building, as well as the Container and Auxiliary Buildings, were inspected to determine the level of compliance with the standards. Although other flammable liquid storage cabinets were noted in various locations of the Turbine Building, none were in excess of the established limits. Requests for flammable liquid storage cabinets and their locations must be approved by the Fire Protection Engineer.

Informal interviews with craft foremen were conducted in order to ascertain their familiarity with the requirements of HCI-HMI. The results of the interviews revealed a lack of knowledge about the three cabinet limit by all personnel interviewed. Some knew there was a limit of cabinets in a single location but did not know the limit.

An informal interview with the Fire Protection Engineer provided information which indicated that employees have, on occasion, relocated flammable liquid storage cabinets to other locations which have not been approved. Instances of this nature are identified during routine walk-through inspections conducted by members of the fire and safety staff, or by quarterly inspection teams.

Inspections conducted by health and safety committees and quarterly inspection teams revealed 11 deficiencies for flammable liquids storage during a period of February 1984 to March 1986. However, none of the deficiencies cited were specifically related to the number of flammable liquid storage cabinets in a particular locale.

Conclusion

This element is not substantiated because the use of the storage cabinets is not by itself a fire hazard. However, the rule limiting the number of cabinets needs to be better understood by personnel. A CATD was sent to ONP WBN describing this problem.

4.8 Findings - Crane Operation

4.8.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Before beginning the work mentioned in the concern, a planning meeting was held by the responsible maintenance specialist, the crane operator, and the ONP WBN safety engineering staff. It was determined that the crane could not safely swing over the crew shacks. To prevent this, the crane and the truck used to handle material were located between the Turbine Building and the crew shacks. This eliminated the need to swing over the crew shacks.

Conclusion

Interviews with the crane operators and the ONP WBN safety engineering staff indicate that the crane did not swing over the crew shacks. Observations of the crane work revealed no operation over crew shacks. This issue is not substantiated.

4.9 Findings - Exterior Doors

4.9.1 Site Specific - WBN

Discussion

Exterior doors inspected in the Interim Office Building, Technical Services Office Building, Modification Building, Service Building, Turbine Building and Plant Office Building are non-CSSC (critical systems, structures, and components), nonfire-rated doors. Maintenance performed on these doors is conducted by the initiation of a MR. MRs for Non-CSSC door work are not retained as permanent records. Therefore, the MR describing the details of work performed on the TSOB door could not be reviewed. However, the CI stated in the concern that the door would not stay closed. This condition in itself does not constitute a safety hazard nor a violation of the Life Safety Code. The means of egress was not impeded by the condition of the door even though it was not functioning fully as intended.

Mechanical maintenance (MM) carpenters are responsible for repairs on exterior doors. An interview with the MM carpenter foreman revealed that a MR had been initiated

about August or September 1985 and the door was repaired. The component repaired was identified as the door closer mechanism. Although door repair is recognized as a continuous, on-going activity, no evidence was found which indicated neglect of exterior door maintenance.

Conclusion

The issue on the maintenance of exterior doors is not substantiated. This determination is based upon the results of inspections of exterior doors of buildings at WBN. All doors inspected, including the door in the concern, were determined to be in compliance with the standards regarding unobstruction of egress.

4.10 Findings - Scrap Metal Drop Chute

4.10.1 Site-Specific - WBN

Discussion

The chute met the requirements when it was constructed. Despite meeting requirements, scrap material could bounce out of the receptacle and strike a person using a nearby walkway. During the summer of 1985, after the concern was submitted, a wooden barrier and a deflector shield were added to the chute. This effectively controls the hazard.

Conclusion

This element is substantiated. Corrective action has been taken.

4.11 Findings - Explosive Detectors

4.11.1 Site-Specific - WBN

Discussion

The metal brackets that hold the control lights on the explosive detectors were designed and installed by the manufacturer. These units have been in service for four to five years and are the same type used at SQN. The ONP WBN PSS manager interviewed stated that he has no knowledge of any injuries or damage to equipment caused by someone striking the control lights and brackets, nor has he received any employee complaints on these units.

The control light brackets extend 14-1/2 inches from the rear of the units but only protrude about 2 inches into the employees' walkway. Brackets are not rigidly mounted but will move approximately 2-inches horizontally if struck. Employees going through the detectors must focus on the lights to know when to stop and proceed through the detectors, minimizing the possibility of striking the lights or brackets.

Conclusion

The control lights and brackets are located as the concern states. However, they create no more of a hazard to employees than desk corners, fire extinguishers hanging on a wall, chairs, pipes, valves and support hangers, etc. Therefore, the concern is not substantiated.

4.12 Findings - Booby traps

4.12.1 Site-specific - WBN

Discussion

Interviews with individuals having knowledge of the original incident revealed no other booby trap incidents have been reported or found in the plant since the 1981 or 1982 incident. The individuals interviewed did not know who set the trap or who the trap was intended. However, some believe it was intended for a general foreman.

Conclusion

Information obtained from interviews does not indicate any traps being reported or investigated since the 1981 or 1982 incident; therefore, this concern is not substantiated.

4.13 Findings - Miscellaneous - ONP WBN

The WBN Employee Suggestions Program (WB2.1.10) details the responsibilities and requirements for implementing this program. Once an employee submits the suggestion, it is tracked until the item is resolved.

The plant DCU has a tracking system for employee suggestions. The suggestions are assigned for resolution to the sections from which they were originated. At 30 days after original date of the suggestion, the DCU forwards any unresolved suggestions to the Planning and Scheduling Unit for addition to the responsible section's Outstanding Items Status Log (OISL).

The DCU advises the Site Director monthly of any suggestions not answered within 30 days. This list and the OISL are discussed monthly at plant staff meetings. Once a suggestion is entered on the OISL it stays there until the suggestion is resolved.

