

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

84 AUG 30 P 1 August 24, 1984

WBRD-50-390/84-39
WERD-50-391/84-34

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATION DUE TO FIRE
DAMAGE - WBRD-50-390/84-39, WBRD-50-391/84-34 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Dave Verrelli on July 30, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR
5760. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our
next report on or about September 21, 1984.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills
L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATION DUE TO FIRE DAMAGE
NCR 5760
WBRD-50-390/84-39 AND WBRD-50-391/84-34
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During July 1984, TVA performed a 10 CFR 50 Appendix R design review for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). During this review, several sets of redundant valves were observed to be capable of invalidating the safe shutdown analysis for WBN. This is due to potentially spurious valve operation as a result of fire damage to control circuitry. The following sets of valves were identified:

1-FCV-67-126, -128 (essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system)
1-FCV-70-197, -010 (component cooling water (CCW) system)
1-FCV-70-002, -003 (CCW system)

Interim Progress

TVA is in the process of reviewing all Appendix R shutdown paths. All valves capable of invalidating the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis due to spurious operation as a result of fire damage to control circuitry will be identified. From this identification, appropriate flow paths will be selected and required plant modifications will be made in order to satisfy 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements and assure the safe shutdown capability of the plant.