

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

October 17, 1985

WBRD-50-390/85-37

WBRD-50-391/85-36

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II

Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO ANNUNCIATE THE TEST  
POSITION OF HS-90-136 A1 AND -136 A2 - WBRD-50-390/85-37, WBRD-50-391/85-36 -  
FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
Al Ignatowicz on September 13, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as SCR  
WBN FEB 8535. A one week delay in submittal was discussed with Steve Weise on  
October 11, 1985. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*J. A. Damer*  
J. W. Hufham, Manager  
Licensing and Risk Protection

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
FAILURE TO ANNUNCIATE THE TEST POSITION OF HS-90-136A1 AND -136A2  
WBRD-50-390/85-37, WBRD-50-391/85-36  
SCR WBN EEB 8535  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a recent design review of the status monitoring system, TVA determined that the control switches (HS-90-136A and -136A2) for the process radiation monitoring system functional test represent an engineering safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) bypass condition when the switches are in the test position. The test position of these switches was not previously identified as a bypass of ESFAS, and therefore, not annunciated in the main control room. This is contrary to the intent of our commitment as stated TVA's response to ICSB item 7 provided in L. M. Mills' letter to E. Adensam dated October 27, 1981. The cause of this condition is attributed to lack of familiarity by responsible personnel with the commitment to provide the annunciation feature for these switches.

Safety Implications

When either of the functional test switches are placed in the test position, switch contacts through which high radiation signals must pass to reach the solid-state protection system (SSPS) are open. This would prevent the initiation of containment vent isolation by the SSPS. Due to this, an operator error which leaves either of the switches in the test position could adversely affect plant safety during a fuel handling accident.

Corrective Action

TVA will provide annunciation for the test position of these switches through engineering change notice (ECN) 5873, and all actions necessary will be completed by unit 1 fuel load. To prevent a recurrence of this condition TVA held a series of licensing familiarization sessions with key electrical design employees to enhance their knowledge of licensing commitments (reference deviation No. 50-390/85-33-01).