The Safety Supervisor maintains a record of the suggestions submitted and provides the health and safety committee members, the Site Director, and Plant Manager a quarterly Safety Suggestion Status Report.

The safety staff conducts an annual audit of the safety program. The Employee Safety Suggestions Program is included in this audit. The program audit report for FY 1985 states that 52 of the 88 safety suggestions forwarded to the Safety Office did not have a response to the originator of the action taken. The recommendation states "implementation of the Employees Concerns Program (WB2.1.10) should adequately address the feedback problem." This program is being implemented.

The safety suggestions that were developed through the Employee Suggestions Program are listed below by number, description, and actions taken to address the suggestions.

- A. WBN-85-001 - Individuals are attaching ear plugs to hard hats with wire. CI believes this is a health hazard.

Based on field observations by the ONP WBN safety staff, this condition has not been observed. There is no criteria on how to attach ear plugs to hard hats.

- B. WBN-85-007 - Air filters in Jerry Collins' office door should be covered with expanded metal. If anyone were to strike the metal portion of the filter they would receive a severe cut.

MR A-410615 was written to delete the filters. The 1985 fourth quarter safety suggestion status report indicates this work is complete.

- C. WBN-0126 - The doorknob on C56 between control room and the hallway outside of shift engineer's office is too close to the edge of the door.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates this doorknob has been replaced.

- D. WBN-0132 - Install a curb around the neutralization tank (Turbine Building, elevation 685) to contain caustic acid spills.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates DCR 630 was written to install a curb. This item was entered on the OISL February 4, 1986, and the August 4, 1986 OISL shows it is still an open item.

- E. WBN-0183 - Safety racks for temporary storage of pressurized gas cylinder in transit at gate 126 could eliminate a hazard.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates a DCR was written to install storage rack. This item was entered on the OISL February 4, 1986, and the August 4, 1986 OISL shows it is still an open item.

A conversation with a Modifications Section supervisor on August 25, 1986 revealed they have purchased bottle buggies to secure the bottles while in transit instead of installing racks.

- F. WBN-0185 - Grease fittings on the lower bearing capsule is very close to the motor shaft. Greasing this lower motor bearing when the motor is running, an employee could get caught in the motor coupling. CI suggests having the fitting extended from coupling so that services are away from the turning shaft. (All ERCW motors.)

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates the procedure was rewritten to prohibit lower bearing lubrication while the motor is running.

- G. WBN-0187 - All confined space areas should be visually marked at the entrances as "Confined Space Areas - Contact Safety..."; also, confined space monitors should have operating instructions laminated on each unit.

A conversation with a representative from the ONP WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, reveals that there is no requirement to mark all confined spaces and they do not intend to mark them. They have laminated instruction on confined space monitors.

- H. WBN-0188 - Bumping hazards in lower containment at and around platforms to pressure relief tank, at elevation 716 and 724. Suggest padding and identifying (tape) these hazards.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates specific bump hazards need to be identified for marking.

A conversation with the ONP WBN Safety Supervisors revealed there are too many bump hazards in the area to mark each one. Employees are to submit MRs on specific ones to be marked or padded.

- I. WBN-0212 - Inadequate entrance into Medical Services to transport an injured person on a stretcher to an examination bed.

A conversation with a representative from the ONP WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, revealed there is an adequate door and passageway to get a stretcher into the Medical Services examination room. This suggestion was submitted after an incident where a chair prevented the door from opening completely.

A 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report states that the furniture blocking the entrance was rearranged.

- J. WBN-0243 - Weld some type of metal or steel hook on the liquid nitrogen Dewar cart to secure bottles from releasing.

A conversation with a representative from the WBN safety staff on August 7, 1986, revealed a chain has been installed on the cart as an interim measure to secure the bottles. A MR A568375 to weld hook on cart has been issued.

- K. WBN-0244 - Need Mechanical Maintenance fitters to remove or relocate piping (1-DRV-889 Drain) at elevation 708, TB-J line, on the steam generator blowdown system. It is a safety hazard at eye level.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates piping was marked to make it more obvious. No action will be taken to reroute piping.

- L. WBN-700 - The CI believes the chain at the loading dock will not properly hold the empty cylinders.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report states a MR was written to improve the securing system and the MR has been completed.

- M. WBN-0268 - Service air headers in Reactor Building, unit 1 have caps when not in use. If valve leaks, it needs repair. Problem is there is no way to bleed valve down to remove cap.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates response was sent to the CI January 8, 1986. No action will be taken.

A conversation with the ONP WBN safety staff revealed these caps are required to prevent contamination. These connections can be used for breathing air; therefore, caps cannot be removed. Caps do not hold enough pressure to be a hazard.

- N. WBN-0271 - There is a need for reflectors along the access road to the plant and on the morning exit from the plant to help drivers during fog and heavy rain.

The 1986 first quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates MR number A-524015 was written to implement this suggestion and action was completed.

- O. WBN-600 I.S. - The three phase bench grinders in the shops need lights installed on the starter to indicate when they are running.

The 1985 fourth quarter Safety Suggestion Status Report indicates MR number A-581327 was submitted. The OISL dated August 8, 1986, indicates the field work is completed.

A review of status of the suggestions that were received, indicates ONP WBN management has taken positive action on 14 of the 15 suggestions that were brought to their attention. The open item is being tracked on the OISL.

4.14 Findings - Miscellaneous - SQN

The employee safety suggestion program is documented in Standard Practice - SQA3178, "Employee Concern Program." This document includes definitions, a policy statement, responsibilities, and requirements. Line management is responsible for tracking concerns.

The concerns and suggestions received from SQN are listed below by number, description and status.

- A. DLJ-85-001 - A tripping hazard exists due to the lip on the threshold of C-15 door to the auxiliary room, unit 1.

This issue originated from a crew safety meeting report. MR A541929 has been written for mechanical maintenance to feather the lip.

