TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

March 22, 1985

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WBRD-50-390/85-12
WBRD-50-391/85-13

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A WATER SPRAY HAZARD - WBRD-50-390/85-12 AND WBRD-50-391/85-13 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector D. M. Verrelli on February 20, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN MEB 8509. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Domer

for J. W. Hufham, Manager
Licensing and Regulations

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
Mr. James Taylor, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A WATER SPRAY HAZARD
WBRD-50-390/85-12 AND WBRD-50-391/85-13
NCR WBN MEB 8509
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

As part of the corrective action for nonconformance report (NCR) WBN SWP 8265 (WBRD-50-390/83-05, 391/83-05), TVA organized a task force to perform a walk through inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) and identify all Class 1E electrical equipment located in areas where piping had been supported for position retention only. NCR WBN MEB 8509 has been written to identify the fact that electric board room chillers A-A and B-B, associated chill water circulating pumps, and electrical junction boxes (all located in one room in the control building at elevation 692) are in the vicinity of high-pressure fire protection (HPFP) piping which are supported for position retention only and were not identified by the task force during their inspection.

TVA has determined that this failure was an isolated occurrence. During the task force's inspection, the door to the room containing the chillers was locked, thus preventing inspection. The task force personnel decided to return at a later time with the room key to do the inspection. However, by the time the task force finished inspecting all other areas of the plant, this particular room was inadvertently overlooked.

Safety Implications

Category 1(L) supports are not qualified as pressure boundary supports, and as such, during a seismic event, the HPFP piping could break and the resulting water spray could damage the safety-related equipment in the room. As this equipment maintians the temperature in the auxiliary instrument room at acceptable levels to assure the continued operation of essential equipment in the room, this deficiency, if left incorrected, could have caused a failure of the equipment during a seismic event and adversely affect safe plant operation.

Corrective Action

TVA has issued engineering change notice (ECN) 5493 to provide water spray shields for the electric board room chillers A-A and B-B as well as the associated chill water circulating pumps. The safety-related electrical junction boxes will be sealed against water spray per the same ECN. This work will be completed by March 31, 1985. Because this equipment controls the environment for the auxiliary instrument room and the computer room, the chillers are not required until initial criticality, and this work does not interfere with unit 1 fuel load.

Because this deficiency was an isolated occurrence and the remainder of the plant was inspected as part of the corrective action for WBN SWP 8265, no action to prevent a recurrence is warranted.