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7- On December 11, 1985, Personnel in the Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) made a presentation to Commissioner Desbriere and other members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The presentation was ~~presented~~ prepared to address specific areas of interest suggested by the NSRS prepared agenda. One item discussed during the presentation on employee concerns was the "NSRS Perceptions of Watts Bar Status". Ten ~~specific~~ items were presented as NSRS perceptions. The perceptions identified were compiled from specific information obtained from the Watts Bar NSRS supervisory staff and corroborated with information held by Quality Technology Company (QTC), Tull's independent contractor that is investigating ~~employee concerns~~ at Watts Bar nuclear plant (WBS).

8- Based on the ten items presented, two "bottom line" conclusions were drawn. One of the conclusions was that Appendix B ^{to the process} items were not being met at least prior to presenting the vignette. On this matter, the NSRS presenter advised that the information about the items had not been reviewed by NSRS upper management. When presented, the Director of NSRS indicated that he was not aware of all of the items listed (five of the ten) and did not know whether or not they could be supported; and, therefore, the information that particular vignette contained should not be considered "in official NSRS position. The NSRS presenter indicated background materials could be provided to support the specifics and these conclusions drawn.




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The a result of compiling the ASRS perceptions
Presentation background material, the position was
by ASRS is that the "bottom line" conclusion on
ASRS, Appendix B requirements are not being met,
has been substantiated that the ASRS present's
analysis, ASRS management had not equated its
specific, as well as collective, investigation report
findings to violations of successes, Appendix B
requirements. The ^{intent of the} ASRS conclusion is not
to be construed that ASRS believes that the
requirements of Appendix B are currently being
violated on a regular or continuous
basis. ~~The conclusion~~ ^{is meant to describe}
~~the state of the established~~ ^{the} program, that of,
management (program) process and feedback controls
have been determined not well-defined nor
appropriate to adequately assure that the
as-constructed plant meets the as-designed
intended ^{analysis} configuration. Because at this
evolving state of GRT program controls at
work, conditions which led to violations of
Appendix B requirements from ASRS investigations
conducted to date still exist pending final
evaluation and determination of appropriate
corrective actions. Steps to minimize further
violations will continue to be taken. The first
goal is to totally eliminate violations of any
type and to adequately correct those already made.

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I hope this information provides sufficient clarification of this matter. If you have further questions, please contact Jim Hitham. The information requested regarding the specific ~~was~~ USRS perceptions will be provided in accordance with the schedule you suggested.

Dear Mr. Denton,




Your letter of January 3, 1985, requested TVA to furnish the corporate position with respect to whether or not 10CFR50, Appendix B requirements are being met at the Watts Bar Facility. This letter was sent regarding the December 19, 1985 presentation to Commissioner Asselstine on the Employee Concern Program. During this presentation, a slide was presented (see the last page of the enclosure to your January 3, 1985 letter) which contains the following statement. "10CFR50, Appendix B Requirements Are Not Being Met."

The TVA position is that, insofar as identified deficiencies in past activities are concerned, Appendix B requirements are not ~~being~~ met. However, no activity affecting quality or nuclear safety is known to be in progress in violation of Appendix B, without identified problem areas having been documented and entered into the resolution process.

As a result of the 370^{S/C} investigations conducted under the employee concern program many problems of varying significance have been identified and reported to TVA management for evaluation and correction. Those problems, regardless of significance indicate violations of one or more Appendix B criterion. As you are aware, not all of those problems have been corrected yet. Many of the more significant ones are still being evaluated to determine the corrective action to be taken.

In addition, over 1200 employee concerns remain to be investigated or reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff and/or Quality Technology Company, and we expect to discover additional problem areas. In this context, (i.e., that uncorrected and as yet unsubstantiated problems exist), TVA acknowledges that 10CFR50, Appendix B criteria are not currently being met in some cases at Watts Bar, but we emphasize that the intent of this program is to identify and resolve those problems. We will provide the additional information you requested no later than February 3, 1986.



Dear Mr. Denton,

Your letter of January 3, 1985, requested TVA to furnish the corporate position with respect to whether or not 10CFR50, Appendix B requirements are being met at the Watts Bar Facility. This letter was sent regarding the December 19, 1985 presentation by Nuclear Safety Review Staff personnel to Commissioner Asselstine on the Employee Concern Program. During this presentation, a slide was presented (see the last page of the enclosure to your January 3, 1985 letter) which contains the following statement. "10CFR50, Appendix B Requirements Are Not Being Met."

The TVA corporate position regarding its ongoing process for compliance with Appendix B is as follows: Because of the present status of identified deficiencies, some Appendix B requirements currently are not being met. Some quality achieving activities are currently ongoing which do involve identified problems or concerns potentially affecting quality or nuclear safety. In these isolated situations, controls have been established to maintain traceability regarding the work activities. Those problems which are discovered during the course of an investigation they are evaluated for their potential safety significance and, if appropriate, are promptly communicated to line organizations for stop work, generic applicability, and reportability evaluations. The problems are subsequently documented and entered into the formal resolution process. Current substantiated concerns will be evaluated for actions to prevent recurrence as well as to resolve past discrepant conditions.

As a result of the 370 safety-related investigations conducted under the employee concern program many problems of varying significance have been identified and reported to TVA management for evaluation and correction. Those problems, regardless of significance indicate violations of one or more Appendix B criterion. As you are aware, not all of those problems have been corrected yet. Many of the more significant ones are still being evaluated to determine the corrective action to be taken.

In addition, over 1200 safety-related employee concerns remain to be investigated or reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff and/or Quality Technology Company, and we expect to discover additional problem areas. In this context, (i.e., that uncorrected and as yet unsubstantiated problems exist), TVA acknowledges that 10CFR50, Appendix B criteria are not currently being met in some cases at Watts Bar, but we emphasize that the intent of this program is to identify and resolve those problems. We will provide the additional information you requested no later than February 3, 1986.