- B. DLJ-85-002 - Tripping hazards are frequently created by hanging scaffolds or other supports from steel grate floors, using pipe or other items to anchor the cables.

This issue came from a safety meeting report. New supports that fit into the grating were ordered to eliminate the trip hazards.

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- C. DKJ-85-003 - The stairs accessing the Turbine Building from the outside are very slick when wet.

The issue came from a crew safety meeting report. Abrasive paint was applied and sheet metal workers applied nonskid strips.

- D. DLJ-85-006 - Open plugs in upper containment cause tripping hazards. This issue originated from a crew safety meeting report.

The issue was investigated by an acting safety planner and plant safety staff. Inspection of the upper containment showed proper handrails and lifelines installed. No real hazard existed.

- E. DHT-86-001 - The PSS and Health Physics stations on the refueling floor are so located that loads pass over employees' heads.

A January 9, 1986, the Safety Supervisor replied in a memorandum that a meeting was being set up to develop an adequate resolution.

A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed the crane operators have been advised by their supervisors not to move loads over employees. They are to stop the load and have employees move before proceeding. Employees have been told in weekly safety meetings not to walk under loads and to move from the area if a load needs to be moved over their work areas.

Management is to relocate the work stations so that they will be out of the path of the crane. This work is on hold until the next outage.

- F. JAM-85-003 - No warning is given that ignitors are being tested. If electrical maintenance is testing hydrogen ignitors, there is a risk of being burned. Request warnings when testing ignitors.

A telephone conversation on August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed verbal instructions have been issued to provide better communications when testing ignitions. Signs are to be posted when ignitions are being tested.

A telephone conversation on August 21, 1986, with the Electrical Maintenance supervisor revealed he has verbally instructed the electrician to "walkdown" areas before energizing ignitors. If there is a scaffold in the area that would permit employees to contact the ignitors, signs are to be posted that ignitors are being tested.

- G. EAC-85-001 - Tie-off cables are not provided above crane bridges for use during crane housekeeping or inspections.

A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed cables have been installed on some cranes but not all yet. However, cables will be installed on the other cranes as soon as practical.

- H. EAC-86-002 - Fittings for high pressure hose are improperly job-fabricated by unqualified personnel and are unsafe.

A note in the concern file dated February 3, 1986, from the Safety Supervisor states the concern is under investigation and remains open. A telephone conversation August 6, 1986, with the Safety Supervisor revealed the following information:

1. Only green hoses would be used for inert gases and oxygen.
2. Only webbed double hose will be issued from the toolroom for gas welding and cutting.
3. Replacement or initial installation of hose fittings will be performed only by employees designated by the Mechanical Maintenance Group supervisor.
4. The toolroom will issue only welding hose with proper fittings.

These four actions have been included in a revision dated April 17, 1986, to the HCI-M7.

- I. EAC-85-006 - Vehicles parked along roadway curbs at the entrance to No. 1 parking lot, obstructing vision and traffic, are a hazard.
- J. RMM-85-005 - Car parking along the curb of parking lot 1 were blocking the view of cars pulling out.

Approximately 300 additional parking places have been provided in a new lot. PSS will mark the area of concern in both concerns as a no parking zone.

- K. EAC-85-008 - Some crane operators board and operate cranes while other operators are in the process of walking down or checking out the crane.

Signs are provided for crane controls to advise operator that crane checkout is in progress. The problem has also been discussed between responsible groups and management.

- L. EAC-85-009 - The concern alleged that heavy equipment operators were lifting casts using Lorain hydraulic cranes without setting outriggers, an unsafe practice.

Investigation by SQN personnel determined lifts to be acceptable. Crane cab has charts for load limits for lifts made on rubber tires, outriggers, and walking the load.

- M. I-86-240-SQN - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting a sheet metal platform be built on the side of the centrifuge.

A telephone conversation with the Mechanical Maintenance Craft Section supervisor on August 11, 1986, revealed this work was completed week of August 4, 1986.

- N. I-86-236-SQN - An anonymous individual mailed in a concern to the NSRS requesting safety screens be installed to cover the caustic valves on the hot water tank at the make up water treatment plant on elevation 685.

This concern was investigated at the SQN site on August 14, 1986. Investigation of the hot water tank revealed that shields have not been installed over the valves. A site safety engineer states that he recalls a MR being initiated over a year ago to do this work. He went to this location to discuss what type of shield would provide protection, but he did not know what happened to the MR after that.

The carpenter foreman was contacted. He stated that while planning the erection of the shields he contacted the Operations Section for advice. They advised him that shielding was not necessary. He relayed this information to his general foreman and the MR was cancelled.

The procedure in effect at that time (SQM-2) required industrial safety MRs to be reviewed by the safety engineering staff if not approved and for the cancelled MR to be returned to the originator. Review of the procedure SQM-2 revealed that the procedure for cancelling industrial safety MRs was in

revision 17, but had been omitted in revision 18 dated August 5, 1986. The data processing staff was unable to locate a record of the cancelled MR. It is their policy to retain cancelled MRs for only six months.

This investigation developed that an assistant shift engineer had identified the valves on the hot water tank as needing shielding in a May 24, 1986 safety meeting. A Work Request 125-190 was initiated on August 15, 1986 to have this shielding installed.

The investigation into the status of these concerns and suggestions revealed management has taken action to resolve the issues on all except I-86-236-SQN. SQN management was sent a CATDs on this issue.

4.15 Findings - Miscellaneous - BFN

This concern was investigated by calling the BFN safety staff for a status report on this concern. Copies of the September 28, 1985, original concern; the October 9, 1985, Safety Supervisor memorandum advising the CI of the status of concern; the DCR-D3251; and the Hazard Assessment Worksheet were obtained.

The Safety Supervisor advised the CI in the memorandum that there were plans for repairing the road, and that a DCR would be initiated to erect handrails and install better lighting.

