

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 25, 1982 A 9: 0'

WBRD-50-391/82-09

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DEFECTIVE 6.9 KV GE CIRCUIT
BREAKER - WBRD-50-391/82-09 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector D. Quick on December 18, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-69-P. Enclosed is our first interim report. The submittal date of this report was discussed with Inspector R. V. Crienjak on January 25, 1982. We expect to submit our next report by March 26, 1982. TVA is still investigating the applicability of 10 CFR Part 21 to this deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
DEFECTIVE 6.9 KV GE CIRCUIT BREAKER
WBRD-50-391/82-09
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

General Electric (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) Magne Blast 3000-ampere Breaker, type AM 13.8-1000-4H, used on the 6.9-kV start board (non-Class 1E) experienced an ML-13 operating mechanism failure that caused the breaker to remain in the closed position. The breaker could not be opened manually or electrically. The stop pin for the trip latch in the ML-13 operating mechanism was severely deformed and held the breaker in the closed position. This deficiency was discovered during maintenance of the breaker. The cause of this operating mechanism failure has not been determined. There are seven other 3000 ampere breakers of the same type installed at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant which have not experienced this type of failure. There are also several AM 7.2-5006HB type breakers which have ML-13 operating mechanisms of similar design installed on safety-related systems at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, but no other failures of this type have been identified.

Safety Implication

Had this condition remained uncorrected, failure of the subject circuit breaker would not have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant. However, circuit breakers with the same design are used on other safety-related systems which could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant if a failure of these circuit breakers occurred.

Interim Progress

The subject circuit breaker was shipped to General Electric, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on December 18, 1981, for investigation of this failure, repair of this breaker, and correction of deficiencies (Tuf Loc Bearing replacement and bushing impulse testing) identified in IE Circular 79-17.

General Electric has been requested to provide TVA the results of their investigation, the corrective action taken, and their determination as to whether or not this is a generic deficiency on the ML-13 operating mechanism. General Electric has also been requested to advise what actions can be taken to prevent recurrence. This information will be provided in our next report.