TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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December 27, 1982

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly,
Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTOR REPORT 50-390/82-09, 50-391/82-07 - REVISED SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE

The subject inspection report dated May 28, 1982 cited TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Our response to that violation and concerns addressed in your transmittal letter were submitted on August 2, 1982 and additional information was provided on December 3, 1982.

Enclosed is our revised supplemental response to item number 4 of the five items discussed in the inspection report transmittal letter. This matter was previously discussed with NRC Resident Inspector T. Heatherly.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
REVISED SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC LETTER DATED AUGUST 30, 1982
INSPECTION REPORT 50-390/82-09 AND 50-391/82-07

Item 4

Extend the scope of the current review of system tentative transfers to include all transfers accomplished after December 1, 1980. Identify retesting for outstanding work items uncovered by this review.

Response

Tentative transfers which have occurred since April 12, 1982 do not require a review since Revision 3 of QCI-1.22, "Transfer of Permanent Features to the Division of Nuclear Power," became effective on that date. Revision 3 of QCI-1.22 provides acceptable assurance that outstanding work on a system will be identified at the time of tentative transfer by requiring multiple walkdowns and providing detailed instructions for preparation of punchlists.

The scope of this review is limited to tentative transfers which supports the preoperational test program delineated in FSAR Chapter 14 and which potentially could have unidentified outstanding work items that could adversely affect the results of completed preoperational testing and possibly requiring retest.

TVA's previous response to action item 4 to the NRC stated, "The review of tentatively transferred systems will be accomplished by engineering personnel presently working in Watts Bar Construction (CONST) and will consist of a detailed field inspection of transferred features along with a review of all quality assurance documentation required for the features. The TVA Division of Nuclear Power (NUC PR) Preoperational Test Group will examine the results of the review to determine if retests may be required."

Based on the results of this review to date, TVA is revising the response as follows:

The review of tentative transfers is approximately 40 percent complete at this time. The Preoperational Test Group has reviewed the resulting list of field deficiencies and documentation problems and has determined that these items do not adversely affect completed preoperational testing.

Since most of the field deficiencies discovered were of the type where damage apparently occurred after inspection and acceptance, all deficiencies will be corrected on work plans using CONST craft personnel or NUC PR maintenance procedures and personnel as appropriate.