A telephone call to the BFN DCU revealed the DCR will not be done until the next outage Unit 3, Cycle 5.

The DCR-D3251 dated November 19, 1985, is for the addition of handrails and lighting on the intake gate structure No. 3. Priority 8/c has been assigned and the recommended schedule indicates March 5, 1986, U3/CSB for "timely disposition of safety concern."

Representatives of the safety staff and line management conducted a hazard assessment of the area in the concern. The Hazard Assessment Worksheet dated October 9, 1985, indicates there is an employee exposure to an unsafe condition that could produce a serious injury.

This issue is substantiated. The concern is a year old and still has not been resolved. From the nature of the work it could be done at anytime and not held until the next outage. A CATD was sent to BFN describing this problem.

5.0 COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

5.1 Management Effectiveness

Management has been effective in resolving unsafe conditions reported through the safety suggestion program at the sites. However, line management has not been totally effective in its support of the safety program. Because of this, unsafe conditions in the workplace are not always recognized and corrected. This results in an increased probability of accidents or injuries caused by such unsafe conditions.

6.0 CAUSES

The majority of the problems identified by the concerns within this subcategory are minor in nature and have been resolved through normal channels. The common cause for these problems is management's failure to recognize and correct unsafe conditions however minor in nature.

The major problems identified by this evaluation and their associated causes are as follows:

- A. The flammable liquid storage limitations contained within HCI-HM1 were not effectively communicated to line management, supervisors, and foremen.
- B. An MR written at SQN to install safety screens to cover certain caustic valves in the water treatment plant was cancelled improperly due to an inadequate cancellation procedure.
- C. Work to add lighting and handrails on the intake gate structure number 3 at BFN was unnecessarily delayed because of management's lack of recognition that the situation could produce a serious injury.

7.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

No immediate corrective actions or stop work orders were initiated as a result of this subcategory evaluation. No outstanding corrective actions exist as a result of any prior investigation of the employee concerns addressed by this report.

Actions previously taken through normal channels to correct deficiencies identified by concerns within this subcategory are listed below.

- A. Repairs were made on the compressed gas bottle sheds at the DNC warehouse.
- B. Illumination in the DNC second shift parking lot was improved by replacing burned out bulbs.

- C. Protective caps for gas heders in the plant were provided and are in use.
- D. The airlock doors at elevation 713 between the Service Building and the Auxiliary Building were adjusted, a safety strip was installed along the bottom edge, and they were subsequently taken out of service.
- E. A wooden barrier and deflector were installed on the scrap metal drop chute to keep materials from bouncing into personnel walkways.
- F. Two flammable liquid storage cabinets were removed from the Turbine Building in order to comply with storage limit requirements.

Inadequate communication between line management and employees concerning industrial safety issues and mangements failure to support the safety program are addressed by Corrective Action Tracking Documents (CATDs) within the Industrial Safety Category as follows:

- A. Subcategory Report 90100, Management of Safety.

CATD 90100-1, 5, 9, and 13 establish a Central Safety Committee (CSC) comprised of line management. CATD 90100-2, 6, 10, and 14 establish various line management subcommittees to the CSC. CATD 90100-3, 7, 11, and 15 establish a safety audit program. One of the principal purposes of the CSC will be to communicate and to improve the enforcement of the industrial safety program by all line managers to their employees.

The following is a list of CATDs issued on problems identified by this evaluation.

7.1 Site Specific - ONP WBN

- a. Problem Description: Interviews with craft foremen revealed a lack of knowledge on the HCI-HM1 requirements, specifically a limit of three flammable liquid storage cabinets in a single area.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-5: A safety bulletin that addresses this problem will be issued by January 1, 1987 to the appropriate personnel.

7.2 Site Specific - SQN

- a. Problem Description: Valves for the caustic dilution station hot water tank on elevation 685 at T6 and D lines do not have shields to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-3: Valves for the caustic dilution stations hot water tank on elevation 685 will be shielded to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel. Work Request 125-190 dated August 15, 1986 has been submitted to shield these valves prior to restart of the system.

- b. Problem Description: Revision 18 of Standard Practice SQM-2 does not contain procedures for cancelling Industrial Safety related MRs or WRs.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-4: Standard Practice SQM-2 will be revised to include procedures for canceling Industrial Safety related work requests (WRs). This revision will provide feedback to the work request originals as to why the request was canceled. Revision will be completed by January 1, 1987.

7.3 Site Specific - BFN

- a. Problem Description: Additional lighting and handrails have not been installed on the intake gate structure number 3 to resolve an employee safety concern and complete DCR D3251. This work should not be delayed until the next outage, unit 3, cycle 5.

Corrective Action Plan:

CATD 91000-2: The addition of hand rails and lighting will not be delayed until the unit 3, cycle 5 outage. The work is not outage related and can be done during operation. A new design support group is being formed at BFN which will handle priority, plant-support type changes. Completion of this ECN will be assigned to this group and given priority. Installation may be completed before unit 2 startup but its completion will not be a constraint to unit 2 restart.

8.0 LIST OF EVALUATORS

Gray, D. K.
Petty, C. R.
Rogers, J. T.

