TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 21, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-03 WBRD-50-391/82-03 32 JIII 26 A8: 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CABLE SEPARATION IN THE ERCW INTAKE PUMPING STATION - WBRD-50-390/82-03, WBRD-50-391/82-03 - THIRD INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on December 4, 1981 in accordance with 10 FR 50.55(e) as NCR WBM MEB 8114. Interim reports were submitted on January 8 and February 24, 1982. Enclosed is our third interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about November 22, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
CABLE SEPARATION IN THE ERCW INTAKE PUMPING STATION
WERD-50-390/82-03, WBRD-50-391/82-03
10 CFR 50.55(e)
NCR WEN MEB 8114
THIRD INTERIM REPORT

Description of the Deficiency

A 20-foot spatial separation or circuit protection for the trained redundant safety related cable interactions was not provided within the ERCW intake pumping station. These redundant Train A and Train B ERCW pump and ERCW strainer power and control cables were not identified in TVA's fire protection shutdown analysis, Table 1.4 (contained in the Fire Protection Submittal forwarded to the NRC by letter from L. M. Mills to A. Schwencer dated September 9, 1980). This is a violation of the cable separation requirements for safe shutdown circuits in the event of fire.

Interim Progress

ECN 3121 has been issued to add 1 hour rated fire barrier protection for those Train B ERCW system cables routed less than 20 feet from redundant Train A cables. This continuous barrier will include, as applicable, wrapping of cables or wireway system with an approved fire protective material. The fire barrier shall extend until a minimum of 20-foot spatial separation between redundant circuit cables is achieved.

TVA is in the process of determining the most appropriate actions to be taken to prevent possible future violations of the cable separation requirements for safe shutdown circuits.