TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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November 17, 1983

WBRD-50-390/83-57
WBRD-50-391/83-53

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SUPPORT FOR TEST LINES BY ALTERNATE ANALYSIS - WBRD-50-390/83-57 AND WBRD-50-391/83-53 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on September 19, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN WBP-8324. Our first interim report was submitted on October 13, 1983. Enclosed is our final report. TVA no longer considers 10 CFR 50.55(e) applicable to this item.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SUPPORT FOR TEST LINES BY ALTERNATE ANALYSIS
NCR WBN WBP-8324
WBRD-50-390/83-57 AND WBRD-50-391/83-53
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The test lines for each of the 10 containment purge air penetrations were supported from the steel containment vessels using TVA 47A051 series typical hanger drawings which qualify the tubing in accordance with the WBN alternate analysis criteria CEB 75-9 for seismic loading. This criteria, however, does not account for loadings created by a design basis accident (DBA).

Safety Implications

After reviewing the flow diagram for this system (47W866-1), we have determined that a nonconforming condition does not exist. The root valves (which isolate the process piping from the test piping) on the test lines, where the the test lines are connected to the penetrations, are clearly shown closed. Also, the class change occurs at the root valve; therefore, the test lines do not require pressure boundary integrity and the supports for the test lines need not be qualified for a DBA. The present support scheme ensures position retention and meets all requirements for TVA class G piping. Since the present support scheme meets all requirements, there are no conditions adverse to safety, and we no longer consider 10 CFR 50.55(e) applicable.