9.0 ATTACHMENTS

Subcategory Summary Table

ATTACHMENT A

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 HP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
 EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
 EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY
 SUBCATEGORY: 910 UNSAFE CONDITIONS

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REGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
FN-85-002-00301	SF	910	N	BFN	1 Y H N N 2 NO NA NA NA 3 D NA NA NA		NSRS	DURING THE EXIT INTERVIEW THE CI EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT ONLY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON A WINNING SAFETY AWARD--INSTALL LIGHTING, HANDRAILS, AND IMPROVE ACCESS ROAD AT THE INTAKE FOREBAY, GATE STRUCTUR	1.15, 2.3.15, 3.3.15, 4.15
HT-86-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	PUBLIC SAFETY AND HEALTH PHYSICS STATIONS ON REFUELING FLOOR ARE LOCATED SUCH THAT LOADS PASS OVER EMPLOYEES' HEADS.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
LJ-85-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - TRIP HAZARD EXIST DUE TO THE LIP ON THRESHOLD OF C-1 5 DOOR TO AUX. INSTR. RM (U-1).	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 INP - ISSS - RWM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
LJ-85-002	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - TRIP HAZARDS ARE FREQUENTLY CREATED BY INSTALLING SC AFFOLDS OR OTHER SUPPORTS BY HANGING THEM FROM STEEL GRATE FLOOR - USING PIPE OR OTHER ITEM TO ANCHOR THE CABLE.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
LJ-85-003	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - THE STAIRS ACCESSING TURBINE BUILDING FROM OUTSIDE ARE VERY SLICK WHEN WET.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14
LJ-85-006	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA A NA		OECP	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - OPEN PLUGS UPPER CONTAINMENT TRIP HAZARD.	1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 INP - ISSS - RWM

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS	B F	L B	S Q	W B	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
AC-85-001	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA						OECP	TIE OFF CABLES ARE NOT PROVIDED ABOVE CRANE BRIDGES FOR USE DURING CRANE INSPECTIONS OR HOUSEKEEPING.	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14
AC-85-006	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA						OECP	VEHICLES PARKED ALONG ROADWAY CURBS AT ENTRANCE TO NO. 1 PARKING LOT OBSTRUCT VISION AND TRAFFIC AND ARE A HAZARD.	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14
AC-85-008	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA						OECP	SOME CRANE OPERATORS BOARD AND OPERATE CRANES WHILE OTHER CRANE OPERATORS ARE IN PROCESS OF WALKING DOWN AND/OR CHECKING OUT CRANE.	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 NP - ISSS - RHM

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
AC-85-009	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA A NA		OECP	CONCERN EXPRESSED THAT HEAVY EQUIPMENT OPERATORS LIFTING CASKS USING LORAIN HYDRAULIC CRANE W/O SETTING OUTRIGGERS IS NOT SAFE.	1.1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14
AC-86-002	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	EMPLOYEE HAS CONCERN THAT HOSE AND FITTINGS FOR HIGH PRESSURE HOSES ARE IMPROPERLY JOB FABRICATED BY UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL AND ARE UNSAFE.	1.1.4, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14
X -85-001-00101 T50032	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	EX-85-001-001	QTC	BOTTLE SHED™-(BEHIND MAIN WAREHOUSE) POST (SUPPORT) HAS FALLEN 2 TO 3 INCHES AND APPEARS TO BE A PERSONAL SAFETY HAZARD. IF THE SHED COLLAPSES, BOTTLES (OXYGEN, NITROGEN ETC...) MIGHT EXPLODE.	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2, 7

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 NP - ISSS - RHM

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
X -85-033-00301 T50138	SF	909	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B	EX-85-033-003	QTC	UNIT #2 IS LACKING IN GOOD HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES, IE EXCESS MATERIAL AND TOOLS ARE LYING AROUND POSING AN INDUSTRY SAFETY "TRIPPING" HAZARD. C/I HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NUCLEAR PWR. DEPT. CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 1.9, 2.3.1, 3.3.9 4.1
02	SF	910	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A				
X -85-038-00101 T50144	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	EX-85-038-001	QTC	THE DOOR IN THE BUILDING NEXT TO THE SITE SERVICES BUILDING IS BROKEN (WILL NOT STAY CLOSED.) THE DOOR IS AN OUTSIDE DOOR NEAR THE SAFETY SECTION. C/I FEELS THIS IS A SAFETY HAZARD. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. C/I HAS P REQUIRED.	1.9, 2.3.9, 3.3.9, 4.9
X -85-048-00901 T50168	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	EX-85-048-009	QTC	THE BIG ELECTRIC DOORS IN THE AUX BUILDING ARE DANGEROUS WHEN CLOSING. A PERSON CAN BE CAUGHT IN BETWEEN THEM DURING CLOSURE BECAUSE THE SAFETY PAD DOESN'T ALWAYS WORK. CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5,

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 INP - ISSS - RMI

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
X -85-064-00301 T50183	SF	906	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA D	EX-85-064-003	QTC	AT TIMES THERE IS UNSAFE EQUIPMENT IN THE FIELD SUCH AS LIGHT CORDS WITH BROKEN LIGHTS, BOARDS WITH NAILS IN THEM.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1
	02	SF	910	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A			
-86-236-SQN	01	SF	910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA D NA	NSRS	AN ANONYMOUS INDIVIDUAL MAILED IN A SAFETY CONCERN TO NSRS REQUESTING THAT SAFETY SCREENS BE INSTALLED TO COVER THE CAUSTIC VALVES ON THE HOT WATER TANK AT THE MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT PLANT ON EL 685. SEVERAL MAINTENANCE R THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF.	1.1.14, 2.3.1, 3.3.14, 4.14, 7.0
-86-240-SQN	01	SF	910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA	NSRS	AN ANONYMOUS INDIVIDUAL MAILED IN A SAFETY CONCERN TO NSRS REQUESTING THAT AT A SHEET METAL PLATFORM SIMILAR TO THE ONE AT HATTIS BAR BE BUILT ON THE SIDE OF THE CENTRIFUGE AT SQN. THE PLATFORM WOULD ALLOW THE LIFTING TO LESSEN THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK INJURIES TO PERSONNEL.	1.1.14, 2.3.1, 3.3.14, 4.14

