

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 25, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-18  
WBRD-50-391/82-17



USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - HVAC REGISTER DAMAGE  
- WBRD-50-390/82-18, WBRD-50-391/82-17 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on January 25, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3884R. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report by April 28, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
HVAC REGISTER DAMAGE  
WBRD-50-390/82-18, WBRD-50-391/82-17  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

HVAC registers which are required to balance airflows throughout the plant have been damaged because of construction activities in the vicinity of the installed registers. The damage was because of excessive dirt and/or physical damage to the registers. The pivot pins which hold the balancing gates in place have broken, rendering the gates inoperable.

Interim Progress

The subject nonconformance is being reviewed by TVA in the following areas:

1. Analysis of the method of mounting the balance device in the duct and the method of securing the device in the balanced position with respect to failure because of a design basis earthquake (DBE).
2. The need for a new procurement specification for registers.
3. The need to replace the dampers on the back of all registers or methods of assuring that existing registers will not fail during a DBE. The methods used to secure the existing dampers in the correct position are also being investigated.