

CHAPTER 7[†]: CONFINEMENT

7.0 INTRODUCTION

Confinement of all radioactive materials in the HI-STORM 100 System is provided by the MPC. The design of the HI-STORM 100 confinement boundary assures that there are no credible design basis events that would result in a radiological release to the environment. The HI-STORM 100 Overpack and HI-TRAC Transfer Cask are designed to provide physical protection for an MPC during normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions to assure that the integrity of the MPC confinement boundary is maintained. The inert atmosphere in the MPC and the passive heat removal capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 also assure that the SNF assemblies remain protected from degradation, which might otherwise lead to gross cladding ruptures during dry storage.

A detailed description of the confinement structures, systems, and components important to safety is provided in Chapter 2. The structural adequacy of the MPC is demonstrated by the analyses documented in Chapter 3. The physical protection of the MPC provided by the Overpack and the HI-TRAC Transfer Cask is demonstrated by the structural analyses documented in Chapter 3 and for off-normal and postulated accident conditions in Chapter 11. The heat removal capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 System are demonstrated by the thermal analyses documented in Chapter 4.

This chapter describes the HI-STORM 100 confinement boundary design and describes how the design satisfies the confinement requirements of 10CFR72 [7.0.1]. It also provides an evaluation of the MPC confinement boundary as it relates to the criteria contained in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)-18 and ANSI N14.5-1997 [7.0.3] as justification for determining that leakage from the confinement boundary is not credible and, therefore, no confinement analysis is required.

This chapter is in compliance with NUREG-1536 except as noted in Table 1.0.3.

[†] This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in *Chapter 1*, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).

7.1 CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY

The primary confinement boundary against the release of radionuclides is the cladding of the individual fuel rods. The spent fuel rods are protected from degradation by maintaining an inert gas atmosphere (helium) inside the MPC and keeping the fuel cladding temperatures below the design basis values specified in Chapter 2.

The HI-STORM 100 confinement boundary consists of any one of the fully-welded MPC designs described in Chapter 1. Each MPC is identical from a confinement perspective so the following discussion applies to all MPCs. The confinement boundary of the MPC consists of:

- MPC shell
- bottom baseplate
- MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates)
- MPC closure ring
- associated welds

The above items form a totally seal-welded vessel for the storage of design basis spent fuel assemblies.

The MPC requires no valves, gaskets or mechanical seals for confinement. Figure 7.1.1 shows an elevation cross-section of the MPC confinement boundary. All components of the confinement boundary are Important to Safety, Category A, as specified in Table 2.2.6. The MPC confinement boundary is designed and fabricated in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB [7.1.1] to the maximum extent practicable. Chapter 2 provides design criteria for the confinement design. Section 2.2.4 provides applicable Code requirements. NRC-approved alternatives to specific Code requirements with complete justifications are presented in Table 2.2.15.

7.1.1 Confinement Vessel

The HI-STORM 100 System confinement vessel is the MPC. The MPC is designed to provide confinement of all radionuclides under normal, off-normal and accident conditions. The MPC is designed, fabricated, inspected, and tested in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME, Section III, Subsection NB [7.1.1], including certain NRC-approved alternatives. The MPC shell and baseplate assembly and basket structure are delivered to the loading facility as one complete component. The MPC lid, vent and drain port cover plates, and closure ring are supplied separately and are installed following fuel loading. The MPC lid and closure ring are welded to the upper part of the MPC shell after fuel loading to provide redundant sealing of the confinement boundary. The vent and drain port cover plates are welded to the MPC lid after the lid is welded to the MPC. The welds forming the confinement boundary are described in detail in Section 7.1.3.

The MPC lid is made intentionally thick to minimize radiation exposure to workers during MPC closure operations, and is welded to the MPC shell. The vent and drain port cover plates are welded to the MPC lid following completion of MPC draining, moisture removal, and helium backfill activities to close the MPC vent and drain openings. The MPC lid has a stepped recess around the perimeter for accommodating the closure ring. The MPC closure ring is welded to the MPC lid on the inner diameter of the ring and to the MPC shell on the outer diameter. The combination of the welded MPC lid and closure ring form the redundant closure of the MPC.

Table 7.1.1 provides a summary of the design ratings for normal, off-normal and accident conditions for the MPC confinement vessel. Tables 1.2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.3 provide additional design basis information.