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 NP - ISSS - RHM

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL				HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910	
					2 SAF RELATED	3 FIND CLASS	BF	BL					SQ
N -85-037-00201 T50002	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	IN-85-037-002	QTC	"BOOBY TRAPS" IN PLANT CAUSED PERSONNEL HAZARDS IN 1981 AND 1982 AT WATT S BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. CONDITIONS MAY STILL EXIST	1.12, 2.3.12, 3.3.12, 4.12
N -85-118-00201 T50014	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	IN-85-118-002	QTC	SOME STORAGE SHEDS (EG SHED "E") HAVE MATERIAL UNSAFELY AND HAPHAZARDLY STORED CREATING SAFETY HAZARDS	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2
N -85-118-00301 T50108	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	IN-85-118-003	QTC	HEAVY MATERIAL (IE: PALLETS OF BRICKS) IS BEING STORED ON WOODEN PLATFORM IN F SECTION OF YARD 2 OF WAREHOUSE OUTSIDE STORAGE AREA. BOTH THE WOODEN PLATFORM AND PALLETS ARE EXCESSIVELY ROTTED. CI IS CONCERNED THAT R PLATFORM GIVE WAY, INJURING PERSONNEL/WORKERS BELOW NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED	1.2, 2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.2

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 INP - ISSS - RHM

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -85-205-00101 T50007A	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	EXIT ROAD FOR THIRD SHIFT WORKERS IS EXCESSIVELY DANGEROUS DUE TO TOO MANY EGRESS POINTS FROM OTHER PARKING LOTS AND A NARROW ROAD	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.2
N -85-311-00501 T50021	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B	IN-85-311-005	QTC	METAL BRACKETS AND CONTROL LIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPLOSIVE DETECTORS PRESENT A SAFETY HAZARD TO OFFICERS AND PERSONNEL BECAUSE THEY EXTEND OUTWARD FROM THE UNIT -18". IT WAS EXPRESSED THAT THESE BRACKETS COULD BE REPAIRED WITHOUT COMPROMISING FUNCTION OF THE UNIT.	1.11, 2.3.11, 3.3.11, 4.11
N -85-338-00201 T50039	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	STEAMFITTERS/WELDERS INTERCHANGING GAS BOTTLE AND HEADER AIR GAUGES WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO COMPATIBILITY. THIS OCCURS IN BOTH UNITS #1&2.	1.4, 2.3.4, 3.3.4, 4.4

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TEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -85-338-00301 T50039	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-338-003	QTC	EXCESSIVE SPEEDING BY TVA VEHICLES ON THE PROJECT.	1.6, 2.3.6, 3.3.6, 4.6
N -85-350-00101 T50026	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		QTC	HOUSEKEEPING IN THE POWER BLOCK AND THE RESTROOMS IS VERY POOR. TRASH IS ALLOWED TO ACCUMULATE IN THE WORK AREAS. THIS CAUSES DEGRADATION OF THE EQUIPMENT AND REPRESENTS A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1
N -85-480-00501 T50028	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-480-005	QTC	HAZARDOUS SAFETY CONDITION EXISTS THROUGHOUT TURBINE BLDG. (UNIT # 2) DUE TO VERY POOR HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1

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REFERENCE - ECPS131J-ECPS131C
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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 2 3	REPORT SAF RELATED FIND CLASS	APPL BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -85-512-00101 T50046	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N N N Y		IN-85-512-001	QTC	SCRAP METAL DROP CHUTE, UNIT 2 SIDE, NEAR ELECTRICAL SHACK, IS UNSAFE IN THAT IT OFTEN ALLOWS DEBRIS TO RICOCHET NEAR PERSONNEL WALKWAYS. CI EXPRESSED A CONCERN THAT APPROPRIATE SHIELDING SHOULD BE INSTALLED TO REDUCE DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE.	1.10, 2.3.10, 3.3.10, 4.10, 7.0
N -85-546-00101 T50047	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N N N Y			QTC	PERSONNEL AIR LOCK ON UNIT 2 (IN OPERATION) CAUSED TWO PERSONNEL TO BE INJURED. BELIEVE AIR LOCK DOES NOT NEED TO BE UNDER PRESSURE AT THIS TIME. (DETAILS KNOWN)	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7.0
N -85-579-00301 T50052	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N N N Y		IN-85-579-003	QTC	POOR HOUSECLEANING THROUGHOUT THE PLANT.	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -85-583-00201 T50055	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C	IN-85-583-002	QTC	OXYGEN & ACETYLENE HEADERS THROUGHOUT UNIT #2 ARE NOT CAPPED OFF WHEN NOT IN USE.	1.4, 2.3.4, 3.3.4, 4.4, 7
N -85-615-00201 T50058	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-615-002	QTC	NO SAFETY LIMIT SWITCH ON AIR LOCK DOOR (713' FROM PORTAL TO ELEVATOR) COULD RESULT IN DOOR CLOSING ON A PERSON AND INJURING HIM/HER.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5, 7
N -85-684-00201 T50063	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		QTC	INADEQUATE LIGHTING IN 2ND SHIFT PARKING LOT. VEHICLES MUST PASS THROUGH PERSONNEL WALKWAYS. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3, 7

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

REFERENCE - ECP5131J-ECPS131C
 FREQUENCY - REQUEST
 PNP - ISSS - RHM

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -85-743-00201 T50077	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA B	IN-85-743-002	QTC	TRAFFIC CONTROL/LANE LINES NEED REPAIRING ON ACCESS ROADS AND IN PARKING LOTS. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE.	1.3, 2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3
N -85-758-00201 T50073	OP	313	S	WBN	1 2 3	IN-85-758-002	QTC	CLEANLINESS IN THE AUX. BUILDING IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. THERE IS DUST, DIRT AND GRIME EVERYWHERE. (UNIT 1) NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED.	1.3, 2.3.1, 3.3.3, 4.1
	02	SF	910	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A			
N -85-803-00101 T50083	SF	910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A	IN-85-803-001	QTC	CRANE PARKED BY THE SHACKS AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING OFTEN SHINGS HEAVY LOADS OVER THE SHACKS WHILE EMPLOYEES ARE INSIDE. A SUB-C CONTRACTOR DOING ROOFING WORK IS OPERATING THE CRANE AND MAKES NO ATTEMPT TO STOP. THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT WAS NOTIFIED BUT NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN NOTED. (NOTIFIED 2 WEEKS AGO.) NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE.	1.8, 2.3.8, 3.3.8, 4.8

