

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 28, 1983

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USNRC REGION I  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

WERD-50-390/82-114

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - CONTROL OF NON-QA HEX NUTS -  
WERD-50-390/82-114 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector D. Quick on October 21, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 4375R. Interim reports were submitted on November 30, 1982 and January 31, 1983. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
CONTROL OF NON-QA HEX NUTS  
NCR 4375R  
WBRD-50-390/82-114  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Fifty hex nuts (plain carbon steel, 1-1/8-inch diameter) were issued to the field forces before receipt inspection. The nuts were issued from WBN power stores to craft without regard to the documentation and transfer requirements of QCP-1.06 R11. The material involved was also incorrectly identified as QA material and may have been used to install some hangers on System 87 (Upper Head Injection).

The root cause of this deficiency was inadequacies of existing procedures.

Safety Implications

The use of unapproved nuts to install hangers on safety-related equipment could result in faulty hangers if the nuts were defective and were to fail, thus jeopardizing the support of the system. Its collapse could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

TVA's further investigation of this NCR has resulted in all fifty nuts being recovered and replaced with proper material nuts.

In order to prevent recurrence, Procedure WBNP-QCP-1.06 R12, "Receipt Inspection of Safety-Related Items," was revised to clarify review of all arriving items by the Materials Services Unit.

Procedure WBNP-QCI-1.06, "Receiving" was issued effective March 11, 1983. This procedure clarifies responsibilities for processing incoming material and instructs TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) WBN crafts to obtain material only from WBN-CONST warehouse. The Material Services Unit and craft personnel were trained in this procedure effective March 30, 1983.