TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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July 18, 1983

WBRD-50-390/83-38
WBRD-50-391/83-38

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - HPFP PIPING WATER DANGER TO SHUTDOWN BOARD TRANSFORMERS - WBRD-50-390/83-38, WBRD-50-391/83-38 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Linda Watson on June 16, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN WBP 8309. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about September 27, 1983.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
HPFP PIPING WATER DANGER
TO SHUTDOWN BOARD TRANSFORMERS AFTER EARTHQUAKE
NCR WBN WBP 8309
WBRD-50-390/83-38, WBRD-50-391/83-38
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Piping for the High Pressure Fire Protection System routed above the shutdown board transformers on elevation 772 of the auxiliary building and shown on TVA drawing series 47W491-3 has been supported for position retention only. The piping should be seismically supported to preserve pressure boundary integrity to preclude spraying water on the shutdown boards transformers. The transformers are located between column lines A1 and A3; U and Q for Unit 1 and A13 and A15; U and Q for Unit 2.

Interim Progress

To correct the identified deficiency, the high pressure fire protection piping in the vicinity of the shutdown board transformers will be supported to insure that pressure boundary integrity and position retention are both maintained. This piping will be alternately analyzed as part of the alternate analysis review program presently in progress on the high pressure fire protection system under ECN 3364. More information concerning this NCR will be provided in our next report.