TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY AS RECEIVE

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

December 3, 1982 NFC 6 All. 0b

CT (3 (2) 3 4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS PAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-390/82-09, 50-391/82-07 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The subject inspection report dated May 28, 1982 cited TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Our response to that violation and concerns addressed in your transmittal letter were submitted on August 2, 1982.

Enclosed is our revised response to item number 4 of the five items discussed in the inspection report transmittal letter. This matter was discussed with Inspector T. Heatherly on November 22, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 856-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Namager Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure) Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 REVISED RESPONSE TO ITEM NUMBER 4 FROM INSPECTION REPORT TRANSMITTAL LETTER

Item 4

Extend the scope of the current review of system tentative transfers to include all transfers accomplished after December 1, 1980. Identify retesting for outstanding work items uncovered by this review.

Response

Tentative transfers which have occurred since April 12, 1982, do not require a review since Revision 3 of QCI-1.22, "Transfer of Permanent Features to the Division of Nuclear Power," became effective on that date. Revision 3 of QCI-1.22 provides acceptable assurance that outstanding work on a system will be identified at the time of tentative transfer by requiring multiple walkdowns and providing detailed instructions for preparation of punchlists.

The scope of this review is limited to tentative transfers which support the preoperational test program delineated in FSAR chapter 14 and which potentially could have unidentified outstanding work items that could adversely affect the results of completed preoperational testing and possibly requiring retest.

TVA's previous response to action item 4 to the NRC stated, "The review of tentatively transferred systems will be accomplished by engineering personnel presently working in WBN CONST and will consist of a detailed field inspection of transferred features along with a review of all quality assurance documentation required for the features. The NUC PR Preoperational Test Group will examine the results of the review to determine if retests may be required.

Based on the results of this review to date, TVA is revising its response as follows:

The complete review of tentative transfers is approximately 40 percent complete at this time. The Preoperational Test Group has reviewed the resulting list of hardware deficiencies and documentation problems and has determined that these items do not adversely affect completed preoperational testing.

Of the two types of deficiencies (field and/or documentation), all of the hardware deficiencies discovered are maintenance type items which would be identified and resolved in accordance with NUC PR maintenance procedures. The remainder of the problems are documentation (not hardware-related) problems. From these results, TVA has a high confidence level that no safety-related problems exist. Therefore, TVA has decided to discontinue the field inspections, but will complete the 100 percent review of documentation for all 47 tentative transfers before final transfer of the systems involved. The documentation review will be completed by January 1, 1983.