

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


HATTAN, TENNESSEE

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 22, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-19
WBRD-50-391/82-18

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS DURING VALVE CLOSURE - WBRD-50-390/82-19, WBRD-50-391/82-18 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on January 26, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3793R1. Our first interim report was submitted on February 25, 1982. Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report by July 21, 1982. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS DURING VALVE CLOSURE
NCR 3793R1

WBRD-50-390/82-19, WBRD-50-391/82-18

10 CFR 50.55(e)

SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During operational testing of certain gate valves manufactured by Westinghouse Electromechanical Division, three Limitorque motor operators failed and rendered the valves inoperable. These valves are supplied by Westinghouse under the Watts Bar NSSS contract. All of the operators which failed are Limitorque model SB-00 units. The SB-00 design utilizes a floating drive sleeve restrained in the axial direction by Belleville springs which are enclosed in a cast housing. This housing therefore receives the motor torque after the springs have compressed. On each of the failed operators, the housing fractured during valve closure which could cause the gate valve to leak or prevent the operator from being able to open the valve.

Interim Progress

Westinghouse is continuing to investigate the failures. Discussions with Westinghouse indicate that the problem may be material related. Westinghouse is continuing their investigation under Field Deficiency Report number WATM-10165.