

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

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June 6, 1986

WBRD-50-391/86-49

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT G-32 REQUIREMENTS FOR  
CONCRETE CHIPPING - WBRD-50-391/86-49 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-Region II Inspector  
Gordon Hunegs on May 8, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN  
6762. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit our next report on  
or about August 13, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
R. L. Gridley, Director  
Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT G-32 REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCRETE CHIPPING  
WBRD-50-391/86-49

NCR 6762

10 CFR 50.55(e)

INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Since February 17, 1981, Appendix D of Construction Specification G-32 has required that the clear distance between existing concrete and the bolthead of a grouted anchor being installed in a hole or a chipped-out area where the sides are sloping be at least three nominal bolt diameters for individual anchors and six nominal bolt diameters for multiple anchors. However, as a result of the generic review for Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) nonconforming condition report (NCR) 4156R1 which concerned the installation of grouted anchors, TVA discovered that the G-32 requirement was not incorporated into the appropriate Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) site Quality Control Procedure (QCP) WBN-QCP-1.14, until July 31, 1985.

Safety Implications

While no failed grouted anchors have been identified, there is a potential for reduced anchorage capacities if the G-32 requirement were not implemented. Under design basis accident conditions, a reduced anchorage capacity could result in failure of the support(s). This condition could subsequently cause a loss of function in safety-related piping systems, thereby adversely affecting plant safety.

Interim Progress

TVA's Division of Nuclear Construction has completed a review of all affected attachment Ds, "Grouted Anchor Test Data," of WBN-QCP-1.14, for unit 2 and, based on past anchor proofload and torque test results, is recommending the anchor bolts be accepted in a "use as-is" condition. The Division of Nuclear Engineering is evaluating this condition to determine the acceptability of the "use as-is" disposition. Also a review of this condition for its application to unit 1 is being performed.

TVA will provide our next report on this item on or about August 13, 1986.