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 NP - ISSS - RHM

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					2 SAF RELATED	3 FIND CLASS	BF	BL					SQ	WB
N -85-934-00101 T50096	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y		QTC	METAL FILINGS/SHAVINGS/SLIVERS RESULTING FROM CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN REACTOR BUILDINGS OF BOTH UNITS ARE NOT CLEANED UP OFTEN ENOUGH, WHICH RESULTS IN A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD, PARTICULARLY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO MUST HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1	
N -85-991-00101 T50100	OP	301	S	WBN	1					IN-85-991-001	QTC	DOOR SYSTEM ENTERING AIRLOCK, ELEV. 713 BETWEEN AUXILLIARY AND SERVICE BUILDING (DOUBLE DOORS BY CHEMISTRY LAB), CAN BE HAZARDIOUS DUE TO SYSTEM OF OPERATION. DOORS ARE AIR OPERATED, AND ONE DOOR SWINGS HARD AND FAST. NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5,	
	02	SF	910	S	HBN	1	N	N	N	Y				
					2	NA	NA	NA	NO					
					3	NA	NA	NA	B					
N -86-008-00201 T50108	SF	910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	IN-86-008-002	QTC	A LACK OF GOOD HOUSE KEEPING PROCEDURES. SCRAP METAL, HANGERS, AND EXCESS MATERIAL CLUTTER THE WORK AREA IN TURBINE BLDG CAUSING A PERSONNEL SAFETY HAZARD. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED	1.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1, 4.1	
					2	NA	NA	NA	NO					
					3	NA	NA	NA	A					

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CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S M R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
N -86-059-00101 T50111	SF	910	N	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA D	IN-86-059-001	QTC	IN THE TURBINE BUILDING (EL. 708') NEAR THE WORK PLAN BOOTH AND ACCESS PORTAL ARE SOME RED LOCKERS WHICH CONTAIN FLAMMABLE MATERIAL. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE MOVED OUTSIDE FOR FIRE PREVENTION. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL I	1.7, 2.3.7, 3.3.7, 4.7,
N -86-246-01401 T50142	OP	301	S	HBN	1 2 3	IN-86-246-014	QTC	TWO LARGE METAL DOORS ARE INOPERABLE AND ARE DANGEROUS. ELEV. 713' (THROUGH PORTALS-INSIDE SECURITY). THEY ARE CURRENTLY BEING KICKED OPEN. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.	1.5, 2.3.5, 3.3.5, 4.5,
	02	SF	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A				
AM-85-003	01	SF	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECF	INDUSTRIAL SAFETY - IF ELECTRICAL MAINT. IS TESTING M2 IGNITORS, AND YOU MUST WORK IN B4 ACCUMULATOR ROOM, ONE MUST GET VERY CLOSE TO IGNITOR AND RISK BEING BURNED.	1.14, 2.3.14 3.3.14, 4.14

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION
									CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
MM-85-005	01	SF 910	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA 3 NA NA C NA		OECP	CARS PARKING ALONG THE CURB OF PARKING LOT #1 WERE BLOCKING THE VIEW OF CARS PULLING OUT.	1.1.14, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 4.14.
BN-0126	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	DOOR KNOB ON C56 BETWEEN CONTROL ROOM AND HALLWAY OUTSIDE OF SE OFFICE IS TOO CLOSE TO EDGE OF DOOR. FRIDAY 11/23, AND EMPLOYEE'S HAND GOT CAUGHT AND WAS INJURED.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
BN-0132	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	INSTALL A CURB AROUND THE NEUTRALIZATION TANK (T.B.EL685) TO CONTAIN CAUSTIC ACID SPILLS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13

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CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
BN-0182	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		OECP	BOXES ON PALLETS IN FRONT OF CARPENTER SHOP NEED TO BE MOVED. CAN STOP DOOR SWINGING OUT HITTING PEOPLE COMING UP THE HALL.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
BN-0183	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	SAFETY RACKS FOR TEMPORARY STORAGE ONLY ON BOTH SIDES OF GATE 126 AND ANYWHERE ELSE WHERE PRESSURIZED GAS CYLINDERS ARE TEMPORARILY LEFT WHILE IN TRANSIT, WOULD ELIMINATE A HAZARD THAT PRESENTLY EXISTS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13
BN-0185	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECP	GREASE FITTINGS ON LOWER BEARING CAPSULE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE MOTOR SHAFT. WHEN GREASING THIS LOWER MOTOR BEARING WHEN MOTOR IS RUNNING, EMPLOYEE COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE MOTOR COUPLING. CI SUGGESTS HAVING THE FITTINGS AT SERVICES ARE AWAY FROM THE TURNING SHAFT. (ALL ERCW MOTORS)	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.13, 4.13

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					2 SAF RELATED	3 FIND CLASS	BF	BL				
BN-0187	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECP	ALL CONFINED SPACE AREAS SHOULD BE VISUALLY MARKED AT THE ENTRANCE AS "CONFINED SPACE AREAS - CONTACT SAFETY ..." ALSO CONFINED SPACE MONITORS SHOULD HAVE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS LA MINATED ON EACH UNIT.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
					2	NA	NA	NA	NO			
					3	NA	NA	NA	B			
BN-0188	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECP	BUMPING HAZARDS IN LOWER CONTAINMENT AT AND AROUND PLATFORMS TO PZR RELIEF TANK @ 716' & 724' ELEC. SUGGEST PADDING AND IDENTIFYING (TAPE) THESE HAZARDS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
					2	NA	NA	NA	NO			
					3	NA	NA	NA	B			
BN-0212	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECP	INADEQUATE ENTRANCE INTO MEDICAL TO TRANSPORT INJURED PERSON ON STRETCHER TO EXAMINATION BED.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
					2	NA	NA	NA	NO			
					3	NA	NA	NA	C			

