

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
5N 157B Lookout Place

JUN 17 1986

WBRD-50-391/86-50

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II

Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - CORROSION OF INSTALLED EXPANSION SHELL
ANCHORS - WBRD-50-391/86-50 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-Region II Inspector
Gordon Hunegs on May 15, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN
6776. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to submit our next report on
or about September 12, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2680.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


R. L. Gridley, Director
Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

**WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
CORROSION OF INSTALLED EXPANSION SHELL ANCHORS
WBRD-50-391/86-50
NCR WBN 6776
10 CFR 50.55(e)
INTERIM REPORT**

Description of Deficiency

TVA has found expansion shell anchors and bolts which were drilled into the floors of the north and south valve rooms that have failed proof tests and have rusted such that, in some cases, the bolts cannot be removed from the shells without twisting the anchor bolt in half. The apparent cause of this deficiency is water or other liquid collecting around the anchors.

Safety Implications

The corroded anchor bolts in question are used to attach conduit supports to concrete. The corrosion of the bolts could reduce the load carrying capacity of the supports to the point where failure of the supports could occur during a safe shutdown earthquake. Failure of the supports could damage both the supported conduit and any enclosed safety-related cable, thereby adversely affect safe plant operation.

Interim Progress

TVA has initiated workplan FA292G-2 to replace the affected anchors and is trying to determine the source of the liquid which is thought to be the cause of the corrosion. TVA is also investigating the generic aspects of this condition with regard to other areas of unit 2 as well as for unit 1.

TVA will provide our next report on this matter on or about September 12, 1986.