

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

83 SEP 19 P 1:14
September 13, 1983

WBRD-50-390/83-52

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - LEAKING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
- WBRD-50-390/83-52 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Morris Branch on August 17, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN W-134-P. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about January 3, 1984.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
LEAKING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
NCR WBN W-104-P
WBRD-50-390/83-52
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During preoperational test TVA-28 on the primary sampling system, several containment isolation valves were found to leak excessively (seat leakage) or failed to seat in a fully closed position. Additionally, numerous pressure control valves for sample lines failed to control pressure as designed. The sample lines involved were as follows:

Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Samples (4 Lines)
SIS Cold Leg Accumulator Samples (4 Lines)
Steam Generator Blowdown Samples (4 Lines)
Pressurizer Liquid Sample (1 line).

Interim Progress

When several of the containment isolation valves were disassembled, debris, composed primarily of sandblasting material ("black beauty" grit) was found in these valves. TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) personnel at Watts Bar have examined the flushing results in accordance with CONST flushing procedure OCT-3.14 and concur that the results were adequate. TVA's Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) has reviewed and evaluated all upper tier documents and procedures, and concurs that they are adequate for flushing requirements.

It is possible that the "black beauty" grit was introduced to the sample system from the process lines. At the time the various primary systems were flushed, no evidence of this grit was found in any of the preliminary or proof flushing. It is not common to find "black beauty" grit in stainless steel piping systems. Usually, it is found in carbon steel systems as residual from preinstallation sandblasting. It is TVA's belief that the systems were contaminated after the systems were flushed.

TVA plans to examine the reactor vessel (RV) and primary coolant piping at the time the RV head is removed.