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BN-0243	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECF	WELD SOME TYPE OF METAL OR STEEL HOOK ON LIQUID NITROGEN DUER CART, TO SECURE BOTTLE FROM RELEASING.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
BN-0244	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA C		OECF	NEED MECH. MAINT. FITTERS TO REMOVE OR RELOCATE PIPING. (1-DRV-889 DRAIN) IT IS A SAFETY HAZARD AT EYE LEVEL ELV.708.T.B. TB-J LINE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
BN-0268	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO 3 NA NA NA A		OECF	SERVICE AIR HEADERS IN RB1 HAVE CAPS WHEN NOT IN USE. IF VALVE LEAKS, IT NEEDS REPAIR. PROBLEM IS THERE IS NO WAY TO BLEED THIS DOWN TO REMOVE CAP.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

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					2 SAF RELATED	3 FIND CLASS	BF	BL				
BN-0271	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECF	THERE IS A NEED FOR REFLECTORS ALONG THE ROAD ENTERING AND THE MORNING EXIT OF THE PLANT TO HELP DRIVERS DURING FOG AND HEAVY RAIN.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
BN-600IS	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECF	THE THREE PHASE BENCH GRINDERS IN THE SHOPS NEED LIGHTS INSTALLED ON THE STARTER TO INDICATE WHEN THEY ARE RUNNING CAUSING A SAFETY HAZARD.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
BN-700	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1	N	N	N	Y	OECF	CI BELIEVES THAT THE LONG CHAIN AT THE LOADING DOCK WILL NOT PROPERLY SECURE THE EMPTY CYLINDERS.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

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 RUN DATE - 01/28/87

CATEGORY: SF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL	2 SAF RELATED	3 FIND CLASS	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTION CAT - SF SUBCAT - 910
-----	---	-----	---	---	BF	BL	SQ	WB	-----	-----	-----
BN-85-001	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y	2 NA NA NA NO	3 NA NA NA A		OECF	A CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT INDIVIDUALS ARE ATTACHING EAR PLUGS TO HARD HATS USING WIRE. CI BELIEVES THIS IS A HEALTH HAZARD.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13
BN-85-007	01	SF 910	N	WBN	1 N N N Y	2 NA NA NA NO	3 NA NA NA C		OECF	AIR FILTERS IN THE DOOR TO JERRY COLLINS OFFICE SHOULD BE COVERED WITH EXPANDED METAL. IF ANYONE WERE TO STRIKE THE METAL PORTION OF THE FILTERS THEY WOULD RECEIVE A SEVERE CUT.	1.13, 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 4.13

59 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY SF SUBCATEGORY 910

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

ECSP Corrective
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

Applicable ECSP Report NO:

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: Yes No
2. Stop Work Recommended: Yes No
3. CATD No. 91000-2
4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: QR NQR Additional lighting and handrails have not been installed on the intake gate structure No. 3 to resolve an employee safety concern and complete DCR D3251. This work should not be delayed until the next outage, unit 3, cycle 5.
7. PREPARED BY: NAME C. R. Petty DATE: 8/12/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86

ATTACHMENTS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: See attached sheet
11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] for H.P. Pennington DATE: 8/25/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

ATTACHMENTS

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE TITLE DATE

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: Yes No
2. Stop Work Recommended: Yes No
3. CATD No. 91000 - 3
4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: QR NQR Valves for the caustic dilution station hot water tank on elevation 685 at T6 and D lines do not have shields to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel.
7. PREPARED BY: NAME J. T. Rogers DATE: 8/13/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H Tom E. [Signature] DATE: 8/18/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 2/2/87

ATTACHMENTS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: Valves for the caustic dilution stations hot water tank on elevation 685 will be shielded to prevent caustic solution from spraying on personnel. Work Request 125-190 dated August 15, 1986 has been submitted to shield these valves prior to restart of the system.
11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

ATTACHMENTS

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: Yes No
2. Stop Work Recommended: Yes No
3. CATD No. 91000 - 4 4. INITIATION DATE 8/12/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: QR NQR Revision 18 of Standard Practice SQM-2 does not contain procedures for canceling Industrial Safety related NRS or WRs.

- ATTACHMENTS
7. PREPARED BY: NAME J. T. Rogers DATE: 8/13/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H Lon E. [Signature] DATE: 8/14/86
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 2/2/87

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: Standard Practice SQM-2 will be revised to include procedures for canceling Industrial Safety related work requests (WRs). This revision will provide feedback to the work request originals as to why the request was canceled. Revision will be completed by January 1, 1987.

- ATTACHMENTS
11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/21/86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE TITLE DATE

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: Yes No
 2. Stop Work Recommended: Yes No
 3. CATD No. 91000-5 4. INITIATION DATE 08-22-86
 5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
 6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: QR NQR Interviews with craft foremen revealed a lack of knowledge on the HCI-HMI requirements, specifically a limit of three flammable liquid storage cabinets in a single area.
- ATTACHMENTS
7. PREPARED BY: NAME C. R. Petty DATE: 8-22-86
 8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H San C. Ellis DATE: 8-22-86
 9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR. [Signature] DATE: 2/2/87

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: All applicable plant supervision will be issued a reminder covering the flammable liquids handling requirements contained in Hazard Control Instruction HCI-HMI. The reminder will be included in a "Hazardline" (safety bulletin) issued by the Safety Section prior to January 1, 1987.
- ATTACHMENTS
11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: [Signature] DATE: 8/25/86
 12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: _____ DATE: _____
SRP: _____ DATE: _____
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: _____ DATE: _____

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE