

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

5N 157B Lookout Place

APR 23 1986  
APR 23 1986  
April 18, 1986 26

WBRD-50-390/86-37

WBRD-50-391/86-36

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region II

Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900

Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INADVERTENT OMISSION OF DRAWINGS FROM  
ECNs - WBRD-50-390/86-37, WBRD-50-391/86-36 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
Bob Carroll on March 20, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as SCRs WBN  
EEB 8621 and EEB 8622. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit  
our next report on or about October 1, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
R. L. Gridley  
Manager of Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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## ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
INADVERTENT OMISSION OF DRAWINGS FROM ECNs  
WBRD-50-390/86-37, WBRD-50-391/86-36  
SCR WBN EEB 8621 AND SCR WBN EEB 8622  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
INTERIM REPORT

### Description of Deficiency

As part of generic review for a Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) problem identification report (PIR), TVA issued PIR WBN EEB 8604. The purpose of this PIR was to review engineering change notices (ECNs) involving the electrical discipline in order to determine whether any documents affected by the scope of the ECN were omitted from the ECN data sheets and not revised prior to ECN closure. Ten ECNs were reviewed by the Watts Bar Engineering Project (WBEP) electrical group and two drawings from one of the ten ECNs were found to have been inadvertently omitted from the ECN data sheet. The specific ECN involved was ECN 5745, and the two drawings omitted from the data sheet involved the installation of insulation on two sampling lines in non-safety-related systems. The insulation was for personnel protection from heat expected from the sampling lines.

The failure to include all necessary drawings on an ECN data sheet is not in accordance with section 4.2.2.1 of Office of Engineering Procedure (OEP) OEP-11 and was caused by a human error; not a procedural deficiency. Because one of the 10 ECN packages sampled was not complete, the potential for the existence of an adverse trend with regard to incomplete ECNs must be considered.

### Safety Implications

Since there is the potential that other ECNs may have been closed before all necessary design changes were completed, there is also the potential that safety-related components or systems do not properly reflect design changes and, as a result, may not perform their intended design function. Therefore, there is the potential that safe plant operation could be adversely affected.

### Interim Progress

TVA is tentatively planning to review a sampling of safety-related ECNs closed by WBEP (various disciplines), for conformance to procedures. This sampling will be done on a basis to provide a high confidence level of conformance to applicable procedures.

TVA will provide the next report on this item on or about October 1, 1986.