Following fuel loading and MPC lid welding, the MPC lid-to-shell weld is examined by liquid penetrant method, volumetrically examined (or, if volumetric examination is not performed, multi-layer liquid penetrant examination must be performed), and pressure tested. If the MPC lid weld is acceptable, the vent and drain port cover plates are welded in place, examined by the liquid penetrant method and a leakage rate test is performed. Finally, the MPC closure ring is installed, welded and inspected by the liquid penetrant method. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 provide procedural guidance, acceptance criteria, and operating controls, respectively, for performance and acceptance of liquid penetrant examinations, volumetric examination, pressure testing and leakage rate testing of the field welds on the MPC.

After moisture removal, the MPC cavity is backfilled with helium. The helium backfill provides an inert atmosphere within the MPC cavity that precludes oxidation and hydride attack of the SNF cladding. Use of a helium atmosphere within the MPC contributes to the long-term integrity of the fuel cladding, reducing the potential for release of fission gas or other radioactive products to the MPC cavity. Helium also aids in heat transfer within the MPC and reduces the maximum fuel cladding temperatures. MPC inerting, in conjunction with the thermal design features of the MPC and storage cask, assures that the fuel assemblies are sufficiently protected against degradation, which might otherwise lead to gross cladding ruptures during long-term storage.

7.1.2 Confinement Penetrations

The MPC penetrations are designed to prevent the release of radionuclides under all normal, off-normal and accident conditions of storage. Two penetrations (the MPC vent and drain ports) are provided in the MPC lid for MPC draining, moisture removal and backfilling during MPC loading operations, and for fuel cool-down and MPC flooding during unloading operations. No other confinement penetrations exist in the MPC. The MPC vent and drain ports are equipped with metal-to-metal seals to minimize leakage and withstand the long-term effects of temperature and radiation. The vent and drain connectors allow the vent and drain ports to be operated like valves and prevent the need to hot tap into the penetrations during unloading operations. The MPC vent and drain ports are sealed by cover plates that are seal welded to the MPC lid. No credit is taken for the seal provided by the vent and drain port caps. The MPC closure ring covers the vent and drain port cover plate welds and the MPC lid-to-shell weld, providing the redundant closure of the MPC vessel. The redundant closures of the MPC satisfy the requirements of 10CFR72.236(e) [7.0.1].

The MPC has no bolted closures or mechanical seals. The confinement boundary contains no external penetrations for pressure monitoring or overpressure protection.

7.1.3 Seals and Welds

The MPC is designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME, Section III, Subsection NB [7.1.1], with certain NRC-approved alternatives. The MPC has no bolted closures or mechanical seals. Section 7.1.1 describes the design of the confinement vessel welds. The welds forming the confinement boundary are summarized in Table 7.1.2.

Confinement boundary welds are performed, inspected, and tested in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB [7.1.1] with certain NRC-approved alternatives. The use of multi-pass welds, root pass, for multiple pass welds, and final surface liquid penetrant inspection, and volumetric examination essentially eliminates the chance of a pinhole leak through the weld. If volumetric examination is not performed, multi-layer liquid penetrant examination must be performed. The vent and drain port cover plate welds are helium leak tested in the field, providing added assurance of weld integrity. Additionally, a Code pressure test is performed on the MPC lid-to-shell weld to confirm the weld's structural integrity after fuel loading. The ductile stainless steel material used for the MPC confinement boundary is not susceptible to delamination or hydrogen-induced weld degradation. The closure weld redundancy assures that failure of any single MPC confinement boundary closure weld does not result in release of radioactive material to the environment. Table 9.1.4 provides a summary of the closure weld examinations and tests.

7.1.4 Closure

The MPC is a totally seal-welded pressure vessel. The MPC has no bolted closure or mechanical seals. The MPC's redundant closures are designed to maintain confinement integrity during normal conditions of storage, and off-normal and postulated accident conditions. There are no unique or special closure devices. Primary closure welds (lid-to-shell and vent/drain port cover plate-to-lid) are examined using the liquid penetrant technique to ensure their integrity. Additionally, the vent and drain port cover plate-to-MPC lid welds are helium leakage tested to be leaktight in accordance with ANSI N14.5-1997 [7.0.3]. A description of the MPC weld examinations is provided in Chapter 9.

