

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

85 DEC 3 11 25 A 7 98 25  
November 25, 1985

WBRD-50-390/85-54

WBRD-50-391/85-51

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II

Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - IMPROPER USE OF CABLE INSIDE  
CONTAINMENT - WBRD-50-390/85-54, WBRD-50-391/85-51 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
Al Ignatonis on October 22, 1985 in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) as NCR WBN  
6302. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit our next report on  
or about January 31, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS  
858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*J. W. Hufham*  
J. W. Hufham, Manager  
Licensing and Risk Protection

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. James Taylor, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
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## ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
IMPROPER USE OF CABLE INSIDE CONTAINMENT  
WBRD-50-390/85-54 AND WBRD-50-391/85-51  
NCR 6302

### INTERIM REPORT

#### Description of Deficiency

In 1979, TVA became concerned with the acceptability of silicone-rubber-insulated power and control cable provided by Anaconda-Continental Wire and Cable Corporation and designated for use in IE circuits inside containment. The cable was purchased through contracts 74C7-85112 and 75C7-85861 and was acceptable to requirements effective at the time. However, with the advent of more definite testing procedures, questions were raised concerning the cables' ability to withstand the levels of radiation which could be present inside containment during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). TVA identified the questionable qualification status of this type of cabling through nonconformance report (NCR) EEB 79-6. Subsequently, measures were taken at the site to restrict the use of this cable by retagging the affected cable spools with class II labels (instead of class I).

NCR 6302 was written to identify the fact that 32 reels of this cable were found in cable staging areas with 12 reels labeled class I, 2 reels were not tagged, and 18 reels having the proper class II designation. Also identified were two previous instances where this cable was used in IE circuits inside containment. The inappropriate use of this type of cabling was noted in nonsignificant NCRs 2177R and 2316R which were dispositioned by replacing the Anaconda cable with qualified cable.

#### Safety Implications

At present, this type of cable is not qualified to the radiation requirements projected for a LOCA inside the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) containment. As such, TVA must assume that the cable could fail during a LOCA, and if it was used in IE circuits inside containment, then the safe operation at the plant could be adversely affected due to loss of the IE circuits affected by the cable failure.

#### Interim Progress

TVA is continuing to investigate the scope of this deficiency. A preliminary investigation has revealed that the Anaconda cable from the two relevant contracts has been used in class IE circuits inside containment.

Our next report on this item will be sent on or about January 31, 1986.