TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
5[illegible]B Lookout Place

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March 10, 1986

WBRD-50-390/86-29

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED FROM WALKDOWN OF INSTRUMENT LINES - WBRD-50-390/86-29 - INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Bob Carroll on February 4, 1986 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-334-P. Enclosed is our interim report. We expect to provide our next report on or about July 18, 1986.

Delay in submittal of this report was discussed with Mr. Carroll on March 6, 1986.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Domer

R. L. Gridley
Manager of Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED FROM WALKDOWN OF INSTRUMENTATION LINES
WBRD-50-390/86-29
NCR W-334-P
10 CFR 50.55(e)
INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a walkdown inspection of Table A instrument lines listed on TVA drawing 45W600-0-7, discrepancies were identified primarily concerning lost and/or incorrect support/hanger documentation. Several fabrication operation sheets (FOS) could not be located. The FOSs document the actual fabrication and inspection of the hanger/support subassemblies. Discrepancies were also identified between the installation operation sheet (IOS) sketches, the actual field configuration, and the design drawings. IOS sketches provide the relative location and FOS number for each support. IOSs are an inspection record used to document the inspected features of a support/hanger subassembly.

Safety Implications

Documentation does not exist to provide assurance that support/hanger subassemblies were fabricated per the correct typical drawing or by an approved field change request (FCR) or variance. Therefore, the acceptability of a number of Category I instrument line support/hanger subassemblies can not be determined. This deficiency represents a potential condition which could adversely affect the safe operations of the plant.

Interim Progress

TVA is in the process of investigating this deficiency to establish the adequacy of the instrument line support/hanger subassemblies. In order to verify the adequacy of the subassemblies, TVA has performed a random sample of sixty supports for structural compliance with the design criteria. The results of this sample indicate that the supports are adequate, although four instrument lines were identified as being overstressed due to assumed overspans from loose or missing attachment clamps. Based on this random sample, a high confidence level exists that instrument lines will perform their intended design functions provided that attachment clamps and their respective bolts are properly installed. A walkdown will be performed on all instrument lines to document the proper use and installation of attachment clamps and their associated bolts. TVA will provide our next report to the NRC on or about July 18, 1986.