Since the MPC uses an entirely welded redundant closure system, no direct monitoring of the closure is required. Chapter 11 describes requirements for verifying the continued confinement capabilities of the MPC in the event of off-normal or accident conditions. As discussed in Section 2.3.3.2, no instrumentation is required or provided for HI-STORM 100 System storage operations, other than normal security service instruments and TLDs.

7.1.5 Damaged Fuel Container

The MPC is designed to allow for the storage of specified damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris in a specially designed damaged fuel container (DFC). Fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel or fuel debris as specified in Section 2.1.9 have been evaluated.

Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris will be loaded into stainless steel DFCs for storage in the

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HI-STORM 100 System. The DFCs that may be loaded into the MPCs are discussed in Section 2.1.3. The DFC is designed to provide SNF loose component retention and handling capabilities. The DFC consists of a smooth-walled, welded stainless steel square container with a removable lid. The container lid provides the means of DFC closure and handling. The DFC is provided with stainless steel wire mesh screens in the top and bottom for draining, moisture removal and helium backfill operations. There are no other openings in the DFC. Section 2.1.9 specifies the fuel assembly characteristics for damaged fuel and fuel debris acceptable for loading in the MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, MPC-32, MPC-32F, MPC-68, MPC-68F or MPC-68FF.

Since the DFC has screens on the top and bottom, the DFC provides no pressure retention function. The confinement function of the DFC is limited to minimizing the release of loose particulates within the sealed MPC. The confinement function of the MPC is not altered by the presence of the DFCs. The radioactive material available for release from the specified fuel assemblies are bounded by the design basis fuel assemblies analyzed herein.

7.1.6 Design and Qualification of the MPC Lid-to-Shell Weld

The Holtec MPC lid-to-shell weld meets the criteria of NRC Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)-18 [7.1.2] such that leakage from the MPC lid-to-shell weld is not considered credible. Table 7.1.4 provides the matrix of ISG-18 criteria and how the Holtec MPC design and associated inspection, testing, and QA requirements meet each one. In addition, because proper execution of the MPC lid-to-shell weld is vital to ensuring no credible leakage from the field-welded MPC, Holtec shall review the closure welding procedures for conformance to Code and FSAR requirements.

Table 7.1.1

SUMMARY OF CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS

Design Condition	Design Pressure (psig)	Design Temperature (°F)
Normal	100	MPC Lid: 550
		MPC Shell: 500
		MPC Baseplate: 400
Off-Normal	110	MPC Lid: 775
		MPC Shell: 775
		MPC Baseplate: 775
Accident	200	MPC Lid: 775
		MPC Shell: 775
		MPC Baseplate: 775

Table 7.1.2

MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY WELDS

Confinement Boundary Welds		
MPC Weld Location	Weld Type†	ASME Code Category (Section III, Subsection NB)
Shell longitudinal seam	Full Penetration Groove (shop weld)	A
Shell circumferential seam	Full Penetration Groove (shop weld)	B
Baseplate to shell	Full Penetration Groove (shop weld)	C
MPC lid to shell	Partial Penetration Groove (field weld)	C
MPC closure ring to shell	Fillet (field weld)	††
Vent and drain port cover plates to MPC lid	Partial Penetration Groove (field weld)	D
MPC closure ring to closure ring radial	Partial Penetration Groove (field weld)	††
MPC closure ring to MPC lid	Partial Penetration Groove (field weld)	C

† The tests and inspections for the confinement boundary welds are listed in Section 9.1.1.

†† This joint is governed by NB-5271 (liquid penetrant examination).

