

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

63 DEC 28 A 8:45 December 21, 1983

WBRD-50-390/83-51
WBRD-50-391/83-49

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - QA PROGRAM FOR THE CONTROL OF FUSES
- WBRD-50-390/83-51, WBRD-50-391/83-49 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Morris Branch on August 15, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-132-P. Our first interim report was submitted on September 13, 1983. Enclosed is our final report. TVA no longer considers this item reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
QA PROGRAM FOR THE CONTROL OF FUSES
NCR W-132-P
WBRD-50-390/83-51, WBRD-50-391/83-49
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A quality engineering survey of installed fuses in safety-related equipment revealed discrepancies between the current ratings of the fuses installed and the current ratings stipulated on the connection diagrams. The discrepancies consist of fuses with both higher and lower current ratings than specified by drawings in various applications.

Safety Implications

TVA has determined that the installation of fuses in safety-related equipment at Watts Bar (WBN) was governed by TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) procedure WBNP-QCP-3.06-2 "Internal Wiring Verification." Section 6.3.6 of this procedure requires the verification of components, including fuses, in accordance with the applicable drawings and/or specifications. Verification implies the documented inspection and verification of component type, size, rating and identification, where applicable.

In addition, a comprehensive survey by WBN Division of Nuclear Power personnel indicated that fuse installations performed by CONST personnel were substantially correct with only minor discrepancies noted inclusive of those noted in the description of deficiency above.

Consequently, since fuse installations were controlled by QA procedures and there are no indications of significant problems with installed fuses, TVA concludes that there is no condition adverse to safety at WBN. Therefore, TVA no longer considers this item reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).