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Table 7.1.3

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Table 7.1.4

COMPARISON OF HOLTEC MPC DESIGN WITH ISG-18 GUIDANCE FOR STORAGE

DESIGN/QUALIFICATION GUIDANCE	HOLTEC MPC DESIGN	FSAR REFERENCE
The canister is constructed from austenitic stainless steel	The MPC enclosure vessel is constructed entirely from austenitic stainless steel (Alloy X). Alloy X is defined as Type 304, 304LN, 316, or 316LN material	Section 1.2.1.1 and Appendix 1.A
The canister closure welds meet the guidance of ISG-15 (or approved alternative), Section X.5.2.3	The MPC lid-to-shell (LTS) closure weld meets ISG-15, Section X.5.2.3 for austenitic stainless steels. UT examination is permitted and NB-5332 acceptance criteria are required. An optional multi-layer PT examination is also permitted. The multi-layer PT is performed at each approximately 3/8" of weld depth, which corresponds to the critical flaw size. A weld quality factor of 0.45 (45% of actual weld capacity) has been used in the stress analysis.	Section 9.1.1.1 and Tables 2.2.15 and 9.1.4. HI-STAR FSAR Section 3.4.4.3.1.5 and Appendix 3.E (Docket 72-1008)
The canister maintains its confinement integrity during normal conditions, anticipated occurrences, and credible accidents, and natural phenomena	The MPC is shown by analysis to maintain confinement integrity for all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, including natural phenomena. The MPC is design to withstand 45 g deceleration loadings and the cask system is analyzed to verify that decelerations due to credible drops and non-mechanistic tipovers will be less than 45 g's.	Section 3.4.4.3 and Appendix 3.A. HI-STAR FSAR Section 3.4.4.3
Records documenting the fabrication and closure welding of canisters shall comply with the provisions 10 CFR 72.174 and ISG-15. Record storage shall comply with ANSI N45.2.9.	Records documenting the fabrication and closure welding of MPCs meet the requirements of ISG-15 via controls required by the FSAR and HI-STORM CoC. Compliance with 10 CFR 72.174 and ANSI N.45.2.9 is achieved via Holtec QA program and implementing procedures.	Section 9.1.1.1 and Table 2.2.15 Section 13.0
Activities related to inspection, evaluation, documentation of fabrication, and closure welding of canisters shall be performed in accordance with an NRC-approved quality assurance program.	The NRC has approved the Holtec quality assurance program under 10 CFR 71. That QA program approval has been adopted for activities governed by 10 CFR 72 as permitted by 10 CFR 72.140(d)	Section 13.0

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


Figure 7.1.1; HI-STORM 100 System Confinement Boundary

REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL AND OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS OF STORAGE

The MPC uses multiple confinement barriers provided by the fuel cladding and the MPC enclosure vessel to assure that there is no release of radioactive material to the environment. Chapter 3 shows that all confinement boundary components are maintained within their Code-allowable stress limits during normal and off-normal storage conditions. Chapter 4 shows that the peak confinement boundary component temperatures and pressures are within the design basis limits for all normal and off-normal conditions of storage. Section 7.1 provides a discussion as to how the Holtec MPC design, welding, testing and inspection requirements meet the guidance of ISG-18 such that leakage from the confinement boundary may be considered non-credible. Since the MPC confinement vessel remains intact, and the design bases temperatures and pressure are not exceeded, leakage from the MPC confinement boundary is not credible during normal and off-normal conditions of storage.

CONFINEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT
CONDITIONS

The MPC uses redundant confinement closures to assure that there is no release of radioactive materials, including fission gases, volatiles, fuel fines or crud, for postulated storage accident conditions. The analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 11 demonstrate that the MPC remains intact during all postulated accident conditions, including the associated increased internal pressure due to decay heat generated by the stored fuel. The MPC is designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME, Section III, Subsection NB [7.1.1], with certain NRC-approved alternatives as listed in Table 2.2.15. Section 7.1 provides a discussion as to how the Holtec MPC design, welding, testing and inspection requirements meet the guidance of ISG-18 such that leakage from the confinement boundary may be considered non-credible. In summary, there is no mechanistic failure that results in a breach of and associated leakage of radioactive material from the MPC confinement boundary.

[7.0.1] 10CFR72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.

[7.0.2] NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems", January, 1997.

[7.0.3] ANSI N14.5-1997, American National Standard for Radioactive Materials – Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment”.

[7.1.1] American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Class 1 Components, 1995 Edition.

[7.1.2] Interim Staff Guidance 18, “The Design/Qualification of Final Closure Welds on Austenitic Stainless Steel Canisters as Confinement Boundary for Spent Fuel Storage and Containment Boundary for Spent Fuel Transportation,” May 2003.

[7.2.1] Deleted

[7.2.2] Deleted.

[7.3.1] Deleted.

[7.3.2] Deleted.

[7.3.3] Deleted.

[7.3.4] Deleted.

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[7.3.10] Deleted.

[7.3.11] Deleted.

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APPENDIX 7.A

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SUPPLEMENT 7.I

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SUPPLEMENT 7.II
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